Abstract
This paper expands on one aspect of Clarke and Knake’s (2010) recommendation for defending the United States’ Internet infrastructure from external attack. First it summarizes the threat that has been demonstrated in the recent past. Included are a number of data compromises that have been traced to servers in China. Also identified are potential physical attacks against facilities that employ supervisory control networks, with the Stuxnet virus being a recent example. Lastly, the fact that malware has been planted on computers in the electric power grid for later use makes an ability to block the command messages or the remote login sequence an absolute necessity. The paper identifies the 12 entry points into the United States’ Internet and, following Clarke and Knake’s (2010, p. 196) suggestion, specifies a firewall platform for those entry points. The total one-time cost for this defensive effort is estimated and found to be feasible. Finally, limitations of this approach are considered.
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