Theatre Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies and China’s concerns of strategic instability

ABSTRACT Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies may exacerbate Chinese concerns about the survivability of its small nuclear arsenal against a precision pre-emptive strike from the US-led coalition, although the degree of the new threat depends on various factors including the numbers and types of such weapons to be deployed. Conventional hypersonic missiles, in particular, may generate acute threat perception, as they can play the role of “door kicker” against China’s so-called anti-access, area-denial capabilities and pave the way for subsequent massive strikes with more traditional weapons. The development of conventional long-range-strike weapons by US allies also affects the risk of conventional conflicts escalating inadvertently to the nuclear level. Such risks are particularly salient in the Asia–Pacific region because of at least two factors: the ambiguous role of Chinese theater nuclear weapons and significant entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities at the theater level. Such conventional capabilities of US allies also help shape the region’s overall military balance—something China treats as part of its broader understanding of the term “strategic stability.” Regional players, however, have competing visions about what constitutes a stable military balance. They also have conflicting interpretations of why other parties are pursuing conventional long-range-strike weapons. The development of such capabilities will pose growing challenges to regional strategic stability in the future.

“A mass psychosis”: The Netherlands and NATO's dual-track decision, 1978–1979

When NATO took its so-called dual-track decision on Theatre Nuclear Weapons in December 1979, the Dutch government, while joining the decision, declared that it would not decide on the deployment of the Dutch share of the new weapons for another two years. With the help of new documents from Dutch archival collections, this essay examines the reasons behind this decision by the centre-right Van Agt government. It shows that there was great reluctance in parliament, but also in the cabinet, to contemplate the coming modernisation. In order to survive politically and keep the Netherlands within the NATO fold, the Van Agt government tried to align NATO's decision as closely with Dutch policy as possible while seeking majority support in parliament for its proposed compromise solution. The essay provides new detail on both efforts, including the response of allied governments to the Dutch reservations.

What, if anything, will France's reintegration imply for the alliance debate on nuclear weapons?

This article asks whether France's return to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s integrated military command could translate into a bigger role on nuclear issues within NATO. As NATO prepares its new strategic concept, its nuclear doctrine is bound to change as several allies have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The presence of American theater nuclear weapons in five NATO countries remains controversial. First, I argue that the removal of NATO's nuclear weapons does not mean the end of extended nuclear deterrence, by making a distinction between extended deterrence and collective-actor deterrence. Second, I compare the nuclear postures of NATO, France and the USA to show that harmonization is possible. Finally, I outline several options for a new nuclear doctrine under NATO and formulate some policy recommendations.

Of Paradise, Power, and Pachyderms

Although global consensus on some key political principles (democracy and respect for human rights, for example) seems greater now than ever before, political conflicts fester where they might least be expected. U.S.-led war in Iraq highlighted a blistering divide over the unilateral use of force, generating claims of anti-Americanism and talk of a fundamental transatlantic rift. Although transatlantic differences have been encountered in the past (for example, the 1956 Suez crisis, President John F. Kennedy's handling of the Berlin crisis, the value of theater nuclear weapons, con tributions to the costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], etc.), rifts have appeared especially acrimonious in recent years. American neoconservatives have most confidently trumpeted an apparent crumbling of the West as a coherent moral community and solid geopolitical axis. In the realm of foreign affairs, it is often claimed that Americans stand for a boldness that accepts the value of force in the pursuit of ideals, while Europeans prefer a limp-wristed and ultimately counterproductive commitment to diplomacy and consensual multilateralism. For instance, Henry Kissinger observes, The early crises within the Alliance were generally in the nature of family disputes, having to do with differing interpretations of the requirements of an agreed common security. Today the very definition of common security and, indeed, of common purpose is being questioned.1 In his much-quoted book, Of Paradise and Power, Robert Kagan warns, It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.2 In the view of Harvard's Daniel Pipes, The

'In a Box in the Corner'? NATO's Theatre Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1999

NATO's theatre nuclear weapons policy and posture underwent three distinct phases of evolution during the period 1989-1999. During 1989-1991, nuclear controversy was a dominant theme, with the particular focus being on the possible deployment of new short-range nuclear systems. This controversy was defused in 1991-1992, largely as a result of US initiative. Thereafter, NATO policy and posture evolved into one of 'existential deterrence plus'. The salience of NATO's nuclear dimension may well decline further, but member states appeared relaxed about this prospect by the end of the 1990s and it is unlikely to affect the health of the institution overall.

U.S. Defense Policy Options: The 1990s and Beyond

The sudden collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of communism has thrust the United States into an entirely new era without the comforts of a neat bipolar balance of power. Just as the debate got under way on the shape of the new world structure, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the resulting war demonstrated that the post-Cold War world will be not very different from the pre-Cold War world. American national security strategy needs major overhaul, with substantial reduction in numbers of strategic and theater nuclear weapons. The force structure needs reconfiguration away from heavy positional forces for the garrisoning of NATO and toward more flexible and deployable forces. Manning of the new force structure should be shifted substantially to a higher percentage of reserve manning, with both active and reserve depending entirely on voluntary enlistment. Emphasis should remain on using high-technology and high-quality people to substitute for high numbers. The bloated Pentagon bureaucracy, last holdout of Stanlinist organization, will continue to be a major obstacle to rational national security policy in the 1990s.

Strategy and theater nuclear weapons modernization in Western Europe

Abstract The theater nuclear weapons modernization program of the Atlantic Alliance is in deep trouble. Since a first CFE Treaty was signed during the CSCE Paris summit last November, the beginning of negotiatiosn on these weapons systems can be expected in the near future. This article presents several factors that political and military leaders should consider before defining the outcome of such negotiations. These factors are the capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO's declared strategy, Alliance cohesion, threats and threat perceptions, costs, and the domestic context. The author argues that past attempts at comprehensive analysis have been inadequate.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN FRANCO-GERMAN MILITARY COOPERATION

Abstract : This article explores the military dimensions of increased cooperation between Bonn and Paris, examining the policy implications and prospects for success. After the plan for a European Defense Community collapsed in 1954 (owing to French opposition to West Germany's membership) and West Germany's entry into NATO the next year, Franco-German military cooperation was very much an open question. The opportunity to moderate this division came in January 1963, with the signing of the Elysee Treaty and, with it, the first phase of Franco-German military cooperation. Unfortunately, this effort was to have little effect, coming as it did when French participation in the NATO integrated military command was being called into question by De Gaulle. With the rupture between France and NATO in 1966, Franco-German military cooperation fell into a state of dormancy, with efforts largely limited to general staff talks and personnel exchanges. This state continued until 1982 when, partly as a result of changes in the leadership of both France and Germany, an effort to revitalize the 1963 treaty was made. French President Francois Mitterand's declared support for the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear weapons, coupled with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Paris immediately after his election in October 1982, paved the way for increased cooperation. The pace during 1987 was particularly intense. On 19 June, Helmut Kohl proposed the formation of a joint Franco-German brigade, which was followed by the announcement by President Mitterand of the formation of a combined Franco-German Defense Council. The announcement was made during the course of exercise Bold Sparrow. However, these initiatives are not without their attendant problems. This article examines these three particular issues -- the creation of a joint brigade, the proposal of a joint defense council, and the combined exercise Bold Sparrow -- within the framework of the security concerns of the two countries.

Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe , and: Conventional Deterrence , and: NATO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe without Nuclear Weapons (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 251 Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe. By Gregory Treverton. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. pp. 242. Conventional Deterrence. By John J. Mearsheimer. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. pp. 296. NATO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight Outnumbered and Win in CentralEurope without Nuclear Weapons. By F. W. von Mellenthin and R. H. S. Stolfi, with E. Sobik. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1984. pp. 161. Reviewed by Lawrence Friedman, a Washington attorney and graduate of the Woodrow Wihon School at Princeton. The constellation of bilateral and multilateral relationships between the United States and Western Europe that comprises that amorphous entity, the Western Alliance, has proven remarkably durable. So immutable does the association seem that it is commonly referred to simply as "the Alliance." While other regional security arrangements patterned after nato have withered or dissolved (cento and seato come to mind), the original Alliance endures, despite predictions of imminent collapse under the weight of conflicting policies among its members. In recent years reports of nato's impending demise have been widespread. Disputes over deployment of modernized theater nuclear weapons, fears that the United States may not be willing to put its own homeland at risk in defense of its allies, and such discordant incidents as the invasion of Grenada or the Achille Lauro affair, are adverted to as portents of Alliance disintegration. As Gregory Treverton correctly points out, conflicts have marked nato since its inception. The perceived threat of further Soviet advancement into Europe, like the German threat that united the Grand Alliance in World War II, concentrates the minds of Europeans and Americans wonderfully. The Alliance, however, remains a compact forged in response to a specific strategic threat by nations with widely diverging perceptions about the nature and extent of that threat. These nations have conflicting political, military, and economic goals within and without Europe as well. Treverton's Making the Alliance Work is a useful survey of the strains that have bent but never broken nato. They range from conflicts over European economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc in the 1950s and disagreements over a proposed multilateral nuclear force in the 1960s to the disputes of the present day. The book usefully describes these past conflicts and points to the factors that have always contributed to Alliance discord. Each ally's national interests, capabilities, perceptions, and domestic political constraints differ from those of its neighbors. Two allies have had armed clashes with each other; two others maintain independent nuclear forces; another has enshrined in its constitution and bound up in its notions of political legitimacy, closer relations, and eventual reunification with a member of the opposing alliance. Treverton's theme is the inevitable clash of interests and what he regards as an avoidable clash of perceptions. Europe will always be geographically closer to the Soviet Union than the United States and so will have different economic goals (trade with the Warsaw Pact is a more viable and alluring proposition, and dependence on Arab oil is greater) and even different military interests (a defense in depth may reduce the need for nato to escalate to a nuclear conflict 252 SAIS REVIEW that places the American homeland at risk, but such a strategy will wreak additional destruction upon Europe). Other factors (the United States is a heterogeneous nation with global interests that often clash with those ofits allies, as in the case of Suez) exacerbate the asymmetries. The divergent interests will remain a constant feature of the Alliance. What can be changed, Treverton argues, is the counterproductive dynamics of Alliance conflicts that result from faulty perception and communication, the classic recent examples being the theater nuclear deployment and enhanced radiation weapon disputes of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This type of misperception and mismanagement is, in Treverton's view, avoidable but ultimately not fatal to an alliance that continues to regard deterring a Soviet invasion as a common and (more or less) urgent task. Treverton's study is a useful reminder of what makes the Alliance survive these unavoidable conflicts. If there is any fault in this comprehensive study (other than such minor errors as...

Conventional Force Deterrence in the Presence of Theater Nuclear Weapons

Abandoning nuclear weapons as deterrents to Soviet aggression in Europe requires NATO conventional forces which can stop a blitzkrieg and place the onus of resorting to nuclear war on the Russians. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority and the need to defend all of West Germany limit NATO's strategic options. Thus the Alliance must practice stringent economy of force to bar a quick, decisive Pact victory with conventional forces alone. However, the terrain offers possibilities for turning the battle area into a killing ground for invaders' tanks. Thousands of small, mobile tank-killer teams could strike and displace to strike again, imposing casualties and heavy supply consumption continually on Pact forces throughout a deep zone. Such an area defense would also require armored reserves for counterattacks. Faced with dim chances of a cheap victory, Pact leaders would face the discouraging prospect that a failed attempt could escalate to nuclear war.

South Asian Security after Afghanistan , and: The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 249 putting NATO on tenuous political footing by endorsing an "offensive " strategy. Ultimately, forward attacks and the level of destruction that the new technologies create may well equal nuclear weapons. If these attacks are to take place on Eastern European soil (which is where the pact's follow-on forces are to be located) the tendency of European leaders to acquiesce in their use may be no greater than with nuclear weapons, which suggests that the political-procedural problems have not been eliminated. Even if conventional capabilities were strengthened, the preemption risk would remain. For the nuclear threshold to be credibly raised, it must be maintained as an option, albeit one of last resort. The location-relocation problems inherent in the deployment of theater nuclear weapons have not been alleviated nor have the dual-capable issues been attenuated (in fact, they may have worsened). The dilemma of nuclear weapons is intractable. The costs of its use are so high as to discourage their credibility as a practical instrument of policy. Yet the lessening of their role in military planning seems to encourage war planning by reducing uncertainty. As John Steinbruner notes, deterrence lies not in force structure or planning, but in the capacity to use nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, so does the fear and the danger. South Asian Security after Afghanistan. By G. S. Bhargava. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington Books Series, 1982. 209 pp. $23.95. The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. Advent, N.Y.: Vikas Publishing House, Ltd., 1982. 296 pp. $37.50. Reviewed by Afshin Pedram, M.A. candidate, SAIS. The authors of both studies make a concerted effort to explore and define the geostrategic implications of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Neither author intends to focus on the ramifications of the invasion on Afghanistan itself, yet both inadvertently place the India-Pakistan regional rivalry as their central themes. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indisputably served to usher in the inauguration of the Soviet Union as a superpower fully capable of resorting to unilateral action in line with its hegemonic desires. Whether the invasion precipitated the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power on par with the United States (as claimed by the Indian scholars), however, should be treated with reservation. Bhabani Sen Gupta argues in the Afghan Syndrome that the arrival of Soviet troops to defend the faltering Marxist regime of Hafizullah Amin, in conjunction with Moscow's earlier interventions in Angola and Ethiopia through Cuban proxies, marks the emergence of the Soviet Union as a true superpower prepared to compete with the United States on equal footing in world affairs. Prior to Afghanistan, a more careful analysis of events clearly indicates Soviet demonstration of a military outer reach by its instant, massive arms delivery to Ethiopia. The magnitude of such an arms air-transport, unprecedented since 250 SAIS REVIEW the United States' role in 1973 Yom Kippur War, clearly tilted the balance of power in the raging Ethiopia-Somalia armed conflict in the Ogadan Desert in favor of Ethiopia's strongman Mengistu Haile. In retrospect, was the Afghan invasion a watershed to formalize the military projection capability of the Soviet Union, or did it merely confirm the pattern of Soviet military continuity in the Third World? Only recently the Soviet air force deployed a helicopter carrier to the Caribbean while the Soviet navy staged its first amphibious landing exercises on the Vietnamese coast. A careful reading of either of the books fails to justify why the Soviets are currently subsidizing their occupation to the tune of $1 million a day despite escalating troop casualties and the loss of several hundred counterinsurgency combat helicopters. In brief, the logic of the U.S.-Soviet superpower military projection in a presumably postwar bipolar world, as claimed by both authors, suffer from reductionism. The strength of both authors, however, is the analysis of interregional relationships encompassing India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and Bangladesh. The public attitudes and government policies of these regimes in the wake of the Afghan invasion should not be taken lightly. The focus of analysis becomes particularly intense in assessing the South Asian...

The role of theater nuclear weapons

Abstract The debate in the West on the utility of theater nuclear forces, and in particular the activities of the various “peace” movements, have served to undermine NATO's ability to resist the expansion of Soviet power. The totally irrational attitude that “nuclear war is unthinkable” has much to do with deficiencies that exist today in the NATO military arsenal, the lack of coherent nuclear doctrine, and the grave disadvantage that Mr. Paul Nitze labors under in the current INF negotiations in Geneva. The proposed theater nuclear force modernization program consisting of some 572 Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, though vital to NATO's defense posture and the credibility of deterrence, will only partially solve the deficiencies in NATO's nuclear capability. What is needed is a more powerful, more survivable, and more effective force, including enhanced radiation warheads, coupled with a credible combined arms doctrine for nuclear and conventional forces. The governments of Western European NATO countries must accept responsibility for the defense of Western Europe and take more positive action to counter the defeatist propaganda of the antinuclear movement.

The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons

Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrines that would make theater nuclear weapons more credible instruments of U.S. and NATO foreign policy. The article explores briefly some of the sources of this radical disagreement.

Regards sur la politique étrangère de l'Italie

Outlook on Italian Foreign Policy, by François Puaux The Atlantic Alliance, Europe and the Mediterranean comprise the three circles of Italian foreign policy. Membership in NATO constitues a security imperative that is more evident in Italy which considers itself, along with the Federal Republic, to be one of the two borderline countries of the Community. Nothing would displease Italy more than finding itself alone on the front line of the Alliance in the Mediterranean. Italy sees itself as a privileged go-between, between Europe and the South, and maintains a policy of equilibrium between Athens and Ankara, Algiers and Rabat, refusing to engage in African and Eastern matters. Since 1973, the Italian government has shown an ever growing sympathy for the Arab cause, even if this evolution hurts the feelings of the American ally. United States hostility to PCI entrance into the government is being used by the Christian Democrats. But it is no reason to pretend that Italy is "infiefed" to the United States. The contribution that the Italian government brings to American (and German) defence policy in accepting the stationing of theater nuclear weapons on its territoy is decisive. Italy feels deeply European and probably expects from the European construction the overcoming of its inner problems. It remains faithful to a 1950's image of Europe, and has not known the "Gaullist" evolution of the Federal Republic. Italian interest in Europe is more political and social than economic. Italy advocates the enlargement of the Community mainly for political reasons. Italy has entered the EMS not because of its benefits for the Italian lira but because it represented an act of faith in Europe. The relative absence of Italy at the international level, its choice of a "low profile" can be explained in terms of Italy's recent history (fascism) and by the consensus principle that governs Italian political life. The hypothesis suggested by the report of the four institutes on "Western Security" - that Italy participate in some summit meetings depending on the topic discussed - can constitute a useful formula with which to bring into the discussion of world problems countries like Italy, Japan or Canada.

The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

The Soviet theater threat‐today and tomorrow

Abstract Attempts at assessing military balances are highly subjective affairs. Although numbers can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, other factors—e.g., quality of weaponry, troop morale, and leadership—are much more difficult to evaluate. Consequently, any assessment of the military balance will be acutely sensitive to the assumptions on which it is based. Although deterrence in Europe probably exists, largely because of the risk that a large conventional attack would escalate to nuclear war, the ability of NATO to defend its territory by conventional means should deterrence fail is problematical. NATO might in that case be compelled to resort to nuclear weapons uncomfortably early, and it is far from clear that we know how to use tactical nuclear weapons for military advantage. The Soviets, on the other hand, might decide to use nuclear weapons first, but in spite of the emphasis on this course in much of their literature, it is doubtful they would want to risk the destruction of their homeland without first trying to win by conventional means. Thus, the task before NATO is to reduce the risk of conventional attack by increasing its conventional might and to enhance deterrence against nuclear attack by modernizing theater nuclear weapons and reducing their vulnerability.

Theatre Nuclear Weapons and European Security

Suite à la reprise du débat concernant le rôle des armements nucléaires tactiques déployés en Europe occidentale sous l'é;gide de l'OTAN, cet essai analyse les fonctions stratégiques et politiques de ces armements à la lumière des récents arguments contenus dans la littérature et les documents officiels et tente d'évaluer jusqu' à quel point ces arguments sont comparables à ceux évoqués lors des précédents débats des années cinquante et soixante.

Theatre nuclear weapons: Begging the Soviet Union to pre‐empt

Theatre nuclear weapons: Begging the Soviet Union to pre‐empt

Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures

Few people in any NATO country are satisfied with the existing theater nuclear posture and doctrine—yet radical revision is politically impossible. There is a marked absence of consensus within NATO on the proper functions of theater nuclear weapons: to Europeans they are, above all, a near-guarantee of a wider war and symbolic of American commitment (thereby enhancing deterrence), while to Americans they are, essentially, a means for reversing a deteriorating battlefield situation. A guide to the debate of recent years is organized around the systematic discussion of four alternative theater nuclear postures:Current NATO, Revised NATO, The Covering Force, andBattlefield Use. The ideas inherent in, and the means for the accomplishment of each, are presented, as are the claimed advantages and disadvantages. The debate occasioned by the Nunn Amendment has focused attention on the question of the relationship between defensive utility and deterrent value.

Theatre nuclear weapons in Europe

Theatre nuclear weapons in Europe