We provide empirical evidence in the debate of the question whether CEOs should be chosen from outside or within the firm. The issue is equivalent to whether managerial skills for success are transferable from one firm to another, and if so, can these skills overcome the home court advantage of inside candidates acquired from years of firm-specific experience. We compare the performance of inside versus outside hired CEOs under two empirical approaches. In the 'level playing field', inside and outside hires are compared only under the same hiring conditions including firm endowment. In the second approach, 'hired against type,' we compare the performance of a) firms that hire insiders when outsiders would appear to be the better choice to b) that of firms that hired the 'right type' of outsiders. These comparisons are made in the following situations: 1) the hiring firms had been severely underperforming, 2) the hiring firms are expected to conduct major restructuring, 3) outside hires are specialists, such as turnaround experts, firms that are perceived not to have quality successors ( 4) firms experiencing a recent exodus of top managers, and 5) firms with no clear succession plan as evidenced by CEOs who had stayed well beyond their normal retirement age), and outsiders that are perceived to be superior ( 6) outside CEOs who are raided from other firms, 7) come from good performing firms, and 8) from larger firms). In all of these eight situations outside hires are one-to-one matched to inside hires at firms with the same prior performance and size. Because we use matching, extensive robustness tests are done. Our large sample results, based on average and top wealth creation, and superior performance persistence, indicate consistent support for insiders and their home court advantage.
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