Abstract
Abstract In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea arrived at contradictory answers regarding the question of succession, testing the strength of bilateral ties at a complex moment in the two countries’ domestic politics and in the Cold War. Blaming the excesses of Maoist radicalism on “feudal thinking,” Deng Xiaoping launched a campaign in the summer of 1980 to “eliminate feudalism” from the Chinese Communist Party and elevate a new generation of leaders. Just a few months later, at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Il Sung went public with what Deng saw as the ultimate “feudal” act: a plan to pass down the role of Supreme Leader to his eldest son, Kim Jong Il. By scrutinizing the public record and secret transcripts of Sino-Korean diplomacy, this article traces the origins of their contradictory approaches to political succession and the evolution of Deng's response to Kim's plan from disapproval to acquiescence.
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