THAILAND The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling

Abstract

Elected in January 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra went to the polls in early 2005 as the first elected Thai leader to serve a full term as prime minister. Although various crises in 2004 led to speculation of an early election, Thaksin's position was largely unassailable. This is not simply a story of individual triumph over circumstance; Thaksin's ascendancy and the possibility of a second-term illuminates much about post-reform Thailand. From the perspective of consolidation a full term and succession by election demonstrates the habituation of norms and conventions. Competing ?lites in Thailand now, seemingly, play by very minimal rules of the game. Rumours of a coup d'etat have been rare, though not absent.1 Paradoxically, all the milestones towards this achievement have involved diminishing the quality of Thailand's fledgling liberal democracy, underwritten by the 1997 constitution.2 Previous chapters on Thailand in Southeast Asian Affairs have highlighted Thaksin's subversion of the institutions designed to check and balance the power of the political executive, deepening hostility and action against independent press, politicization of the nominally independent senate, and the normalization of extra-judicial killings.3 2004 witnessed an intensification of this malaise, most notably in the deep South with the imposition of martial law in three southern provinces to quell a muddled mix of separatist and mafia-like violence. Thaksin's longevity under democratic rules has come at a time when shadowy state elements have exerted their presence in the south of Thailand and elsewhere, undermining the already tenuous constitutional nature of rule in Thailand. Despite this, Thaksin has gained praise from some observers for significant economic and diplomatic achievements in his first term in office.4