Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles Research Articles

THEBULAVAMISSILE: A RUSSIAN MILITARY TRUMP CARD?

On October 29, 2010 Russia conducted the latest in a series of test-launches of its new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) R30 3M30 (RSM-56) Bulava (NATO code: SS-NX-30). The missile was l...

Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

The survivability of China's ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles is examined. First, the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine is noisy and vulnerable even in shallow waters. This suggests the urgency for China to improve the quietness of the Type 094. Second, after the deployment of the U.S. interceptor missile, SM-3 Block IIA, in 2018, China's intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from Chinese coastal waters would face a three-layer engagement, constructed by SM-3 IIAs deployed near China's coastal waters, ground-based interceptors deployed in California and Alaska, and SM-3 IIAs deployed near U.S. coastal waters respectively. These deployments could undermine the credibility of China's nuclear deterrence. It would be well for China and the United States to work together to improve strategic stability between these two states.

Stellar/inertial integrated guidance for responsive launch vehicles

Responsive space-lift is a new trend in space launches. It requires the guidance system of the launch vehicle to be easily prepared, precise, robust, and adaptive. The stellar/inertial integrated guidance system, which combines two distinct types of navigation data, has been successfully used for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This paper focuses on its application for responsive launch vehicles. Only the prelaunch positioning and orientation errors are considered in order to provide a simple illustration of the basic principles, which can be conveniently generalized to practical launch activities with a well-developed optimum correction method. Error transition and measurement equations are constructed and two injection error correction schemes are proposed. Because the integrated guidance accuracy varies with regard to the stellar direction, an analytical method is addressed to determine the optimal navigation star. Finally, numerical studies are conducted and the results verify the integrated guidance policy. Stellar/inertial integrated guidance can simplify prelaunch preparation and improve the orbital injection accuracy. Thus, it provides an alternative that does not rely on man-made signals for responsive launch vehicles.

Five Lessons from the History of North American Aerospace Defence

Since the onset of the War, the United States and Canada have been cooperating in what has since come to be called the of North America. This has entailed detecting, and in some instances being able to intercept, aircraft (above all Soviet bombers and cruise missiles), intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and satellites. In 1957, Washington and Ottawa agreed to the creation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), headquartered at Colorado Springs, Colorado with a US commander-in-chief, a Canadian deputy commander, and a staff drawn from the militaries of both countries. NORAD was given operational control over the air defences of both countries. The binational organization was renamed the North American Aerospace Defence Command in 1981. Despite this name change, and although NORAD has remained at the heart of continental defence cooperation, its operational control over air defence was never extended to aU of aerospace defence. Most notably, it has never encompassed baUistic missile defence.Canadians have often made assumptions about what they have to do for continental defence to keep the Americans satisfied, how the Americans have to defend Canada, or how the Americans have to rely on Canadian territory and airspace, and have often been understandably confused about who actuaUy does what in North American aerospace defence, and how decisions are made. To address these issues, here are five lessons that can been drawn from the history of continental defence.GEOGRAPHY DREW CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY CLOSER TOGETHER UNTIL 1957; SINCE THEN, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF UPTICK IN THE 1980S, THE GEOGRAPHIC BONDS HAVE LOOSENEDNo sooner had the Second World War ended, public servants in Ottawa began pointing out to their political masters that bombers would largely have to pass through Canadian skies to attack the US. Washington could therefore be expected to take an avid interest in defence cooperation with Canada. Canada would be the ham in the sandwich or the of the atomic age. In the 1950s, those expectations were born out. The two countries cooperatively put in place a vast air defence system. Newspapers published maps showing the way it would work. Soviet bombers would first be detected by the American-built and -operated distant early warning (DEW) line in the high Arctic, which would provide plenty of time for the air defence and for the bombers of the US strategic air command to get aloft. The southward movements of the Soviet aircraft would be confirmed by the mid-Canada Une that Ottawa itself had paid for and put in, using Canadian technology. When they reached the vicinity of the Pinetree radars in southern Canada, most of whose stations were operated by Americans, they would be attacked by Canadian and US interceptors and surface-to-air missiles.While there was a lot of cooperation between the two air forces, missing until 1957 was one commander who could take control over all the vast air defence forces that the two countries had been in place and use them as part of a continent- spanning air defence battle. That gap was filled when the two air forces were able to convince the two governments to create NORAD.Shortly before NORAD stood up, the Soviets tested their first intercontinental baUistic missile. It changed the geography of continental defence; the Americans did not need Canada to be able to respond to the missile threat. Unlike aircraft that needed to pass through Canadian airspace, Soviet ballistic missiles would travel beyond the atmosphere and then sharply downward to their US targets. To detect them, the US needed radar sites looking out over the top of the world towards Russia. Alaska, Greenland, and the United Kingdom provided better locations than Canada. To these three sites the Washington later added detectors on satellites and at sites in the continental United States. To any Canadians walking around with that ham sandwich or Cold War Belgium model in their heads - which still applied to air defence - the geographic impact of missile detection must have come as a surprise. …

The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79

Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilson's first government between 1964 and 1970. This Polaris improvement programme was known from 1974 onwards as Chevaline. Chevaline offered Britain an indigenous solution to meet the ‘Moscow Criterion’ – the requirement that British strategic missiles had to be capable of penetrating Moscow's ‘Galosh’ Anti-Ballistic missile defence system (ABM) even in the absence of US support. This came during a time of economic austerity in a changing strategic environment which led Labour to explore nuclear cooperation with the French. It also led to calls from within the party to renounce nuclear weapons through unilateral disarmament. This article will shed fresh light on the bitter internal debates that ensued and how a select band of senior ministers responded to this dilemma.

A Different Path to Nuclear Arms Reductions

Opponents of the Conventional Trident Modification (a non-nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile), European-based long-range missile defenses, and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (a new nuclear warhead) have exaggerated the possible drawbacks of these capabilities and overlooked the opportunities they represent. Deployment of long-range non-nuclear strike systems (like the Conventional Trident Modification), missile defenses, and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (along with improvements in the nuclear weapons infrastructure) over time could diminish the requirements for nuclear weapons and enable further reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

The Death of Disarmament in Russia?

You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink. --Anonymous With growing confidence, analysts and policymakers have referred to death of arms control, the Cold War industry that produced landmark agreements intended to curb the growth of opposing strategic arsenals. For better or worse, the United States did not keep arms control on life support. In October 1999 the US Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would eliminate the Department of Energy's only proven means of ensuring the safety and reliability of the United States' nuclear stockpile if ratified. Three later, the Bush Administration legally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the 1972 pact with the Soviet Union that outlawed national missile shields. In May 2002 the United States and Russia did sign a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by the end of 2012, but this legal vehicle was more an act of diplomatic charity than a necessary contract. Russia relishes the prestige that accompanies splashy arms control formalities, but America's former peer did not need a treaty to see the benefits of strategic forces cuts--absent significant funding increases, its arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015 with or without the new pact. (1) This reality was suggested by President Bush, who casually offered to write it down on a piece of paper if Moscow felt it needed an official agreement to do what the United States was going to do over the next ten years anyway. (2) Traditional arms control agreements with Russia, it seems, are as much a part of Cold War history as the Soviet Union itself. Now, the same experts may be unwittingly witnessing the demise of disarmament in Russia. Most of the dismantlement programs the United States initiated to secure and ultimately destroy Russian nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon systems appear to be completed or no longer agree with Moscow's policy goals. The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the Department of Energy's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN) program suffer from poor Russian cooperation as well as from access and transparency problems that have crippled major parts of the sister initiatives. In addition, Russia's spending priorities and contributions do not reflect a continuing, mutual interest in disarmament. Moscow, to be sure, is willing to take advantage of US disarmament resources--but frequently acts against the spirit of the overall effort. Today, Russia seems to view these cooperative initiatives as a means to a strategic modernization program that includes the production of new weapon systems, the elimination and cleanup of older ones, and the maintenance of illicit biological and probably chemical warfare programs. The sum realities of poor transparency and cooperation, backward spending priorities, and stubborn proliferation practices--all key indicators of a country's true arms control intentions--bare a divergence of objectives and expectations between Washington and Moscow that may have already upended the well-meaning programs' primary purpose. A thorough and candid reexamination of US nonproliferation policy toward Russia is in order. Early Success To date, the oft-cited Cooperative Threat Reduction program has achieved a respectable measure of success in deactivating strategic weapons--nuclear warheads and their associated delivery systems--in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. By the Defense Department's count, the CTR program has helped to destroy some 530 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and no less than 27 ballistic missile submarines over the last dozen years. The congressionally-mandated initiative also has effected the elimination of 475 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and about 120 heavy bombers. …

Potential Contributions by the Canadian Armed Forces to the Defence of North America against Terrorism

The contents of this paper are the product of discussions held by a study group on North American Security, organized by the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Most of the 15 group members are retired, after long service in the Department of International Affairs and International Trade, or in the Department of National Defence. Members include (BGen) Clay Beattie, Bob Cameron, (Col) Ron Cleminson, Bob Edmonds, Ross Francis, Dwight Fulford, George Grande, (BGen) Keith Greenaway, John Hadwen, Hugh Henry, David Kirkwood, George Lindsey, Blair Seaborn, Ken Williamson and Gerry Wright.THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER is to investigate how modern technology and the geography of North America can determine the most suitable roles for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in protecting the continent against terrorism in the 21st century. A useful background, however, can be assembled by considering how the geography and technology of the 20th century influenced the roles played by the CAF in the defence of North America against the threats presented during the Cold War, and how some of the experience, organizations, and equipment provided for the Cold War can be exploited for the defence against terrorism.DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA DURING THE COLD WARBackgroundFor more than a century before the Cold War, neither Canada nor the United States faced a serious threat of attack on their territory from outside the North American continent. This came to an end, however, with the Soviet Union's acquisition of long-range bomber aircraft, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). All were armed with nuclear payloads.The shortest and most direct routes for the Soviet bombers and ICBMs to reach the US's central 48 states would be to travel across the Northeast Pacific, the Arctic or the Northwest Atlantic Oceans. These routes were all either close to, or directly over, Canadian territory.(1) Most of the SLBMs likely would have been launched from Soviet submarines patrolling in zones off the East Coast of the United States.To counter these three threats, a reliable early warning system was required. Its primary purpose was to enable the bombers of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) to become airborne before their bases were destroyed, and, later, to allow American ICBMs to be launched before they were destroyed on the ground. If the SAC bombers of the 1950s and 1960s were to be launched from bases in the central US, and ordered to deliver retaliatory strikes, they would need to refuel before beginning the long flight to the Soviet Union. There were two refueling options: one was to land at one of the six Canadian bases manned partially or wholly by USAF personnel;(2) the other was to receive fuel in the air from US tanker aircraft deployed in Canada.Countermeasures against the air threat: the creation of NORAD(3)In addition to its role in preservation of the American offensive forces needed for deterrence, early warning was providing information that was essential for active defence units--both American and Canadian. Against the bomber threat, these included air defence control centres, radar stations and bases for fighter aircraft, as well as anti-aircraft missiles, and guns, deployed for the interception and destruction of the bombers before they could reach their targets in the United States or Canada.The key system installed for early warning against bomber attacks was the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, consisting of a chain of manned radar stations following the 70[Symbol Not Transcribed] [degree] north parallel of latitude along the northern coasts of Alaska and mainland Canada (and across Baffin Island). Until 1965, another warning system, the Mid-Canada Line, was in place. Using elementary unmanned radars, it spanned the whole of Canada, along latitude 55[Symbol Not Transcribed] [degree] north, and formed a tripwire that was able to confirm if bombers were coming south. …

US nuclear posture

The current US nuclear posture review (NPR) should answer key questions, such as how many of the 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads should be retired, against whom and what those remaining should be targeted, and how weapons cuts should be distributed amongst the 'triad' of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bombers. Factors to be studied include the present shape and future direction of the post-Cold War political environment; wider issues concerning nuclear deterrence, such as the number and types of weapon needed to facilitate deterrence; and, on a more theoretical level, the patterns of behaviour that can be deterred by nuclear weapons. There is considerable disagreement within the US defence community over the answers to each of these questions, just as there was during the Cold War.

Eisenhower's Pentagon

After long delay, the Historical Office of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) has published the third volume in its series of histories of OSD (the last volume was published in 1988).1 Whatever caused the delay – whether the study’s sheer magnitude,2 the inter-agency declassification process, or the Historical Office’s internal review – the result is an important study of a formative period in Cold War history. During the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration presided over the development of a huge “overkill” nuclear weapons capability epitomized by the “triad” of U.S. nuclear-delivery forces of strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Paying for the “triad” would be enormously expensive, and the annual budgetary process that financed nuclear weapons systems and the U.S. military generally is at the heart of Watson’s narrative. His story, however, is also about national security planning, centralization of policymaking authority, nuclear strategy, arms control, U.S.–European and U.S.–Japanese relations, and, not least, Cold War crises. Indeed, this study’s scope is so broad that a brief review cannot do it justice.

U.S. strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998

Quantitative data on operational nuclear weapons is tabulated and described in some detail in the article. Nuclear weapons categories reported include intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and weapons. The total number of warheads in the U.S. arsenal is approximately 7150, slightly lower than last year`s level of almost 8000 warheads. There are 1085 launchers and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

French nuclear testing: A fool's errand

Tariq Rauf is Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Previously, he served as Nonproliferation Expert at the Office of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canada, and Senior Associate at the Canadian Centre for Global Security. Only personal views are expressed in this viewpoint. Despite protests from all parts of the world, France resumed underground nuclear testing on September 5, 1995, for the ostensible reason of calibrating equipment to facilitate computer simulations designed to check the reliability of French nuclear warheads. France detonated a small nuclear device equivalent to about 8,000 tons of TNT at its Mururoa test-site in the South Pacific (Centre d’Experimentations du Pacific). Some arms control experts, however, believe that the real reason for the series of tests is to certify a new nuclear warhead (TN-76/TN-100) for the M-45/M-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (and also possibly for a new cruise missile, though this seems unlikely). Despite strong international opposition, France carried out a second nuclear test, in the current series, at Fangataufa on October 1. Announced on June 13, 1995, by the new President of France Jacques Chirac as his presidential debut on the international stage, this new series of up to eight tests, did not come as a surprise, though it was roundly criticized internationally. Only Colonel Mu’ammar alQadhdhafi, the Libyan leader, endorsed Chirac’s plan. In his election campaign, Chirac noted the necessity of temporarily resuming testing, which had been suspended by his predecessor President Francois Mitterand in 1992, to maintain France’s nuclear arsenal. Chirac’s presidential announcement also noted that the new series of tests would be concluded by May 1996, and that France would then go on to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of 1996. The resumption of French nuclear weapon testing has evoked strong criticism internationally and has resulted in France being perceived as somewhat of a nuclear pariah, particularly by nations in the South Pacific. Australia and Chile recalled their envoys from Paris, while New Zealand, Japan, and South Pacific Forum nations issued condemnations, and peace groups set up protests ranging from Europe to the South Pacific. The inopportune political timing and insensitivity of France’s testing program is only exceeded by that of China, which conducted a nuclear test in mid-May, barely three days after the ending of the historic Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Ironically, France played a constructive role at that conference by helping shape language on two key decisions (i.e. “principles and objectives” and “strengthened review”) to which it is a party. In its efforts to justify its testing program, the French government has linked its international stature and influence to its nuclear weapon capabilities and has even offered to extend its nuclear umbrella to defend its European Union (E.U.) partners. These blandishments, however, have not gone over well as several E.U. members have questioned French political wisdom and sincerity. Perhaps more significantly, the standing of both President Chirac and his government in domestic public opinion in France has markedly declined. In order to properly assess France’s position on the necessity of the current series of tests, it would be useful to briefly examine the history of the French nuclear testing program, its nuclear force posture, as well as France’s stance toward nuclear arms control.

From Polaris to Trident: The Development of U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology by Graham Spinardi

430 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE that naval aviation, including not only the carriers but also the su­ perbly trained personnel and the procurement practices for securing the advanced weaponry that performed so impressively in the Pacific during World War II, succeeded as well as they did. But the author is candid about the negative aspects of Moffett’s career as well. The admiral cultivated wealthy and influential friends whom he used un­ abashedly in seeking presidential support for renewing his appoint­ ment as head of BuAer. And surely Moffett’s continued advocacy of rigid airships despite a succession of fatal accidents, which clearly demonstrated their dangerous vulnerability to adverse weather, sug­ gests some want of objectivity on his part in assessing the technical capabilities of dirigibles. While his enthusiasm for airships may have been misguided, it was sincere, for it was as a passenger in the ill-fated Akron, which crashed in a storm off the coast of New Jersey, that he lost his life. Moffet’s impressive achievements resulted in no small part from his “innate sense of what was possible and what was not possible in times of rapid technological change” (p. 275). As a leader he selected top-notch subordinates, and if he demanded their unswerving loyalty, he was no less loyal to them, encouraging their initiatives and advanc­ ing their careers to the best of his abilities. I. B. Holley, Jr. Dr. Holley is with the Department of History at Duke University. From Polaris to Trident: The Development of U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology. By Graham Spinardi. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. ix + 253; notes, index. $54.95. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles represented a technological counterpoint to the de­ velopment and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles by the U.S. Air Force. This book outlines the development of the naval systems, from the Polaris missile, initiated in 1956 and put to sea in 1960, to the Trident D5 missile deployed in 1990, which served as one of the final bargaining chips in the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. In that time, the Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident weapons systems went from a submarine’s complement of sixteen missiles, each carrying a single nuclear weapon, to twenty-four missiles, each with eight independently tar­ geted warheads. Graham Spinardi’s analytical goal is to use this account to demon­ strate that none of the often-cited factors—science, technology, or politics (bureaucratic or international)—alone determined the tech­ nological outcome. Rather, he argues that a sociological approach provides a framework to account for the interactions of these influ­ ences, so that “technological success can be explained by reference to TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 431 social factors rather than to ‘natural’ logic, and can be seen as requir­ ing networks of interests which need to be actively forged and main­ tained” (p. 18). This story’s foundation is the U.S. Navy’s careful effort to forge a distinct strategic mission, and a technology which reflected it, by cre­ ating a role complementary to the dominant position staked out by the Strategic Air Command and the air force’s missileers. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke determined that while the air force made claims to accuracy sufficient to deliver nuclear weapons to spe­ cific military or industrial targets within the Soviet Union, the navy would find its own strategic role and missile. In contrast to the flyers, the sailors defined their mission as deterrence; missile-carrying sub­ marines, weapons aimed at cities rather than narrowly defined strate­ gic targets, represented a hidden threat designed to forestall a nu­ clear strike by its ability to punish the aggressor’s populace after one took place. This position claimed the virtue of not threatening a first strike, and so made a virtue of the accuracy initially to be expected of submarine-launched missiles, which could hit a city but might miss a smaller target. While at first the navy was the junior partner in a joint army-navy development project, the fact that liquid fuels were unsuitable for use aboard ship justified the navy...

Enduring Misconceptions of Strategic Stability: The Role of Nuclear Missile-Carrying Submarines

This article exposes many of the flawed assumptions about the submarine leg of the nuclear triad implicit in traditional strategic stability theory. It argues that the US strategic studies literature has put too much emphasis on traditional stability theory and that stability, whether defined traditionally or in modern terms, is more threatened by submarine-based nuclear weapons than is generally realized. The article notes that, although the possibility of a major nuclear surprise attack is becoming increasingly remote, insofar as there currently exist military incentives to launch such attacks it is due in large part to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which facilitate command and control decapitation strikes and threaten to negate options such as Launch on Warning. It moreover suggests that SLBMs are the strategic weapons most likely to endanger efforts to prevent loss of control in crises because: (1) US SLBMs do not contain Permissive Action Links (PALs); (2) in contrast to ICBMs, SLBMs regularrrl come into direct and potentially violent contact with enemy military forces in peacetime and are significantly more likely to come under direct attack in conventional war; and (3) SLBMs could make it particularly difficult for decision-makers to determine the source of a nuclear attack. The article concludes with several recommendations for enhancing strategic stability.

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile (June 1987)

The US. nuclear stockpile is at its lowest level since late 1958 or early 1959. In the past year, many weapons were returned to central military storage depots in the United States and funneled to the Energy Department's Pantex facility for final disassembly and disposal. This article presents a table showing the author's current estimate of the composition of the current operational stockpile, which contains some 10,500 warheads. Also categorized are warheads in [open quotes]inactive reserve[close quotes] and warheads awaiting eventual disassembly. The warheads are generally grouped as bombs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Initial production dates and yield are listed for the warheads.

Trident: Tracing the Course of Nuclear Weapons Technology

Given the potentially apocalyptic nature of our nuclear predicament, any detailed studies of the development of nuclear weaponry are welcome. However, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are especially interesting because they have traditionally epitomized what many considered to be the ideal deterrent. Not only are they virtually invulnerable, once at sea, but they have also lacked sufficient accuracy to threaten protected enemy targets, such as hardened missile silos. Thus they are seen as very stabilizing, offering little value in a first strike, but ensuring deadly retaliation. Moreover, because of their deployment method, SLBMs are the ultimate in weapons systems. 1 Not only must warheads, guidance and piopulsion be combined in the missiles, but these must be compatible with missile submarines which in turn require a supporting infrastructure for navigation and communication. Finally, two US SLBMs Polaris and Trident II have the additional interest of forming the basis of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.

R&D cost of weapons continues to escalate

The massive commitment of U.S. scientific and technological resources to the development of new weapons systems that has been building up these past four years will continue unabated. That is an unmistakably clear message contained in Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1985 report to Congress. The 314-page document was submitted earlier this month in support of the Administration's budget for fiscal 1986. That budget pegs the Department of Defense's research, development, testing, and evaluation program at $39.3 billion, up 25% from fiscal 1985 and 45% from fiscal 1984. Why the Pentagon insists it needs such massive increases in R&D funding becomes clear from the details given in Weinberger's report of the massive expense of developing modern weapons systems, particularly strategic systems. For instance, the Trident II is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It is scheduled to be deployed in late 1989. It is of longer range and it carries more powerful nuclear ...

Chinese nuclear force modernization: Implications for arms control

On October 16, 1982 China successfully test-fired a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) into a target area in the East China Sea. Earlier, in late June of that year, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had held extensive military exercises under conditions of simulated tactical nuclear warfare. These two events were major signposts on China's road to the diversification of its nuclear forces. Western analyses of China's nuclear forces are often of two kinds. The first tends to be static and one-dimensional, focusing almost exclusively on China's nuclear hardware and its significance for relations with the Soviet Union. It is not often that strategic analysts have examined the role of internal politics in the structure of China's nuclear forces, or looked at the possible direction in force development in light of changes in China's foreign policy alignments, interests, and goals. The second type, while taking into account the dynamics of China's nuclear policy, assumes that Beijing's military needs can be measured only by what it would take to match Soviet capabilities. It also fails to explain adequately the nature of China's minimum deterrent} This paper attempts to put Chinese nuclear forces in the context of China's domestic political process and changing military and foreign policy requirements. It will begin by looking at some of the internal and external influences on China's strategic and substrategic nuclear force posture. It will then examine the trends in the PRC's strategic doctrine and force posture as well as the evolving debate over the acquisition of a diverse theater and battlefield nuclear capability. Finally, it will look at some of the implications of nuclear diversification for the security of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Asia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity

The United States confronted three important decisions in the late 1960s affecting the state of the Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance: whether to deploy antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), which had the potential of greatly reducing the destruction that a nuclear attack might produce, especially in a second strike (unless the opponent had offset the defensive effect of the ABMs by adding to its own offensive warheads); whether to deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which had the potential of enabling whichever side struck first to deprive the other of its fixed-site intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as secure second-strike weapons (unless the opponent had offset the offensive effects of the MIRVs by multiplying its fixed sites or defending them); and whether to deploy additional forces to keep pace with the additions the Soviet Union was making to its offensive forces, additions which (unless offset) had the potential of changing the strategic balance from one of American superiority to one of parity or even, perhaps, Soviet superiority. By the mid-1970s, the United States had made all three decisions. It decided to avoid, if it could, the deployment of ABMs, and in 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty limiting ABMs to nominal levels and banning the deployment of other forms of ballistic missile defense. In contrast to their approach to ABMs, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union made a determined effort to negotiate an agreement to ban MIRVs or to limit them to nominal levels. The United States began to deploy MIRVed ICBMs in 1970 and MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

Military: particle-beam weapons: a controversy: `highly questionable' is the label applied by four M.I.T. scientists, but the U.S. department of defense is betting on the new scheme

With just two particle-beam weapon systems installed on satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit at 40000 km, a country could, theoretically, neutralize ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles fired from any site in the world. Such 'death ray' weapons, it is reported in a study by four physicists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, could - again theoretically - destroy enemy missiles the moment they climbed out of the earth's atmosphere and entered space.