1. IntroductionWhat are the relations between ethical values and moral norms, on the one hand, and cognitive values and norms, on the other hand? Between ethical and intellectual virtues and vices? Between cognitive values and other types of value-aesthetic, hedonic, political, prudential and religious? Between kitsch, sham emotions or sentiments, and foolishness? Between foolishness and cognitive vices and forms of practical irrationality such as self-deception, ressentiment, blether, obscurantism, and obscurity? What are and should be our affective attitudes towards knowledge, truth, justification, precision, and clarity?In 1930 Jose Ortega y Gasset wondered why there is still no study of foolishness (tonteria) dealing with those aspects of the phenomenon not investigated by Erasmus.1 The first installments of The Man Without Qualities in 1931 and 1933 provide a remarkable panoply of fools, foolishness, silliness, and stupidity and a determined attempt to understand these phenomena. The passion of the book is, its author says, the passion for precision.2 Reason, he also says, plays a great role in his art.3 Many of the fools and follies in the novel are presented as examples of attempts to mind (Geist) to life. The Parallel Action is, through and through, a foolish enterprise.4 Amheim, Meingast, Feuermaul, Hans Sepp, Gerda, Diotima, Bonadea, Clarissa, and Professor Lindner display a variety of cognitive vices. Humanitarianism, intuition, mindless action or energy, and pharisaism are depicted as cognitive vices or evils.Ulrich and Agathe, on the other hand, are (imperfect) epistemic heroes. Agathe has unusually exact memory, which did not deform its contents by any sort of prejudice or wishful thinking.5 But, we are told by the (Weiningerian?) narrator, although intelligent women such as Agathe are unerring in their observation of the men they love, they have no theoretical inclinations.6 Unlike Ulrich, who is a prince of mind. listens to, analyses, evaluates, and indeed provokes an astonishing amount of nonsense and bullshit. Thus Ulrich converses with Hans Sepp and Gerda in the pidgin-language of the frontier district between the super-rational and the sub-rational. What Sepp has to say is mere nonsense, claptrap (Geschwatz), peppered with pretentious nouns.7One early striking appearance of foolishness in the novel is the account given by and the narrator of a peculiar phenomenon-the tendency of the cognitively virtuous to manifest virtue or habit only in severely restricted contexts. Ulrich's second career, as an engineer, fills him with enthusiasm because of its possibilities:Who still needed the Apollo Belvedere when he had the new forms of a turbodynamo ... before his eyes !... Looked at from a technical point of view, the world is simply ridiculous: impractical in all that concerns human relations, and extremely uneconomic and imprecise in its methods; anyone accustomed to solving his problems with a slide-rule cannot take seriously a good half of the assertions people make ... If you own a slide-rule and someone comes along with big statements or great emotions, you say: Just a moment, please-let's first work out the margin for error and the most probable values.8But this powerful view of what it meant to be an engineer is not shared by the engineers has known, who fail to adapt the daring and innovative soul of [their] technology to [their] private soul[s]:9It is hard to say why engineers don't quite live up to vision . . . [A]ny suggestion that they might apply their daring ideas to themselves instead of their machines would have taken them aback, much as if they had been asked to use a hammer for the unnatural purpose of killing a man.10Their cognitive virtues or habits, then, are manifested only selectively.The panoply of folly presented in the novel is contrasted in many ways with the first and third of the three individual utopias explored one after the other in the novel-the utopia of exactness and the utopia of inductive humility. …