Support For Populist Parties Research Articles

Populism, Voters and Cleavages in Bulgarian Politics

The growing success of populist parties from across the political spectrum in Europe calls for an examination of the link between populist parties and voters and the new (if new indeed) cleavages that such parties exploit. Scholars have pointed to the erosion of traditional cleavages as one reason for the success of populist parties. Such analysis fits well with the established democracies of Europe but has little application in the East European context. Traditional cleavages have taken root in few places in Eastern Europe before communist takeover and became even less relevant following four and a half decades of communist rule. With the fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe, the only meaningful division within society was that of anti-communists and supporters of the old regime. Similarly, concepts of Left and Right had (and to a great extend continue to have) little relevance in the East European context where the Left came to be dominated by former communist parties and the Right engulfed an ideologically incoherent opposition. The stronger the former communists were (such as in Bulgaria and Romania) the more fragmented the Right was, as it was the only available space for political competition. The present paper aims to examine voter support for populist parties in Bulgaria and analyze on the cleavages that those parties exploit or create. Thus, the paper examines the impact of populist parties on the political landscape in terms of the changes that those parties result in in voter behavior and cleavage formation. The paper utilizes exit-poll surveys, focusing on voter demographic profiles and the mobility of the vote. The findings indicate that populist parties are most successful in mobilizing non-voters when they first appear, but that their support quickly wanes afterwards. At the same time, there is voter mobility from one populist party to a newer populist party, which makes for a prolong trend of populist politics.

Right‐wing populist party supporters: Dissatisfied but not direct democrats

AbstractRight‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash

Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism -- the economic insecurity perspective -- emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. Alternatively, the cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change. To consider these arguments, Part I develops the conceptual and theoretical framework. Part II of the study uses the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. Part III compares the pattern of European party competition at national-level. Part IV uses the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national evidence at individual level for the impact of the economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting for populist parties. Part V summarizes the key findings and considers their implications. Overall, we find the most consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis.

The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party

The good result of the recently formed Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) was a striking outcome of the 2013 Federal Election. This article explores why AfD supporters chose this party at the 2013 Federal Election and at the 2014 European and eastern German State (Land) Elections. At the Federal Election the AfD's electorate was composed of two groups: a minority of instrumental issue-voters that were drawn to the AfD by its emphasis and positioning on the Euro crisis, and a majority of ‘late supporters’ that decided close to Election Day and were moved more by expressive motives, most notably xenophobic sentiments like those identified in other European countries as a main source of support for right-wing populist parties. The analysis of the subsequent elections shows that, paralleling developments in the AfD's public rhetoric, the Euro crisis ceased to be important for AfD support whereas xenophobic motives became more central.

Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.

Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe

It is widely believed that the recent recession has soured public attitudes towards immigration. But most existing studies are cross-sectional and can shed little light on the economy-wide forces that shift public opinion on immigration. In this paper I use the six rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2012) to test the effects of macro-level shocks on immigration opinion for 20 countries. For Europe as a whole the shifts in opinion have been remarkably mild but with differences between countries that reflect the severity of the recession. Pro-immigration opinion is negatively related to the share of immigrants in the population and to the share of social benefits in GDP, but only weakly to unemployment. These effects are common across different socioeconomic groups and there is little evidence of divergence in opinion. The continuing rise in support for right wing populist parties during the recession owes more to growing Euro-scepticism than to a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment.

Theorizing the New Populism in Eastern Europe: A Look at Bulgaria

This article offers a new theoretical approach to populism that allows for a better understanding of the rise of populism in Eastern Europe and its appearance from across the political spectrum. It argues that populism is a political strategy utilized by personalist parties to reduce the transaction costs of politics by increasing the use of informal political institutions, which have an association with direct and immediate action, and decreasing the use of formal political institutions, which have connotations of slow or non-action. This approach allows for better understanding of voter behavior and voter support for populist parties and introduces a dynamics-based component which helps understand the rise and evolution of populist parties and changes in their voter support, further linking them to changes in the political and economic context. Moreover, highlighting the strategic aspect of populist political behavior, this approach allows for examining the effects of populism on institutions (the transaction cost framework constituting the core of institutional economics), business, and the functioning of democracy. The Bulgarian case is used to illustrate and substantiate this theoretical proposition and to stipulate the effect of populist movements and parties on democracy.

The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany

AbstractWhat are the psychological roots of support for populist parties or outfits such as the Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or Germany's Left Party? Populist parties have as a common denominator that they employ an anti‐establishment message, which they combine with some ‘host’ ideology. Building on the congruency model of political preference, it is to be expected that a voter's personality should match with the message and position of his or her party. This article theorises that a low score on the personality trait Agreeableness matches the anti‐establishment message and should predict voting for populist parties. Evidence is found for this hypothesis in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The relationship between low Agreeableness and voting for populist parties is robust, controlling for other personality traits, authoritarianism, sociodemographic characteristics and ideology. Thus, explanations of the success of populism should take personality traits into account.

Media Cues and Citizen Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties

Right-wing populist parties are thriving across Europe. Their success is usually attributed to demand-side voter factors and supply-side factors explaining differences in success between countries and parties, such as the role of the media. This study focuses on the interplay of these factors and adds to the literature on media and political populism by (1) its individual-level focus, accounting for indirect effects, and (2) the use of an experimental design employing a party cue and two right-wing populist cues: an immigrant cue and an anti-politics cue. The authors find effects of certain cues on key attitudes driving right-wing populist support—anti-immigrant attitudes and political cynicism. Furthermore, through these attitudes, the cues indirectly affect probability to vote for such a party.

The new right and the welfare state: The electoral relevance of welfare chauvinism and welfare populism in the Netherlands

Next to their well-documented authoritarian cultural agenda, new-rightist populist parties have developed specific views on the welfare state: welfare chauvinism and welfare populism. This article studies the electoral relevance of these views for Dutch new-rightist populist parties by means of survey data representative of the Dutch population ( N = 1972). The electorate of those parties shows high levels of both welfare chauvinism and welfare populism. However, only welfare populism underlies support for new-rightist populist parties in addition to well-known cultural motives. Based on these findings, ideological and electoral competition between political parties is discussed, and suggestions for further research are provided.

Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland

During the 1990s, the working class has become the core clientele of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. This article empirically examines the motives of workers for supporting a right-wing populist party. Based on data from the European Social Survey for Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland, three different sets of explanations are tested: (1) hypotheses stressing economic determinants, that is, the fear of wage pressure and competition over welfare benefits; (2) hypotheses emphasizing cultural determinants, that is, the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity; and (3) hypotheses focusing on social alienation, that is, dissatisfaction with the way the country's democracy works and the nonintegration into intermediary networks (trade unions). We find questions of community and identity to be clearly more important than economic grievances. Hence, in Austria and Switzerland, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties among workers seems primarily due to cultural protectionism: the defense of national identity against outsiders. In Belgium, France, and Norway, cultural protectionism is complemented by deep-seated discontent with the way the countries' democracies work.

Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe

Inspired by a previous debate in Acta Politica between Rudy Andeweg and Arend Lijphart on the pros and cons of consensus democracy, this article explores whether support for populist parties is traceable to the institutional framework of West European democracies. ‘Populism’ is conceptualized in terms of its emphasis on the antagonism between the people and corrupt elites, and its opposition to intermediary structures between the rulers and the ruled. We consider right-wing as well as left-wing populism. Two institutional dimensions — the executives-parties dimension and the federal–unitary dimension — are drawn from Lijphart's work to analyze the association between patterns of democracy and populism. Throughout, consensual systems are hypothesized to display higher support for populist parties than majoritarian systems. We show that the executives-parties dimension, which measures the diffusion of power within political institutions, indeed makes a difference for populist support. Moreover, unlike many similar studies on anti-system parties, this article also explores Lijphart's federal–unitary dimension and consequently finds that federal states are more conducive to populism than unitary states.

Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties

One of the ways in which support for right-wing populist parties is held to be distinctive from that for other kinds of political parties is that their leaders are alleged to be ‘charismatic’ figures who play a crucial role in the electoral success their parties have enjoyed. Focusing on three Dutch elections, this article tests the charismatic leadership hypothesis, asking whether leader effects are stronger for populist than for established parties and whether they are stronger for populist leaders who are widely held to be more rather than less charismatic. The results indicate that if, following Weber, charisma is seen as an intimate and direct bond between leaders and followers, there is in fact little support for the charismatic leadership hypothesis, at least in the context of leaders shaping electoral outcomes. While recognizing that charisma may manifest itself in other, perhaps indirect, ways, there would seem to us at the very least to be a need for the notion of charisma to be conceptualized more rigorously if it is to continue to be used as an explanation of right-wing populist party success.

THE RISE AND FAULTS OF THE INTERNALIST PERSPECTIVE IN EXTREME RIGHT STUDIES

In contemporary political science, the extreme right phenomenon continues to attract considerable academic attention. Among major political developments in established Western-style democracies, few have provoked as much interest as the revival of different forms of right-wing radicalism and extremism in recent years (Betz 2003, 74). The number of studies focused on the subject, the number of scholars active in the field and the range of theoretical approaches have all expanded enormously (Mudde 2000, 6). In short, there has been an ‘explosive growth of the literature’ (Ignazi 2002, 22).1. Despite renewed interest in the ‘dark side of Europe’ (Harris 1994), it should not be overlooked that there exists a rich tradition of research focused upon various aspects of extreme right-wing politics. As pointed out by Norris (2005), social psychology, political psychology, political sociology and political science have all devoted significant efforts to investigating the social bases of support for a variety of manifestations commonly labelled ‘extreme right’, whether fascism and Nazism (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950), Poujadisme in France (Hoffman 1956), American phenomena such as McCarthyism and the John Birch Society (Bell 1963; Lipset and Raab 1970), or more recent developments in Western Europe (e.g. Betz 1994; Cheles et al. 1995; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Merkl and Weinberg 1997; Ignazi 2003; Carter 2005). What differentiates previous instances of extreme right success from more recent examples is that the former, for example the Poujadists in 1956 or the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in the 1960s, experienced only ‘flash’ success, while contemporary extreme right parties (ERPs) have exerted an appreciable impact upon a number of party systems over the course of a number of electoral cycles. As observed by Schain et al. (2002, 16), ‘there seems to be little question that the radical right has become an important political force in Western Europe’. The principal aim of this review article is to examine the scholarly response to the extreme right phenomenon and, to this end, is composed in the following manner: first, it outlines how a preoccupation with ‘demand-side’ or ‘externalist’ explanations led researchers away from examining extreme right parties (ERPs) and towards assessing the impact of socio-economic developments on levels of ERP electoral support. Second, although contributors have in recent years attempted to redress this imbalance by focusing increasingly upon party-centric factors, to date ‘internalist’ perspectives have suffered from a glaring lack of empirical analysis. The review concludes by suggesting that researchers might gain a richer insight into internalist dimensions and the nature of contemporary ERPs through examining the political actors at the heart of this phenomenon.

The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support

Since the initial rise of Radical Right-wing Populist parties (RRPs) in the mid-1980s, comparative analyses have tried to identify the core social and attitudinal elements to these parties' electorates and changes therein. To date, none of these has been accepted as providing a satisfactory typology of RRPs. Regional differences between these parties, in particular between the Scandinavian Radical Right and the ‘Continental’ Extreme Right, have constituted one element of diversity informing much of the literature on these cases. However, many have recently emphasized the apparent convergence towards a common RRP type in Western Europe, away from the parties' differing roots. This paper looks at evidence of such shifts in RRP electorates, concentrating on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of their social profile. It finds that, while there are indeed shifts in the party electorates across time, these do not correspond entirely to the perception of a convergence of RRP types, and indeed that, on key social indicators such as education and class, the dynamics do not correspond to those commonly held in the comparative literature.

Economics, politics, and foreigners: Populist party support in Denmark and Norway

This paper investigates the dynamics of vote intention for the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties. It shows that support patterns for these populist parties can be explained with similar independent variables. These include national economic conditions and political events. Empirical support for the usefulness of these variables is stronger in the case of the Danish Progress party. The analysis also suggests that increases in support for both parties during the 1980s was to a significant extent driven by the increase in the number of foreigners entering these countries.

Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning

Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning