Summa Theologiae Research Articles

São Tomás de Aquino metido num “imbróglio”: A demonstração da existência de Deus

This article attempts to clarify the thesis by St. Thomas Aquinas, according to which it is possible to prove that the existence of God can be demonstrated. On the basis of the analyses in Summa Theologica I, q.2 and Summa contra gentiles I (I-XV), there is an attempt to understand the meaning and relevance of this thesis, its implications and its philosophical and theological significance. Thomas Aquinas’ analyses underline the importance of distinguishing between a knowledge about the existence of God and one regarding his essence, while highlighting in each case a set of difficulties and lack of knowledge factors. In a context where the idea of confusion plays a central role, Thomas Aquinas tries to show that: a) no matter how confused knowledge about God is and no matter how large the disproportion between the human and divine perspectives, there is an ineradicable notitia Dei, and b) this notice is linked at the same time to the inability to know God’s essenceand the ability to demonstrate His existenceby means of certain effects and traces of His. This all leads to the peculiar demonstration of the existence of a Deus absconditus. It is precisely the discovery of this God who manifests himself and at the same time hides himself that makes it possible to document the pos-sibility of demonstrating that God exists and that constitutes the foundations on which every and any demonstration of the existence of God rests.

Aquinas's Prohibition of Killing Reconsidered

St. Thomas Aquinas speaks to the heart of what it means to be human in our relationship with God when he expounds the way of the moral life in his Summa Theologiae.' A classic example of the depth of his understanding is evident in his treatment of acts that knowingly kill. His style of writing is succinct and sometimes his ideas are distributed among several texts, but one can mine the riches of his thought with patient reading and reflection. This Article focuses exclusively on the extreme case where a person is certain to die if nothing is done and the only way to save that person is by one's act while knowing that it must result in the certain killing of another person. Most scholars using some version of the doctrine of double effect interpret Aquinas to permit such an act when it repulses the attack of an aggressor on someone's life. This Article rejects this conclusion as well as its justification in the doctrine of double effect and proposes a rule that more accurately reflects the texts of Aquinas as he distinguishes prohibited acts from permitted acts. Specifically, it argues that his rule is that, when a person (whether oneself or another) is certain to die if nothing is done and the only way to save that person is by one's act (as a private individual and not one acting under public authority) knowing that it must result in the certain killing of some other person (whether or not an aggressor), the act is prohibited unless one retains or removes a vital life support from the person killed that belongs to the person saved (whether oneself or another), or unless one ducks, blocks or redirects a deadly force away from the person saved (whether oneself or another who is under one's charge). If the act does not fit within one of the two exceptions, then it is an attack on the vital life support of the person killed and is a prohibited killing. The first Part explains how and why Aquinas constructs this prohibitory rule and its exceptions. The second Part adds further clarity by applying the rule to several controversial modern-day cases.

Thomas Aquinas on Abstinence and Fasting: Participating in Christ’s Cruciform Wisdom

This article argues that St. Thomas Aquinas’s treatise on temperance in the Summa Theologiae offers what in effect constitutes a series of embodied spiritual exercises whose goal is to facilitate the reader in his progress towards the contemplation of Divine realities. Attention to Thomas’s treatment of Christ’s Passion reveals moreover that the embodied wisdom practices of abstinence and fasting lead to a greater participation in the Cross of Christ and prepare the one who undertakes them for the reception of a cruciform wisdom. Finally, it is argued, these embodied wisdom practices also exert an influence on the pursuit of speculative theological wisdom.

KONSEP KEADILAN (IUSTITIA) PERSPEKTIF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS DAN RELEVANSINYA BAGI PEMAKNAAN SILA V PANCASILA

In principle justice touches the human nature as social animal. The discourse of justice has become an important theme in social and political philosophy all the times. St. Thomas Aquinas is one of the philosophers who pays much attention on this theme. In Summa Theologiae, he spent a lot of pages to explain justice as one of the cardinal virtues. Inspired by Aristotle, he defined justice as “a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will.” This essay wants to explain the discourse of justice according to St. Thomas Aquinas and to compare it with the concept of justice in fifth principle of Pancasila. The writter uses the relevancy study to get the convergency idea between two different ideas of justice. This essay will explore both concept of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas and Pancasila perspective. There are at least some convergency ideas between those two. But the pressure point is the concept of bonum commune. Pancasila as the Philosophische Grondslag of Indonesia as like as St. Thomas Aquinas’ idea of justice emphasizes the common good (bonum commune) as the very end of Indonesia nation. Reflecting on these convergency ideas, we can find some relevant discourses concerning justice in socio-political life of Indonesian people, i.e: law, politic, and religion. In the end of this essay, the writer gives a critical thought to the tendency of the liberalism pathology in social life

The Mortara Affair and the Question of Thomas Aquinas’s Teaching Against Forced Baptism

Contemporary scholars critical of Pope Pius IX’s decision to remove Edgardo Mortara from his parents in Bologna, Italy, in 1858, appeal to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching against forced baptism of Jewish children in the Summa theologiae. However, these scholars have overlooked the fact that the question of Aquinas’s teaching against forced baptism was actually at the center of a rather extensive theological exchange between the Mortara family, and the Vatican’s papal counsel in 1858. This article demonstrates that without attention to the 1858 exchange, the contemporary debate lacks an understanding of the key theological questions, including the problem that Aquinas’s teaching was claimed by both sides. After an analysis of the appeals to Aquinas in the 1858 exchange, the article demonstrates why the contemporary discussion could benefit from a closer examination of Aquinas’s teaching against forced baptism of Jewish children in its historical context.

Conservatio sui: inclinación de la naturaleza hacia sí. Una teoría finalista en la lectura de Cicerón y de Tomás de Aquino

El presente artículo tiene por objeto considerar, en primer lugar, los rasgos propios de la concepción ciceroniana de la “conservatio sui”, en el contexto de la filosofía práctica ciceroniana, distinguiendo los componentes de tradición estoica de la postura que Cicerón expone como propia. El artículo se centra en la exposición ciceroniana de De finibus III y IV, y en pasajes de otras obras que permiten componer los vínculos que Cicerón establece entre natura, ratio y lex. En segundo lugar, el artículo se propone una compulsa de la elaboración ciceroniana de la “conservatio sui” con pasajes del corpus de Tomás de Aquino, en especial con el Tractatus de legibus de Summa Theologiae.

Capitalism vs. Creation Spirituality Resolve (C.S.R.): A Tete-a-tete of Two Cultural Consciousness

This research work argues that religious conviction is contributory to the making of the culture of Capitalism in the West. This was presented by annotating Max Weber’s Sociology of Religion. There, the study presents Capitalism’s cultural values influencing the behavior and attitude of the modern man. From here, the paper establishes how the values of Capitalism, in the global extent, became the main culprit in the destruction of the ecological system. To see both sides of the story, the paper examines how capitalists respond to this environmental crisis created mainly by them. At this point, the paper argues why the ‘method’ of most economic experts, including those of the philanthrocapitalists, fails in resolving the problem of sustainability vis-à-vis environmental wellbeing. After discoursing on what Capitalism has done and the illeffects it has produced, the paper presents a dialectic between Capitalism and Creation spirituality. There it argues why Creation spirituality, reflected from the different faith traditions, becomes the appropriate cultural consciousness that serves as antidote to the environmental malaise caused by Capitalism. While a synthesis between the two opposing values of each spheres could be made using a dialectical framework, the paper opts instead to take the position of Creation spirituality. The paper points out that the way to counteract the “colonizing” position of Capitalism is for religion to take charge. In the end, the paper argues that only in paradigm-shift where the position of Creation spirituality is taken, that genuine solution can be achieved in this pressing environmental crisis. Lastly, the paper recommends to utilize the principles and values of Creation spirituality via incorporation of it in religious academic curricula. Likewise, the study bids the same in the wider sphere of interreligious relations and communications that religious leaders, preachers and teachers should consider as a course of action to take. ReferencesBakan, J. (2004). The Corporation: The pathological pursuit of profit and power. NY: Free Press.Bhaktivedanta Vedabase. Retrieved from www.vedabase.com/en/bg/11Bowker, J. (2015). Beliefs that changed the world: The history and ideas of the great religions. London, United Kingdom: Quercus Publishing.Carroll, A. and Buchholtz, A. (2008). Business and society: Ethics, sustainability and stakeholder management. Cengage Learning.Chief Seattle. (2000). The speech of Chief Seattle. Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books.Clayton, P. (2004a). “Panentheism in metaphysical and scientific perspective”, in In whom we live and move and have our being: panentheistic reflections on God’s presence in a scientific world, P. Clayton and A. Peacocke (eds.), Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, pp. 249-264.de Chardin T. (1975). The human phenomenon. NY: Harper and Row.Fox, M. (1983). Original blessing. Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Company.Fox, M. (ed.) (1987). Hildegard de Bingen’s book of divine works: With letters and songs. Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Company.Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and freedom (40th Anniversary Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of communicative action vol. 1: Reason and rationalization of society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.Horkheimer, M. (1982). Critical theory selected essays. New York: Continuum Pub.IPerceptive: Ibn-Arabi Quotes. Retrieved from https://iperceptive.com/authors/ibn-arabi-quotes.htmlJung, C. G. (2006). The undiscovered self. New York, NY: New American Library.Knight, K. (2017). The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Retrieved from http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1065.htmMarx, K. (1990) [1867]. Capital, Volume I. London: Penguin Classics.Nhat Hanh, T. (1999). Going home: Jesus and Buddha as brothers. New York, NY: Penguin Group.O’ Murchu, D. (2004). Quantum theology: Spiritual implications of the new physics (Revised Ed.). NY: The Crossroads PublishingCompany.Pope Francis (2015). Laudato Si: On care for our common home. Rome. Rasmussen, L. (2005). Earth community, earth ethics. Makati, Philippines: St. Paul’s.Rieff, D. (2015). The Reproach of hunger: Food, justice, and money in the twenty-first century. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.Smith, A. (1977). The wealth of nations: An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.The Meister Eckhart Site. Retrieved from https://www.ellopos.net/theology/eckhart_in-creatures.htmlWeber, M., & Kalberg, S. (2013). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of Capitalism. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Synthesizing Aquinas and Newman on religion

In this paper I carry out a philosophical inquiry that yields an account of religion as a personal disposition. This exercise is also expository, since I take my bearings from two thinkers, Thomas Aquinas and John Henry Newman. Regarding Aquinas, this means delineating his treatment of the virtue of ‘religio’ in the ‘Summa theologiae’; regarding Newman, it means attending to his description of the experience of being religious in ‘Grammar of Assent’. The resulting account captures both the “objective face” of being religious as well as its “subjective inscape,” thus depicting religion as a human perfection imperfectly realized in any given individual.

Ethics, Indigenous Ethics, and the Contemporary Challenge: Attempt at a Report on Ethics for the Filipino Today

Ethics, Indigenous Ethics, and the Contemporary Challenge: Attempt at a Report on Ethics for the Filipino Today

Kon cepcja rado ści w SumIE TeologiI św. To masza z Akwinu

The purpose of this article is to present the development of Thomas Aquinas’sconcept of joy in the subsequent parts of Summa theologiae. Beginning with thedescription of joy as simple movements of the soul, Thomas comes to present theconcept of spiritual joy, which is fundamental to the human visio beatifica. Therefore,the article is divided into three parts, which discuss Aquinas’s accounts ofjoy: Prima secundae, Secunda secundae and Tertia pars. The first part focuses onthe inclusion of joy as experience and feeling. Joy here is understood as one of thefeelings of the sensitive power is considered in the perspective of human emotionality(vis concupiscibilis). Joy that comes from satisfying the lack of sensory goodsis called pleasure (delectatio). It differs from the joy of affection (gaudium) – theintellectual and spiritual affrct, to which the second part of the article is dedicated.Spiritual joy does not include the sensory-corporal component, and it superimposesitself over purely intelligible beings. Thomas clearly emphasizes that only Godcan be the cause of spiritual joy. This perspective allows Aquinas to develop hisconcept of theology of joy in the next part of Summa (III pars), which is devotedin the last part of this text. The emotionality of Christ is the central problem forThomas here. These considerations throw a lot of light not only on the supernaturalapproach to joy, but also on the ways in which joy – the fruit of the Holy Spirit canbe experienced by a human being in hac via.

Between Wisdom and Sluggishness: Thomas Aquinas on the Elderly

Between Wisdom and Sluggishness:Thomas Aquinas on the Elderly Piotr Roszak THOMAS AQUINAS DID NOT live long enough to experience old age himself. He died when he was approximately forty-nine years old, "on his way," literally, as he was traveling to Lyon to participate in a council, busily penning his works (he averaged twelve standard A4 pages at the last stage of his life, according to the calculations of Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P.),1 his Summa theologiae still incomplete. Whenever he speaks of old age he reads it, as if by default, through the works of St. Paul, who approached the Old and New Covenant dialectically and reminded that a Christian puts on a new man even if his or her calendar age is advanced. This reference to the spiritual aspect of old age defines Thomas's thought, with particular emphasis on the concept of new creation. At the same time, he asks himself the serious question of whether church offices should be held by elders or juniors.2 Thomas's theological method with respect to this point is characteristic of him: he does not speculate in a vacuum but instead engages in a dialogue with the broad intellectual tradition—and not only the Christian tradition. He was [End Page 91] familiar with the classic treatises on old age, including those of Cicero, whom Thomas frequently cites in his reflections on morality. He was also greatly influenced by Aristotle and his fundamentally naturalistic description of old age. Thomas associated the term senex with the notion of maiores, a legacy still present in many modern languages. For instance, Spanish refers to an elderly person as mayor de edad, even though mayor is ambiguous, as it describes someone who is either "older" or "greater." In what sense, therefore, is an elderly person maior? The respect due to old age, regarded as the fruitio of life experience, opens up a theological reflection on the meaning of the passage of time in our life. What is the meaning of each passing moment? Did not the Creator determine everything? Are we not determined by our genes to become whatever they make us to be? For what purpose did God need this delay in creation? He could have created the world and saved it immediately afterwards. He chose not to. Following the creation of the world, a whole history opened up and became deeply meaningful to all Christians. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to place old age on the axis of the passing time and emphasize the importance of experience, decisive in attaining the heights of moral life. A theologian identifies this dynamic as a "grace of time" given to each human being so that he or she can experience becoming a cause of good in the world. For Thomas, "being good" is but one form of perfection, while a far greater form of perfection is "being a cause," even if instrumental, of good in another person.3 This article will present the spiritual ethos of the elderly person in the light of Thomas's thought. I will explore, in addition to Thomas's more familiar works such as the Summa theologiae, a few lesser-known works, such as his biblical commentaries, in which Thomas, the medieval professor, expresses himself most eloquently. The Bible speaks [End Page 92] at length about old age and its significance; Thomas's biblical commentaries provide direct access to his understanding of these passages. Furthermore, the Summa theologiae was intended to develop a better understanding of the Bible, as we read in the Summa's prologue.4 We will see that Thomas praises the doctrine of the elders while warning against certain tendencies of old age that could lead elderly persons astray and cripple them spiritually. Of course this does not mean that God's idea of old age is a failure, that the elderly are not to cooperate as higher causes in God's plan for creation. Thomas simply recognizes that there are dangers that accompany the potentialities. In my analysis, I shall focus on questions of wisdom, prudence, and hope. I. The Parable of the Vineyard Workers: "Old Age Is...

Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies

Reviewed by: Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies Raymond Hain Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxviii + 485 pp. Brian Davies's Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary comes two years after the publication of his delightfully (some would say quixotically) ambitious Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary. Like the first, this second book "aims to be introductory, if also comprehensive, and it does not presume that its reader is already familiar with medieval thinking" (xvii). But while both volumes run close to five hundred pages, the much shorter length of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] allows Davies a little more breathing room, and the result is a smooth and thoughtful overview of the entire text immensely useful for nonspecialists and worth consulting for specialists. After a brief discussion of Aquinas's life and writings, Davies rejects the view that the SCG was written to aid missionaries, Dominican or otherwise, and instead claims (with the help of the opening chapters of the SCG) that Aquinas has provided "an extended essay in natural theology" in books I–III and then offers "defenses of the articles of faith" in book IV. "And that," he concludes, "is all that we can confidently refer to [End Page 1291] when it comes to the question 'Why did Aquinas write the SCG?'" (15). (But why the need to remark in a footnote that Aquinas "does refer to Islam" in these sections, offering "a brief tirade against Mohammed," even though this "little anti-Islamic outburst" is hardly evidence of a missionary purpose? [397]) Of the remaining seventeen chapters, eight address God's existence, nature, and creative power, six address creatures and their relation to God's providential plan, and the final three address the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the sacraments and salvation. Each chapter follows the same plan: a section of the SCG is explained, with copious quotations and sometimes exhaustive (and exhausting) lists of arguments with lots of examples to make Aquinas's claims both clear and attractive. Each expository section is then followed by Davies's own evaluation of the text. These are the most interesting and readable sections (and worth perusing for a specialist working on the topic at hand), and they make many references to contemporary challenges one might offer to Aquinas, as well as arguments in defense of, and occasionally critical of, Aquinas's views. Davies is most comfortable, and confident, in the eight chapters on God. These make up more than one third of his text (though treating about one fifth of the SCG), and an entire chapter is spent on SCG I, chapter 13 (arguments for God's existence). Davies is certain that Aquinas's arguments for God's existence are not obvious failures, but stops short of calling them successful demonstrations. "My view is that [whether or not they are successful demonstrations] is not an easy question to answer since some of the arguments contain stages that are difficult to understand" (45). Like most defenders of Aquinas, he constructs an example of a causal chain with two types of causes. If my hand holds a stack of books, then each book keeps the book above it from falling to the ground. But my hand is a cause of a different sort, something "whose causal power runs through the chain in such a way as to make the members of the chain do what they do or be what they are" (52). But does Davies think the arguments work? As he often does throughout the commentary, he ends only by quoting from another Aquinas scholar, in this case Edward Feser's defense of this type of argument, and then concludes: "I take it that Feser is suggesting that something that actually exists, but does not have to exist, is potentially nonexistent, and that its sheer existence depends on it being actualized by what cannot not-exist" (55). The remaining chapters on God focus on the divine attributes, which flow (as they do in the parallel questions in the Summa theologiae) from...

Thomas Aquinas, Prophecy, and the ‘Scientific’ Character of Sacred Doctrine

AbstractThis paper explores the claim made by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 3 that ‘sacred doctrine’ is ‘scientific.’ After reviewing some of the key historical commentators on the question, I propose an examination of Thomas' treatment of the gift of prophecy as providing an important clue into discerning more clearly his evolution from an Aristotelian understanding of knowledge or ‘science’ (scientia) to a fuller sense of the term scientia as used by Thomas. Chief among these is a clue into how Thomas resolves the difficulty between necessity and history. His treatment of prophecy in the Summa Theologiae gives one a glimpse into how Thomas is a historical thinker, despite weighty authorities such as Etienne Gilson arguing otherwise. Closer attention to prophecy permits one to rethink Thomas' account of sacred doctrine in Question One and appreciate how pivotal the fact of divine revelation having been made to prophets in history is for its ‘scientific’ character.

Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics by J. Budziszewski

Reviewed by: Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics by J. Budziszewski Raymond Hain Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics by J. Budziszewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), xxvii + 295 pp. J. Budziszewski's Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics follows his similarly structured 2014 Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law. But while the earlier commentary, over 500 pages long, works straight through all of questions 90–97 of the prima secundae and is supplemented by an additional 250-page online commentary, this commentary is shorter, highly selective, and lacks a supplemental online commentary. And since the first half considers selected articles on the virtues in general, while the second half considers selected articles on justice, the Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics itself feels like a supplement to the earlier law commentary. After describing its overall content and structure, I will comment on how useful it might be for its intended audience: "scholars," "students" and "even . . . serious general readers" (xxi). The Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics includes the text of, and commentary on, eighteen articles from the Summa theologiae. Ten articles focus on the virtues in general: I-II, q. 55, a. 4 (Whether virtue is suitably defined?) I-II, q. 58, a. 4 (Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?) I-II, q. 58, a. 5 (Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?) [End Page 583] I-II, q. 61, a. 2 (Whether there are four cardinal virtues?) I-II, q. 61, a. 3 (Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?) I-II, q. 62, a. 1 (Whether there are any theological virtues?) I-II, q. 63, a. 1 (Whether virtue is in us by nature?) I-II, q. 63, a. 2 (Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?) I-II, q. 65, a. 1 (Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another) I-II, q. 84, a. 4 (Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?) And the remaining eight articles focus on the virtue of justice: II-II, q. 30, a. 3 (Whether mercy is a virtue) II-II, q. 58, a. 1 (Whether justice is i described as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?) II-II, q. 60, a. 1 (Whether judgment is an act of justice?) II-II, q. 60, a. 2 (Whether it is lawful to judge?) II-II, q. 60, a. 5 (Whether we should always judge according to the written law?) II-II, q. 60, a. 6 (Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?) II-II, q. 80, a. 1 (Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?) II-II, q. 122, a. 1 (Whether the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of justice?) The text of each article is presented twice—once in the 1920 Blackfriars translation (now in the public domain and widely available) and once in a paraphrase by Budziszewski. Line-by-line commentary follows each portion of the text and is keyed to the sentences in the Blackfriars translation. Besides the text of the commentary itself, an eleven-page general introduction and an index are included as supporting material. Budziszewski is most interested in understanding the plain meaning of the text, and in working through Aquinas's sources, and there are almost no comments that engage contemporary scholars or critics of Aquinas. As he says, "Some may think I do not spend enough time quarreling with critics of St. Thomas. My conviction is that before we enter these quarrels, we had better make sure we understand him. If we do understand him, many of the criticisms fall away like dead leaves" (xxii). Serious general readers will find this commentary very helpful, especially [End Page 584] if they are coming to Aquinas for the first time. Consider this representative passage from ST I-II, q. 55, a. 4 that discusses the "matter" of virtues and Budziszewski's paraphrase (10–11): Text: [5] Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which...

Thomas Aquinas, Basic Philosophical Writing: From the Summa Theologiae and The Principles of Nature, ed. and trans. by Steven Baldner. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2019, 254 pp.

No one can overlook the intellectual medieval giant, Thomas Aquinas. He looms so large in the Middle Ages that we ultimately almost tend to take him for granted and yet still do not quite know what positions he might have taken on so many different issues. St. Augustine, Isidore of Seville, and Thomas Aquinas belong to a category of medieval philosophers and theologians all by their themselves, which makes it rather difficult for most readers to gain a concise understanding of their teachings. Normally, we do nothing but cherry-picking, and use whatever statements we might need for our own research topics. But this does not do justice to those major figures. Any effort to synthesize and summarize what they had to say in a modern language can only be welcomed, certainly a daunting task.

The Spiration of Love in God according to Aquinas and His Interpreters

The Spiration of Love in God according to Aquinas and His Interpreters Jeremy D. Wilkins "Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror quocumque feror."1 Augustine "Contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis est principium amoris spiritualis."2 Thomas Aquinas THE HOLY SPIRIT, according to Thomas Aquinas's teaching in the Summa theologiae, proceeds from the Father and the Son in the mode of will (per modum voluntatis), as proceeding love (amor procedens), as the beloved in the lover (amatum in amante), as an inclination to and impression of the beloved (inclinatio, impressio).3 Both the Scholastic commentary tradition and more recent scholarship attest to a problem of interpretation regarding these assertions. Interpreters do not agree about (1) whether the will emanates an operatum, parallel in some way to the procession of the inner word within the intellect; (2) what is meant by the beloved in the lover; (3) what, exactly, Aquinas's analogue for the procession of the Spirit is; and (4) how Aquinas uses the one name, "love," to [End Page 357] denote (a) an essential attribute of God, (b) a personal property of the Spirit, and (c) a notional act of the Father and the Son. The chief question regards the operatum in, or from, the will. One line of interpretation, classically represented by John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) and lately promoted by Gilles Emery, takes the beloved in the lover to be a product or term in the will emanating from the act of love, as the inner word is a reality in the intellect emanating from the act of understanding. On this interpretation, there are two acts called love, one emanated from the other: a basic act of love, and a derivative act described as love's fruit, impress, or impulse, but also called love. It is this derivation of one act of love from another, according to the majority of interpreters, that provides Aquinas's analogue for spiration in God. A minority report, however, urged most explicitly by Bernard Lonergan and others under his influence, but possibly found also in Cajetan, takes the beloved in the lover to be the act of love itself, emanating into the will from the inner word in the intellect. This reading denies that the impress or impulse of love is anything other than the act of love itself; affective momentum is not something love produces, but is just what love is (as Augustine suggests in the remark quoted in epigraph). The problem has psychological, theological, and exegetical aspects. Fundamentally, the question lies in the field of rational psychology. Either the psychological facts can be determined clearly and exactly, or they cannot. But insofar as the matter at hand is an interpretation of Aquinas, our concern shall be to determine as best we can how he understood the psychological facts, leaving to the side an evaluation of his views. To this question of psychological fact is annexed a theological issue. We develop an imperfect but fruitful understanding of the mysteries by analogy with realities more familiar to us. But if the more familiar realities are themselves shrouded in mystery, we are moving per ignotum ad ignotius. The more familiar reality Aquinas takes for his Trinitarian analogue purports to be a structure of acts within our rational consciousness, but he has [End Page 358] been accused of rigging the system.4 In the measure that accusation is sustained, his achievement is not theoretical illumination but at best a coherent restatement of the truths of faith. Verbal coherence is not nothing, of course, but neither is it the imperfect but fruitful understanding that is the aim of systematic theology. If, then, we ourselves wish analogically to conceive how (and not merely coherently to assert that) divine understanding utters an inner word spirating love, we must first grasp as clearly as possible how our own understanding utters an inner word spirating love. In the measure that these psychological facts are obscure to us, the illuminating substance of theory is exchanged for a merely verbal coherence; we are left with a model that is unverified, opaque, or contrived, and a set of syntactical rules for applying it to the Trinity. Finally, there is the direct locus...

Aquinas's Two Concepts of Analogy and a Complex Semantics for Naming the Simple God

Aquinas's Two Concepts of Analogy and a Complex Semantics for Naming the Simple God Joshua P. Hochschild THE TOPIC OF "divine names" as treated by Aquinas can be traced back to pagan Greek thinkers, Aristotle and earlier. More proximately, it can be traced to a Christian heavily influenced by that Greek tradition, (Pseudo-)Dionysius. At the beginning of his commentary on Dionysius's Divine Names, Aquinas describes it and three other works of Dionysius in terms of their relation to human reason. Features of God that pertain to the three divine persons and their essential unity "find no adequate likeness" in creatures; these are mysteries "exceeding the whole faculty of natural reason," treated in De divinis hypotyposibus. There are other truths about God revealed in Scripture that "our intellect cannot conceive" and that "exceed all that which can be apprehended by us"; these are treated in a work on Mystical Theology. There are other divine features that can be investigated by human reason, insofar as "some likeness in creatures is found"; in that case, it is possible for our intellect to be led to conceive of God from creatures. Some of these are merely metaphorical similitudes, as when God is said to be a lion, a stone, or the sun. Such "likenesses" obtain "according to something transferred from creatures to God." These characteristics, truly in creatures and not properly in God, are treated in a work on Symbolic Theology. But some likenesses obtain because of "something that in creatures is derived from God." Such divine characteristics— [End Page 155] expressed in words like "good," "just," "wise," and "powerful"—are treated in the work On Divine Names.1 Thus, according to Aquinas, Dionysius's Divine Names treats what can be understood of the proper attributes of the one God that are knowable by reason. Though the work clearly draws inspiration from faith, we could anachronistically say that it functions very much as an exercise in "natural theology." In particular it reflects on how our concepts and language can be extended to God precisely because they are derived from likenesses that emanate from and participate in their preeminent, perfect source. Words express—even if in a very exceptional way—what we know about divine reality. For Dionysius, reflecting on these words and the ways that they express divine realities is a matter not just of theological language, but of theological epistemology and metaphysics: the divine names are an occasion to contemplate divinity and its attributes. [End Page 156] Although Aquinas is deeply informed by this work, when he writes his own theological treatises the topic of "divine names" becomes more circumscribed. In the Summa theologiae, question 13 of the Prima pars addresses divine naming, but quite a lot is said about God, and about our knowledge of God, in questions 2 through 12. (A comparable structure is evident in the Summa contra Gentiles.) We could say that Aquinas is content to engage in divine naming before making it an object of reflection in its own right, but it is clear that, for Aquinas, the topic of divine naming is a more circumscribed part of theology. Rather than encompassing the investigations of natural theology, it is about how, as Lawrence Dewan has described, certain words as applied to God have "a distinctive meaning … and a distinctive way of meaning what they mean."2 For Aquinas, as for Dionysius, the "names" in question are not proper names, but any true predicates of God. At issue are words like "good," "just," "wise," and "powerful"—even the very word "God" (which is not really a proper name, for Aquinas, but functions more like a common term, albeit a very unique common term). The presumption is that these words can be truly predicated of God. However, given God's otherness from the creaturely context in which such words are learned, how do these words function when they are predicated of God? In short, rather than encompassing natural theology tout court, Aquinas's own doctrine of divine names is what we might call a theological semantics. Aquinas's doctrine of analogy is sometimes taken to be almost coincident with the topic of divine names, or at least...

The Vocation of the Theologian

The Vocation of the Theologian James L. Heft SM (bio) It is an honor to have been invited to speak at the convocation for the faculty of theology and the continuing education division of the University of St. Michael's College. This gathering also marks the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the doctoral program of theology, which degree I was privileged to receive here in 1977. I have almost nothing but fond memories of my years here in Toronto, of the excellent faculty and fellow students. There was, however, one not so pleasant memory. In 1969, when I began my graduate studies, the Vietnam War continued to profoundly divide the United States. At that time, I was driving a car that had an Ohio license plate, and was twice pelted with eggs. For the record, I opposed that war. In those days, as one of my Canadian professors told me, "Americans are as benignly ignorant of Canadians as Canadians are maliciously informed about Americans." Over the next seven years, I overcame my ignorance of Canada and have developed and retain a great affection for its peoples. I am not here this afternoon to tell old war stories, to comment [End Page 127] on the legalization of pot in Canada or on last Tuesday's mid-term elections in the United States. I am here to speak about something much more important: the sacred calling of being theologians. Walter Burghardt (To Christ I Look, 98–99) reminded theologians that they deal with mystery, before which the most appropriate posture is silence and contemplation. Before we sit at a desk and write, or stand before others and teach, we should be on our knees in prayer. We distort the mystery of God whenever we try to possess it or imagine that we can capture it conceptually. Although the reality of God and God's revelation is objective, it should never be objectified. Good theologians are not spectators. One of my favorite atheists, Frederick Nietzsche, wrote: "For this is the truth: I have left the house of scholars and slammed the door behind me. Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table; I have not been schooled, as they have, to crack knowledge as one cracks nuts … they sit cool in the cool shade: they want to be mere spectators in everything; they take care not to sit where the sun burns upon the steps" (Thus Spake Zarathustra, 147). Some years ago a student sent me an e-mail complaining about her theology professor who, in Nietzsche's words, left her hungry at his table. She wrote, "Every theology course I have endured seemed like logicians parsing a love letter." I do not remember how I responded, but it should be obvious that theologians need to be on the field, in the contest, and, as St. Paul tells us, gratefully running the race. If we remain spectators in the stands, we will never really understand the game. In other words, when theologians are personally involved with and committed to what they study and teach, students are nourished, not bored. Forty-five years ago, in the chapel across the street at 95 St. Joseph Street, I heard a homily that I have never forgotten. Basilian priest Bill Irwin based it on a question from the Summa theologiae (III, q. 42) in which St. Thomas asks whether Jesus should have written down what he taught. Thomas, as you know, structures his questions in a predictable way. First, he gives several reasons to answer positively the question he posed; then he states his own position; and [End Page 128] finally, he answers, in the light of his own position, the questions he posed at the beginning. Let me summarize how Thomas handles this fascinating question. He begins by presenting three reasons why Christ should have written down his teachings. First, he writes that since Christ said that his doctrine is supposed to last till the end of time, it would have been fitting for him to put it in writing so that it might more easily and more accurately be handed down to posterity. Second, he cites the biblical precedent of the...

The Preaching of the Master: Thomas Aquinas’s University Sermons on Happiness

ABSTRACTThe single task of the Parisian masters of the thirteenth century was to read Scripture, a task they performed by way of the famous legere, disputare, praedicare. Although intimately connected these three are rarely studied in relation to each other. Thomas Aquinas’s sermons on the beatitudes (Matthew 5. 1–10) can be compared to his commentary on Matthew and the Summa Theologiae. This opens up a new perspective on the sermons, addressing some of the questions they raise. The edition of Aquinas’s sermons by Louis Bataillon is instrumental in performing this task and will therefore be considered in greater detail. The present article seeks to contribute to Medieval Sermon Studies by way of a more theological approach and to present to theologians the importance of a greater appreciation for the sermons of the masters.

Откровение и пророчество в «Сумме теологии» Фомы Аквинского

Откровение и пророчество в «Сумме теологии» Фомы Аквинского