Taiwan's Participation Research Articles

Сотрудничество стран Северо-Восточной Азии в сфере рыболовства: торговля морепродуктами и обмен квотами

This paper is concerned with the analysis of the current state of cooperation in the field of fisheries in the NEA region in two main areas: seafood trade and the exchange of fishing quotas. The author analyzed three types of sources: statistical data, documents and reports of official institutions and data collected from the news agencies archives. The author has come to the conclusion that cooperation in the field of fisheries between the Northeast Asia countries in these areas is developing very actively. The main actors are Russia, Japan, South Korea and China, while Mongolia and the DPRK, due to various factors, do not actively participate in it. Taiwan's participation in this interaction has not been considered due to lack of reliable information from the sources available to the author. Within the framework of the current model of interaction in this area in the Northeast Asia, Russia remains to be the largest supplier of raw materials; China is a major producer and consumer of seafood, while South Korea and Japan are engaged in advanced processing of raw materials or products from Russia and China of primary processing. In the domestic markets of South Korea and Japan there is a great demand for seafood. Unfortunately, because of the sanctions of the UN Security Council DPRK cannot realize its potential in the field of cooperation in fisheries to the full.

Offline: Health in the unhappy time of COVID-19

It was a tragedy for anyone hoping to see COVID-19 become a catalyst for international solidarity. On the first day of the first-ever virtual World Health Assembly, held during the worst acute global health crisis since WHO's creation in 1948, Alex Azar, US Secretary of Health and Human Services, further damaged the credibility of the US Government as a constructive member of the international community. “We must be frank”, he began. What followed was an astonishing series of unsubstantiated allegations. “There was a failure by this organisation”, Azar stated. He argued that WHO had conspired with a member state (he meant China) “in an apparent attempt to conceal this outbreak”. He accused WHO of unjustly blocking Taiwan's participation at the World Health Assembly. And he said “WHO must change.” It must be more transparent and more accountable. Earlier, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus gave a forceful defence of the agency. He accepted that “we all have lessons to learn”, but argued that WHO had stood “shoulder-to-shoulder with countries”. The agency had acted quickly, Tedros said. He promised to initiate an “independent evaluation” of the global response. “The world must never be the same.” There was no need for new plans, procedures, or institutions. What mattered now was to strengthen existing mechanisms, especially national public health capacities specified in the 2005 International Health Regulations. Investing in health was a prerequisite for development. To protect the world from future pandemics, Tedros called on member states to support a stronger WHO. In the speeches that followed, countries repeatedly backed WHO and the Director-General. China stressed that it acted in a timely, open, transparent, and responsible manner. Some countries went further, denouncing the unilateral and coercive actions of the US Government. That was on Monday. Overnight, President Trump wrote an explosive letter to WHO's Director-General. He claimed that “the repeated missteps by you and your organization in responding to the pandemic have been extremely costly to the world…if the World Health Organization does not commit to major substantive improvements within the next 30 days, I will make my temporary freeze of United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our membership in the organization. I cannot allow American taxpayer dollars to continue to finance an organization that, in its present state, is so clearly not serving America's interests.” But the basis for his accusations is dubious at best. In his letter, President Trump reports the results of a review his administration conducted into WHO's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He wrote that “we know the following”. The first allegation he makes is that WHO “consistently ignored credible reports of the virus spreading in Wuhan in early December 2019 or even earlier, including reports from the Lancet medical journal. The World Health Organization failed to independently investigate credible reports that conflicted directly with the Chinese government's official accounts, even those that came from sources within Wuhan itself.” This statement is factually incorrect. The Lancet published no report in December, 2019, referring to a virus or outbreak in Wuhan or anywhere else in China. The first reports the journal published were on Jan 24, 2020. In a paper by Chaolin Huang and colleagues, the first 41 patients from Wuhan with COVID-19 were described. The scientists and physicians who led this study were all from Chinese institutions. They worked with us closely, collaboratively, and quickly to make information about this new epidemic outbreak and disease fully and freely available to an international audience. A second paper, from Jasper Fuk-Woo Chan and colleagues, also published on Jan 24, described the first scientific evidence confirming person-to-person transmission of the new virus. This report included scientists and physicians from Hong Kong and mainland China. The allegations levelled against WHO in President Trump's letter are serious and damaging to efforts to strengthen international cooperation to control this pandemic. It is essential that any review of the global response is based on a factually accurate account of what took place in December and January. It is regrettable that President Trump's letter fell short of these standards. He should retract his letter, correct the record, and withdraw his allegations against WHO.

Regional Cooperation in the Post-South China Sea Arbitration Era: Potential Mechanism and Cooperative Areas

ABSTRACTAlthough the South China arbitration has been settled recently, the final settlement of the South China Sea disputes remains in a political stalemate, at least for the near future. This article proposes a regional mechanism that could form the basis for further cooperation in the South China Sea. This mechanism is informed by political theory, facts on the grounds, and lessons learned from cooperative practices in other regions. As a way to work toward a resolution to the South China Sea's sovereignty disputes, and to improve on current cooperative practices, the objective of this mechanism is to involve all parties in the region and thus cover the entire South China Sea, including the disputed areas. Based on incentives for claimants, the level of political sensitivity, the advantage of involving all claimants and disputed areas, and past practices that have facilitated Taiwan's participation, it is the conclusion of this analysis that the conservation and management of marine living resources is the most promising area of cooperation. In addition, the practice in Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission is recommended as an appropriate model to be applied mutatis mutandis in the South China Sea.

Incorporating Taiwan in International Fisheries Management: The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement Experience

ABSTRACTThe incorporation of Taiwan into the legal framework of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) has proven to be challenging. This article reviews RFMO practice in this area in light of the recent experience of the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) and outlines some of the legal creativity that has provided solutions. Taiwan's participation in RFMOs is essential to the achievement of effective management outcomes. Accordingly, this article argues that today, with relevant international legal obligations and numerous suitable precedents, political considerations should not represent an obstacle to providing for fair and appropriate involvement of Taiwan in RFMOs.

A question of sovereignty?

Taiwan's efforts to take part in international organisations (IOs) have received little backing from the international community owing to Taiwan's contested sovereignty. This article investigates under what circumstances and how the European Union (EU) supported Taiwan's participation in IOs and agreements by examining the role of the EU in three success stories: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The analysis of six factors that shaped the EU's approach shows that a strong EU interest in Taiwan's IO participation was a precondition for its support and that once this precondition was met, applicable membership/participation criteria and opportunities for circumventing or neutralising China's opposition then gained in importance. A supportive United States (US) stance could function as a trigger for EU support. Two counterintuitive findings are that the radicalisation of Taiwan's own strategy fostered increased EU activity in brokering compromises between Taiwan and China and that the EU's decision-making mechanisms did not play a decisive role in the formulation of its support policies.

The FTA Music Is Playing in Asia: After ECFA, Will Taiwan Join the Dance?

In the context of stalled multilateral trade negotiations, major trading economies are seeking free trade agreements (FTAs) to secure their market access objectives. Nowhere is this dynamic stronger than in East Asia, where a web of bilateral and plurilateral agreements is stitching together piecewise an Asian free trade area that could plausibly rival the EU and NAFTA trade blocs and where the possibility of a formal pan-Asian agreement has been raised. Taiwan has been largely excluded from this dynamic. However, with the June 29, 2010 signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China, the possibility of Taiwan joining the FTA dance in East Asia would appear to have been greatly strengthened as the advocates had anticipated. This article considers the economic and trade implications of Taiwan's participation versus non-participation in an emerging East Asian trade bloc. We support our analysis with simulations using the GTAP computable general equilibrium model. The article finds that the benefits to Taiwan of participating in such a bloc have increased, as have the opportunity costs of exclusion, since the share of East Asian partners in its trade has risen.

China, the Asian Games and Asian politics (1974–2006)

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. X. Wu, ‘My Memory of the Asian Games, 4. 2. Fu, The History of Sport in China, 379. 3. Ibid. 4. Dong Huang, ‘China Entered the Asian Games in 1974. Deng Xiaoping Made the Plan’, Global Times, 16 December 2006. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Tang, China at the Olympic Games 2: 321. 8. Interview of an OCA official by the author, 10 April 2006. 9. Ibid. 10. Hao, The History of Sport in China. 11. Song and Qiao, People's Memory, 374. 12. Ibid., 374. 13. ‘From “The Sick Man of East Asia” to the New Sports Super Power’, Wenhui Daily, 3 December 1982. 14. ‘The Spirit of A New Sports Super Power in Asia’, Dagong Daily, 3 December 1982. 15. Fu, The History of Sport in China, 84. 16. Zhang, ‘The Changes Brought by the Asian Games’, 280. 17. Ibid., 84–85. 18. Ibid., 271. 19. Cheng, Yingsheng and Qilu Liu, ed. The 1990 Asian Games. Wuhan: Wuhan Press, 1990. 20. Zhang, ‘The Changes Brought by the Asian Games’. 21. Li, The 1990 Asian Games, 23. 22. Ibid. 23. It was renamed Yingdong Swimming Pool after the 1990 Asian Games. 24. Mou and Wang, The Legend of Chinese Businessmen. 25. Wang, ‘Cheering Team at the Asian Games’, 48. 26. ‘From the Beijing Asian Games to the Guangzhou Asian Games’, China Youth Daily, 12 November 2010. 27. Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games, 27. 28. ‘China Welcomes Taiwan's AG Trip’, Manila Standard, 16 July 1988. 29. Reporter, ‘Welcome Taiwan's Participation in the 1990 Beijing Asian Games’, PLA Daily, 15 July 1988. 30. Yaming Wu, ‘Statement made by the Office of Taiwan Affairs’, People's Daily, 23 July 1989. 31. Shihong Ye, ‘The Chinese Team Captures Most of the Gold Medals’, The Liberty Times, 11 November 2010. 32. Previous to the 1994 Asian Games, Cambodia participated in the 1954, 1958, 1962 1970 and 1974 Asian Games. 33. Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport, Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1994–1995). 34. Olympic Council of Asia, ‘Overall Medal Standings – Hiroshima 1994’, Olympic Council of Asia, http://www.ocasia.org/Game/MWinner.aspx?AMWCode=16&GCode=1 (accessed 5 February 2011). 35. Kidd, Edelman, and Brownell, ‘Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals’. 36. ‘China's fall from grace’, BBC Sport: http://cdnedge.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/839040.stm 37. Ross, ‘The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force’. 38. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War & Peace. 39. Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan. 40. Sadec Asia Pacific, ‘13th Asian Games News Coverage, News Wire Archives of the 13th Asian Games’, Sadec Asia Pacific, http://www.sadec.com/Asiad98/news1206.html (accessed 2 May 2011). 41. Sport Weekly, 2 December 1998. 42. Sadec Asia Pacific, ‘13th Asian Games News Coverage, News Wire Archives of the 13th Asian Games’. 43. HERESports Ministry, Sport in China in the Past 30 Years, 117. 44. Hong Kong became a colony of the British Empire after the First Opium War (1839–1842). The 156 years of British colonial rule in Hong Kong ended on 1 July 1997 when the sovereignty was officially transferred from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China. 45. Olympic Council of Asia, ‘Overall Medal Standings - Bangkok 1998’, Olympic Council of Asia, http://www.ocasia.org/Game/MWinner.aspx?AMWCode=17&GCode=1 (accessed 6 February 2011). 46. East Timor used to be the colony of Portugal between 1702 and 1975. It was then occupied by Indonesia between 1975 and 2002. The country gained independence in May 2002 and became a member of the United Nations in September 2002. 47. Jong-Heon Lee, ‘Asian Games Open in South Korea’, United Press International, 29 September 2002. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/29/Asian-Games-open-in-South-Korea/UPI-40631033315236/ 48. Ibid. 49. Portuguese colonists settled in Macau in the sixteenth century and occupied Macau after the First Opium War (1839–1842). The Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed between the Qing and Portuguese governments and officially turned Macau into a Portuguese colony. The sovereignty of Macau was handed over to China on 20 December 1999. 50. Olympic Council of Asia, ‘Overall Medal Standings - Busan 2002’. 51. Macau participated in the 1990, 1994 and 1998 Asian Games as a Portuguese colony. Athletes competed under the flag of the Municipality of Macau (in Portuguese, Concelho de Macau). 52. Nick Mulvenney, ‘Mainland Expects a Doha Gold Rush’, Reuters, 29 November 2006. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=8&art_id=32906&sid=110910 79&con_type=1&d_str=20061129&fc=4 53. Olympic Council of Asia, ‘Overall Medal Standings - Doha 2006’, Olympic Council of Asia, http://www.ocasia.org/Game/MWinner.aspx?AMWCode=19&GCode=1 (accessed 5 March 2011). 54. ‘Professional Politician of Sport’, The Straits Times, 26 October 1986, 19.

The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan's Participation

Since 1990, 19 Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been held. The Workshop, attended by Government and military officials in their private capacities as well as by academics mainly from the littoral States of the South China Sea (SCS) and from the non-SCS countries, is a continuing dialogue process that aims to manage potential conflicts by exploring areas of cooperation among the littoral States in the SCS area. It is also the only regional dialogue mechanism dealing specifically with the SCS issues, where scholars and Government officials from Taiwan and China can meet regularly and exchange views. This article reviews and evaluates the SCS Workshop process and discusses Taiwan's participation in the process. In the concluding section, the adoption of the China-Taiwan South-East Asia Network for Education and Training (SEA-NET) joint project at the nineteenth SCS Workshop, a big step regarding Taiwan's participation in the Workshop process, is discussed. And it is suggested that there likely will be more cooperative measures taken by Taipei and Beijing regarding the SCS area in the future.

Taiwan's Participation in the World Health Organization: The U.S. “Facilitator” Role

Abstract In April 2009 Taiwan finally received an invitation from the World Health Organization (WHO) to attend the 62nd World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva as an observer. This study examines the background of Taiwan's campaign to participate in the WHO since 1997, reviews the “facilitator” role of the United States, and considers the People's Republic of China's posture concerning Taiwan's participation in the organization.

Could Taiwan be included in UNFCCC negotiations?

Taiwan has not been able to join the existing global climate regime because of its ambiguous international status. The Kyoto Protocol and the restrictive accession rules of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) preclude Taiwan's membership. The government of Taiwan is preparing to join the post-2012 multilateral climate regime by building its capacity to regulate greenhouse gases and by setting reduction targets. Taiwan currently contributes about 1% of the total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the world. It has its share of responsibility in global warming and should be included as part of the solution. Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly in 2009 suggests that the People's Republic of China might be willing to accept Taiwan's participation in international treaties as long as membership does not imply statehood. If the post-2012 architecture is designed with flexible accession rules, Taiwan might be able to join despite the unresolved political issues regarding its statehood. The accession rules of the World Trade Organization and the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean may provide useful precedents on how to design such flexibility.

Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008 , and: Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan (review)

Reviewed by: Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008, and: Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan Judy Polumbaum (bio) Xu Guoqi . Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. xi, 377 pp. Hardcover $31.00, ISBN 978-0-674-02840-1. Andrew D. Morris . Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. xi, 271 pp. Hardcover $49.95, ISBN 978-0-520-26279-9. One might ask whether a book that anticipates the staging of a mega-event has outlived its usefulness once that event has come and gone. Alternatively, one might read such a book after the event to see whether its prognostications held up. In the case of historian Xu Guoqi's endeavor to set the stage for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, neither approach is especially germane. China's imminent hosting of its first Olympic Games turns out to be merely the news peg on which to hang an episodic study of the intertwining of politics and sports. Xu's forecasts about the potential meanings and implications of the Beijing Games turn out to be contingent as well as conventional enough not to be embarrassing, regardless of their outcomes. Olympic Dreams has little that will surprise the well-versed scholar of either contemporary China or contemporary sports. Conceptually, its main contention that organized global sporting competition is a potent instrument of both internationalization and nationalism is neither novel nor controversial. The book follows what by now is a familiar narrative of China's enlarging repertoire of engagement with the rest of the world through the rituals and practices of modern sport, a process accompanied by both ambivalence and enthusiasm and involving accommodations both clumsy and adroit. Omnivorous forays into Olympics history for purposes of illustration or analogy likewise retrace much well-traveled territory. Nevertheless, this work does make valuable contributions to our knowledge of China and international sports and politics in several respects. It adds a great deal of fascinating detail to the opening salvo of U.S.-China rapprochement known as ping-pong diplomacy, incorporating new information from Chinese accounts as well as U.S. government documents, private papers, and memoirs. In particular, we [End Page 263] learn more about Chinese activities, concerns, and perspectives throughout the back-channel peregrinations that diverted the U.S. table tennis team, en route home from international championships in Japan, to a warm reception in China in April 1971, laying the groundwork for Nixon's China visit early the following year. In addition, the book reviews an often overlooked reciprocal U.S. visit by Chinese table tennis players in the spring of 1972. However, the author may be overstating the importance of this phase of the story, marred as it was by wrangling over security and financial arrangements as well as the Nixon administration's renewed bombing of North Vietnam. Olympic Dreams also documents in greater detail than elsewhere how the Olympic movement and its agencies became sites of prolonged geopolitical struggle revolving around Taiwan's and Beijing's contending claims to represent the entirety of China. The maneuvering begins in the early 1950s, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) sending a delegation to the 1952 Helsinki Games that arrived late and missed most of the competition, and Taiwan passing up its concurrent invitation. In 1956, the PRC withdraws from the Melbourne Games to protest Taiwan's participation, and cuts off all Olympics ties by 1958. A veritable follies of posturing on the part of all parties—not only Beijing and Taiwan, but also the International Olympic Committee (IOC), host countries, and other IOC member nations, not least the United States—continue into the 1960s and resume at a fever pitch leading up to the Montreal Games of 1976. The furor makes a compelling case study of multifarious confusion, bumbling, and silliness, with plenty of blame to go around—a salutary reminder, perhaps, of how consequential political, military, and economic hostilities can masquerade as absurdity. Toward the end of the book, approaching what might be expected of Beijing's 2008 extravaganza, the author expresses dismay with China's post-Mao zeal...

LABORATORY ASTROPHYSICS IN TAIWAN

We report the development of laboratory astrophysics program in Taiwan. We begin with outlining Taiwan's participation in the FLASH collaboration for measuring the fluorescence yield using SLAC 28.5 GeV electron beam. We then report the domestic effort of studying cosmic ray shower properties using NSRRC 1.5 GeV electron beam.

The Impact of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan's Participation in International Fisheries Fora

This article discusses Taiwan's participation in various international fisheries fora before and after the adoption of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, emphasizing the pragmatic approach taken by Taiwan in gaining recognition in a number of tuna management organizations as a Commission Member.

Taiwan's Participation in Inter-Governmental Organizations: An Overview of Its Initiatives

Emboldened by the ascendance of economic issues on the global agenda and the erosion of security-driven bipolar structures, Taiwan in the late 1980s decided to use its economic advantages for diplomatic gain. Examination of changes in three phases of Taiwan's initiatives indicates that its inter-governmental organization strategies and targets correlate well with domestic politics and external factors.

Taiwan's Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and the Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of the IATTC

For the past two decades, responsible fisheries have been promoted in order to manage and conserve marine living resources. It is important to include all those engaged in fishing in attaining these goals. Due to its international status, it is difficult for Taiwan to participate in the regional fisheries management organizations established to deal with straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. This article will focus on Taiwan's experience with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). It is concluded that the international legal capacity of a fishing entity is approaching a “state-like entity” in terms of enjoying rights and having responsibilities. Moreover, the application of “fishing entity” to Taiwan should lead to a strengthening of the effectiveness of the management and conservation mechanism of the IATTC.

What Can Taiwan (and the United States) Expect from Japan?

In the 1990s and into the new century, increased Japanese sympathy toward Taiwan and antipathy toward mainland China led to a series of moves to improve treatment of Taiwan, including enhanced transportation links, a higher level and frequency of official contacts, posting of a military attaché, and expressions of support for Taiwan's participation in regional and international organizations. Nevertheless, Japan remains firmly wedded to a One China policy that opposes both the use of force by the mainland and a declaration by Taiwan of independence from China. Japan's willingness to cooperate with the United States to defend Taiwan is increasingly in doubt. The sources of Japan's supportive but restrained policy include the decline of traditional ties with Taiwan, the increasing size of the mainland market, and above all a perception of security risks that ultimately diverges sharply from that of Taiwan. Serious cooperation in defense and diplomacy requires shared (or complementary) threats, not just shared adversaries.

TMD ROCKING REGIONAL STABILITY

Abstract The convertabililty of theater missile defense (TMD) systems technology makes TMD more offensive than defensive. The US is most active in TMD projects due to its available resources for TMD and its crisis management strategy questing for TMD. By joining US TMD projects, Japan is attempting to develop a pre-emptive strike capability against North Korea and Taiwan is trying to consolidate its defense relations with the US. South Korea could also get a ride on US TMD, but the short distance between Seoul and Demilitarized Zone makes TMD inefficient. China, Russia and North Korea have no TMD resources at present. The strategies of China and Russia are based on retailiation which costs less than TMD. TMD exacerbates strategic suspicions between China and the US-Japan Alliance and makes security cooperation difficult. Taiwan's participation in US TMD projects would aggravate tensions in the Taiwan Strait because the deployment of TMD could strengthen the political confidence for public independence. TM...

U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Bid to Rejoin the United Nations

The recent history of the Republic of China (ROC) has been an eventful one. In two decades, the island has managed to transform itself from a backward, authoritarian state into a full-fledged democracy and an economic powerhouse. Despite these changes, however, Taiwan continues to be locked out of most important international organizations-including the United Nations (U.N.). Indeed, Taiwan is the only country denied a seat in the prestigious world body. This article examines Taiwan's drive to return to the U.N. It outlines the background of the U.N. representation question and shows how Beijing and Taipei hold different views on the issue. The study also discusses U.S. policy toward Taiwan's participation in the organization and examines some options Washington may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that the U.S. should not revise its present policy on Taiwan's admission to the U.N. at this time. There is a strong probability that a change in policy would succeed only in undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Political Economy of Taiwan´s Relations with Southeast Asia: The “Southward Policy”

When President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan visited Southeast Asia in early 1994, Taiwan's Southward began to be known world-wide. Superficially, this policy is aimed at strengthening Taiwan's economic relations with Southeast Asian countries, but in reality the ROC Government intends to expand Taiwan-Southeast Asian economic linkages in exchange for Tai wan's political participation in regional organizations and activities. Yet, while Southeast Asian countries welcome Taiwan's economic resources (capital and technology], they hesitate to upgrade their political relations with Taiwan owing to their deference to China. This article suggests that while Taiwan exerts efforts at streng thening its relations with Southeast Asia, it should also promote practical relations with mainland China. In addition, the South ward should be seen as a long-term objective instead of a short-term programme.