Abstract
This article examines the Vietnam-era Marine Corps Combined Action Program from a context in which political activities at the junior Marine level arose from tactical considerations. It points out how at the junior soldier level, war and politics are often indistinct, or traditional relationships between the two are reversed. What emerges is a fusion of political and military considerations. It is significant that this political-military fusion occurs at not only the senior officer levels as is commonly outlined in civil-military relations theory, but also at the junior enlisted (E-1 through E-5) level. In using the Combined Action Program as an analytical framework, this article identifies a growing political function; one relevant to partially understanding the soldier's multidimensional role in contemporary low-intensity conflicts.
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