Technological Ties Research Articles

THE MICROBLADE INDUSTRY FROM SWAN POINT CULTURAL ZONE 4b: TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE EARLIEST HUMAN OCCUPATION IN ALASKA

Swan Point in central Alaska contains the oldest recognized human occupation in Alaska (Cultural Zone 4b [CZ4b]), dating to circa 14,000 cal BP. This component consists of a microblade and burin industry with clear technological ties to the Siberian Upper Paleolithic Diuktai Culture. Through the systematic use of the Yubetsu method for the production of microblades, Swan Point is technologically more similar to Siberian microblade sites than to later-age (Denali complex) microblade sites in Alaska. The Yubetsu method is the hallmark of the Diuktai Culture, and in Alaska, Swan Point CZ4b is the only component with systematic production of microblades using the Yubetsu method. Other late Pleistocene and Holocene microblade sites in Alaska have an industry based on Campus-style, conical, or tabular microblade cores. Analysis of the collection furthers our understanding of how CZ4b relates to previous Siberian Diuktai-related assemblages and to later Alaskan Denali-related sites. We interpret the CZ4b component as representing a brief single event that has major cultural and technological implications for the early colonization process of North America.

Influence of network ties on inter‐firm network management activities. A comparative study between international new ventures and international mature firms

AbstractThis article investigates the types of network ties that contribute to the development of inter‐firm network management activities. It also examines whether these activities improve performance in the firms involved in those relationships. Data gathered from Spanish international new ventures and international mature firms show that marketing and technological ties significantly affect inter‐firm network management activities in international new ventures, while reputational ties only have effects in the case of international mature firms. Inter‐firm network management activities have a positive effect on performance in both samples. This paper provides evidence that firms' networks differ from one type of firm to another. Our findings suggest ways managers can influence networks to obtain benefits from inter‐firm network management activities. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Innovation and Competition Policy, Chapter 8: Innovation, IP Rights, and Anticompetitive Exclusion

This book of CASES AND MATERIALS ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY is intended for educational use. The book is free for all to use subject to an open source license agreement. It considers numerous sources of competition policy in addition to antitrust, including those that emanate from the intellectual property laws themselves, and also related issues such as the relationship between market structure and innovation, the competitive consequences of regulatory rules governing technology competition such as and interconnection, misuse, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Chapters will be updated frequently. The author uses this casebook for a three-unit class in Innovation and Competition Policy taught at the University of Iowa College of Law and available to first year law students as an elective. This document is Chapter 8, revised second edition on exclusionary practices, including refusal to license, exclusionary pricing, anticompetitive design, and technological tying. It also includes coverage of expanded sharing duties under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, as well as net neutrality and related regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission.

Social networks, technology ties, and gatekeeper functionality: Implications for the performance management of R&D projects

R&D project teams concerned with efficiency under limited resources must cohesively coordinate cooperation, interactions, and the exchange of ideas to sustain innovation. This research investigated the management of social networks, technology ties, and gatekeeper functionality from a networking perspective and examined their contribution to R&D performance, which was evaluated using data envelopment analysis. This study verified the relationships by using data from the Taiwan National Telecommunication Program, which coordinates more than 100 R&D teams in pursuing next-generation broadband technologies. The results regarding these relationships varied. The density of social networking and the outward- and novel-oriented gatekeeper functionality of a project team was found to significantly promote its R&D performance, whereas the density of technology ties exhibits no significance. Accordingly, this paper presents strategic implications for the management of projects, team interorganizational linkages, and governmental subsidy policies, and discusses the networking activities of R&D teams at the project level.

Distribution of Indirect Costs on the Basis of the Matrix Approach (as Exemplified by CHP Plant of Cogenerated Type)

Background: One of the most effective management tools is a calculation of the total cost of products, works and services, which, as part of the fuel and energy complex, is complicated by the presence of multi-stage production processes, and is currently carried out at most business entities in a simplified manner with the exception of some cause-and-effect relationships. Methods: In the present study different results of calculations of the total cost of products and semi-finished products using both existing and the proposed approaches to the problem are simulated. The analysis of the problem relating to the distribution of indirect expenses at Central Heating and Power Plant (CHPP) of cogeneration type is given; the advantages and disadvantages of the most common current traditional approach to the allocation of costs are revealed; the mathematical model of indirect costs distribution is proposed based on back-directed technological ties. Findings: The traditional approach to cost allocation and full cost formation is unable to determine the above index in case of material counter-flows, which is a characteristic feature of complex technological networks in organizations and for the interaction within groups of companies (holding companies). This disadvantage is excluded in the proposed by the authors approach based on the use of mathematical apparatus of matrix algebra, which is more consistent with modern information technologies used in the practice of organizations (the concept of ‘Spreadsheet’), and which, ultimately, will enable to introduce painlessly the proposed method of full cost evaluation in practice. Improvements: The proposed model and methods of its use allow improving the indirect cost allocation mechanism in the process of calculating the total product cost of CHPP.

Spectrum policy in Canada

Canadian spectrum policy is caught in a constant struggle between asserting national independence, while recognizing the profound economic, political, and technological ties to its southern neighbour, the United States. Canada is a vast country, the world’s second largest, but the overwhelming majority of the population live close to its border with the United States. In 2014, cellular networks only needed to cover approximately 20 percent of Canada’s geographic land mass in order to reach 99 percent of the Canadian population [1].

To Life: Optimism Bias and Technological Ties in the Face of the Worst

This essay addresses a recent media controversy. Two journalists actively questioned the appropriateness of a popular blog that chronicles a young woman's fight with cancer. Elaine Replogle () unfolds the facts of this case and discusses the role of fame and status in understanding the journalists' response to the blog. Here, I extend that conversation, exploring how our culture's optimism bias, as well as the increasing importance of our technological ties, informs our understanding of both the blog and its critics.

Knowledge Spillovers and Alliance Formation

AbstractOur study examines the conditions under which firms enter into strategic alliances subsequent to knowledge spillovers. We propose that spillovers serve as signals of knowledge dependence and potential complementarity, encouraging alliance formation to enable better learning and limit appropriation. We posit that the likelihood of a knowledge alliance subsequent to a spillover is contingent on the specialization of each of the firms in the knowledge involved in the spillover. We also hypothesize that the effects of such specialization on knowledge alliance formation are moderated by technological ties and geographic distance between the dyad involved in the spillover. Our results demonstrate significance for the effects of specialization, supporting learning and appropriation motivations. Technological ties strengthen while geographic distance weakens the relationship between specialization and alliance formation.

Technological tying and the intensity of price competition: An empirical analysis of the video game industry

Using data from the 128-bit video game industry I evaluate the impact technologically tying has on the intensity of console price competition and the incentives for hardware firms to tie their produced software to their hardware. Tying occurs when a console hardware manufacturer produces software that is incompatible with rival hardware. There are two important trade-offs an integrated firm faces when implementing a technological tie. The first is an effect that increases console market power and forces hardware prices higher. The second, an effect due to the integration of the firm, drives prices lower. A counterfactual exercise determines technological tying of hardware and software increases console price competition; console makers subsidize consumer hardware purchases in order to increase video games sales, in particular their tied games, where the greatest proportion of industry profits are made. I also determine technological tying to be a dominant strategy for hardware manufacturers when software development costs are low.

Between Beijing and Washington: Israel's Technology Transfers to China

Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely—they have shifted to the civilian sphere—technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.

Tying and bundling: applying EU competition rules for best practices

Tying and bundling are examples of practices that constitute abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of art. 102 TFEU. Such practices can take many various forms – from technological tying to mixed bundling. There are many reasons for tying. One of them is that companies can reduce costs by offering together products and provide customers with products of better quality or cheaper. On the other hand in most cases the European Commission of the EU courts had found that tying practices were aimed at causing damage to competitors or customers. The article presents case law of the EU Courts and the decisions of European Commission concerning tying practices. It focuses conditions that have to be met in order to classify the practice of the company as abuse of dominant position.

Vezana trgovina kao oblik zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja u pravu konkurencije Evropske unije

Tying is the practice where a supplier of the tying product requires the buyer to buy also a second product, the tied product. In the beginning US law was against this practice, considering it to be per se infringement. Now there is a much better understanding that tying is a normal feature of commercial life and not something that should be regarded as inherently suspicious, in determining whether it is an infringement of Article 102 of EU Treaty, several conditions must be met. First of all, it shall be a case of a company that has a dominant position in the relevant market. Second it is necessary that these are two separate (independent) products, whereby the problems may arise in practice when assessing whether these are really two separate products. Third, the key element when considering the tying is compelling (coercion). Finally in order for tying to constitute abuse it is essential that such practices lead or can lead to distortions of competition in the market (of the tied) product, the purchase of which is a precondition for the purchase of another product (tied market). Regardless of the numerous situations which can lead to the abuse of dominant position through tying the practice has shown that dominant companies can avoid liability on the basis that there was a reasonable justification for tying or if tying contributes to increased efficiency. In particular, the so-called 'technological tying' will be a sensitive issue in the future, taking into account the rapid and dynamic development of information technology.

The European Union, the United States, and Microsoft: A Comparative Review of Antitrust Doctrine

When a seller bundles together two products that have previously been sold separately, the arrangement is sometimes referred to as a tie. If the two products are bound together physically, it is often referred to as a technological tie. In the 1970s, IBM physically integrated so-called peripheral products, such as disk drives and printers which previously had been sold separately, into its central processing units. This integration was then attacked (largely unsuccessfully) by independent manufacturers of peripheral equipment as unlawful tying and as monopolization through tying. More recently, Microsoft has incorporated products, such as browsers and media players, into its operating system, behavior that again amounts to technological tying. It has also improved its server software by heightening the degree to which servers employing that software can interact. By raising the level of interaction among servers equipped with its software, Microsoft has so integrated work group servers as to enable groups of small servers to approach the capacities of mainframe computers. The European competition-law authorities see both matters as problematic. The integration of the media player has been condemned as tying; and the heightened server interaction has been faulted for failing to provide the interoperability that rival server software requires in order to participate on an equal footing with Microsoft server software in Windows work groups. Microsoft’s integration (at least in the view of the European antitrust authorities) also raises issues of essential facilities, and of the role of antitrust in achieving interoperability. Integration of these sorts - e.g., the hardware integrations of IBM and the software integrations of Microsoft - raise antitrust issues, as the extensive litigation in the United States and Europe over Microsoft’s behavior has revealed. We have now reached a moment in time in which both the American and European laws are sufficiently developed to warrant reflection and comparison. That is the task approached in this article. Part I, below, examines the European approach, exemplified in the decisions of the European Commission and the Court of First Instance about the interoperability of Microsoft’s server software. That part also examines the integration of the Windows Media Player into the Windows operating system. Part II reviews the U.S. decisions dealing with Microsoft’s integration of its Internet Explorer browser into its operating system. Since most readers will be familiar with the U.S. litigation at least in its main routlines, that review can be brief. Part III contains an initial comparison of the U.S. and European approaches to product integration. The conclusion in Part IV identifies the major differences and the doctrinal bases on which they rest.

Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying

This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.

Technological tying of the Apple iPhone: Unlawful in Australia?

Technology vendors are producing products and services which, by design, use technological methods to restrict interoperability and tie the use of their products and services to the use of other products and services from the same vendor. Often this type of technological tying raises concerns that it is anti-competitive. One such example is the technological tying of the Apple iPod to music purchased from the Apple iTunes Music Store, and vice versa. The new Apple iPhone contains technological locks which tie the iPhone to the mobile telephony services of a particular third-party mobile carrier, a new development in technological tying, and much more likely to be unlawful in Australia. The purpose of this article is to examine whether the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), in its current form is adequate to deal with this type of technological tying.

PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL TYING IN A WINNER‐TAKE‐ALL MARKET*

In a winner‐take‐all duopoly for systems in which firms invest to improve their products, a vertically integrated monopoly supplier of an essential system component may have an incentive to advantage itself by technological tying. If the vertically integrated firm is prevented from technologically tying, there is an equilibrium in which the more efficient firm invests and serves the entire market. However, another equilibrium may exist in which the less efficient firm wins the market. Technological tying enables a vertically integrated firm to foreclose its rival. The welfare implications of technological tying are ambiguous and depend on equilibrium selection.

The Divided States of the Americas

While economic and technological ties may be bringing the Americas closer, at a national level there has been a marked breakdown of consensus, along with deepening disintegration.

Technological Tying

Technological Tying

Technological Tying in the Computer Industry: When Does it Contravene s 46 of the Trade Practices Act?

While Australia is still heavily reliant on 'old economy' industries, such as primary production and manufacturing, there is now general recognition of the importance of high-value 'new economy' industries. The term 'new economy' refers to industries such as computer software and hardware, the internet, mobile telephony, biotechnology and others that are primarily based on intellectual property rights (IP rights) and that are undergoing rapid technological change. The appropriate relationship between competition law and IP rights has been the subject of review both in Australia and in the United States of America. In Australia, the application of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) to IP rights has been the subject of an independent inquiry and the Government has announced that it proposes to amend the TPA to take account of the recommendations of the Review Committee. In Washington D.C., the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have, since February 2002 been conducting lengthy public hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy. In the past, the reward/incentive function for IP rights has been subordinated to the policy objective of competition law; however, the stringent application of competition law may result in a loss of consumer welfare. Developments in the 'new economy' industries are throwing up new problems for competition lawyers. The purpose of this paper is to consider one such problem, namely, the tying or bundling of two or more products into one integrated product. Increasingly, firms within the computer industry are bundling one or more separate products through technological integration. Bundling is also occurring across different sectors in 'new economy' industries. The courts in Australia have very little experience of the complex issues that arise when allegations are made about anti-competitive bundling or tying in relation to the supply of computer products. The paper falls broadly into two parts. The first part considers some special characteristics of computer based markets, and the elements that need to be established in order to make out a contravention of s 46 of the TPA.The second part of the paper considers two different types of technological tying: first, the tying of two separate products through the creation of one integrated product; and secondly, tying the sale of a product with its repair or servicing in such a way that independent service organizations (ISOs) are foreclosed from the market. Both types of technological tying are open to a claim that they are anti-competitive and constitute a form of leveraging contrary to s 46 of the TPA.

ERA Technology ties up with European Microwave week 2001

ERA Technology ties up with European Microwave week 2001