Thaksin Research Articles

Opening address by His Excellency Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand

Opening address by His Excellency Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand

Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai

Among the most interesting questions in Thai politics today is how to account for the rise and (until recently) the success of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party. This article describes and analyzes some of the factors that contributed to the rise and success of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai, arguing that neither Thaksin's personal assets nor the effects of the crisis are enough to explain Thai Rak Thai's rise and success. It focuses instead on the 1997 changes to Thailand's constitution. These institutional reforms were crucial because they altered Thailand's political-institutional landscape in fundamental ways. The reforms provided new opportunities and incentives for political actors that Thaksin and his party adeptly took advantage of. The argument presented is that the key reforms that helped pave the way for the rise of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai were those reforms that helped reduce the number of political parties and that increased the power of the prime minister relative to coalition partners and intraparty factions.

Comment on “Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia”

Comment on “Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia”

Thailand after the coup

After months of political instability, on 19 September 2006 the Thai armed forces, led by army Commander-in-Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, seized power in the country’s first coup since 1991. The coup leaders justified their actions primarily on the basis of the government’s alleged corruption of the democratic process and the stresses and strains imposed as previous caretaker leader Thaksin Shinawatra exploited social divisions for political gain. The military’s intervention may have a positive impact on the country’s Muslim-dominated deep south, where the former government displayed incompetence and heavy-handedness in responding to a separatist insurgency. But the coup has been received ambivalently in Thailand and abroad, and the country has entered a period of political fragility.

Political Turmoil in Thailand: Thaksin, Protests, Elections, and the King

In the concluding section of my preceding assessment of the political situation inThailand (see eastasia.at, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2005), I anticipated six monthsof suspense. Factors assumed to contribute to this suspense were the decision ofthe Supreme Administrative Court on the privatization of the Electricity GeneratingAuthority of Thailand (EGAT); a disappointing cabinet reshuffle; the second Senateelection on 19 April 2006 producing a TRT-dominated Upper House; and ano-confidence debate against a number of ministers for alleged corruption. In reality,the course of political events unexpectedly accelerated. On 24 February 2006,Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra dissolved the House of Representatives andcalled for new elections to be held on 2 April.From the “Sondhi Phenomenon” to “Thaksin ook pai !”After Sondhi Limthongkul—the founder of the newspaper Manager, and since lateSeptember 2005 on a self-styled mission to rescue the Thai nation from theclutches of “Thaksinocracy” by calling for a royally-appointed government—on 13January 2006 led about 3,000 protestors from Lumpini Park to Government House,his star seemed on the wane. A few hundred of Sondhi’s followers had forced theirway into the compound. Many observers thought that this action went too far.Moreover, it was lamented that Sondhi could not present any new revelations aboutThaksin’s alleged myriad of serious wrongdoings. Reflecting on the possibility thatpolitically-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could join Sondhi inwhat appeared to be a personally motivated retaliation campaign against the primeminister, Thirayuth Boonmee, a leading social critic, said that “activists needed moreevidence of corruption to try to bring down the Thaksin government” (The Nation, 15Jan. 2006). The Nation (20 Jan. 2006) proclaimed that “Mob politics is not theanswer,” and spoke of the “self-styled Thaksin haters-cum-reformists” with their“less-than-transparent cause.” The editorial continued:It is not inconceivable that a genuine people’s movement for politicalreform can arise from Sondhi’s campaign. It is simply a matter ofrebalancing the mix: more rationality, less raw emotion, more publiceducation, less incitement.[i]Since Sondhi’s “crusade against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra falters”(Bangkok Post, 22 Jan. 2006), a mass demonstration at Sanam Luang, announcedfor 4 February, was generally seen as a good way for Sondhi to achieve a “softlanding” (ibid.) of his campaign. He had announced that he would end that event bysubmitting a petition to the King and then withdraw from organizing any moreprotests. In short, Thaksin’s political life seemed well on its way to being relieved ofsome burden. Even this burden should not have been taken as seriously as manyobservers and political actors did, thus increasing political tension. After all, in ademocracy, one should not be too surprised that some people are unhappy withwhat the government does. Neither should the public demonstration of such dissentbe perceived as something unusual in an open political order.[ii] In any case, Political Turmoil in Thailand: Thaksin, Protests, Elections, and the King

Concept and Function of the ACMECS

The end of the Cold War facilitated the expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), all with lower economic standards than the original six members. Within this expanded framework, sub-regions have been formed, among them the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), followed by a Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle and now by the Ayeyawadi-Chao Praya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). The latter was initiated by Thai Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. The Bagan declaration of 2003 sets out its aims. External partners are there and now this forum resembles a mini-ASEAN, with the detailed programmes and schedules of meetings that it has. But the promotion of ACMECS also enriches Thaksin's business empire, while there is some hint here of Sino-Japanese rivalry. In a globalised world, ACMECS cannot afford to be a closed group and it will not be long before India is invited to join.

THAILAND´ S INDEPENDENT AGENCIES UNDER THAKSIN: Relentless Gridlock and Uncertainty

Present-day Thailand has a more stable and transparent political system than in the past, when frequent changes in government, often by military intervention, seemed to be the leitmotif of the Thai polity. The last coup in 1991, followed by events in May 1992, where security officers killed at least 50 unarmed civilians during street confrontations in Bangkok, shocked the Thai political system and stimulated a marked change in the kingdom's democratic consolidation. Since then, not only have the armed forces kept out of the operation of the civilian government, but there have also been five successful elections with peaceful transitions. In addition, Thailand's political party system has grown increasing stable over time. In January 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party almost won an absolute majority in the first general election under the new charter, and subsequently absorbed a variety of factions and parties into its fold. During the February 2005 General Elections, TRT established the first-ever popularly elected single party administration as it convincingly defeated four other parties. The 2005 elections were a watershed in Thailand's as TRT's victory ensured the Prime Minister's hegemonic control over parliament and other key state institutions without the need for coalition partners, legitimizing his seeming insolence towards democratic consultation.1 Whether one labels his regime as semi-authoritarian, soft-authoritarian, diminished democracy, or simply delegated democracy, there is little doubt that Thaksin's administration has shown greater authoritarian tendencies in comparison to his immediate

Thaksin´ s Political Zenith and Nadir

The year 2005 is likely to be remembered as extraordinary, even peculiar, in the history of Thailand's evolving democracy since 1932. Within the year Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra soared to unprecedented political heights and then descended steeply into a political abyss. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party secured a thumping victory in the February 2005 General Election. Yet less than a year later, he faced a virulent Bangkok-based insurrection that called for no less than his resignation and permanent banishment from Thai politics. How did Thailand's most popularly elected prime minister who had risen so meteorically decline so precipitously? This article sheds some light on key episodes following Thaksin's re election triumph in February 2005. It begins with the significance of the re-election and the factors that led to the TRT's overwhelming victory. In the immediate aftermath of his re-election, Thaksin exhibited uncharacteristic signs of magnanimity and benevolent statesmanship, which lasted just several weeks. By mid-2005, his authoritarian streaks returned in full force, fanning the flames of discontent over his governance. By September an anti-Thaksin movement broke out into the open, spearheaded by a disgruntled media tycoon who had been an erstwhile ally of the Prime Minister. While this movement was initially confined to the Bangkok-based intelligentsia, middle classes, and civil society groups, it expanded into a mass movement to topple Thaksin when his family owned Shin Corporation (Shin Corp) was sold to the Singapore government's Temasek Holdings in January 2006. The Prime Minister's political standing appeared untenable as long as he remained unable to convincingly explain the controversial sale of Shin Corp. The article concludes with the implications of

Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South: Network monarchy strikes back?

Rather than viewing the recent violence in the Thai South largely as a product of long-standing historical and socioeconomic grievances, this article argues that the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has played a crucial role in provoking conflict in the region. Early in his premiership, Thaksin decided that the South was controlled by forces of “network monarchy” loyal to the palace and to former prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. Thaksin sought to reorganize political and security arrangements in the deep South in order to gain personal control of the area, but in the process he upset a carefully negotiated social contract that had ensured relative peace for two decades. As the violence increased, royal displeasure — articulated mainly by members of the Privy Council — forced Thaksin to make certain concessions, notably the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission to propose solutions for the growing crisis. Network monarchy had struck back, albeit from a position of weakness. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that the southern violence is actually inextricable from wider developments in Thailand's national politics.

Thaksin's Achilles' Heel: The failure of Hawkish approaches in the Thai South

Many scholars voice approval for the political strategies and approaches that businessman-turned-politician Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has borrowed from the business world. His CEO management style is regarded as a key political asset. Moreover, his populist policies such as the “one village–one tambon” village fund and the “bank for the poor” show him to be full of concern for grass-roots Thais. In this article I argue that Thaksin's handling of the South reveals another side of his character, his preference for the use of violence to tackle problems and his disdain for “softer” methods such as discussion and negotiations. Thaksin pays very little attention to peaceful solutions offered by academics, the National Human Right Commission, and even the government-appointed National Reconciliation Commission. Unfortunately, this hawkish approach has widened distrust and discrimination among Thais and non-Thais. Thaksin's draconian methods have had serious consequences both on himself and the country. The volatile conflict in Thailand's far South is Thaksin's Achilles' heel.

Thailand and Thaksin Shinawatra: From Election Triumph to Political Decline

  Before the latest general election on 6 February 2005, [i] critical political observers had perceived Thailand's incumbent prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, as a threat to the country's fledgling democracy. [ii] It seemed that (for reasons of centralizing personal power) he did not accept the democratic rules of the game, but rather tried to narrow down the public political space, infiltrate the constitutional checks-and-balances system, and control the public access to information regarding the government's performance. This was accompanied by the implementation of a multitude of 'populist' policies that accrued tangible benefits to the great majority of voters. They repaid Thaksin’s performance at the helm of government with an overwhelming election triumph. Even the voters in Bangkok, who were considered politically sophisticated and thus perhaps inclined to counter any authoritarian tendencies, convincingly backed Thaksin. Only the South withheld support, largely because of the government's mishandling of the Muslim insurgency, such as the incidents at Krue Se mosque and the Tak Bai police station, which cost dozens of lives.

Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand

This article argues that widely used ideas such as bureaucratic polity, constitutional monarchy, transitional democracy and political reform fail to characterize accurately the recent politics of Thailand. Instead, Thai politics are best understood in terms of political networks. The leading network of the period 1973–2001 was centred on the palace, and is here termed ‘network monarchy’. Network monarchy involved active interventions in the political process by the Thai King and his proxies, notably former prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. Network monarchy developed considerable influence, but never achieved the conditions for domination. Instead, the palace was obliged to work with and through other political institutions, primarily the elected parliament. Although essentially conservative, network monarchy also took on liberal forms during the 1990s. Thailand experienced three major legitimacy crises after 1992; in each case, Prem acted on behalf of the palace to restore political equilibrium. However, these interventions reflected the growing weakness of the monarchy, especially following the landslide election victories of prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 and 2005. Thaksin sought to displace network monarchy with new networks of his own devising. This article suggests that conventional understandings of the power of the monarchy need to be rethought.

Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today

How important have Thai parties and intraparty factions been in Thailand's fast-evolving democracy? What role do they play today, especially since the enactment of the latest constitution? What has accounted for the fragmentation in Thailand's party systems and coalitions? How did Thai democracy allow for the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra? This article analyzes these questions, presents a theory of Thai coalition behavior, and offers some predictions for Thailand's democratic future.

Political Transitions in Southeast Asia

One could easily be pessimistic about Southeast Asia's prospects given the series of crises that hit the region in 2004. These include the onset of avian flu (coming on the heels of SARS) and the looming pandemic threat, the persistence of terrorist-related incidents, and the devastating earthquake and tsunami that caused massive loss of lives, property and livelihood. Yet, if there is something to be optimistic about it is in the number of general elections that took place in many ASEAN countries within a span of one year. It began in March 2004 with the holding of Malaysia's general elections, followed by elections in Indonesia in April that were spread over six months, and then the elections held in the Philippines in May. This was soon followed by the elections in Thailand in February 2005. This series of elections is significant for many reasons. First, we see the emergence of new political actors who have taken over the mantle of leadership from long-serving leaders in the region. In Malaysia, Abdullah Badawi replaced long-time Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamed; and while there was no election in Singapore in 2004, there was nevertheless a changing of the guard in August 2004 with the installation of a new prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, who succeeded Goh Chok Tong. Second, despite having come after three short-lived presidents who had succeeded long-time Indonesian leader Suharto, the country's new president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the first directly elected president of post-New Order Indonesia. The direct presidential elections have capped the six year process of political transition in the country toward a democratic political system. And third, the two incumbent leaders, Philippines' Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra, who could still be considered as relatively new players in the region, are serving their second terms in office after their

Challenge and Change in East Asia: “Business Populism” in Thailand

Abstract: Thailand’s politics have changed dramatically under Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party since 2001. The business-based party has gradually come to resemble the “neo-populist” regimes of Latin America. It appeals to the “disorganized” mass in the rural economy and urban informal sector by launching redistributive policies, distancing itself from old leaders, and simultaneously undermining democratic institutions and liberal values. The party’s stance is a reflection of Thailand’s political economy under globalization marked by externally dominated economy, embattled local capitalism, and large informal sector.

THAILAND The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling

Elected in January 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra went to the polls in early 2005 as the first elected Thai leader to serve a full term as prime minister. Although various crises in 2004 led to speculation of an early election, Thaksin's position was largely unassailable. This is not simply a story of individual triumph over circumstance; Thaksin's ascendancy and the possibility of a second-term illuminates much about post-reform Thailand. From the perspective of consolidation a full term and succession by election demonstrates the habituation of norms and conventions. Competing ?lites in Thailand now, seemingly, play by very minimal rules of the game. Rumours of a coup d'etat have been rare, though not absent.1 Paradoxically, all the milestones towards this achievement have involved diminishing the quality of Thailand's fledgling liberal democracy, underwritten by the 1997 constitution.2 Previous chapters on Thailand in Southeast Asian Affairs have highlighted Thaksin's subversion of the institutions designed to check and balance the power of the political executive, deepening hostility and action against independent press, politicization of the nominally independent senate, and the normalization of extra-judicial killings.3 2004 witnessed an intensification of this malaise, most notably in the deep South with the imposition of martial law in three southern provinces to quell a muddled mix of separatist and mafia-like violence. Thaksin's longevity under democratic rules has come at a time when shadowy state elements have exerted their presence in the south of Thailand and elsewhere, undermining the already tenuous constitutional nature of rule in Thailand. Despite this, Thaksin has gained praise from some observers for significant economic and diplomatic achievements in his first term in office.4

Political Transitions in Southeast Asia

One could easily be pessimistic about Southeast Asia's prospects given the series of crises that hit the region in 2004. These include the onset of avian flu (coming on the heels of SARS) and the looming pandemic threat, the persistence of terrorist-related incidents, and the devastating earthquake and tsunami that caused massive loss of lives, property and livelihood. Yet, if there is something to be optimistic about it is in the number of general elections that took place in many ASEAN countries within a span of one year. It began in March 2004 with the holding of Malaysia's general elections, followed by elections in Indonesia in April that were spread over six months, and then the elections held in the Philippines in May. This was soon followed by the elections in Thailand in February 2005. This series of elections is significant for many reasons. First, we see the emergence of new political actors who have taken over the mantle of leadership from long-serving leaders in the region. In Malaysia, Abdullah Badawi replaced long-time Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamed; and while there was no election in Singapore in 2004, there was nevertheless a changing of the guard in August 2004 with the installation of a new prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, who succeeded Goh Chok Tong. Second, despite having come after three short-lived presidents who had succeeded long-time Indonesian leader Suharto, the country's new president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the first directly elected president of post-New Order Indonesia. The direct presidential elections have capped the six year process of political transition in the country toward a democratic political system. And third, the two incumbent leaders, Philippines' Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra, who could still be considered as relatively new players in the region, are serving their second terms in office after their

Thailand´ s Paradoxical Recovery

In Thailand's February 2005 parliamentary elections Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party achieved a sweeping victory. It had already formed the first elected government in Thai history to serve a full four-year term and was now the first individual party to be elected to a full parliamentary majority, and that a massive one.1 The party's electoral success owes much to the Prime Minister's own political skills and much also to the economic recovery achieved under his government. In 2004, for the first time since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, real output per person exceeded its pre-crisis level of 1996 and in this respect Thailand had finally emerged from the economic after-effects of the crisis. In many dimensions, the economy was booming. Despite setbacks from rural drought, panic-producing outbreaks of avian influenza and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), combined with continued political violence in the Muslim southern provinces, estimated growth of real GDP reached a respectable 6.4 per cent in 2004, only marginally below the 2003 growth rate of 6.8 per cent. Growth for 2005 is expected to be slower, at a little over 5 per cent, reflecting a slowdown in export growth, diminished inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the economic consequences of the tsunami of 26 December 2004. The terrible human costs of the tsunami dominate its economic effects, but the latter are nevertheless significant. Thailand was less severely affected than some other countries with coastlines facing the Indian Ocean, especially Indonesia, Sri Lanka and possibly Myanmar (Burma), but many thousands lost their lives (perhaps between 8,000 and 9,000 out of a regional total approaching 300,000) and entire communities were destroyed.2 Tourism was sharply affected in the short term and some long-term effect seems certain, but the long-term size of these effects remains

Government Mediation and Transformation of Thailand's National Innovation System

This article focuses on how a major shift in government policies can transform the national innovation system (NIS) of a developing country. Thailand's used to be a typical developing country NIS. It was quite weak and fragmented. Major change took place when Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in 2001. New policies and practices, which can be group together as ‘Thaksinomics’, transformed not only the government sector, but also two other leading actors of the NIS: private firms and university. Even though it is too early to draw final conclusions of the effects of Thaksin policies on Thai NIS, it is true that it became stronger and more coherent. The experience of Thailand demonstrates that a national innovation system of a latecomer country can transform from a long-standing character of a weak, fragmented and slow-learning one to a stronger, coherent and more-active-learning one, if there is a significant change in the behaviour of a key actor that can cause positive effects in other actors.

The antipolitics of good governance

This article sets out to understand the relationship between the complex process of structural change and the proliferating political strategies and programs implemented to manage the process of political and social change. More particularly the authors examine how in the wake of the Asian economic crisis international financial institutions advocated a new global policy through programs such as Social Investment Funds. The thread that runs through the global social policy is a distinctly political project that uses the liberal language of participation and empowerment as a strategy of “antipolitics” that marginalizes political contestation. The authors argue, however, that the antipolitics of technocratic social policy gave way to a more populist form of antipolitics of a new government led by Thaksin Shinawatra. This article examines the nature of governance projects and seeks to explain the shift between them. This new populism may be a precursor to a new “authoritarian statist” mode of political regulation that could come to dominate Southeast Asia, buttressed by the requirements imposed by the “war on terrorism.”