Strong Constructivizations Research Articles

Situating nature: On doing cultural geographies of Australian nature

This paper concentrates on the practices and possibilities of doing poststructural cultural geographies of nature. The paper begins with an overview of the ways in which nature is being reconceptualised in social thought. It charts a middle territory between strong social constructivism and realist approaches, arguing for a relational understanding of nature and culture, and the extension of agency to non-humans--organic and artificial. These 'more than human worlds' (<citeref rid="b51">Whatmore, 'Hybrid geographies'</citeref>, Sage, London, 2002) pose considerable challenges for researchers. They open spaces for new subjects and new subjectivities, decentre human agency, and challenge more conventional methodological approaches that rely on a separation between subject and object. The paper considers the sorts of methodological shifts required for relational analysis, arguing for a multilayered, multivalent, embodied and situated approach. The practices of situatedness are emphasised in the Australian context, especially in relation to cross-cultural and postcolonial understandings. The paper concludes with a brief comment on the politics of doing such cultural geographies.

Reflecting on complexity of biological systems: Kant and beyond?

Living organisms are currently most often seen as complex dynamical systems that develop and evolve in relation to complex environments. Reflections on the meaning of the complex dynamical nature of living systems show an overwhelming multiplicity in approaches, descriptions, definitions and methodologies. Instead of sustaining an epistemic pluralism, which often functions as a philosophical armistice in which tolerance and so-called neutrality discharge proponents of the burden to clarify the sources and conditions of agreement and disagreement, this paper aims at analysing: (i) what has been Kant's original conceptualisation of living organisms as natural purposes; (ii) how the current perspectives are to be related to Kant's viewpoint; (iii) what are the main trends in current complexity thinking. One of the basic ideas is that the attention for structure and its epistemological consequences witness to a great extent of Kant's viewpoint, and that the idea of organisational stratification today constitutes a different breeding ground within which complexity issues are raised. The various approaches of complexity in biological systems are captured in terms of two different styles, universalism and (weak and strong) constructivism, between which hybrid forms exist.

Law and Science: An Essay on Links and Socio-Natural Hybrids

Contrasting views of science--as a realist enterprise or a social construction--and differing opinions as to whether the link between law and science should be strong or weak, produce roughly four different perspectives on law and science: realism but weak link, realism and strong link, social constructivism and weak link, and social constructivism but strong link. The first three perspectives recur in post-Daubert legal literature, and the fourth appears self-defeating and impractical. I argue, however, that the fourth view is the least problematic and the most appropriate.

Questioning Representation

There are two ways in which postmodernity has been defined, or defines itself, as an event of representation. On the one hand, there is the approach usually associated with cultural studies, post-colonial theory, postmodern theory and literary theory. On this account of post-modernism--an account more often described by its detractors than put forward by any actual proponents--there is nothing outside representation. Truth, the real, legitimation, philosophy and the world are effects of textuality. This strong constructivism or representationalism is rarely, if ever, met with, and tends to provide a point of lament rather than any actual target. Nevertheless, there is a dominant movement across a number of disciplines that affirms the primacy and limits of representation. When Richard Rorty (1982) defines philosophy as a "kind of writing" he expresses a typical uptake of post-structuralism that sets itself the task of overcoming foundationalism, legitimation and the questioning of the world in any grand sense. This branch of postmodern theory is remarkably homely. It stresses the inevitability and desirability of remaining within the world, and at one with the domain of representation. The idea of a critical or transcendental position is not only deemed impossible but is criticized for its alienation from everyday life. [End Page 47] Against the legitimating meta-narratives of modernity, post-modernism returns all those grand truth claims to the domain of representation.

Cooperation and the Two Cultures: Response to Labinger

surprised that dramatic statements (especially if they make nice soundbites) play a disproportionate role in how his work is perceived. 67. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). I think that's what he calls for, but I am not yet (and perhaps never will be) sufficiently adept at SCS to claim any deep understanding of Latour's writings. 68. Karin Knorr-Cetina, 'Strong Constructivism from a Sociologist's Point of View: A Personal Addendum to Sismondo's Paper', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23 (1993), 555-63.

Strong Constructivism — from a Sociologist's Point of View: A Personal Addendum to Sismondo's Paper

As a labelled constructivist, I turned with pleasure to Sismondo's paper,' expecting it to instruct me in what I was labelled for, and hoping to learn something about constructivism's variants and wrinkles. I was not disappointed. The field badly needed a first review and Sismondo's is a good one; it is informative about various brands of constructivism, and expert in pointing its fingers at sore ppo'ts. Sismondo is not passing by distinctions which have become important in the field and which are usually conflated, like that between constructivism (which one could call constructionism) and social constructivism. He realizes that constructivism has been reinvented in science studies rather than taken over from sociological precursors like Berger and Luckmann, and in many ways constitutes a different doctrine altogether. And he seems sympathetic at least to some of the challenges constructivism has posed, to the point of wishing to reconcile constructivism with empiricism and realism. However, Sismondo's paper also puts into focus disagreements and differences in understanding between those who have been associated with constructivism and those who have not. To be sure, some of these differences are of the kind that one might be able to work out with a critic like Sismondo over dinner, but they are irritating nevertheless. For example, the desire which Sismondo manifests to reconcile constructivist science studies with more received views of science is one that puzzles me, not only in this author but also in others. Is what lies behind it the biblical mood of bringing home the sheep that has gone astray? What is constructivism supposed to be brought home to