Chinese nuclear force modernization: Implications for arms control

Abstract

On October 16, 1982 China successfully test-fired a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) into a target area in the East China Sea. Earlier, in late June of that year, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had held extensive military exercises under conditions of simulated tactical nuclear warfare. These two events were major signposts on China's road to the diversification of its nuclear forces. Western analyses of China's nuclear forces are often of two kinds. The first tends to be static and one-dimensional, focusing almost exclusively on China's nuclear hardware and its significance for relations with the Soviet Union. It is not often that strategic analysts have examined the role of internal politics in the structure of China's nuclear forces, or looked at the possible direction in force development in light of changes in China's foreign policy alignments, interests, and goals. The second type, while taking into account the dynamics of China's nuclear policy, assumes that Beijing's military needs can be measured only by what it would take to match Soviet capabilities. It also fails to explain adequately the nature of China's minimum deterrent} This paper attempts to put Chinese nuclear forces in the context of China's domestic political process and changing military and foreign policy requirements. It will begin by looking at some of the internal and external influences on China's strategic and substrategic nuclear force posture. It will then examine the trends in the PRC's strategic doctrine and force posture as well as the evolving debate over the acquisition of a diverse theater and battlefield nuclear capability. Finally, it will look at some of the implications of nuclear diversification for the security of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Asia.