Supreme Leader Research Articles

Basic differences between Ukrainian and Russian political identities

The article is devoted to identifying key differences between Ukrainian and Russian political identities. It is ascertained that the basic parameters for Ukrainian political identity are individualism, rejection of the authoritarian principle, love of freedom, etc. The idea of freedom has been long embedded in the mentality of Ukrainian people. By contrast, as regards the Russian people (Muscovites) mentality, slavish obedience has long been considered a virtue. According to eyewitnesses, Muscovites considered deception to be a proof of great intelligence. They are not ashamed of lying.
 Ukrainian political identity representatives should not be expected to automatically submit to the authorities, as the reputation and legitimacy of the leader are important for them. Ukrainians can force an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally to relinquish the power.
 The bearers of Russia’s political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. This state of Russian political culture, where decision-making is delegated only to rulers, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. Atomization, that is, the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of Russia’s political identity nowadays. Due to the atomization of society and people being unable to trust each other, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in Russia are impossible.

Peter the Great’s “heirs”: power and administration in post-Petrine Russia

The article examines the evolution of the power and governance system in the first decade after the death of Peter the Great, one of the most dramatic periods of Russian history, commonly referred to in the historical literature as the “ epoch of palace coups”. The article gives the author’s interpretation of the activities of the Supreme Privy Council to improve public administration during the reign of Catherine I and Peter II. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of events connected with the invitation to the Russian throne by the members of Supreme Privy Council of the niece of Peter the Great, the Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna, during whose reign the first attempt in the political history of Russia was made to limit the autocratic power of the monarch. The author examines the reasons for the defeat of the plan of the “supreme leaders”, who proposed to Anna Ioannovna “restrictive points” (“conditions”), formulated by Prince D.M. Golitsyn, to change the form of government in Russia, and draws some important conclusions for understanding the events. According to the author, Anna Ioannovna managed to snatch victory, relying on the support of the middle and lower nobility, primary because in Russia the middle class was always afraid of the weakening of the central government, which, as a rule, led either to anarchy or to the power of the oligarchy.

Bangabandhu as the eternal sovereign: on the construction of a civil religion

ABSTRACT The omnipresence of his name and portrait in Bangladesh suggests that Father-of-the-nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – known as Bangabandhu – is more than just a national hero. He is subject of a secular deification that establishes him as the fountain of political authority and an embodiment of the sovereignty of the nation – the one without whom there can be no authority, no sovereignty, no nation. Historically he was the supreme leader of the national movement, the extraordinary individual who created the independent nation. In that founding moment a new political order was formed, an order consciously maintained by the political party he founded and by his daughter, the current prime minister. This paper addresses the secular deification of him and investigates its efficacy as fountain for national sovereignty and for the authority of the political order.

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

Shia Clerics, Holy Sites, and the Online Visual Culture of the Revolutionary Youth in Iran

Since the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) called on the clergy to embark on an online jihad to rescue youngsters trapped in the “killing field” of the internet, a vast number of clerics and state-sponsored religious organizations and actors have expanded their online activities. The growing body of Islamic online contents produced by the IRI’s promoters and the proliferation of social media-related practices in religious places and events have shaped the online visual culture of the Iranian revolutionary youths. To explore this under-researched area, this study concentrates on three sets of visual tropes: (1) selfies with martyrs, (2) selfies taken by revolutionary clerics in disaster-stricken areas, and (3) shared images of the holy shrine of Imam Reza on Instagram. In addition to online documents (including posters, photographs, and reports), the data includes selectively chosen Instagram postings retrieved by searching pertinent accounts, hashtags, and locations on the platform. The investigation inquires the ways in which online image-making has been incorporated in the construction of holy sites and the culture of sacrifice and martyrdom propagated by the IRI as ideal youth aspirations. The findings demonstrate the extensive appropriation of social media and intensive integration of online image-making in this field. The study contributes to understanding of the online spaces and practices aimed at extending the influence over the online youth culture in Iran in line with the IRI’s cultural plans and policies.

Selection of China's Top Leadership Cadre: The Roles of Supreme Leaders, Factional Networks, and Candidate Attributes

This article provides empirical evidence to show how the general secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party dominated provincial personnel through their factional ties. Based on panel data from 1993 to 2017, this study finds that the provincial leaders’ personal connections with the incumbent party head significantly increased their promotion chances. The positive effect of the incumbent party heads on promotion did not depend on provincial leaders’ economic performance and seniority. This study further uncovers that working experiences in the prefectural leading positions strongly increased the likelihood of promotion. However, connections with other important top leaders did not have similar effects. These findings challenge the traditional wisdom on the collective leadership and indicate the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party's heads for provincial personnel arrangements.

Feudal Contradictions between Communist Allies

Abstract In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea arrived at contradictory answers regarding the question of succession, testing the strength of bilateral ties at a complex moment in the two countries’ domestic politics and in the Cold War. Blaming the excesses of Maoist radicalism on “feudal thinking,” Deng Xiaoping launched a campaign in the summer of 1980 to “eliminate feudalism” from the Chinese Communist Party and elevate a new generation of leaders. Just a few months later, at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Il Sung went public with what Deng saw as the ultimate “feudal” act: a plan to pass down the role of Supreme Leader to his eldest son, Kim Jong Il. By scrutinizing the public record and secret transcripts of Sino-Korean diplomacy, this article traces the origins of their contradictory approaches to political succession and the evolution of Deng's response to Kim's plan from disapproval to acquiescence.

America’s Foe on Twitter

This article examines English and Farsi political messages on Twitter from two Iranian leaders, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. During the summer of 2019, Iran’s relations with Western democracies were further strained by Iranian attacks on foreign commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman and on a US surveillance drone. Shortly thereafter, President Trump announced on Twitter that he had ordered an air strike against Iranian targets, only to rescind the order minutes before contact. We explore Iran’s response to Trump and the international crisis that emerged during the spring and summer of 2019. Our article utilizes a content analysis to descriptively account for the politics and political messages that Zarif and Khamenei sought to promote. We also pay particular attention to the content criticizing America and its leadership during this time as we seek to understand Iran’s interest in provoking the United States on social media.

Innovation in the indicators of the republic from the perspective of the Imams of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

This research has been formed with the aim of explaining and comparing the innovative features of the republic in the political ideas of the Imams of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In this regard, by using the research method of content analysis, all the statements and thoughts of Imam Khomeini from 1963 to 1989 and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei from 1989 to 2015 in full as a statistical population under study Is located. In order to carry out the research, 15 indicators for the republic were determined from the perspective of the Imams of the Islamic Revolution of Iran After obtaining the approval of experts regarding the desired innovative indicators, coding was performed and a total of 420 items of Imam Khomeini's orders and 512 items of the Supreme Leader's statements were cited in statistical analyses. In the following, the collected data and information are analysed and the research findings indicate that the most important indicator from Imam Khomeini (Allah’s pleasure)'s point of view is the "Populares of the Islamic government" and from the perspective of the Supreme Leader " Obligation, constructiveness and honest service to the people " which is defined and explained based on the conditions and requirements of the time.

Contesting ritual practices in Twelver Shiism: modernism, sectarianism and the politics of self-flagellation (taṭbīr)

ABSTRACT Shiis perform a number of rituals on the first 10 days of the Islamic month of Muḥarram to mourn the killing of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Husayn, in Karbala in southern Iraq in 680CE. Among the most controversial rituals is the practice of blood-letting self-flagellation (taṭbīr). This article provides a comprehensive discussion of debates around this ritual among prominent Shii clerical figures of the 20th and 21st centuries. While the vast majority of senior clerics is either sympathetic to taṭbīr or retains an indifferent attitude, clerical interventions critical of it are informed by the discursive parameters of Islamic modernism and emphasize the universal moral and socio-political message of Husayn’s revolt. These debates also point at concerns over inter-sectarian relations between Sunnis and Shiis and efforts to discard Shii ritual practices that could antagonize Sunni Muslims. Finally, these debates contain an important political dimension reflecting contestations around Iran’s aim to exercise hegemony over Shii communities across the world. The 1994 fatwa by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic ‘Ali Khamenei (b. 1939) in which he declared taṭbīr prohibited (ḥarām) has hardened existing cleavages between those supporting and those rejecting this practice, as this article illustrates.

Historical, Empirical and Domestic Pieces of evidence of Iran's Foreign Policy

This article discusses the empirical and domestic factors in the formulation of the foreign policy of Iran. It is essential to understand the history, state-craft and power complex of Iran. In Iran, Faqih is the supreme leader and he has full command of the armed forces and general policies of the state. The foreign policy complex of Iran consists of individuals, agencies and different departments that directly influence the foreign policy of Iran. The foreign policy complex and Statecraft of Iran's political system play a significant role and influence the foreign policy behaviour of Iran. Since the Islamic revolution, Iran is facing threats from regional and global powers. Post Saddam, Iran is mainly focusing on Saudi Arabia, Israeli and America to contain their influence. Since last many decades, Iran is facing serious criticism and sanctions because of its nuclear program. Despite USA sanctions, Iran is moving from the regional to the global arena and also improving its relations with Russia, and China.

Opinions of Central Asian Thinkers on Educational Leadership

The article explains many of the qualities, requirements, laws and regulations that are unique to rulers and officials in Central Asian states. The gradual development of the requirements for leaders for the system of public administration in the first states formed in Central Asia is analyzed on the basis of the works of medieval Muslim scholars. One of the most famous thinkers of the Eastern Renaissance, Farobi studied the management of a noble society, the 12 qualities and attributes that a leader should possess, the conditions of suitability and unworthiness for the position of executive leaders, and the role of the leader in state and society relations. Another scholar of this period, Yusuf Khas Hajib, studied the system of views on leadership, which classified the leadership into general and assistant leaders, their characteristics, the requirements for their activities. The article also analyzes the activities of the Supreme Leader in the administration of Nizamulmuluk, the requirements for his activities and the necessary principles for their implementation. In the work of the great medieval commander Amir Temur "Rules" socio-ethical requirements are studied.

Setting the policy agenda for the treatment of substance use disorders in Iran

BackgroundDrug use is one of the most common public health problems globally. This study was done to analyze the agenda-setting of policies related to substance use disorder treatment in Iran since 1979.MethodsThe current qualitative study was done through document review and interviews with policymakers and executives. Purposive sampling with snowball strategy was considered for sampling. Semi-structured interviews were done. A total of 22 documents were examined, and the data were saturated with 32 interviews. Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework was used to analyze the data.ResultsThe results indicated the intersection of problem stream, policy stream, political stream, and opening the opportunity window. In the problem stream, the rapid growth of AIDS among people who inject drugs (PWID), the decrease in the average age of first drug use, the increase in the prevalence of substance use disorder in women, the ineffectiveness of compulsive treatment, and criminological perspectives played key roles. The policy stream included criminological perspective and war on drugs, and harm reduction. The political stream included announcing general anti-narcotics policies by the Supreme Leader of Iran and understanding the need for treatment, rehabilitation, harm reduction, and social support for substance use disorder by officials and policymakers.ConclusionsFor a long time in Iran, policies based on the war on drugs were the dominant approach, and then, policies based on harm reduction and patient-centeredness were considered. The ideology and political parties influenced the executive apparatus's policy stream in this area. In countries with an ideological approach, the political stream plays a critical role in setting issues on the agenda. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs can put the points on the agenda by attracting the attention of political forces to the issue.

Preempting the past: How the future space unfolds in political discourse of Iran

This paper is to analyse 180 speeches of the Iranian Supreme Leader (SL), Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, from 2005 to 2013 which are concentrated upon characterising the threats of doshman [enemy] and depicting the future space of Iran. Adopting the Proximisation Theory, the investigation of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s speeches reveals that doshman poses futuristic spatial-axiological threats to the central values, programmes and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Furthermore, the future space of Iran is figured in multifarious policies to preempt the construed spatial-axiological threats of doshman. In this regard, I indicated that the Supreme Leader resorts to the characterisation of the pre-revolutionary states of affairs (the past) to analogously characterise the opposite futures space of the IRI. Therefore, the SL programmes to mould the futures based on the present time values and programmes in order to abort the re-birth of the past. It was also indicated that the future space in this discourse serves to preempt the reification of the construed threats in the future.

Оппозиционная активность партии «Движение за свободу Ирана» (1989–2005 гг.)

The article examines the course of opposition activity of the Freedom Movement of Iran party, one of the most famous parties of the left bloc in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The chronological framework of the study is the period from 1989 to 2005. This is resulting from to the fact that since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the country's current state system was fully formed only by 1989. In the same year, the composition of the power elite also underwent changes. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) was elected the new president, and after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader of Iran. If in the period from 1979–1989 The Freedom Movement of Iran, like its leader, Mehdi Bazargan, remained in the political arena, retaining parliamentary seats, then after 1989 the Iranian authorities prevented any attempt by liberal parties to nominate their candidates for both presidential and parliamentary elections. This fact led to the growth of the opposition activity of the Freedom Movement of Iran, which continued until 2002, when party members were accused of establishing contacts with foreign countries to gain support in the fight against the regime of the Shiite clergy. From that moment until 2005, the party's activity decreased and was limited only by organizing small rallies and demonstrations.

Существовала ли «империя печенегов» в степях между Трансильванией и Нижним Доном?

The attempts by some researchers to present “The Pechenegia” mentioned by Konstantin Porphyrogenitus as a nomadic empire seem purely speculative. The Pechenegs were fragmented into separate tribes, which persisted for the entire period of their residence in the European steppes. They had neither supreme leader nor developed ethnic identity nor imperial thinking. They failed to organize a single devastating invasion by the joint military forces of all the tribes. Instead, their neighboring sovereigns used some of their militia as an auxiliary force to fight their opponents.

Ideological self-obsession and the Burden of victims: Review of the ISC case

In this paper, we intend to present the anchor points of the Ustasha ideology that used to be the foundation of the Independent State of Croatia. This puppet creation, made on the ruins of the Yugoslav monarchy, promoted nationalist fury. Its intention was to create an ethnically clean state in the territory where, in geopolitical terms, it was impossible without an exodus and execution of the population with other nationalities. Commitment to antiSemitism was used by this state as an impetus for national intolerance towards Serbs and it largely exceeded the intended pattern of the Nazi Holocaust. The remembrance culture was created presenting the past as a decadeslong struggle, the cause of which was mostly attributed to Serbs. The culmination was the Yugoslav dungeon. Young generations were brought up and educated to represent national purity and to serve the Supreme Leader loyally. The personality cult was the crown of such furious ideology that, in its decisive intention to reach its realization, despite the resistance of the reality, used all available means. The war and uncontrollable hatred were favourable circumstances for the final solution to the Croatian question that, in the Ustasha ideology, was impossible without the thorough solution to the Serbian factor. The consequences of this were innumerable victims.

Min Jian: The Rise of China's Grassroots Intellectuals

In China, the shock of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre abruptly terminated a post-Mao decade of rapid socioeconomic change and halting political liberalization. Deng Xiaoping and old-guard communist leaders decisively rebuffed young and old reform-minded intellectuals who were devoted to the imperial tradition of loyal literati remonstrating with rulers to effect urgently needed changes. This deeply researched and consistently thought-provoking study explores a new turn that Chinese intellectual life took after this debacle. The heterogeneous individuals and groups that Veg subsumes under the deliberately loose-fitting and protean label of min jian (popular, grassroots) intellectuals significantly expanded discursive ground in the 1990s and early 2000s. Whether as freelance writers, independent filmmakers, unofficial and amateur historians, rights lawyers, or journalists and bloggers, their work was facilitated by the internet, the rise of social media, and the availability of new technology (notably, digital video recorders) as well as their own new approaches to addressing persistent social problems.What most of the min jian intellectuals, including many women, had in common was financial independence or, at least, a disdain for material goods in China's increasingly consumerist society. They were impatient with abstract philosophical principles and dogmatism of any kind. Rejecting Marxist class analysis, they were committed to investigating, publicizing, and expediting social change for China's vast number of disadvantaged, exploited, and despised rural dwellers, urban migrants, religious worshippers, vagrants, and sex workers—in short, the lowest rungs of a hierarchical and vastly unequal society dominated by a bureaucratic official caste and nouveaux riches entrepreneurs. Locating themselves between the state and the market economy, the min jian intellectuals focused on concrete problems that individuals were confronting. For example, rights lawyers (weiquan) were bent on helping rural petitioners—dispossessed by avaricious local officials and interred in “black prisons” (invisible and unofficial places of confinement) before being returned home without a proper hearing—to seek justice in Beijing. Unofficial historians gathered the stories of surviving victims of the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 and the Great Famine of 1959 – 61, most of whose victims were not elite intellectuals but ordinary people crushed by a punitive state. Yang Jisheng's Tombstone, a monumental history of the Great Famine, is one of many books on these disasters that Veg discusses. Independent filmmakers chronicled marginal persons and, in some cases, armed them with digital video recorders to empower them and chronicle their own lives. Whatever the medium of expression, min jian intellectuals provided a counterpoint to the ingrained Chinese tradition of official history and the centrally controlled state monopoly of the media.What is most evident from Veg's copiously footnoted discussion is the vitality, pluralism, and spirited contention among all the different varieties of min jian intellectuals. They did not form a school of thought, nor did they seek consensus. They embodied the free spirit of unfettered inquiry, grounded for many of them in identification with elements of society that Dostoevsky called “the insulted and the injured” in his 1861 novel of that title. Although they were not overtly political and did not pose a frontal threat to the state system but rather worked within its confines to ameliorate its worst features, they were barely tolerated in the 1990s and early 2000s. By the second decade of our century, they were subjected to the intensifying repression that characterizes the reign of Xi Jinping, supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party. But the spirit that animated the grassroots intellectuals is unlikely to be extirpated and may reemerge, in perhaps different forms, at some time in the future.

A Study on the Changes in the Constitutional Status and Authority of NK Supreme Leader: Focusing on the cross-comparison of the statuses and authorities among the President, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and Chairman of the State Affairs

The North Korean constitution regulates the status and authority of the supreme leader in detail. Therefore, through reviewing the revised constitutions of North Korea, we can compare the constitutional status and authority of Kim Il Sung (President), Kim Jong Il (Chairman of the National Defense Commission), and Kim Jong Un (Chairman of the State Affairs Commission). This study comparatively analyzed the 1972 Socialist Constitution when the status of the President was the highest, the 2009 revised Constitution when the status of the Chairman of the National Defense Commission was the highest, and the 2019 revised Constitution(14th, 15th amendments) when the status of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission was the highest. As a result, the constitutional status and authority of ‘Chairman of the State Affairs Commission’ took precedence over ‘President’ and ‘Chairman of the National Defense Commission’. One of the representative distinctions in terms of status is the fact that the new constitution(Article 101 of the 15th amendment) regulates that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission does not serve as representatives of the Supreme People s Assembly. ‘President’ and ‘Chairman of the National Defense Commission’ had served as representatives to the Supreme People s Assembly, although not regulated by law. In terms of constitutional authority, the distinct difference is the right to “appoint and summon diplomatic representatives stationed in other countries” (Article 104). It is an authority that neither the president nor the Chairman of the National Defense Commission had in the past. In August 2019, with the introduction of the new Constitution, this right was transferred to the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission from the Standing committee of the Supreme People s Assembly. Kim Jong Un had exercised this right to summon his uncle Kim Pyong Il, the ambassador to the Czech Republic(2019.11). It must have been an exercise of authority to prevent the leakage of power and to consolidate the monolithic leadership system. This is a good example for showing the purpose of expanding and strengthening Kim Jong Un s constitutional status and authority. The constitutional status of Kim Jong Un (Chairman of the State Affairs Commission) reached its peak in the new constitution in August 2019 and surpassed not only Kim Jong Il (Chairman of the National Defense Commission) but also Kim Il Sung (President). The preface to the Constitution states that it is “Kim Il Sung - Kim Jong Il Constitution,” but it seems safe to call it “Kim Jong Un Constitution.” This upgrade of Kim Jong Un s constitutional status and authority in 2019 fully predicted the change (rise) of Kim Jong Un s party status at the 8th Party Congress held in January this year.

Development of Technology Identification model focusing on Technology Intelligence and Components and Indicators extracted from Upstream Documents of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The intelligence of science, technology, and innovation in today's world can be very influential. So, making a wrong decision can have irreparable consequences and may even hurt an economy or a country for several years. Considering that the upstream documents are the guidelines for determining the macro-policies of science and technology, it is necessary to analyze these documents to identify the components of National Powerness from the perspective of these documents. In this study, we sought to investigate the upstream documents and statements of the Supreme Leader to enumerate the dimensions and components of National Powerness. The method used was based on documentary study and to analyze the findings, the Content Analysis method was used. In the policy section, upstream documents such as the constitution, the vision of the I.R. Iran on the horizon of 1404, the declaration of the second step of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and other documents were examined. In the speeches section, statements of the Supreme Leader among scientific experts, university professors, industry, and technology activists, etc. were reviewed and analyzed. The themes extracted from these documents were classified into six dimensions: political, defense-security, environmental, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural discourse. Below these dimensions, 75 components were extracted. Depending on the extracted components, technology can be identified or ranked.