Ever since Canada emerged as a distinct and active international actor in the immediate post- World War II period there has been a certain schizophrenic character associated with the debates about the country's inherently proper role in the world. This has especially been the case in the context of Ottawa's relations with Washington, particularly on broad military strategic issues. Should Canada closely commit itself to collective western defence under US leadership or should it focus on broad multilateral collective security, eschewing close military and political alignment with America? Perhaps no one caught this better than Henry Kissinger when he observed that instinct in favor of the common defense conflicted with the temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter.1These two opposing conceptions of what ought to be the Canadian way came to the fore in the early 19605, when, after more than a decade of Cold War and amid the attempts the Diefenbaker government to alter the approach of the previous Liberal governments, a debate emerged over the nature of Canadian foreign and defence policy. At the heart of this intellectual ferment was the issue of how much Canada needed to adapt its policies to changes in the overall strategic namely the development of multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons the United States and the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly decolonized nations of Africa and Asia. Indeed, many Canadian intellectuals and academics feared that the Canadian approach to international affairs had become increasingly stale and even outmoded. The result was that there was much discussion about whether there were any alternatives available to Canada.Two of the most important works in this period were James Macdonald Minifie's Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Role in a Revolutionary World, published in 1960, and Canada's long-term strategic situation, which was written Robert J. Sutherland for International Journal in 1902.a Minifie, the Washington correspondent for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, argued that Canada should seize the opportunity to become a neutral power and fulfil its potential as a force for good in the world. On the other hand, Sutherland, an official with the Defence Research Board, defended the status quo, at least partially in response to Minifie, and argued that policies served national interest. These works, therefore, symbolized this search for alternatives and the effort to defend and justify the status quo that was so evident during this debate. Moreover, many of the arguments made Minifie and Sutherland would foreshadow subsequent and current debates over Canadian foreign and defence policy.THE ALTERNATIVEMinifie, reflecting a small but not entirely marginal body of Canadian public and elite opinion, argued passionately that Canada had the potential to play an increasingly important role in world affairs. In his mind, the onset of decolonization had created upheaval that cannot be directed military alliances or brought to order dropping atomic bombs.... If it is to be channelled into democratic patterns it must have enlightened and demonstrably selfless leadership from powers innocent of designs of world paramountcy (2). Minifie argued that Canada could fulfil this role because [n]obody fears Canada, since it is without territorial ambitions. Nobody harbours resentment against Canada, because it has never held sovereign control over an alien people.3 Nobody suspects Canada of coveting natural resources - it has plenty of its own (2-3). Canada also had other advantages, including its history of resolving internal disputes through negotiation and its competence in foreign affairs as demonstrated its efforts to resolve the Suez Crisis in 1956 (3).He then argues that these superb advantages, which are potentially of inestimable and lasting strength, are cancelled out close ties with the United States or, as he puts it, by the fact that Canada is still walking with the Devil (3). …
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Jun 1, 2013
Richard Moore 
Open Access