Introduction According to his critics, Carl von Clausewitz believed was governed by reason and controlled by the dictates of policy. Martin van Creveld claims Clausewitz viewed as little more than a instrument for the attainment of rational social ends; (1) and Barbara Ehrenreich states Clausewitz saw war itself as an rational undertaking, unsullied by human emotion. (2) Yet these assertions, viewed outside their proper context, distort Clausewitz's contribution. His ideas are more complex than these crude depictions of strict political rationalism suggest. Indeed, Clausewitz believed that logic often came to a stop in the labyrinth of war. (3) There no simple, pithy explanation of the manner in which the political fits into his theory; no formulaic or linear characterization suffice. This article seeks to reveal the depth of Clausewitz's insight into the relationship between politics and war. Ideas of politics, policy, and reason hold a number of differing implications in terms of their relationship to one another and their influence on war. Indeed, misinterpretations of Clausewitz stem from the complexity of the subject itself, combined with its somewhat limited and confusing presentation in On War. (4) This cause for detailed analysis of the text, the logic of Clausewitz's thought on the subject, and the implications of his ideas. War as an Instrument of Policy That an instrument of has become of a truism, almost to the point of cliche, in Western strategic literature, regardless of how well the complexities of the idea are understood. The ubiquity of the idea can largely bc attributed to Clausewitz; direct reference often made to On War whenever this principle outlined. The idea commonly quoted out of the context Clausewitz intended, deminishing it of much of its meaning. Also, it often mistakenly presented as representing the totality of his theorizing on war. Its most common modern usage as a prescriptive device--one especially suited to modern liberal democracies in which the subordination of the military to civilian control deemed a vital component of a properly constituted state, especially in the nuclear age. (5) The complexities of the concept are often diluted in the interest of doctrinal precision and pedagogical clarity. Given the profusion of critiques in relation to this aspect of Clausewitz's thought, this situation not suffice. A more robust explanation required. Clausewitz wrote that contains an element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. (6) This claim may appear cold-blooded and militaristic, but his assertion descriptive, not prescriptive. This confused by the fact that Clausewitz often draws prescriptive conclusions on the basis of this observation, and the two perspectives are often juxtaposed in the text. It perhaps ironic that what appears to bc a morally repugnant statement, because it suggests he viewed resorting to force as an entirely routine extension of unilateral state policy (7)--actually leads Clausewitz to conclude that war, in a practical and moral sense, ought to be subject to policy; otherwise, it becomes something pointless and devoid of sense. (8) Ostensibly, the concept of as an instrument of straightforward. The use of military force a means to a higher end--the political object. War a tool that uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. So, the purpose for which the use of force intended be the major determinant of the course and character of a war. As Clausewitz explains, is controlled by its political object, which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail. …