Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures

Abstract

Few people in any NATO country are satisfied with the existing theater nuclear posture and doctrine—yet radical revision is politically impossible. There is a marked absence of consensus within NATO on the proper functions of theater nuclear weapons: to Europeans they are, above all, a near-guarantee of a wider war and symbolic of American commitment (thereby enhancing deterrence), while to Americans they are, essentially, a means for reversing a deteriorating battlefield situation. A guide to the debate of recent years is organized around the systematic discussion of four alternative theater nuclear postures:Current NATO, Revised NATO, The Covering Force, andBattlefield Use. The ideas inherent in, and the means for the accomplishment of each, are presented, as are the claimed advantages and disadvantages. The debate occasioned by the Nunn Amendment has focused attention on the question of the relationship between defensive utility and deterrent value.