Tentara Nasional Indonesia Research Articles

The Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship: Enhancing Bilateral Relations at the Expense of Justice

Since 1999 independence referendum, Timor-Leste (East Timor) has struggled to achieve justice for human rights atrocities committed throughout Indonesia's 25-year de facto administration from 1975 to 1999. In particular, efforts have focused on violations committed prior to and following referendum of 1999, including during three-week scorched earth campaign that was actively encouraged by Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). During this time, it was estimated that 2,000 people were murdered, 60-80 per cent of physical infrastructure across East Timorese territory was destroyed and 400,000 people were displaced. (1) Timor-Leste provides a unique case study on international dimensions of pursuing post-conflict transitional justice as many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations have escaped prosecution with assistance of Indonesian state. This presents challenges for Timor-Leste as it balances competing international and domestic imperatives. On one hand, since attaining sovereignty in 2002 Timor-Leste has been responsible for establishing legitimate democratic institutions that possess widespread public support and encourage socio-political order through respect for rule of law. On other hand, Timor-Leste's national security interests and development capacities depend upon a strong bilateral relationship with Indonesia. This article examines establishment of world's first bilateral reconciliation commission, Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) in 2005. The Commission, comprising half Indonesian and half Timor-Leste Commissioners, was established independently of United Nations (UN). The CTF was responsible for finding conclusive truth about the perpetration of gross human rights violations and institutional by conducting an inquiry and arriving at recommendations and lessons learned. (2) The Commission employed a definition of crimes against humanity that accorded with international law under Rome Statute, including torture, rape and murder. (3) In addressing past crimes, Commission made recommendations regarding institutional reform, development of joint policies, creation of new human rights institutions and provision of material and symbolic reparations. This article argues that since release of CTF report in 2008, both Indonesia and Timor-Leste have demonstrated a lack of political will in implementing many of Commission's recommendations. This suggests that core aim of CTF was to promote cooperation between Timor-Leste and Indonesia through a unique form of international reconciliation designed to set aside past conflict. (4) Timor-Leste's prioritization of reconciliation with Indonesia was evident in ways it permitted Indonesia's avoidance of responsibility for human rights violations committed by senior military and civilian figures in 1999. Following independence referendum in 1999, Timor-Leste faced a number of divergent challenges in implementing post-conflict, transitional justice mechanisms to promote democratization and a human rights culture. (5) The first challenge involved achieving substantive justice, including punishing major human rights crimes committed in past. This was necessary for instituting rule of law, which requires an understanding among citizens that no one is above law. Punishment allows states to deter crime and instil trust in new judicial structures. Democratization and internal sovereignty is supported by establishment of a socio-political order based on widespread public acceptance that state-based laws and judicial institutions are valid and effective. Timor-Leste's second objective was fulfilling international legal commitments. International justice is characterized by global articulation of basic human rights and peremptory norms outlawing crimes against humanity. …

Where Are They Now?: The Careers of Army Officers Who Served in East Timor, 1998-99

Where Are They Now?The Careers of Army Officers Who Served in East Timor, 1998-99 Douglas Kammen (bio) In 1998-99, the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) organized and armed pro-integration militias and oversaw and participated in widespread violence before and after the United Nations-sponsored referendum in East Timor. The violence left at least 1,500 people dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced from their homes, many forcibly relocated to Indonesian West Timor. Basic infrastructure was devastated, homes were destroyed, and livestock killed. In the face of international condemnation, the Indonesian military eventually withdrew its troops from the territory, and the Indonesian government agreed to relinquish its claim to East Timor. Human rights activists called for an international tribunal to bring the perpetrators of the violence to justice, but there was little support in the United Nations for such an initiative, which was soon dropped in favor of piecemeal measures. Several Western powers cut off ties with the Indonesian military and pressured the Indonesian government to act on the findings of the National Human Rights Commission's fact-finding team. In 2001, the Indonesian government did so, establishing an Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights Violations in East Timor that tried eleven army officers, four police officers, and three civilians. Of these, three army officers, one police officer, and three East Timorese civilians were convicted, but all were subsequently acquitted on appeal. In Dili, meanwhile, the United Nations established a Serious Crimes Unit to investigate human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, and a Special Panel for Serious Crimes was created to try those [End Page 111] indicted. A number of low-level militiamen were brought to trial, but because the special panel had no jurisdiction over suspects in Indonesia, the major indictment against senior and middle-ranking Indonesian military officers never made it to court. The half-hearted and now stalled initiatives to bring the perpetrators of human rights abuses in East Timor to justice have been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny, so they will not be summarized here.1 Instead, I would like to ask what has happened to the careers of those Indonesian army officers who served in East Timor in 1998-99. This is particularly important in light of the debate over foreign—including US—engagement with the Indonesian military and ongoing human rights violations. In a 2007 diplomatic cable arguing in favor of resuming US cooperation with Indonesia's special forces, Cameron Hume, the US Ambassador to Indonesia, argued that Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command) forces "play an essential role in Indonesia's ability to protect US official, civilian, and commercial interests." Ambassador Cameron approvingly cited the argument posed by the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces that "younger officers [should] not be penalized for past transgressions."2 Such lobbying eventually paid off. In June 2010, the United States and Indonesia signed a defense cooperation agreement for military-to-military cooperation, and a month later the US resumed ties with Kopassus. Commenting on the US-Indonesian security partnership at the time, security analyst John Haseman noted that "[m]ost of the individuals involved in these incidents [in East Timor and the abduction of activists] have already retired or left the service, and Kopassus has not been credibly accused of a major human rights violation in at least the last five years."3 The data presented here are limited, as they concern only the two most senior army officers in the Bali-based Udayana Military Command and army officers who served in East Timor in 1998-99. Senior officers in the army and armed forces headquarters in 1998-99, most of whom were already approaching mandatory retirement age, and officers in the police and mobile brigade are not included. In all, sixty-two officers are listed. It is essential to note at the outset that the data presented here were collected from publicly available sources. Much of the information is from Indonesian newspapers and magazines that, now electronically accessible and searchable, regularly report on appointments, promotions, and the activities of the army. Further information has been obtained from the myriad military websites that not only report military...

Papua

Papua Muridan S. Widjojo (bio) During the year 2010, the provinces of Papua and West Papua routinely witnessed political events like those of the previous year. Very low level armed encounters between Indonesian military/police and the pro-independence armed group tpn/opm occurred more frequently than in 2009. As in 2005, several demonstrations over the people’s desire to hand back the Special Autonomy Law of 2001 (popularly called Otsus) to the national government involved not only civil society groups but also state institutions such as the Papua People’s Assembly (mrp). In addition to political pressure from within Papua, growing international pressure was noteworthy, especially from the United States Congress and the Vanuatu government. Pressure on Indonesia increased especially after the Asian Human Rights Commission (ahrc) uploaded to the YouTube website videos of torture committed by soldiers of the tni (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or the Indonesian military). This exposure confirmed to the national and international public that the many allegations of Indonesian security forces committing human rights abuses in Papua were true. Despite these facts, some positive signs also emerged in 2010. Campaigning and advocacy for more dialogue between Jakarta and Papua made some progress. At the beginning of the year, the Papua Peace Network (ppn) was established under the leadership of Father Neles Tebay and Muridan S Widjojo of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (lipi) or Indonesian Institute of Sciences. Facilitation and mediation by the ppn and [End Page 483] the lipi team in Jakarta did encourage the central government to improve its policy in Papua. A Papua Road Map proposal emphasizing peace talks was presented to Indonesian Vice President Boediono and seven government ministers on 23 November 2010; in general, the response was encouraging. The government is now committed to establishing a new body whose main task is to smooth the implementation of the Otsus law. Similar progress also took place on the part of the Papuans. In Papua, the ppn has successfully conducted public consultations in nine districts with grassroots leaders including representatives of the tpn/opm during February and July 2010. Moreover, the ppn has encouraged various pro-independence factions to overcome their fragmentation and improve cooperation in order to prepare for dialogue. In Port Moresby, the ppn managed to organize a “West Papua Leaders Summit,” which was attended by exiled pro-independence Papuans, including envoys from the armed wing. In Jakarta, there were some clearly positive political signals. First, the government was more responsive to the report of rights abuses. For example, the release of the torture video resulted in a military court giving a number of Indonesian soldiers jail sentences of five to seven months. Second, the government strove to improve the implementation of the Otsus law and was willing to build political communication with Papuan opposition leaders. Moreover, open-minded and progressive high officials were given more roles in designing the resolution policy. In his state address on 16 August 2010, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono promised constructive political communication with Papuan leaders. This promise was manifested on 1 December by the president’s determination to appoint two special envoys to Papua tasked with building preliminary trust and encouraging clear Papuan representation in the coming dialogue. As in 2009, the tpn/opm, led by Goliath Tabuni, continued its campaign on Puncak Jaya. On 27 February a boxcar was shot at from a hill near a bridge over the Kurage River, and a civilian was wounded on his upper cheek. As a consequence, a military/police unit chased the perpetrators. According to a Papuan activist’s report, on 17 March in the village of Kalome, subdistrict of Tingginambut, two local pastoral functionaries of gidi (the Evangelical Church of Indonesia) named Kindeman Gire and Pitinus Kogoya were tortured and shot. As they waited for a car coming from Wamena with their goods, they happened to meet tni soldiers, who suddenly began to torture and interrogate them regarding the whereabouts of confiscated police guns. Kogoya, who managed to flee, heard gunshots. Gire is believed to have been shot, but his body was never found, and local authorities have provided no clarification about the case. On 18 March, tni soldiers also attacked a compound in Lumbuk...

IMPUNITY RESURGENT: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA, 1998–2001

IMPUNITY RESURGENT: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA, 1998–2001

The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level

This is a study of a humanitarian intervention in Southeast Asia led by a neighbouring state. The focus of the article is the first month of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation led by Australia on behalf of the international community, with strong regional support, at the invitation of Indonesia. The article deals with the practical considerations that confronted senior military commanders as they implemented INTERFET's United Nations Security Council mandate at the operational level. INTERFET sought to shape events in East Tim or through the deterrence of certain Indonesian force elements while at the same time developing effective co-operation with senior Indonesian military officers. Various aspects of the INTERFET operation are analysed. Introduction Australia, on behalf of the international community, led and implemented the United Nations-sanctioned intervention in what was still Indonesian territory in East Timor in late 1999. This article looks at how that this was done at the operational level -- the level at which military commanders plan and implement operations within a designated theatre. The time period employed here is the important first month of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation. It was during this time that INTERFET (and Indonesian) military commanders confronted their greatest challenges. Developments in this small poor province were the focus of intense international attention. The smallest of incidents could have provoked an international incident. This article sheds light on how senior INTERFET (and where possible Indonesian) military officers managed the practical implementation of national responses to a humanitarian tragedy on the ground. It touches on how INTERFET's senior officers interpreted and responded to events. INTERFET sought to shape events with a combination of deterrence, engagement, and co-operation with the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). The application of military operational warfighting concepts in a peacemaking environment is also touched on, including INTERFET's provision of higher level military protection for its lightly armed and unprotected supply ships in response to submarine and air combat threats. INTERFET was a remarkably successful peacemaking mission. It achieved its goals in co-operation with Indonesia. Little blood was shed. Yet, the success of this operation at the outset depended on INTERFET depriving any potential adversary the opportunity to use force in the expectation of achieving a realistic gain. This was achieved by the use of higher-level military capabilities along with very well equipped and determined soldiers on the ground. This approach was complemented by co-operation. TNI commanders responsible for East Timor were kept fully briefed on INTERFET's intentions and were given the space to retire gracefully from East Timor. Mechanisms were established to allow senior INTERFET and TNI officers to raise issues of concern and to work through problems. Potential sources of conflict were generally diffused. Methodology The study is weighted towards an INTERFET perception of events. This is a consequence of research access to officials and officers who influenced INTERFET's decision-making. It is hoped that in due course a corrective study capturing Indonesian perspectives derived from interviews with key relevant TNI officers will be possible. This study is drawn from interviews with senior officers of the staffs of the maritime and land components of INTERFET. Other very senior officials and officers kindly provided their time to explain some of the wider facets of the operation. These interviews were supplemented by an account of the INTERFET operation by its Commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, and by specialist studies by the Australian Defence Force Maritime and Land Warfare Studies Centres. In addition, other participants shed light on the tactical level. …

The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

Research Article| July 01 2000 The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia Terence Lee Terence Lee Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2000) 40 (4): 692–706. https://doi.org/10.2307/3021189 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Terence Lee; The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia. Asian Survey 1 July 2000; 40 (4): 692–706. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3021189 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 2000 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.