Support For Israel Research Articles

The Winner Takes All: The 1949 Island of Rhodes Armistice Negotiations Revisited

Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the war. A large number of Palestinians had fled and had lost their homeland. After the war, Israel was in a much stronger military position than Egypt, and could resume the war if necessary. New empirical evidence shows that this imbalance of power on the ground was strengthened by strong support in Israel's favor from the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, as well as from the US administration. Such support served to limit the UN mediator's room for maneuver and ultimately contributed to a biased agreement. An analysis of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Rhodes sheds light on and widens our understanding of the approach and power relations which marked the 1949 negotiations. The armistice negotiations represent the first example of a process and an agreement based largely on Israeli premises. Such an agreement could not provide the basis for peace in the Middle East. Ever since 1947, mediators have tried to convince Israel, the Palestinians, and their surrounding Arab neighbors that a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict is both desirable and possible. Still, all initiatives launched by the United Nations in the years following 1947 and the subsequent establishment of the State of Israel have failed. Similarly, repeated attempts by the United States have had limited success. On the Island of Rhodes, Israeli and Egyptian delegations entered an armistice agreement under UN auspices on February 24, 1949. Ralph Bunche, a US doctor of political science and a former US State Department official, was the UN Acting Mediator (henceforth mediator). The agreement signed on Rhodes in 1949 between Israel and Egypt was the result of the first round of negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and formed the basis for three further armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors: Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The armistices were intended to provide the basis for later peace negotiations, which were expected to commence within a year.1 They were initiated in Lausanne, but nothing came of them. On December 10, 1950, Ralph Bunche received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to negotiate the armistice agreements in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbor states.2 Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the 1940s represents the crucial beginnings; the formative years that would later influence similar attempts. An appreciation of the approaches, processes, and outcomes of peace initiatives during this period is arguably of utmost importance for understanding the entire post-war era. This article seeks to shed light on the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations and, through this exploration, call into question the accuracy of the traditional explanations offered with reference to this process. In fact, crucial issues with regard to the armistice negotiations on the Island of Rhodes have not been adequately studied.3 This article will provide fresh insights into what took place on Rhodes during the Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations. Why did the armistice agreement reached on Rhodes fail to contribute to later peace negotiations in the Middle East? Can the answer be found in the nature of the final agreement and how this agreement was reached? Could it be that the very nature of the negotiations, with specific reference to the mediator's room for maneuver and the role of external actors, such as the United States and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, proved decisive in terms of the final outcome? Mediation theory points to the fact that process symmetry rarely serves to redress existing power asymmetry between negotiating parties. …

Value Judgment: Why Do Americans Support Israel?

Many theories purport to explain American support for Israel, from strategic considerations to ideological affinity to a strong pro-Israel lobby that has captured Congress. This article argues that domestic politics play a large role not due to the influence of a lobby, but through voter preferences translating into official support. First, the paper documents high levels of public affinity for Israel and demonstrates that policy toward Israel is driven primarily by public opinion rather than by an Israel lobby. Second, it uses five case studies to demonstrate that public support for Israel is based on ideological, rather than strategic, grounds. Finally, it uses these conclusions to make some observations about the future of American support for Israel.

Distancing or Transformation? Ties to Israel Come of Age

I cannot meaningfully discuss the survey reports of engagement or disengagement. However, from my vantage point, there are broad areas in which Israel is a significant part of contemporary American Jewish life, including young Jews. The engagement with Israel that these phenomena reflect is a better informed, more pluralistic and more complex relationship that can no longer be measured on the old scale of blind loyalty and support. Perhaps that may not be much succor to the traditional organizations that currently mobilize and channel support for Israel (AIPAC foremost among them), but the relationship between American Jewry and Israel is transforming itself into something new and more mature.

Obama's AfPak Strategy: Will it succeed in Afghanistan?

Written on 17th January 2010, the article argues that there will not be support for a continued American and Western military presence in Afghanistan for very long, and that building an effective ethnically balanced Afghan Security Forces, improving the quality of governance, redressing the balance of power between different ethnic groups, eliminating corruption, providing better governance, bringing under control the clandestine financing received by the Taliban from donors who view America as an enemy of Islam and a blind supporter of Israel, reducing the financing provided by the opium cultivation and trafficking will take more time than is available. It advocates that the enunciated American Counter terrorism doctrine—15% kinetic, 20% diplomatic and 65% economic—should be applied in practice with money being spent on creation of employment opportunities in proportion to the $100 billion budgeted for the military effort after the troop increase of 30,000 announced by President Obama. Reconciliation with the Taliban and offering them a share of power after having reduced their support base by providing employment and economic opportunities to the Taliban foot soldiers offers the only solution within the available time frame. Welcoming the emphasis on protecting the population as the basic thrust of military activity it suggests that this must be accompanied by military action to clear and hold selected areas traditionally regarded as Taliban strongholds and that in such areas good governance must be quickly established to further the winning of “hearts and minds” among a people who have over the centuries survived by picking the winning side.

Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.

Identity versus Identity: Israel and Evangelicals and the Two-Front War for Jewish Votes

Republicans made major efforts to win a larger share of the Jewish vote in 2004 by emphasizing their strong support for Israel. They partially succeeded, but did not make a dent in the overall loyalty of American Jews to the Democratic party, since they lost approximately as many votes because of Jews’ negative reactions to the party’s evangelical base. We argue that both Israel and worries over evangelical influence in the country reflect concerns about Jewish identity, above and beyond disagreements on specific social issues We compare American Jewish voting behavior and liberalism to non-Jews in 2004 using a survey of Jews from the National Jewish Democratic Coalition and the American National Election Study. For non-Jews, attitudes toward evangelicals are closely linked to social issues, but for Jews this correlation is small. The Jewish reaction to evangelicals is more of an issue of identity and the close ties of evangelicals to the Republican party keeps many Jews Democratic. Attitudes toward evangelicals are far more important to Jewish voting behavior than for non-Jewish voters.

Why peace can be as difficult as war

The book under review fills an important gap in examining American foreign policy during the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the events of September 11, 2001. It documents American reactions to the events during and after 1989 and explains some of the difficult foreign policy choices facing the US during the 1990s. It also describes how the mid-1990s came to be seen by some as ‘an age of anxiety’. The book largely focuses on the thinking of the foreign policy elites and, in the opinion of this reviewer, might have said more about American domestic politics at this time. The rise of the conservative movement, the belief in the unfettered free market, and the seemingly unconditional support for Israel were largely rooted in domestic politics but had important foreign policy implications. One paradox, so this reviewer argues, was the way in which some in the West—the Cold War victors—seemed disorientated or even demoralized by their own victory. One underlying problem, implicit in this book, is that of achieving cohesion in the absence of a common enemy. For that reason peace can sometimes be as difficult as war.

'God Doesn't Care': The Contradictions of Christian Zionism

AbstractDefining Christian Zionism as theological support for Israel as a Zionist state, this article analyses four contradictions in such a theology. Firstly, although Christian Zionism insists it is purely theological, not political, this separation is impossible. Secondly, mainstream Zionist use of Christian Zionism to influence US foreign policy is misguided, since Christian Zionists wish to convert or annihilate all Jews. Thirdly, Christian Zionism is anti-Semitic, wishing to eliminate all non-converted Jews (and Arabs). Finally, since Christian Zionists read the Old and New Testaments in a 'literal' fashion, they resort to the violence of Armageddon to resolve their theological contradictions.

WHAT DO MUSLIMS REALLY THINK ABOUT ISRAEL?

Muslim realism, featuring a pragmatic, pluralistic approach to Israel as a member of the community of nations, has resulted in direct, bilateral treaties with a number of Muslim-majority states. These developments are grounded not only in realpolitik but in Islamic law and statecraft, and many moderate Muslims have voiced their support of Israel's existence. The Palestinian Authority must summon the political will to bring the Islamic Waqf officials under control and to repudiate Salafi claims over Jerusalem. With the vital support of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the Palestinians and Israelis may be able to establish order and justice in their lands.

Disarming Hezbollah

Hezbollah has become a powerful yet destabilizing force in Lebanon, affecting internal stability, allowing Syria and Iran dangerous influence, delaying peace with Israel, and complicating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, it forces the United States to struggle between traditional support for Israel and newfound support for Lebanese democracy. The international community should capitalize on Hezbollah's damaged public image following its 2006 war with Israel and pursue a multiparty disarmament effort, to include incentives for the major regional players. The effort should address Hezbollah's continued presence in the Lebanese Parliament, international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, return of the Golan to Syria in exchange for its cutting military support to Hezbollah, and a nonaggression agreement between Israel and Lebanon.

The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right (review)

Reviewed by: The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right Saul Lerner The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right, by George Michael. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 397 pp. $34.95. George Michael has written a very important book in The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right. Not only has he effectively described the historic background of both U.S. and [End Page 138] non-U.S. extremist and hate groups and militant Islamic groups, but he has effectively shown how such groups share goals and objectives and, therefore, are likely to develop and encourage future cooperative efforts. The book describes the nature, political objectives, and historical backgrounds of such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, white supremacists, Holocaust deniers, the American and the European extreme right, neo-Nazis, radical Christians, and others. Michael makes clear that although “virtually all terrorists come from the ranks of extremists, most extremists are not terrorists,” but “political extremism often serves as an incubator for future terrorism” (p. 13). Opposition between militant Islamists and American extremists over religious belief, racial/ethnic background, cultural differences, and other important distinctions has not undermined the goals that the two groups hold in common, and both continue to oppose modernity, democracy, aspects of capitalism and globalization, the United States, nation-states, and other such phenomena. Moreover, both militant Islamists and the extreme right are angered by U.S. involvement in the Middle East, participation of the United States in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. support of Israel, and the influence of Israel on U.S. politics and political decision making. These groups are strongly motivated by support of the Palestinian cause, a deep commitment to antisemitism, and demonization of the Jew. In his analysis of the American extreme right, Michael indicates that two major changes have taken place since the 1980s: the ultimate demise of communism turned this group away from extreme patriotism and, as the nonwhite population of the United States grew, this group became increasingly nihilistic (p. 23), viewed the United States as controlled by a “Zionist Occupation Government” (ZOG), and grew ever-more obsessed with Jews. The result has been that the extreme right has sought destruction of the old order. Terrorism has been seen as a means of shocking the masses into overthrowing Zionist domination (pp. 28–9). Citing the study of Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Comes to America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), the Islamic militants have shared some views with American extremists, for they have been: “[r]adical [u]topian,” “[t]otalitarian,” “[a]ntidemocratic,” “[a]ntimoderate,” “[a]nti-Semitic,” “[a]nti-[w]estern,” and “[u]nwilling to coexist” (pp. 33–34). Militant Islamists view the United States and “Israel—along with a putative international Zionist cabal—” “as the main threat to and oppressor of Islam” (p. 45). Hence, in the same way that the extreme right sees overthrow of the government of the United States as key to the resolution of all American problems, Islamic militants seek to resolve modern problems and the problems [End Page 139] of all humanity by overthrowing U.S./Zionist domination and restoring “the universalistic fervor of early Islam” (p. 34). Based on such works as those of Daniel Pipes, Yossef Bodansky, Islamic Anti-Semitism as a Political Instrument (Houston, TX.: Ariel Center for Policy Studies, 1999), and others, circulation in the Middle East of The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, widespread Arab belief that an Israel lobby dominates American Middle Eastern policy, and support of the destruction of Israel, Michael has built an effective case describing militant Islamist antisemitism. Moreover, he has traced the development of such antisemitism from the years prior to the World War II, including Arab support of the Nazis during World War II, collaboration with neo-Nazis in the post-war period, and opposition to both Israel and Jews throughout the decades since the end of World War II. Anti-Jewish and anti-U.S. perceptions are considered by the author to be part of the political and...

“Containing” the Bush Doctrine: Ian Shapiro’s Critique of the Post-9/11 American Security Strategy

“Containing” the Bush Doctrine: Ian Shapiro’s Critique of the Post-9/11 American Security Strategy Susan Keppelman Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror , by Ian Shapiro. Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2007 , 133 pages. $24.95 (hardcover). In Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror , Ian Shapiro argues for the rejection of the Bush Administration’s national security strategy in favor of a strategy based on George Kennan’s idea of containment. Shapiro offers a systematic critique of the current security strategy, which he refers to as the “Bush Doctrine,” and argues that preemptive use of force and abandonment of multilateral institutions will ultimately alienate the U.S.’s supporters and foster new terrorists. Despite the book’s name and chapter titles (such as “Containment for Democracy” and “Containment’s Realism”), Shapiro provides little discussion of the details of his theory of containment. The first five of seven chapters, for example, address the history and rationale of the Bush Doctrine, with only passing references to what alternatives Shapiro would propose. The book’s primary pitfall, however, is that Shapiro occasionally deviates from a pure discussion of strategy to inject partisan attacks, which likely alienates certain potential readers and will certainly limit the adoption of his ideas. Shapiro approaches this topic with a background in political theory and 24 years as a political science professor at Yale University. While he does not have a background in either history or national security issues, Shapiro has extensively studied theories of democracy, including the preconditions for democratic government and rule of law, relevant to both the Bush Doctrine and the idea of containment. This book, however, is not an academic study, but rather meant for mass consumption. The prose is easy to read, with much of Shapiro’s tedious research hidden in the 40 pages of endnotes (for only 133 pages of text). Containment begins with a review of how the Bush Administration came to reject previous Cold War-era security strategies, such as containment and deterrence, and adopt the Bush Doctrine. The “shock, scale, and sheer drama of the 9/11 attacks”1 led the administration to conclude that the U.S. would need a more aggressive security strategy based on preemptive, rather than reactive, actions. In August 2002, Vice President Cheney concluded that “it’s [End Page 203] a lot tougher to deter enemies who have no country to defend, and containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction and are prepared to share them with terrorists, who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States.”2 According to Shapiro, the 2002 National Security Strategy was a departure from previous U.S. policies in that it had a worldwide scope, affirmed the U.S.’s right to unilateral action unconstrained by alliances, allowed for preemptive war even without an “imminent threat,” envisioned the replacement of dictators with democracies, and, most importantly, created a condition of “permanent war” with the administration’s declaration of war on terror. Shapiro refutes the basic assumption of the Bush Doctrine—that terrorism is a threat unlike any other the U.S. has experienced. Specifically, he lists six claims that the Bush administration has made to justify its new policies, a discussion that dominates 40 of the book’s 133 pages. These claims include assertions that the U.S. is facing new technologies of destruction, that “rogue regimes” are developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that corruption makes international sanctions regimes impossible, that terrorists leaders and attackers who are willing to die are unresponsive to incentives, and that weak states provide havens for terrorist organizations. Shapiro responds to these assertions by highlighting the fact that all terrorist groups depend on some degree of local support and sanctuary, and that the U.S. can fight terrorism by making it less likely that these groups will find indigenous support. A policy of containment should recognize that the U.S. may be powerless to influence others’ ideologies, but that collective-action sanctions can serve to influence their behavior. While he offers no particular policy suggestions, Shapiro does emphasize that “the strident assertion of American might alienates people unnecessarily”3 and that U.S. support for Israel...

Michael Walzer Responds

Jerry Slater's polemic is notable most of all for its exaggerations. I am indeed a supporter of Israel, and only wish that I was as eminent, authoritative, prominent, well known, and influential as he says I am—for then I would be a far more useful supporter than I have been. I would also be a more useful critic. Israel needs its supporters, because it is the only state in the world whose legitimacy is widely denied and whose destruction is publicly advocated and threatened. And it needs its critics so that its response to those denials and threats is held within the necessary moral limits. But the critics, if they are to be useful, must get the denials and threats right. Slater minimizes them throughout his piece, as when he says that Hezbollah is committed to Israel's destruction "at least on the ideological level"—by which he means, it's really just talk; the commitment doesn't affect political practice. But I am afraid that Islamic militants give every sign of believing in the old left maxim about the unity of theory and practice.

‘Thy Will Be Done’: The New Foreign Policy of America's Christian Right

America's evangelical community are usually seen to be little more than cheerleaders for the Bush administration's activist foreign policy. However, there is much going on in this diverse community, which has begun to develop its own ideas about foreign policy, many of which contradict realist and neo-conservative approaches. Tracing the development of the community's interest in foreign affairs, the article focuses on the three most important contemporary issues for America's conservative Protestants (CPs): solidarity with the oppressed; concern over and use of international institutions (and with Europe); and support for Israel. There is a growing coherence among America's (white) CPs, which will be of increasing relevance to America's partners and friends.

In Zion's hall of mirrors: a comment on Neuer Antisemitismus?

ABSTRACT Beller's review article takes as its starting point the essays published in a recent collection exploring the question of a ‘new antisemitism’. He claims that this debate has generated more heat than light. Warnings about the rise of a new antisemitism in Europe, especially on the left, are greatly exaggerated, largely unjustified and approach a form of psychological ‘projection’. Anti-Zionism is not necessarily antisemitism. Zionism is an ethnonationalist ideology and, as such, contradicts the universalist logic of the socialist and liberal left; the enthusiastic support for Israel by European socialist parties from 1948 until the 1970s was anomalous. Nevertheless, the recent critical approach taken by the liberal European media to Israeli policy is not usually anti-Zionist, but rather holding Israel to its own high moral standards. If there is conflation between anti-Zionist and antisemitic attitudes this reflects the similarly conflating Zionist belief that Israel is the expression of the Jewish people's right to national self-determination. Some manifestations of Arab/Muslim anti-Zionism do indeed exhibit the worst forms of antisemitism. However, there are reasons for this hostility. Heated assertions decrying the denial of the right of Israel to exist are distractions from the very problematic issues raised by Arab grievances. A deeper question here involves the conflict between the Muslim world and two forms of western modernity: neo-conservative, uniform, nationally based rationalism; and the more ‘postmodern’, critical and pluralist tradition of European (and American) left/liberal intellectuals. Ironically, current American and Israeli policy now represents the former ‘modernity’, while the latter, critical tradition derives to a great extent from the experience of the Jewish diaspora. The diasporic Jewish tradition is the model to which Israel and its supporters should look to secure Israel's peaceful, sustainable future.

The Israeli Lobby and the U.S. Response to the War in Lebanon

On 28 August 2006, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)sponsored a panel discussion on “The Israeli Lobby and the U.S. Responseto the War in Lebanon” at the National Press Club, Washington, DC. StephenWalt (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard) and John Mearsheimer(University of Chicago), authors of the controversial article “The IsraeliLobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” were featured.The panel began with opening remarks by Corey Saylor (governmentaffairs director, CAIR) and Nihad Awad (executive director, CAIR). Awaddiscussed the war in Lebanon and the situation in Gaza, described Israel’sdropping of cluster bombs on civilian Lebanese towns, quoted a HumanRights Watch report that states Israel does not distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as an Amnesty International report describingIsraeli actions in Lebanon as war crimes. He concluded: “Our one-sided supportfor Israel is a liability in the war on terror. It has turned much of theworld, including our European allies, against us.”Stephen Walt summarized the main arguments of his research articlewith John Mearsheimer. Among them are that comprehending the recent warin Lebanon requires an understanding of the pro-Israel groups’ politicalpower in the United States; that the Israeli lobby’s influence has led to policiesthat are not in the United States’ national interest, or in those of theregion’s countries, including Israel; and that $3 billion of American taxpayers’money is given unconditionally to a wealthy industrial nation. Hequoted former American negotiator Aaron Miller’s remark that the UnitedStates acted as Israeli’s lawyer during Oslo and has been even more onesidedunder President Bush ...

The Empire of the Spectacle

The Empire of the Spectacle

Rabbi Engagement with the Peace Process in the Middle East*

Objectives. Support for Israel has been a hallmark issue of the Jewish lobby in American politics. But what do Jewish religious leaders think about U.S. policy toward Israel and the peace process, and how often do they address these issues?Methods. Using a sample of more than 400 rabbis drawn from the four major movements of American Judaism in the fall of 2000, we investigate rabbi views of and speech about foreign affairs, especially about Israel.Results. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find considerable diversity in opinion among rabbis (if not public speech), particularly on issues concerning Israel and the peace process.Conclusions. We conclude that the Jewish community—really, several communities organized by movement—is hearing a diversity of opinions about the peace process. We argue that reference group theory and movement socialization help explain this diversity.

Israel's Advocates

Israel and United States have been closely allied since Israel's founding. President Harry S Truman officially recognized Israel almost immediately after it declared independence, and popular support for this new state grew among Americans Jews and Christians alike. Support for Israel has remained high even as the strategic value of the alliance has apparently diminished. Indeed, in supporting Israel the United States has at times pursued a sub-optimal foreign policy. This presents an interesting political puzzle: in a country where public policy is made by majoritarian institutions (Congress and the president) designed to represent local interests and opinion, how has the cause of this small country maintained consistently high levels of support from policymakers and the public alike? That is the question we, together with our colleagues Kenneth Wald and Beth Rosenson, investigate in this research project.

The Russian Diaspora in Central Asia: Russian Compatriots and Moscow's Foreign Policy

Abstract: This article examines how Russians and the Russian government have conceptualized their compatriots living in Central Asia, examines the circumstances surrounding Russian immigration to and emigration from the region, discusses the role played by the Russian diaspora in Russian foreign policy and Central Asian politics, and outlines the Putin administration's approach to Russian compatriots abroad. President Putin has devoted considerable attention to promoting and defending the interests of Russian compatriots in Central Asia, and Russian foreign policy is slowly changing to utilize soft power more effectively in achieving Russia's goals in the near abroad. Russia's nationalist movement actively lobbies for greater attention to the diaspora in Russian foreign policy. A surge of patriotism resulting from terrorist attacks and the Chechnya conflict heightens Russians' sense of identity and could lead to greater pressures to defend Russians abroad. The Russian diaspora is now more important symbolically than it was under Yeltsin, yet traditional political and security considerations, a vigorous energy diplomacy, and participation in emerging regional organizations overshadow Russia's compatriots abroad as factors in Moscow's Central Asia policy. Key words: Central Asia, compatriots, diaspora, foreign policy, Russians ********** Diasporas can have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policies of states. The American Jewish community, for example, constitutes a powerful voice within the United States in support of Israel, and shapes American policy toward the Middle East. For years, the Armenian community has influenced U.S. policy toward Turkey and the Caucasus, whereas Florida's Cubans have pressured Washington to maintain a hard line against Castro's regime. Ethnic Chinese living in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Taiwan have invested heavily in the PRC, contributing substantially to the mainland's phenomenal economic growth. When the Soviet Union collapsed, some twenty-five million ethnic Russians were living in the fourteen non-Russian republics, with several million more scattered around the globe. This article assesses the importance of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Central Asia (collectively termed compatriots) for Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. The Russian diaspora issue was on Moscow's agenda only intermittently when Boris Yeltsin was in office. President Putin has emphasized restoring Russian power and influence in the world, particularly along the unstable southern border where ethnic Russians mix with peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Under Putin, Russian nationalism is becoming a stronger force in domestic politics and foreign policy. Given these developments, Russian foreign policy could become more assertive in defending the interests of Russians abroad, or at least in playing the diaspora card in international relations. Moscow's efforts to exert greater influence in the southern border regions, which pose the greatest security challenge to Russia, elevate the potential importance of the Russian diaspora as an instrument of statecraft. This article addresses the following questions. First, how have Russians and the Russian government conceptualized their compatriots living in Central Asia? What are the circumstances surrounding Russian immigration to and emigration from the region? What role has the Russian diaspora played in Russian foreign policy and Central Asian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union? Has Vladimir Putin's administration adopted a substantially different approach to Russian compatriots abroad than that of Boris Yeltsin? What has been Russia's ethnic strategy in the critical security region of Central Asia, and how does the ethnic factor fit into Russia's overall strategy toward the region? My first task is to present some theoretical issues relevant to diaspora politics and foreign policy, outline the pattern of ethnic Russian settlement in Central Asia, and discuss the elusive concept of Russian identity outside the Russian Federation. …