Conventional Force Deterrence in the Presence of Theater Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

Abandoning nuclear weapons as deterrents to Soviet aggression in Europe requires NATO conventional forces which can stop a blitzkrieg and place the onus of resorting to nuclear war on the Russians. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority and the need to defend all of West Germany limit NATO's strategic options. Thus the Alliance must practice stringent economy of force to bar a quick, decisive Pact victory with conventional forces alone. However, the terrain offers possibilities for turning the battle area into a killing ground for invaders' tanks. Thousands of small, mobile tank-killer teams could strike and displace to strike again, imposing casualties and heavy supply consumption continually on Pact forces throughout a deep zone. Such an area defense would also require armored reserves for counterattacks. Faced with dim chances of a cheap victory, Pact leaders would face the discouraging prospect that a failed attempt could escalate to nuclear war.