Victory in scholarship on strategy and war

Abstract

When policy-makers use force to achieve political ends, they use the word ‘victory’, yet its meaning is frequently left unclear. Policy-makers are using force for new purposes (peace operations, preemption, state-building, democracy promotion, counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism), but the language and thinking on victory in these new situations has not kept pace with the times. The essential problem is that the term ‘victory’ is an imprecisely defined concept for guiding decisions about military intervention. Everyone, from scholars to policy-makers, should understand that the failure historically to develop a precise concept of victory weakens the ability of policy-makers to use force effectively and contributes to confusion when societies debate whether to use force. This article seeks to make three fundamental contributions towards reducing the ambiguity that surrounds the term ‘victory’ in the strategic studies literature. First, it establishes the renewed importance of the question: ‘what is precisely the meaning of “victory?”’ Second, it presents a typology for understanding the nature of victory. Third, it uses this typology to reevaluate the contributions of prominent and lesser-known thinkers in strategic studies whose ideas have contributed to the scholarship on what it means to achieve victory in war.