Support For Populist Parties Research Articles

A left-right divide? Alternative news use and political trust, populist attitudes, and populist vote intentions in the case of Denmark

Many western democracies have witnessed an upsurge of partisan alternative media that explicitly challenge the legitimacy of mainstream media and politics alike and promote populist discourses. Accordingly, alternative media are often discussed in relation to lower levels of political trust and support for populist parties. Yet, only a limited number of studies have investigated these relationships empirically. Drawing on survey data representative of the Danish adult population ( n = 1,518) collected in January/February 2023, this study investigates how using alternative media is related to political trust, populist attitudes, and populist vote intentions. Unlike previous studies, it distinguishes between left-wing and right-wing alternative media users and finds notable differences: Users of right-wing alternative media have lower political trust, hold more populist attitudes, and have greater predicted probability of intending to vote for a right-wing populist party than non-users, but similar results were not found for users of left-wing alternative media. The study discusses potential explanations for this and how (different) alternative media might impact democracy.

Challenging Democracy: Understanding How the Ideas of Populists and Disenchanted Citizens Align

This thematic issue proceeds from the idea that, despite extensive research, we do not know enough about the alternatives to representative party democracy that people disenchanted with democracy and populists envision apart from greater citizen involvement. Citizens’ potential preferences seem to range from stealth democracy and decision-making by apolitical experts to deliberative mechanisms and referenda. The picture is equally blurred when it comes to the views of populist actors themselves. Research suggests that their calls for referendums diminish over time and that they reject deliberative bodies outright. This thematic issue reassesses our understanding of the extent to which populists’ and citizens’ ideas and the alternatives they propose coincide and argues for a wider dissemination of relevant research that explores these shortcomings. The articles presented explore these points by featuring conceptually and/or methodologically innovative contributions that address issues such as the mismatch between populists and citizens in terms of democratic alternatives, (dis)satisfaction with populist parties in public office, the preferences of distinct subgroups as well as the role of political emotions among populist party supporters.

The Mosque Nearby: Visible Minorities and Far-Right Support in France

How is support for right-wing populist parties affected by exposure to Muslim visibility? Using an original database on French mosques, this article analyzes the relationship between the presence of mosques and support for the Front National at the polling station level in the late 2000s. It finds that the propensity to vote for the Front National increases in polling stations up to intermediate distances from mosques and then decreases, suggesting a spatial mechanism known as the halo effect. The analysis also shows that larger mosques and those with minarets are associated with an accentuated halo effect, suggesting the importance of the salience of minority groups rather than their relative size in influencing political behavior.

What drives support for authoritarian populist parties in Eastern and Central Europe?

Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we examine the rise of the far right in nine east-central European states in the last half of their third post-communist decade: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. For many in the region in 2018 religion remained a cornerstone of national identity even as the nation struggled with the institutional demands of democracy in the aftermath of a global economic recession and the 2015 migration crisis. While far-right parties had many paths to success, our results suggest that respondents affiliated with a religious denomination were more likely to vote for the authoritarian populist party and the most religious were even more likely. Religion served as a tool of illiberalism. Because the appeal of populist parties that combine exclusionary anti-immigrant and anti-diversity rhetoric with generous benefits for citizens may transcend regional historical and political boundaries, the role of religiosity in these findings merits further consideration. Autocratic leaders in some states used Church support for traditional culture and social welfare payments to families and tax rebates to secure electoral victories for themselves and guide party establishments and the civil society away from judicial independence and a free press that could expose corruption. It is not inconceivable that authoritarian populism propped up by ethno-nationalism and social welfare benefits could gain sufficient scope, direction, and durability to undermine the European Union and serve as a beacon of intolerance.

The Preferred Governing Actors of Populist Supporters: Survey Evidence From Eight European Countries

Populist parties have been shown to attract many voters disillusioned with representative democracies. And some of these parties do indeed propose models of government that challenge contemporary democratic systems. However, we do not know exactly what the democratic preferences of populist party supporters are. We propose to fill this gap by investigating the types of actors that citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties would like to see play a greater role in their national political system. First, we find that populists believe that citizens should be more involved, highlighting the people-centred nature of populism. Second, they advocate a greater role for business leaders, military generals, and religious leaders, a preference found among both right-wing and left-wing populists. Third, left-wing populists show a unique preference for scientific experts in government, suggesting a technocratic inclination. Conversely, right-wing populists are particularly critical of elected politicians, underlining their deep anti-elitist attitudes. Our findings suggest that, among citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties, there is support for models of government that challenge representative democracy. The question is whether populist parties would be influenced by these citizens to push for institutional reforms.

The revenge of districts that don’t matter: inequality and elections in Rome from 2000 to 2023

ABSTRACT This article examines whether the theory of the ‘revenge of the places that don’t matter’ applies to urban districts within a metropolis like Rome, Italy. To contribute to this body of literature, we test the hypothesis of a ‘deprivation loop’ arising from local issues related to socio-economic marginality and urban deprivation. To explore this hypothesis, we analyse the relationships among compositional and contextual indicators using principal components analysis. We then use the resulting factor components as explanatory variables in multiple linear regression analyses of voting patterns. Between 2000 and 2023, electoral outcomes reveal that left-wing parties perform best in semi-central, densely populated districts, while right-wing and populist parties gain more support in low-density, sprawling outskirts. Other areas exhibit more variable trends following the turning points of 2008 and 2016. Our findings indicate that certain territorial determinants of discontent enhance electoral support for right-wing or populist parties by channelling protest votes. Key factors include residence in new sprawling districts with many young households, in socially challenged and marginal areas with a high prevalence of precarious or underemployed workers (often foreigners), and generally in ‘left behind’ places.

Rightwing populism and public opinion on the Covid‐19 pandemic in Sweden: The role of strategic party positioning and political cues

AbstractDuring the early stages of the Covid‐19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work‐from‐home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid‐19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS‐COV‐2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti‐elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid‐19 pandemic.

Austerity, economic vulnerability, and populism

AbstractGovernments have repeatedly adjusted fiscal policy in recent decades. We examine the political effects of these adjustments in Europe since the 1990s using both district‐level election outcomes and individual‐level voting data. We expect austerity to increase populist votes, but only among economically vulnerable voters, who are hit the hardest by austerity. We identify economically vulnerable regions as those with a high share of low‐skilled workers, workers in manufacturing and in jobs with a high routine‐task intensity. The analysis of district‐level elections demonstrates that austerity increases support for populist parties in economically vulnerable regions, but has little effect in less vulnerable regions. The individual‐level analysis confirms these findings. Our results suggest that the success of populist parties hinges on the government's failure to protect the losers of structural economic change. The economic origins of populism are thus not purely external; the populist backlash is triggered by internal factors, notably public policies.

Submission or Rebellion? Disentangling the Relationships of Anxiety, Attitudes Toward Authorities, and Right-Wing Populist Party Support

Submission or Rebellion? Disentangling the Relationships of Anxiety, Attitudes Toward Authorities, and Right-Wing Populist Party Support

The (unintended) consequences of ineffective corruption control on populism in Europe

The literature on populism in European politics contends that the inability of mainstream parties to address effectively economic challenges and immigration issues fosters protest voting for anti-establishment figures. This article proposes an alternative perspective centred on corruption control and delineates two pathways through which corruption influences support for populist parties in Europe. First, populists exploit growing public discontent with mainstream policymakers’ incapacity to advance sustainable corruption mitigation measures. They espouse an anti-corruption stance and pledge to rectify what ‘the establishment’ fails to address. The second connection arises from the European Union’s (EU) approach to combating corruption. The EU employs an ineffective anti-corruption strategy and attributes unfavourable outcomes to member states and their citizens. This flawed approach contributes to nationalist sentiments across Europe, which populist politicians leverage by adopting an anti-EU rhetoric. Drawing from an original dataset encompassing every national election across 28 European nations from 1990 to 2020, this study probes the circumstances under which populist parties expand their electoral support. Various statistical analyses reveal that the rise in corruption is a fundamental factor driving support for populism. Not only does the EU fail to assist in tackling national corruption, but its anti-corruption strategy inadvertently bolsters public approval of populist politicians. This effect is accentuated in member states where corruption becomes more pronounced post-EU accession.

Does Performance Matter? The Influence of Attitudes Towards Welfare State Performance on Voting for Rightwing and Leftwing Populist Parties

Abstract In recent decades, populist parties and leaders have obtained great political success. Since populism plays on voter dissatisfaction with the political elite, we might expect that dissatisfaction with the welfare state should also play a role. In this study, we suggest measures to assess welfare state performance (WSP), and we examine how assessment of WSP helps to explain support for the populist political parties – both rightwing and leftwing. Our findings are based on the sixth round of European Social Survey data that has a special module on democracy, which includes questions that enables us to measure WSP. This article shows that WSP is a significant predictor in explaining support for populist parties, but the dynamics differ between how WSP influences support for leftwing populist (LWP) and rightwing populist (RWP) parties.

Logistic hubs and support for radical-right populism: Evidence from Italy

Increasing discontent and the associated growing support for populist parties have been attributed to several drivers, including globalization, technological change, and migration waves. We analyse a phenomenon that encompasses a mix of economic and cultural grievances — the logistic revolution. The Italian logistics industry is characterized by a heavy reliance on low-paying and precarious contracts, it employs a large number of foreign workers, and is dominated by multinational corporations. The construction of large logistic hubs can increase the feeling of economic insecurity and trigger cultural backlash against foreign workers and large corporations. This, in turn, can create a favourable environment for populist radical right-wing parties that portray themselves as protectors of traditional values and national identity, and as defenders of the working class against the perceived threats posed by globalization, immigration, and large corporations. Through an IV and a DiD approach, we provide evidence that the support for Lega, a populist radical-right party, grew in Italian municipalities where new logistic hubs have been built.

Does being ‘left behind’ corrode government legitimacy? Tax morale and economic stress

By now we are familiar with studies which tie being ‘left behind’ to voter support for populist or other extreme views. In the UK case, this is seen in support for Brexit but can also apply to support of parties such as UKIP (e.g. Bolet, 2021; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Comparative studies show that electoral support for populist parties in part reflects lowered trust in mainstream politics (e.g. Geurkink et al., 2020; Keefer et al., 2021; Mauk, 2020), which is seen as a behavioural indicator of slipping legitimacy. Political support for populist movements is interpreted as declining legitimacy of existing governments, and that decline is seen as being tied to economic stress and the ‘left behind’ areas. In this article, we ask whether economics stresses also have impact upon another and possibly more direct measure of government legitimacy – tax morale.

Трансформация партийно-политической системы ЕС накануне евровыборов-2024

The article analyzes the main trends in the transformation of the political party system of the European Union on the eve of the next European Parliament election, which will be held in June 2024. Long-term trends include: a decrease in the popularity of traditional political parties – conservatives, social democrats and liberals – in most EU member states; an increase in electoral support for populist parties in the same countries; an increase in the representation of women in EU authorities; strengthening the pan-European political space, which leads to deepened impact of EU political institutions on the political systems of EU member states, etc. Relatively new trends in the transformation of this system are: growing popularity and influence of Eurosceptic parties both in individual European countries and in the European Union as a whole; political conflict between the EU and its member states – Poland and Hungary which violate European democratic principles, including the rule of law with respect to the rights of citizens and the independence of the judicial branch of government. The author scrutinises the influence of changes in the socio-class structure of European society on these processes, which occur partly owing to a visible reduction in the number of the industrial proletariat. It is noted that the consequences of these changes are the destruction of the boundary between the traditional right and left parties, and the death of many classical ideological categories. The study also presents the forecast of results of the leading pan-European political parties’ participation in the 2024 European election, made by a number of European non-governmental organizations and mainstream media holdings following public opinion polls, as well as their possible impact on the formation of a new composition of the European Parliament and the European Commission.

The urban roots of populism: Mapping and explaining populist strongholds within major Italian cities (2013–2022)

The impact of local contexts on populist voting patterns is receiving more attention, after being initially underestimated in the research literature. Populist support tends to be concentrated in areas ‘left behind’ or ‘that don’t matter’, but we still lack an accurate understanding of (1) the locations of these places within major cities and (2) what characteristics of urban contexts prompt the populist vote. We aim to bridge this gap by analysing precinct-level electoral results of populist parties within six major Italian cities over the 2013–2022 decade. Through novel maps of the within-city populist vote, we identify four types of urban environments: populist strongholds, emerging populist, sporadically populist and never-populist areas. We then investigate how two types of intra-urban factors – compositional and contextual – relate to the formation of populist strongholds and support for populist parties with distinct ideological profiles. The findings improve our comprehension of the urban ‘places of populism’ and highlight the need for the ‘left behind’ thesis to focus more fully on within-city patterns and divides.

Well-being foundations of populism in Europe

Models of retrospective voting assume that voters’ preferences and choices depend on their subjective well-being, and thus, the belief that a particular candidate if elected, shall implement policies to improve it. We use this framework to address the populist phenomenon in Europe over the last 20 years. We find an inverse relationship between individual life satisfaction and self-reported support for populist parties (i.e., party identification). We further explore that relationship and identify political trust as one mechanism through which changes in life satisfaction affect the probability of supporting a populist party, especially, if positioned at the radical right or left.

Fairness and Support for Populist Parties

On the premise that issues of fairness are important to voting behavior but often unrecognized, we explore how feelings of unfairness increase support for populist parties. We distinguish personal unfairness, the view that one’s own economic situation is unfair, from social unfairness, the view that the economic situation of others in society is unfair. Based on findings in psychology, we argue that uncertainties associated with the transition to a globalized knowledge economy heighten people’s feelings of personal unfairness and find empirical support for that contention. We develop arguments about why feelings of personal unfairness should increase support for the populist right and feelings about social unfairness should increase support for the populist left and find empirical support for them. Our results contribute to explanations for why people vote for the populist right rather than the left and underline the roles that uncertainty and issues of fairness play in electoral politics.

The Impact of Government Participation on the Political Trust of Populist Party Supporters

AbstractCitizens are more trustful of politics if their preferred party is an electoral winner and becomes part of the government. However, there remains the question of whether this positive effect of joining the government also holds for supporters of populist parties. Populists show low levels of political trust, as they strongly criticize the political elite. This study argues that voters of populist parties perceive the political system as more responsive to their concerns when their preferred party becomes part of the government and so they become more trustful of politics. Drawing on the case of Austria, the analyses demonstrate that political trust among populist party voters is higher when their party is in government. In contrast, non-populist voters' level of political trust is more stable, even when their party is not in government.

Is there a populist personality? Populist attitudes, personality, and voter preference in Australian public opinion

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether personality affects support for populist parties either directly or indirectly through “populist attitudes.” It theorizes that populist attitudes should be disambiguated into their component facets and that the attitudinal components of populism are best understood as loosely related characteristic adaptations, which mediate the relationship between personality and vote choice. Using data from a nationally representative survey of 2200 Australians fielded prior to the general election in 2019, the paper demonstrates that the three attitudinal components of populism (People-centrism, Anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) are weakly associated with one another and distinctively connected with underlying personality traits. Our results indicate that populist attitudes are better conceptualized as a cluster of weakly related psychological tendencies rather than as a coherent worldview or personality. Mediation analysis indicates that personality traits affect support for populist parties both directly and indirectly through the attitudinal components of populism.

Alternative science, alternative experts, alternative politics. The roots of pseudoscientific beliefs in Western Europe

ABSTRACT The Covid-19 pandemic has given further centrality to science within the public debate. But it has also acted as a great multiplier for pseudoscientific (conspiracy) theories. This exploratory study investigates the determinants of pseudoscientific beliefs in five European countries, using data from a survey conducted in May 2021. The concept of pseudoscience is theoretically framed and then operationalised by constructing a Pseudo-scientific Beliefs Index (PBI). Results show that exposure to scientific information does not ‘protect’ against unsound scientific claims, if not complemented by a correct understanding of the division of scientific labour. Pseudoscientific views are strongly associated with distrust of official science. But, in the context of today’s information abundance, even more relevant is the spread of epistemological populism, which fosters reliance on alternative sources and the pseudo-expertise of ‘alternative scientific authorities’. The embrace of ‘alternative scientific facts’ is also associated with electoral support for populist parties.