Stuxnet Virus Research Articles

Analysing the Effects of Cyber Security on National Security from a Realist Perspective: "Stuxnet" Example

In this study, the effects of providing cyber security on national security are examined from a realistic perspective using the example of the Stuxnet virus. It has been stated that the increasing complexity of cyber threats due to technological advances poses serious risks to states' national security. In the study, the critical role of cyber security in protecting national security is emphasized through the Stuxnet attack. The Stuxnet attack is a cyber-attack on the facilities where Iran carried out its nuclear enrichment program in 2010. As a result of this attack, it was revealed that Iran had both interruptions in its nuclear program and a weakness in cyber security. As such, it is underlined that cyber security can affect the international balance of power and the strategic interests of states. From a realist perspective, since ensuring national security requires a resilient defense against cyber threats and vulnerabilities, it has become necessary to consider cyber security as an important parameter in determining national security policies. This study reveals the interdependent relationship between cyber security and national security in this age when cyberspace has become a very important arena for power struggles. Considering these reasons, it has been recommended that states, which realists consider the main actor in the international system, should make investments that will support their cyber security to protect their national security.

Fractional mathematical modeling of the Stuxnet virus along with an optimal control problem

In this digital, internet-based world, it is not new to face cyber attacks from time to time. A number of heavy viruses have been made by hackers, and they have successfully given big losses to our systems. In the family of these viruses, the Stuxnet virus is a well-known name. Stuxnet is a very dangerous virus that probably targets the control systems of our industry. The main source of this virus can be an infected USB drive or flash drive. In this research paper, we study a mathematical model to define the dynamical structure or the effects of the Stuxnet virus on our computer systems. To study the given dynamics, we use a modified version of the Caputo-type fractional derivative, which can be used as an old Caputo derivative by fixing some slight changes, which is an advantage of this study. We demonstrate that the given fractional Caputo-type dynamical model has a unique solution using fixed point theory. We derive the solution of the proposed non-linear non-classical model with the application of a recent version of the Predictor–Corrector scheme. We analyze various graphs at different values of the arrival rate of new computers, damage rate, virus transmission rate, and natural removal rate. In the graphical interpretations, we verify the values of fractional orders and simulate 2-D and 3-D graphics to understand the dynamics clearly. The major novelty of this study is that we formulate the optimal control problem and its important consequences both theoretically and mathematically, which can be further extended graphically. The main contribution of this research work is to provide some novel results on the Stuxnet virus dynamics and explore the uses of fractional derivatives in computer science. The given methodology is effective, fully novel, and very easy to understand.

Cyberspace in a State of Flux: Regulating cyberspace through International Law

Cyberspace continues to become increasingly integral to our way of life. It has brought with it many benefits but has recently become a domain used for misdeed, as was evident from the recent WannaCry ransomware, the Stuxnet virus issue, and the much-publicized US 2016 Election hacking. These incidents have caused the issue of cyberspace to be on the international agenda, but there is a lack of consensus among the various nations on how cyberspace should be regulated. The article analyzes the legal status of cyberspace by first embarking on a discussion on what is cyberspace, followed by a discussion on recent notable cyberattacks. It is against this backdrop that: (1) the legal status of cyberspace in domestic law is analyzed; (2) the application of the existing rules of international law to cyberspace are considered; (3) the problems with the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime are discussed; and (4) proposals for a new Convention on cybersecurity at the UN level in light of the Tallinn Manual, and the Budapest Convention of Cybercrime are made.

Design of backpropagated neurocomputing paradigm for Stuxnet virus dynamics in control infrastructure

Design of backpropagated neurocomputing paradigm for Stuxnet virus dynamics in control infrastructure

ტექნოლოგიური პროცესების მართვის ავტომატიზებული სისტემების უსაფრთხოება, SCADA – შეტევის ობიექტი

(……) Modern automated technology process control systems and the chances of attacks on them are examined in this article. It studies worm virus, Stuxnet, and its detection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. It also analyzes ways of carrying out attacks on critically important objects, and provides analytical tools for the security of technological process systems. The ways for discovering nodes compromised by the Stuxnet virus are proposed. The article considers technological network of typical topology and its typical vulnerabilities; it analyzes the Modbus protocol, the routing system, and passwords on Cisco routers.

Fractional Dynamics of Stuxnet Virus Propagation in Industrial Control Systems

The designed fractional order Stuxnet, the virus model, is analyzed to investigate the spread of the virus in the regime of isolated industrial networks environment by bridging the air-gap between the traditional and the critical control network infrastructures. Removable storage devices are commonly used to exploit the vulnerability of individual nodes, as well as the associated networks, by transferring data and viruses in the isolated industrial control system. A mathematical model of an arbitrary order system is constructed and analyzed numerically to depict the control mechanism. A local and global stability analysis of the system is performed on the equilibrium points derived for the value of α = 1. To understand the depth of fractional model behavior, numerical simulations are carried out for the distinct order of the fractional derivative system, and the results show that fractional order models provide rich dynamics by means of fast transient and super-slow evolution of the model’s steady-state behavior, which are seldom perceived in integer-order counterparts.

Operation “Olympic Games.” Cyber-sabotage as a tool of American intelligence aimed at counteracting the development of Iran’s nuclear programme

The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation “Olympic Games” including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, and the use of many different methods and intelligence sources. Thus, strong states with well-developed intelligence capabilities are much more capable of effectively using cyber-sabotage on a large scale.

Design of a mathematical model for the Stuxnet virus in a network of critical control infrastructure

The purpose of this study is to develop an epidemic virus model that portrays the spread of the Stuxnet virus in a critical control infrastructure after bridging the air-gap between a normal local area network and the critical network. Removable storage media plays an important role in the transfer of data and virus to the computers connected to the critical network (consisting of industrial controllers) and this can compromise the whole system. A mathematical model is formulated that incorporates these features and depicts the controlling mechanism. Disease free and endemic equilibria are analyzed in terms of the basic reproduction number R0. Global stability of disease free and endemic equilibrium points are analyzed using Lyapunov functions. Numerical simulations are performed to determine the accuracy of the proposed model for the smart Stuxnet virus which is designed to target critical industrial systems. Model shows very good resemblance with the observed real life data available for this virus. Future work may invoke interesting results and control strategies.

Design and Implementation of Attack-Resilient Cyberphysical Systems: With a Focus on Attack-Resilient State Estimators

Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the number of securityrelated incidents in control systems. These include high-profile attacks in a wide range of application domains, from attacks on critical infrastructure, as in the case of the Maroochy Water breach [1], and industrial systems (such as the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial supervisory control and data acquisition system [2], [3] and the German Steel Mill cyberattack [4], [5]), to attacks on modern vehicles [6]-[8]. Even high-assurance military systems were shown to be vulnerable to attacks, as illustrated in the highly publicized downing of the RQ-170 Sentinel U.S. drone [9]-[11]. These incidents have greatly raised awareness of the need for security in cyberphysical systems (CPSs), which feature tight coupling of computation and communication substrates with sensing and actuation components. However, the complexity and heterogeneity of this next generation of safety-critical, networked, and embedded control systems have challenged the existing design methods in which security is usually consider as an afterthought.

МЕТОДИКА ОЦЕНКИ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЙ КИБЕРАТАК НА ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕННЫЙ ПРОЦЕСС

The rapid development of modern information management technology leads to the emergence of new aspect of their security. In particular, special importance has acquired the co-called problems of industrial cyber-security, gradually allocated in independent field of scientific and technical research. In recent years, the number of attacks on industrial objects has increased significantly. This is according by ICS-CERT reports for 2014-2015. Several incidents that have received wide press coverage are related with cybersecurity issues. For example, the STUXNET virus, which affects Siemens industrial systems. STUXNET caused serious damage to Iran’s nuclear program by exploiting vulnerabilities of the operating system and the so-called “human factor”. There are a number of modified viruses capable of carrying out successful attacks on various industrial networks based on STUXNET architecture. Siemens is one of the key industrial equipment manufacturers in the world, so STUXNET is widespread and was even discovered at Russian NPP. Thus the security of the automated control systems, process control is critical now and its importance can not be underestimated. One of the most devastating attacks on the possible damage is the diversion of the production process. Diversion of the process affects all levels of the process control system. This article proposes assessment of consequences of performing each of the described attack’s steps, determines the information possessed by the attacker after each phase of attack.

Human Factors of Cyber Attacks

Cyber security has been a growing focus within the human factors community. Over the last several years, human-centered cyber research has provided valuable insights into the cognitive and collaborative work within cyber operations, but has largely ignored how the genesis, intentions, methods and outcomes of cyber attacks impact human-related outcomes. Leveraging insights from other, more technologically focused communities, the goal of this paper is to synthesize previous work and to present a unified, descriptive framework of cyber attacks. Our framework, which consists of three dimensions, adversarial, methodological, and operational, aims to maintain the rich interactions between the components of a cyber attack while offering a further abstraction useful to future human factors research. We present each dimension in terms of the previous techno-centered research, demonstrate how the human factors community can contribute to our understanding, and ground each within the context of the StuxNet virus.

Security & privacy column

Security and data privacy play today a central role in the digital society. For instance, cyber attacks against nuclear power plants, such as the Stuxnet virus, shed a light on the disruptive potential of cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism on our society, pushing governments and industries to make plans to protect a large spectrum of critical sectors. As a further example, the widespread adoption of web and mobile technologies for carrying on commercial activities has made client devices as well as service providers a profitable, and unfortunately frequent, target of hackers and cyber criminals. Finally, privacy scandals systematically gain the headlines of newspapers, making the public opinion more and more conscious and critical about the exposure of sensitive data in the digital world. The complexity of the digital ecosystem makes the definition and enforcement of security and privacy properties a formidable challenge, which manual design and analysis techniques proved inadequate to tackle. This state of affairs calls for rigorous approaches, backed up by a formal reasoning and supported by mechanized procedures. The scientific research has shown, in particular, how logical frameworks and program verification techniques, originally developed to define and certify the correctness of programs, constitute a solid basis on top of which it is possible to build powerful and innovative tools for rigorously reasoning about security and privacy in the digital society. Indeed, the design of formal methods for security and privacy proved over the years a flowering and extraordinarily active research area, which has seen exciting contributions from a variety of disciplines at the core of SIGLOG, such as logic, semantics, automated deduction, and verification. This research field has tons of success stories and many open challenges on its horizon: among the former, I like to mention cryptographic protocol analysis, access control models, and information flow security, while the latter include, for instance, web security, mobile security, data privacy, and cybersecurity.

The Evolving U.S. Cybersecurity Doctrine

Since the 2010 public discovery of the Stuxnet virus, cybersecurity has continued to vie for a place at center stage in the global dialogue on international security. For the first time in American...

Article 2(4) and Cyber Warfare: How do Old Rules Control the Brave New World?

With the past attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure utilizing sophisticated weaponized computer code, such as the Flame worm, (Note 1) Stuxnet (Note 2) virus and Duqu (Note 3) worm, it is apparent that the age of cyberwarfare (Note 4) is upon us. While many commentators have been predicting this eventuality (Note 5) the transition from theory to reality has exposed gaps within the international legal framework regulating the use of force by states. (Note 6)

Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?

Offensive cyber operations represent a broad new frontier in warfare that allow states to achieve kinetic-like effects without using traditional means such as airstrikes and troop deployments. For example, in a recent debate in the Obama Administration in the lead-up to the deployment of NATO forces in Libya, lawyers and policymakers considered using such cyber attacks in lieu of traditional military operations to disable Libya’s air defense network. Yet, like many areas of emerging warfare, a bevy of questions concerning the legality of these new types of operations arise. In particular, American policymakers have only begun to question whether the use of cyber weapons – such as the Stuxnet virus purportedly developed by the United States and Israel and responsible for attacking and destroying Iranian uranium enrichment facilities – trigger traditional means of limiting the President’s war-making authority, such as the War Powers Resolution.This article examines the interaction of this new tool of warfare with the War Powers Resolution, one of the most controversial means by which Congress has attempted to limit the President’s ability to use his Article 2, Section 2 authority as Commander in Chief to deploy U.S. military forces. 50 U.S.C. sec. 1541–1548. At its core, the article answers the following questions: insofar as it is constitutional, can (and under what circumstances) the War Powers Resolution serve as an effective limit on the President’s Article 2, Section 2 power? Conversely, does this new type of tool help the executive branch evade Congressional oversight of U.S. military operations?

Securing America Against Cyber War

This paper expands on one aspect of Clarke and Knake’s (2010) recommendation for defending the United States’ Internet infrastructure from external attack. First it summarizes the threat that has been demonstrated in the recent past. Included are a number of data compromises that have been traced to servers in China. Also identified are potential physical attacks against facilities that employ supervisory control networks, with the Stuxnet virus being a recent example. Lastly, the fact that malware has been planted on computers in the electric power grid for later use makes an ability to block the command messages or the remote login sequence an absolute necessity. The paper identifies the 12 entry points into the United States’ Internet and, following Clarke and Knake’s (2010, p. 196) suggestion, specifies a firewall platform for those entry points. The total one-time cost for this defensive effort is estimated and found to be feasible. Finally, limitations of this approach are considered.

Out of control [IT security in key public infrastructure

In 2010 there was an attack on the control system of an Iranian nuclear reactor by the Stuxnet virus. However, despite this ominous development and recent reports that the threat of attacks has increased, a worrying amount of vital public infrastructure is still vulnerable. Despite high-profile attacks, there is still a lack of IT security in key public infrastructure. The author asks if it will take a major meltdown to prompt governments to take action.

Hacking the Lights Out

The article discusses cybersecurity and the potential for a cyberattack on the U.S. electric power grid. According to the author, computers control every facet of the modern electrical grid and is the greatest example of physical infrastructure interlinked with electronics. Topics include an overview of the Stuxnet virus that infected Iran's nuclear program, which according to the author, revealed how vulnerable machines could be to a well-developed electronic virus, similar vulnerabilities in the U.S. grid, and efforts by the U.S. to increase security to prevent an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. INSET: Holes in the Grid.

Weaponised malware: how criminals use digital certificates to cripple your organisation

The recent cyber-attack on an Iranian nuclear facility using the Stuxnet virus should worry all of us - not just those in close proximity who were in danger of being blown into the next world by the actions of a computer virus. The recent cyber-attack on an Iranian nuclear facility using the Stuxnet virus should worry all of us. The malware utilised multiple zero-day vulnerabilities and employed a signed digital certificate to authenticate itself. And its purpose was to cause physical damage - the first example of 'weaponised' malware. This should be a concern to all organisations. Most do not know how many certificates they have, where they are installed, who installed them, their validity and the expiration date. Jeff Hudson of Venafi explores the implications of weaponised malware, and what we can do about it.

Computer security: Is this the start of cyberwarfare?

Last year's Stuxnet virus attack represented a new kind of threat to critical infrastructure.