Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles Research Articles

United States nuclear weapons, 2024

ABSTRACT The United States has embarked on a wide-ranging nuclear modernization program that will ultimately see every nuclear delivery system replaced with newer versions over the coming decades. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that the United States maintains a stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads—an unchanged estimate from the previous year. Of these, only about 1,770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,938 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,336 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,044 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and approximately 100 tactical bombs are at European bases. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and program associate Mackenzie Knight. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dating back to 1987, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/.

Revisiting Presidential Nuclear Autonomy

The United States (US) Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) system is no longer appropriate for the current global security environment. The NC2 system lacks adequate hard checks and balances on the president’s use of nuclear weapons. Designed for decisiveness, there is no systemic barrier preventing the president from authorizing and ordering the launch of a nuclear weapon, regardless of the reason. As such, this memo proposes that Congress impose limits on the president’s nuclear first-strike authority. Congressional approval should be required before the president can launch a nuclear strike. In addition, the Department of Defense should reduce its reliance on silo-based missile systems and increase its reliance on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The high vulnerability of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to enemy nuclear strikes creates a ‘use it or lose it’ scenario, where ICBMs must be launched before they are destroyed. This increases pressure on the president to launch these missiles before they are destroyed, increasing the chance of miscalculation or launch if there is a false alarm. SLBMs are not subject to the same vulnerabilities. As more survivable assets, SLBMs reduce pressure on the president to act hastily, eliminating the chance of a poorly informed nuclear launch.

United States nuclear weapons, 2023

ABSTRACTThe Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the status of the US nuclear arsenal. The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Department of Defense maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads. Of these, only about 1,770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,938 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,536 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,244 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and 100 tactical bombs are at European bases.

North Korean Nuclear Crisis from Contending Theoretical Perspectives

This article investigates the North Korean nuclear crisis from various contending international relations theoretical perspectives analyzing North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the possibility of regime survival, and various policies for coping with North Korea's nuclear threat. North Korea's nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs should guarantee Pyongyang's security enough, but Kim Jong‐un's intention in developing various strategic weapons, such as multiwarhead tactical nuclear missiles, nuclear‐warhead‐tipped ICBMs and submarine‐launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear‐powered submarines, and continuing enrichment of high enriched uranium and plutonium pose dire security threats to the USA and its alliances. As for countermeasures against North Korea's WMD, the US‐ROK should upgrade their missile defense system based on the 4D principle. The alliance should conduct regular military drills anticipating various possible North Korean preemptive tactical nuclear weapon and missile attacks. Also, the USA and South Korea should make continuing efforts to persuade Kim Jong‐un to give up his nuclear weapons and ICBM programs.

IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING NATO’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE BASED ON THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

The study focuses on NATO’s nuclear policy in the face of Russia’s aggressive policy and threats from the Kremlin.
 The author examines the history of the nuclear policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the founding of NATO, as well as key aspects of the implementation of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy.
 Part of the study focuses on the geostrategic aspects of NATO’s nuclear triad and covers the three components of the nuclear triad: strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It also examines specific aspects of the use of nuclear systems by the three main nuclear powers of NATO, namely the USA, the UK, and France, and the main geopolitical rivals of the Alliance, specifically the Russian Federation, taking into account Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the People’s Republic of China.

United States nuclear weapons, 2022

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the status of the US nuclear arsenal. The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Defense Department maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads. Of these, only about 1,744 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,964 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,720 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,428 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,744 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 944 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and 100 tactical bombs are at European bases.

THE TWOFOLD MEANING OF BRINKMANSHIP: EXPLAINING STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY IN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Discussions and debates about whether or not the role of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons underpins a so-called “Escalation to De-Escalation” strategy culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared the need for deploying a new low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to prevent Russia from escalating to the limited nuclear level and successfully terminate the conflict. While unofficial evidence barely suggests that Russia may exhort to its NSNWs in order to stave off the adversary in crisis situations, common Western discussions on Escalation to De-Escalation revolve around the alleged existence of an “offensive” Escalation to De-Escalation strategy. Thereby, Moscow would pre-emptively escalate to the limited nuclear level over NATO's Eastern flank in order to take over it while leaving Western countries without no escalation options, given the doubts surrounding the ability of B61s’ delivery systems at going beyond Russian air-defence. However, while Western countries are often busy with self-deterrence, thus perceiving immediate threats at each deployment by the adversary, they tend to overlook strategic manipulation of deployed capabilities. That is why analysis of ambiguity surrounding Russian NSNWs have been less popular in Western contexts. Based upon critical analysis of Escalation to De-Escalation and classic deterrence and escalation studies, this paper argues that ambiguity surrounding Russia’s NSNWs is part of a brinkmanship strategy, which inadvertently triggered destabilizing dynamics in US-Russia relations. The article proceeds as follows. First, an introduction sets the scene and the aim of the article, as well as the methodology, including the scope and background of facts. Second, the Escalation to De-escalation debate is broken down in the attempt of shedding light on the ambiguity it builds on. Third, it is argued that ambiguity surrounding NSNWs is strategically exploited according to Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, though exacerbating the risk of inadvertent escalation with Western countries. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the argument and indicates its implications.

Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

ABSTRACT Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: (1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities”; and (2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

‘Dog-beating stick’: General Zhang Aiping’s contribution to the modernisation of China’s nuclear force and strategy since 1977

Since the Reform and Opening-up in the late 1970s, the second generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, worked towards a breakthrough in the development of strategic nuclear weapons and employment policy. By the middle 1980s, the Chinese military had successfully developed China’s first generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and communication satellites, which provided China with an elementary and limited second-strike capability. These technological advances were complemented by advances in Chinese nuclear strategy as well. Despite retaining the basic principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, the Chinese military leaders, such as Deng and General Zhang Aiping, gradually accepted the concept of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, they put forward China’s own concepts, including ‘da gou gun’ (‘dog-beating stick’), ‘huan shou zhi li’ (‘the power to strike back’), ‘xia hu ren’ (‘bluff’), and ‘di you wo you, di yong wo yong’ (‘we have whatever the enemy has; we use whatever the enemy uses’). All of these new strategic weapons and concepts, which came from the 1980s, have been playing a key role in ensuring that China enjoyed limited nuclear deterrent since the late 1980s. Zhang devoted most of his attention to these achievements.

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: A Japanese Perspective

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific:A Japanese Perspective Noboru Yamaguchi (bio) From a Japanese perspective, the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific under the Trump administration seems to be far more robust than many in the region worrisomely speculated during the presidential election campaign. Despite Donald Trump's tough words on U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe as a presidential candidate, the administration's approach in East Asia, centering on the alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), has been positive and pragmatic, endorsing the importance of the hub-and-spoke network of bilateral arrangements between the United States and Asian partners.1 Visits to Asia by Secretary of Defense James Mattis in February and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in March, followed by Vice President Mike Pence in April, have signaled that the United States will keep emphasizing its Asia policy and cooperation with allies and partners in the region. This essay discusses, first, how Japan sees the Trump administration's commitment to Northeast Asian security; second, the implications of the Trump administration's Asia policy; and third, the outlook for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the near future. The U.S. Commitment to Northeast Asian Security in the Trump Administration The Trump administration has so far proved the United States' strong commitment and firm resolution to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. In particular, the administration's willingness to cooperate with important players in the region, including China as well as U.S. allies Japan and the ROK, to address the threat posed by North Korea exemplifies its commitment to regional stability. For Japan, while serious concerns [End Page 13] remain regarding the future direction of China, whose rise might have both positive and negative impacts on the regional and global strategic environments, North Korea constitutes the paramount foreign threat to national security. North Korea has been vigorously pursuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite a series of UN resolutions.2 In 2016 alone, the country conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests and launched 24 missiles. Pyongyang has claimed that it is developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the United States.3 With the possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, the danger posed by such programs is no longer regional but soon could directly threaten the United States. On March 6, 2017, North Korea simultaneously launched 4 missiles with a range of around one thousand kilometers, 3 of which landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan. Ten days later, presumably in response to North Korea's accelerated missile and nuclear programs, Secretary Tillerson made it clear that "all options are on the table" to deal with North Korea's destabilizing acts against Japan. He further commented in Seoul on March 17 that "if they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that [military] option is on the table." 4 This statement was powerfully endorsed earlier by Secretary Mattis on February 3 when he stated that "any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming." 5 These words were followed by deployment of the carrier strike group headed by the USS Carl Vinson near the peninsula. Strategic bomber overflights, frequent port visits by U.S. Navy ships to the ROK, and joint exercises with Australia, the ROK, and Japan, among other actions, also demonstrate U.S. determination and capabilities on issues related to Northeast Asian security. The U.S. attack against Syria on April 6 reinforced this message to North Korea and other concerned parties that the United States will not tolerate any action threatening the international community with the use of [End Page 14] weapons of mass destruction. This message was seemingly well understood by China and conveyed to North Korea. Indeed, one of the Chinese Communist Party's own international media outlets, the Global Times, openly warned North Korea and expressed China's reluctance to be involved in a military conflict, stating that "if Pyongyang's unwavering pursuit of its nuclear program continues and Washington...

북한의 핵전략과 잠수함발사탄도미사일 (SLBM)위협분석을 통한 한국의 대응전략

북한의 핵전략과 잠수함발사탄도미사일 (SLBM)위협분석을 통한 한국의 대응전략

Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats: In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations

Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats:In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations Chung-in Moon (bio) Inter-Korean relations have hit rock bottom. Since President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013, her government pursued the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula initiative and tried to improve ties with North Korea. But such efforts have failed, and inter-Korean relations have worsened.1 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the Park government adopted a much tougher stance by closing the Kaesong industrial complex and completely suspending inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Seoul and Washington have also intensified joint military exercises and training on deploying strategic weapons. Pyongyang responded to these moves by conducting numerous missile test launches and by undertaking an additional nuclear test in September. A vicious cycle of action and reaction has heightened inter-Korean military tension, which has deepened public anxiety. The North and the South are engaging in a dangerous game of chicken without any channels of communication, increasing the risk that an accidental clash may well escalate into a full-blown military conflict. Over the past seven years—while the six-party talks have been derailed—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear materials and is now estimated to possess more than ten nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has so far conducted five nuclear tests in total and acquired short-range Scud-type missiles, intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan missiles, and even submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is also close to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well. The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer fictional but real and poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the [End Page 74] military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful coexistence there. The regional security impacts are also profound—a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism. Against this backdrop, this essay provides a critical assessment of existing strategies to deal with the North Korean nuclear deadlock by focusing on sanctions and other pressures, deterrence and missile defense, and preemptive attack and nuclear armament. It then suggests dialogue and negotiation as a viable alternative. The Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions and Other Pressures The Park Geun-hye government has responded to the threats from North Korea by employing a variety of countermeasures ranging from sanctions and other pressures to deterrence, preemptive strikes, and defense. Its preferred method of managing Pyongyang’s unruly behavior has so far been sanctions. The Park administration strongly believes that North Korea’s crimes (possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions) should be punished by comprehensive and forceful sanctions and that such sanctions can compel the North and its leader, Kim Jong-un, to choose a path toward denuclearization. Otherwise, the Kim regime will risk collapse. But sanctions have not been effective. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, North Korea has not shown signs of compliance. On the contrary, its behavior has become more defiant, with the Kim regime conducting a fifth nuclear test and additional missile tests. North Korea is still a closed society and is very much accustomed to sanctions. Moreover, China does not want to go ahead with any sanctions that would undermine stability in the North and lead to regime collapse. Given that 91.3% of North Korea’s trade is with China, as of December 2015, international sanctions cannot be effective without Beijing’s full cooperation.2 As sanctions and other pressures have not produced any tangible outcomes, the South Korean government has not only strengthened its deterrence posture but also begun to adopt a more assertive defense stance, especially against a potential North Korean missile attack. This deterrence [End Page 75] strategy is composed of three elements. The first is deterrence against the North by implementing a kill chain predicated on improved missile and...

Analysis of the flight trajectory characteristics of North Korea SLBM due to launching mode

The current research aims to simulate the flight trajectory of the North Korean submarine–launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and analyze its flight characteristics based on its range control method. Recently, North Korea has completed the test flight of SLBM and it has become a significant threat to international security. North Korea obtained SLBM technologies from Russia while disbanding decommissioned Russian submarines, and it is suspected that North Korea will continue to experiment in related fields along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons. If North Korea completes the development of SLBM and deploys the missiles, it means the completion of the three asymmetric warfare elements (nuclear weapon, ballistic missile, and submarine) and they will be the most significant threats to northeast Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to scientifically analyze SLBM to adeptly respond to such threat. One characteristic of SLBM is capability of attacking its target in a variety of ways based on its range control method. Based on this fact, the current research derives the flight equation of North Korean SLBM and simulates its flight trajectory based on various range control methods. The flight trajectories that we derive can be used to establish an effective anti-ballistic missile defense system in northeast Asia.

Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China

Abstract As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large.

잠수함 발사 탄도미사일 탐지를 위한 해상 센서플랫폼의 배치에 관한 연구

본 논문은 잠수함 발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 탐지를 위한 해상 센서플랫폼의 배치에 관한 연구이다. 최근 북한은 SLBM의 수중 사출시험을 실시하였으며 이는 국제사회에 심각한 안보 위협이 되고 있다. 이러한 위협에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 기동이 가능한 해상 센서플랫폼은 SLBM의 탐지 가능성이 높은 위치에 배치되어야 한다. 그러나 전형적인 레이더 센서체계의 최대탐지거리 특성은 표적의 비행궤적과 레이더 반사 단면적(RCS)에 따라 달라진다. 이러한 관점에서 본 연구는 SLBM의 전술적 특성에 따른 비행궤적을 분석하고, RCS를 계산하였다. 또한 센서 플랫폼의 위치에 따른 탐지 시간을 분석하여 효과적으로 SLBM을 탐지할 수 있는 해상 센서 플랫폼의 위치를 제시하였다. This paper describes deployment of a sea based sensor platform for the detection of a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Recently, North Korea successfully conducted the underwater launching test of the SLBM, which will seriously threaten the global security. To defend these threats successfully, a sensor platform of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) should be deployed in the area of high detection probability of the missile. The maximum detection range characteristics of the typical radar sensor system, however, depend on the radar cross section (RCS) and flight trajectories of the target. In this point of view, this work analyzed the flight trajectories based on the tactics and calculated the RCS of the SLBM. In addition, sea based sensor platform position is proposed from the analysis of the detection time.

Nonproliferation treaty talks end in acrimony

Issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament take a back seat to a Middle East regional nuclear-free zone.

The Evolving Nuclear Order: Implications for Proliferation, Arms Racing, and Stability

The 25 years since the end of the Cold War have seen several notable shifts in the global distribution of nuclear capabilities:* The Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States have slashed their arsenals by roughly 75% from 20,000-30,000 warheads to 7,000-8,000.1* France and Britain have also made substantial cuts, reducing their nuclear forces from 500 weapons at their peak to roughly 300 and 200, respectively.* Of the Cold War big five (the United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union, and China), only China has not reduced its stockpile, which is estimated at 250 warheads. Beijing has also made significant investments in modernizing its forces, developing new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.* Three new countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the list of acknowledged nuclear weapons states, and one (South Africa) has been removed.* Finally, in recent years a series of aspirants (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) have seen their nuclear ambitions foiled, while one (Iran) continues to press on toward the finish line.What are the implications of these developments for the conduct of international relations, and, in particular, how are they likely to shape events in eastern Eurasia, a zone of strategic interaction that extends from the Korean Peninsula, down through the South Asian subcontinent, and into the Persian Gulf region? The essays in this roundtable have helped shed light on three aspects of this question: proliferation, arms racing, and stability.ProliferationRegarding the further spread of nuclear weapons, the next chapters of the story in the broader Middle East will depend a great deal on what happens in Iran. If Tehran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, other states may feel compelled to follow suit, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If it does not, Israel may remain the region's only nuclear weapons state.In East Asia, those states most likely to contemplate pursuing nuclear status are also anxious friends and allies of the United States. Japan, South Korea, and (albeit implicitly) Taiwan have until now been content to take shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But they could come to doubt the reliability of U.S. guarantees in the face of North Korea's new capabilities, China's nuclear modernization programs, or, especially in the case of Japan, both developments taken together.While this once-taboo topic has been discussed more openly in both Japan and South Korea in recent years, neither country shows any overt signs of moving to acquire its own nuclear forces. Still, as Noboru Yamaguchi explains in his essay, there is nothing in Japan's peace constitution that absolutely precludes the possibility, should the nation's leaders deem it necessary for self-defense. Like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has shown an interest in acquiring rocket and cruise missile technology that could someday serve as the basis for an independent deterrent force. For the moment, however, the potential for further proliferation in East Asia remains latent.Arms RacingOne of the main features of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was the interaction between their respective armaments efforts, including their offensive and defensive nuclear weapons programs. Although there are a number of competitive dyads emerging in Asia, and while the possibility exists for even more complex arrangements, the degree of interaction among the actors to date remains limited. As Benjamin Schreer describes, China's modernization of its long-range nuclear forces appears to be motivated in large part by a desire to reduce its vulnerability to a possible U.S. conventional precision strike. An increase in the number of weapons deployed, perhaps on multiple warhead delivery systems, could also reflect concern over the possible thickening of the U.S. national missile defenses. …

Chinese nuclear forces, 2015

China is the only one of the five original nuclear weapon states that is quantitatively increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal and it now is estimated to have approximately 260 warheads. The arsenal’s capabilities are also increasing as older missiles are replaced with newer ones. As China assigns a growing portion of its warheads to long-range missiles, the US intelligence community predicts that by the mid-2020s the number of warheads on missiles capable of threatening the United States could increase to well over 100. The nuclear warheads in the Chinese stockpile are intended for delivery mainly by land-based ballistic missile but also by aircraft and submarines. The current force has nearly 150 nuclear-capable land-based missiles, half of which are short-range and medium-range. China has also built two types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, one developed for a submarine no longer considered operational and the other in the final stages of development.

China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike Capability: Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence

China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike Capability:Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence Benjamin Schreer (bio) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of improving its nuclear arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since the details of this nuclear modernization process remain clouded in secrecy, estimates of the numbers of China’s nuclear warheads vary significantly. Pessimists believe that Beijing could possess well over 1,000 warheads, most of which are assumed to be hidden in a complex system of underground tunnels.1 In contrast, this essay agrees with conservative assessments that the total size of China’s nuclear arsenal is approximately 250 warheads, delivered by land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, and an emerging ballistic submarine fleet. The U.S. intelligence community expects that the number of these nuclear warheads capable of threatening the U.S. homeland will more than double to over 100 by the mid-2020s.2 China is on a long-term path of replacing its old liquid-fuel, moveable DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was also expected to conduct its first patrol by the end of 2014 while armed with the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The PLA Navy is estimated to have three Jin-class boats, which could increase to four to five SSBNs by 2020. China is also reportedly developing a next-generation SSBN, called the Type 096. It is therefore gradually making progress toward a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.3 [End Page 14] Therefore, as one scholar wrote in the pages of this journal, “after decades of reliance on a small and potentially strategic deterrent, China is finally achieving the ‘lean and effective’ nuclear force” that its leaders believe to be essential to protect the nation’s security interests.4 The PRC’s incremental development of this more secure second-strike nuclear capability began more than two decades ago. The rapid advances in U.S. conventional precision-strike capabilities observed in military operations during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s was a key driver behind those efforts. However, while Beijing’s reasons for wanting to enhance mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States are clear, the implications for China’s strategic behavior, U.S.-Sino crisis stability, and Asian security in general are less certain. Optimists argue that China’s development of a more secure second-strike capability that enhances mutual vulnerability will strengthen U.S.-Sino crisis stability. One proponent of this view is Robert Ross, who argues that such a capability would minimize the risk of the United States launching a disarming first strike, while leaving intact Washington’s ability to respond with its dominant conventional forces to any attempt by Beijing to alter the regional status quo.5 Yet given the changing strategic context underlying the U.S.-Sino relationship, there are reasons to caution against such a positive reading. The Changing Strategic Context and U.S.-China Strategic Stability China’s nuclear modernization occurs in the midst of Asia-Pacific power shifts. Beijing is increasingly willing to contest U.S. leadership in the region, which has long been based on the United States’ unrivaled military power. To do so, China is not only modernizing its nuclear forces but also significantly upgrading its conventional capabilities. By investing in anti-access/area-denial capabilities, China is raising the costs for a third-party intervention (for example, by the United States) in a dispute in its “near seas”—that is, the Yellow Sea, the Philippine Sea, and the South China Sea. The goal of this strategy seems to be to displace the United States as the dominant power in the western Pacific.6 [End Page 15] In this context, the assumption that the United States’ conventional superiority will guarantee U.S.-Sino strategic stability in contemporary Asia could be problematic. To be sure, in absolute terms U.S. conventional forces will still outweigh China’s by a wide margin for years to come. However, as China is...

US nuclear forces, 2014

The United States has an estimated 4,650 nuclear warheads available for delivery by more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. Approximately 2,700 retired but still intact warheads await dismantlement, for a total inventory of roughly 7,400 warheads. The stockpile includes an estimated 2,130 operational warheads, about 1,150 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 470 on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Roughly 300 strategic warheads are located at bomber bases in the United States, and nearly 200 nonstrategic warheads are deployed in Europe. Another 2,530 warheads are in storage. To comply with New START, the United States is expected to eliminate land-based missile silos, reduce the number of launch tubes on its missile submarines, and limit its inventory of nuclear-capable bombers in coming years. Coinciding with a revised nuclear weapons strategy, the Obama administration is also planning an upgrade of all nuclear weapons systems. The three-decade-long plan would cost more than $200 billion in the first decade alone.