Revisiting Presidential Nuclear Autonomy

Abstract

The United States (US) Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) system is no longer appropriate for the current global security environment. The NC2 system lacks adequate hard checks and balances on the president’s use of nuclear weapons. Designed for decisiveness, there is no systemic barrier preventing the president from authorizing and ordering the launch of a nuclear weapon, regardless of the reason. As such, this memo proposes that Congress impose limits on the president’s nuclear first-strike authority. Congressional approval should be required before the president can launch a nuclear strike. In addition, the Department of Defense should reduce its reliance on silo-based missile systems and increase its reliance on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The high vulnerability of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to enemy nuclear strikes creates a ‘use it or lose it’ scenario, where ICBMs must be launched before they are destroyed. This increases pressure on the president to launch these missiles before they are destroyed, increasing the chance of miscalculation or launch if there is a false alarm. SLBMs are not subject to the same vulnerabilities. As more survivable assets, SLBMs reduce pressure on the president to act hastily, eliminating the chance of a poorly informed nuclear launch.