Support For Israel Research Articles

Ofira Seliktar. Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. xvi, 272 pp.

Israel, and before that the idea of a Jewish state in the traditional homeland, has long captured the imagination of many, if not always most, American Jews. The close connection between Jews in Israel and the United States intensified as the events of the last century unfolded, especially the Holocaust, the struggle for Israel's independence, and then the unending effort to safeguard that independence and ensure security. The 1967 Six-Day War, the run-up to which conjured up images of another calamity, had a profound effect in the Diaspora, driving home the reality of Israel's precarious security and the state's central importance in modern Jewish life. That watershed produced a relatively short-lived period when it seemed that American Jews were united in their support for Israel. But, since 1977, that “sacred unity” has been called into question as sharp divisions have appeared—exacerbated by controversial Israeli government decisions and the pressures of the peace process since 1991.

Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion, Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997–2002

ABSTRACT This paper explores the contours of support for the state of Israel in the House of Representatives from 1997 to 2002. In an analysis of votes and cosponsorship decisions, we find that when Congress considers innocuous resolutions of support for Israel, support is consensual and nonpartisan. However, as the violence escalated between Israel and the Palestinians in the 106th and 107th Congresses (1999–2001), the House increasingly considered bills and resolutions that directly engaged the Palestinian issue and forced legislators to take a side in the ongoing conflict. This transformed the politics of support for Israel and increased the level of conflict among legislators. With that, new partisan, ideological, religious, and racial cleavages emerged. Democrats, liberals, and African Americans started to identify with the Palestinians—not Israel—as the oppressed group. At the same time, religious and ideological conservatives and Republicans started to identify with Israel as a just state under attack from lawless individuals considered to be outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. At least with regard to Israel, this suggests that the development of U.S. foreign policy, which is often characterized as an elite-driven pursuit of national interests, is heavily marked by domestic ethno-religious forces.

Moderate Islam

The Debate
 Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.

Moderate Islam

The Debate
 Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.

The “Jews of Silence”—the “Jews of Hope”—the “Jews of Triumph”: Revisiting Methodological Approaches to the Study of the Jewish Movement in the USSR

In December 2001, over 150 citizens of Russia, Israel, the U.S., Ukraine and some other countries gathered in Moscow in their capacity as former activists of the non-official Jewish movement in the USSR to celebrate the 25th anniversary of an event that had never taken place—an unofficial Moscow Symposium on Jewish Culture. The symposium, which had been forbidden by the KGB, acquired an important, but symbolic, meaning (as vivid evidence of the suppression of Jewish culture in the USSR) for the very fact of its non-performance. Celebrating this (non-)event 25 years later, members of the Jewish movement who had been active for some time in the period from the late 1960s to the late 1980s talked about their struggle against the Soviet regime, emphasizing the victory they had gained together with other dissenting groups. They called for the “political support of Israel, the United States, and Russia in their fight against international terrorism,” spoke on behalf of repeal of the Jackson–Vannick amendment, voted for the establishment of a transnational association of Russian (or Russian-speaking or former Soviet) Jews, and even discussed the “historical mission of Russian Jewry.” The issue of Jewish culture was virtually omitted from the discussion.

Truth and Fiction: The Holocaust on Stage and Screen

As writers and film makers we have the privilege of being able to make our views known through our work. Each time we draw attention to the Holocaust we are, I believe, educating, reminding, warning and proclaiming as loudly as we can our support for Israel's continued existence. I do not look for the themes about which I write, they look for me. I nurse the hope that those themes will either become less obsessive or go hunting elsewhere, perhaps to alight on new, younger writers and film makers. I long for other themes to find me and provide respite. But that, I know, may be a forlorn hope. I also long for films and plays about the Holocaust to become less and less necessary but that, too, I suspect is a forlorn hope.

Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion Toward the Middle East: Israel's New Best Friends?*

Objectives. Although Christian fundamentalist elites have become increasingly vocal in their support for Israel in the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, it is not clear that this rhetoric has produced differing attitudes about U.S. foreign policy in public opinion. This article examines whether such differences exist, and whether they are rooted in aspects of fundamentalist eschatology.Methods. Data from a national telephone survey on attitudes toward the Middle East conflict and U.S. policy were examined using multivariate regression and means comparisons.Results. These results demonstrate that Christian fundamentalists are the strongest supporters of Israel in America today. Fundamentalists have greater sympathy for Israel, oppose policies to pressure Israel, and are distinctive from all other groups in their high levels of support for continuing Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories, as well as complete Israeli control of Jerusalem.Conclusion. Christian fundamentalists in America are distinctive on this vital issue in American foreign policy because of their literal interpretation of the Bible or their leaders' increased cues on Middle East policies, or both. This suggests that religion is now an important factor in understanding public opinion on U.S. foreign policy in the region.

The Dilemma of Double Standards in U.S. Human Rights Policy

In May 2000 the United States was voted off of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. This reflected the frustration of much of the international community with the United States’ increasingly obstructionist approach to international institutionalism. The United States’ opposition to the proposed International Criminal Court (ICC) reflects its pursuit of double standards in human rights policy. Double standards are manifest in U.S. support for Israel and Turkey with their records of gross human rights violations. They likewise are discernable in the strategic motives behind the 1999 Kosovo intervention. The proposed ICC challenges the United States’ use of human rights rhetoric to pursue unilateral objectives by forging a more neutral means of prosecuting international justice. If the United States is to recover its status as the world's human rights leader, it must renew its commitment to multilateral institutionalism and must avoid double standards that undermine the legitimacy of human rights discourse.

The moral psychology of US support for Israel

(2003). The moral psychology of US support for Israel. Survival: Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 123-144.

The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations

This article examines United States behavior at the United Nations regarding the Question of Palestine, with focus on the US-Israel relationship and US voting pattern. What is found is an overwhelming voting coincidence between the US and Israel in the UN General Assembly or a US liberal use of the veto in the UN Security Council in support of Israel. The strong bond between both countries, brought about by common interests and practical US realities, has created an impasse on the Question of Palestine at the UN. All concerned must realize that membership in the UN necessitates upholding the UN Charter and moving beyond national idiosyncrasies and short-term advantages in order to achieve stability and peace with justice for all.

Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy

WHEN TOPPLING Saddam Hussein rose to the top of the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda, a chorus of voices protested that Washington had misdiagnosed the root cause of its Middle Eastern dilemmas. It's Palestine, stupid! was the refrain heard not only from European and Arab capitals, but from some quarters in the United States as well. These voices argued that attacking Iraq while the Israelis were reoccupying Palestinian lands would substantiate the claim, already widespread in the Middle East, that the United States had declared war against all Arabs and Muslims. The ensuing backlash would undermine the American position in the region and wreak havoc on American interests. What Washington really needed to do was postpone or abandon a showdown with Saddam and focus instead on achieving a breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Unqualified U.S. support for Israel, the critics reason, drives a wedge between Washington and the Arabs, most of whom support Palestinian aspirations; for the United States to improve its regional position, it must remove the wedge by tilting somewhat toward the Palestinians. The problem with this argument is that it rests on two hidden and faulty assumptions: about how much Washington would have to change its stance, and about how much goodwill that change would produce.

Unholy Wars

Reading this book is a lot like trying to eat undercooked meat – there is proteinin there, but it is flavorless and tedious. You can chew and chew, but youjust cannot bring yourself to swallow it. The author presents his case with anauthoritative tone, stuffing each paragraph with names, dates, and historicaldata, but a closer look reveals the use of manipulative language that stringstogether half-truths and repeated insinuations with conclusions that do notdirectly relate to the given evidence. The “Acknowledgements” mention thatthe author has important friends in media and politics, yet his credentials(e.g., for whom he is working, or what his political motivations are) are notgiven. This is a serious weakness.Even more serious is his clear contempt for Islam, for he makes no genuinedistinction between Muslims’ desire for self-rule based upon their beliefsystem (often called “Islamism”) and terrorism. The CIA’s use of Muslimlives to advance American corporate interests is taken for granted, whileMuslims are portrayed as untrustworthy imbeciles or ungrateful servants.Such mainstream and moderate organizations and intellectuals as TablighiJamaat, Jamaat Islami, Maududi of Pakistan, and Hassan al-Turabi of Sudanare given as examples of dangerous extremism. American terrorism againstIraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan, and its support of Israel, are unquestioned asbeing justified, noble, and necessary, while any attack on western interests orAmerican lives is described with emotionally loaded terms. The only seriouscriticism of the United States is that it ever trusted Muslims as allies ...

The Street Reacts to Operation Defensive Shield: Snapshots from the Middle East

One of the least-remarked upon features of Israel's Operation Defensive Shield was the massive popular response it engendered at the popular level throughout the Islamic world (and in many other countries in Europe and Asia): within days, hundreds of thousands of people from Morocco in the west to Indonesia and Malaysia in the east had taken to the streets to protest Israel's assault on the Palestinian territoriesand U .S. support of Israel. In the Arab countries, where reactions were strongest (the estimated attendance of a single demonstration in Rabat, Morocco, ranged from 500,000 to a million), angry protesters, even in places such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, railed against the passivity and impotence of the Arab regimes; in a number of countries, U.S. diplomatic facilities were attacked, and protests turned violent; demonstrators were killed in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen. Common patterns included the role of satellite television coverage of Israeli destruction in galvanizing popular anger, massive collections of funds and supplies to send to Palestine amounting to tens of millions of dollars, and boycotts of American-made goods that continued after the demonstrations had died down in May 2002, and indeed are still in force in many places. Moreover, while Islamic groups spearheaded the demonstrations in some countries, everywhere secular and civil society groups had a strong presence. What differed from country to country was how the governments handled the protests——by co-optation, repression, and combinations thereof.The following are brief reports on the public response in the four countries borderingIsrael and in Turkey.

The Middle Eastern Challenge

In the aftermath of September 11, the whole world is struggling to understand the madness behind Bin Laden's world of terror. In our search for answers, we are most immediately drawn to the ongoing traumas of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the decade-old Gulf War, and the Iranian Revolution as possible explanations for this Islamic rage toward the West. Bin Laden himself has pointed to the U.S. presence in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, the unequivocal U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. hubris as justifications for the twin towers attack. However, the distinguished historian Bernard Lewis encourages us to look beyond the obvious. In his latest book, finished before the tragic events of September 11, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, Lewis takes us back in time to an era of Muslim supremacy—the age of Islam. It is there, at the apogee of Islamic power, that we find the roots of current Muslim discontent. Lewis's book is essentially an examination of Middle Eastern history and politics that give the reader a rationale for the disparities and anxieties permeating the Middle East today. He appropriately concludes that to overcome the years of regional malaise and stagnation, Middle Easterners themselves must assume responsibility for "What Went Wrong." Ultimately, they must address their resistance to modernization and to any form of cultural change.

The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism

SINCE LAST YEAR'S attacks on New York and Washington, the con ventional wisdom about the motivation behind such deadly terrorism has gelled. The violence, we are often told, was a reaction to misguided U.S. policies. For years, certain American actions-such as the country's support for Israel and for unpopular, oppressive Arab regimes-had supposedly produced profound grievances throughout the Middle East. Those grievances came to a boil over time, and finally spilled over on September n. The result was more than 3,ooo American deaths. Although anti-Americanism is genuinely widespread among Arab governments and peoples, however, there is something seriously mis leading in this account. Arab and Muslim hatred of the United States is not just, or even mainly, a response to actual U.S. policies-policies that, if anything, have been remarkably pro-Arab and pro-Muslim over the years. Rather, such animus is largely the product of self interested manipulation by various groups within Arab society, groups that use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems within those societies. This distinction should have a profound impact on American policymakers. If Arab anti-Americanism turns out to be grounded in domestic maneuvering rather than American misdeeds, neither

Antisemitic Europe and the ‘Third Way’: The Ideas of Maurice Bardèche

Maurice Bardèche is an important neo-fascist writer whose ideas derive from those of Pierre Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach. After 1945 he argued that right-wing thought had been ghettoized and even imprisoned by a post-Nuremberg liberal political establishment. In the face of a US military and cultural occupation of Western Europe and an encroaching Communist Soviet menace, Bardèche argued for a united European ‘third force’ to confront these two enemies. His dream was of a fascist-ruled Europe that would regenerate and defend the continent and the West against Communism and liberalism. Organic and idealist fascist states, without the faults of Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy, would implement a moral revolution, bolster economic affairs and prevent Europe being swamped by foreign goods, such as Asian electronics. He regretted Europe's membership of NATO and its being sucked into Cold War conflicts in the Middle East and in support of Israel. Europe's and fascism's enemies were blamed for all their ills, and a Jewish conspiracy was blamed for its campaign against the world whether in the guise of US financial power or through its control of Bolshevism, the latter being judged responsible for terrorism and subversion in the developing world. Bardèche was purely a warrior of the pen, and was important primarily for providing a link between fascism and neo-fascism and a training ground for new fascist writers in his journal Défense de l'Occident.

Louis Massignon. The Crucible of Compassion by Mary Louise Gude

BOOK REVIEWS567 newfound "relevance" of the churches and people stayed away in droves. They are still staying away from all the "relevant" churches and seminaries in Britain and America to this day. Ken Hendrickson Sam Houston State University Huntsville, Texas Louis Massignon. The Crucible of Compassion. By Mary Louise Gude. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 283. $34.95.) Mary Louise Gude's admirable biography ofMassignon is the only one in English (a French life appeared in 1994) despite his international reputation as an Oriental scholar, a religious mystic, and a social and political activist who devoted much ofhis life (1883-1962) to promoting understanding between Islam and Christianity and, in a larger context, between the Arab world and the West. The work appears at a sadly opportune moment, when with increasing violence and fanaticism the need to achieve such understanding becomes even greater than in the past. Gude records in detail Massignon's career as one ofthe greatest Arab scholars of his time, dwells on the profundity of his religiosity which co-existed with social and political activism as evidenced in his attacks on colonialism and social injustice, and in his heroic efforts, despite fierce accusations against him as "anti-French" and "Communist," to bring peace to Algeria . Massignon's family belonged to the "grande bourgeoisie." His father, an agnostic, successfully practised sculpture under the pseudonym of "Pierre Roche." His mother, a devout Catholic, gave her son a religious education, but by the age of eighteen he had become an unbeliever who was to recover his faith only "in contact with the African desert and with Sufi mystics. . . ." With the years, he became a devoted husband and father and an ordained Melkite priest. After receiving his "bac" in mathematics in 1901 , he made his first contact with Arab culture during a trip (the first of many) to North Africa, a trip which was to influence the rest of his life. In a letter to Paul Claudel he states:"It was there that I was really born." He was enchanted by the beauty of the desert, where he experienced "a sense of beauty and of deep religious exaltation."After completing his military service (1902-3) he re-affirmed his commitment to Arab culture by choosing, as the subject ofhis "Diplôme d'études supérieures" Leo Africanus, a sixteenth-century Moroccan geographer. In 1906 he obtained a diploma in written and spoken Arabic and became deeply interested in the medieval Sufi mystic, Hallaj. (His study, La Passion de Hallaj, martyr et mystique de l'Islam, was published in Paris in 1922. English translation by Herbert Mason, 1982.) In Paris, he was named a member of an archaeological mission in Mesopotamia. He arrived in Baghdad in December, 1907, rented a house in a Muslim neighborhood where no Westerners lived, dressed as an Arab, frequented young Muslims . On the way to the archaeological site in a remote village, he was attacked by a group of Bedouins who suspected him of being"a spy" and was robbed by 568BOOK REVIEWS members of his own caravan. He complained to Turkish authorities who claimed that he "wasn't in his right mind." Mentally depressed, he returned to Baghdad, where he was hospitalized for several weeks and then was sent off to France. On the ship, he suffered attacks of paranoia and was confined. This experience , as he recalls in numerous essays, culminated in his return to the Church. In the following years, he soon enjoyed increasing success as an Orientalist , as professor at the Collège de France, as founder of the Institut des études islamiques, as writer (the author of twelve major works) and lecturer, as a social and political activist, and as a member of the national academies often different countries, including Iraq and Egypt. But all these official honors did not suppress his unrelenting criticism of governmental injustice. He enraged conservative French Catholics for his pro-Arabic position in the Algerian war. He criticized the Americans for their support of Israel against the Palestinians, although he greatly admired Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the last years of his life, despite failing health, he remained passionately involved...

Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (review)

Book Reviews 127 account fails to illustrate the deadly blend of arrogance,.,ignorance, and incompetence that took the lives of the 241 American Marines who died in a suicide truck-bombing while they were asleep. The Reagan administration seemed unable to believe that great American power and wealth might fail to solve the Lebanese conundrum within the limits of what was politically acceptable to the American Congress and American voters. In addition to Hudson's book, among the works indispensable to an understanding of the tragedy in Lebanon are Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (New York, 1980); The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report, foreword by Abba Eban (Princeton, NJ, 1983); Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role ofa Lifetime (New York, 1991); William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, 1993); Hamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY, 1985); Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York, 1984); and Jonathan C. Randall, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York, 1983). P. Edward Haley Claremont McKenna College and Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, by Timothy L. H. McCormack. New York: S1. Martin's Press, 1997.339 pp. $49.95. International Law is not a suicide pact! Recognizing this, Timothy L. H. McCormack has used the case study of the Israeli bombing of Osiraq to examine the limits of selfdefense under international law. Rejecting the restrictive view that, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, self-defense must follow an armed attack, the author accepts the long-standing customary idea of anticipatory self-defense in certain circumstances. With this in mind, he concludes that Israel's preemptive attack was an altogether permissible use of force, indeed, one that was mandated by the peremptory expectations of national self-preservation. What, exactly, were the facts ofthis case? On June 7, 1981, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed the reactor shortly before it would go "on line." At the time, the general global community reaction was overwhelmingly hostile. Even the UN Security Council, in Resolution 487 ofJune 19, 1981, indicated that it "strongly condemns" the attack and that "Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered." Looking back at this event, the author understands Israel's defensive action in a 128 SHOFAR Fall 1997 Vol. 16, No. I very different light. As he is aware, Saddarn Hussein's plans to build a French-supplied reactor at his nuclear research center in Tuwaitha, about 20 kilometers from Baghdad, were designed to produce militarily significant amounts of plutonium. The ultimate objective was to manufacture nuclear weapons that could provide Saddam with regional hegemony-a position that could be expressed by an attack on the Jewish State. Significantly, an Iraqi dictatorship with nuclear weapons would have had far-reaching global implications, affecting not only the "infidel" State of Israel, but also the security of those other states requiring Middle Eastern oil and/or those states that came to be engaged in the 1991 Gulf War. Did Israel act illegally at Osiraq? Recalling that every state is entitled, within pertinent constraints, to strike fust when the danger posed is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,"1 McCormack weaves a complex and competent jurisprudential argument in support of Israel's resort to anticipatory self-defense. Further, he underscores, quite correctly, that this right is especially compelling in the modem world, when-in an age of mass-destruction weaponry-failing to preempt could bring about annihilation. Did Israel commit aggression at Osiraq? The author points out: "Since the creation ofthe State ofIsrael in 1948, Iraq has refused to recognize Israel's legitimacy as a state and has consistently and openly declared that its very existence is an aggression against 'the Arab nation."'Jurisprudentially, this means that, upon Iraqi insistence, a state of war has always existed between the two countries. It follows that since aggression cannot be committed against a state with which a country is already at war, Israel...

Psychological distress among recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel, I. Correlates of level of distress.

In most migrations some selection takes place either by the absorbing country and/or the individuals who emigrate. Israel has an open-door policy for immigrants and the recent large wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union was made up of entire families rather than individuals. This provided an opportunity to examine the issue of migration and psychological distress more directly. A nationwide sample of 600 immigrants who arrived during the preceding year were interviewed in December 1990. Their psychological distress was measured by the PERI Demoralization questionnaire. For both genders, the mean demoralization score of the immigrant sample was found to be significantly higher than that reported for the Israeli-born population (after controlling for education). The factors that were found to be correlated with the level of distress were mostly individual characteristics of the immigrants (e.g. profession, religiousness, former residence in the Chernobyl region, previous contact with the health profession because of psychological problems). Increased distress was also significantly related to perceived lack of social support in Israel, which may in fact be partly determined by personality traits.

American support for Israel: History, sources, limits

(1996). American support for Israel: History, sources, limits. Israel Affairs: Vol. 2, U.S.—Israeli Relations of the Crossroads, pp. 128-146.