In response to our article arguing that ecological integrity is neither real nor morally valuable (Rohwer & Marris, 2021), Karr et al. (2021) defend the concept of ecological integrity for its pragmatic success and intuitive appeal. We understand their attachment to a term that has no doubt felt useful to them, but we simply do not think it worth retaining as a “useful fiction” when there are defensible, specific, and measurable values that could be used more directly and more clearly. The authors argue that the construct “ecological integrity” has “led to many real-world accomplishments in river and water resource protection and later, to assessing and conserving diverse environments (freshwater, marine, wetland, and terrestrial)” (Karr et al., 2021, p. 2). We do not doubt this. In fact, we admitted as much in our piece, writing that “Where it is used as a rough proxy for complexity, diversity, and preferred historic states, it may not lead us astray in the short term” (Rohwer & Marris, 2021, p. 9). But we added a primary concern: that “where actions to protect or promote ‘integrity’ prompt us to stop ecosystems from adapting in the face of change, we may find ourselves unwittingly compromising other values we hold dear, including biodiversity” (Rohwer & Marris, 2021, p. 9). We stand by this concern. The fact that interventions taken in the name of ecological integrity have led to positive outcomes is not a convincing argument for the existence of ecological integrity. When sewers were installed in cities to combat disease because of a belief that poor sanitation created unhealthy “miasmas,” lives were undoubtedly saved, since the action had the effect of destroying habitats for deadly bacteria. Those saved lives do not prove the existence of miasma (Whorton, 2001). The authors argue that “the concept of ecological integrity—particularly, biological integrity—can be and has been translated into measurable, practicable criteria for protecting living ecosystems” (Karr et al., 2021, p?). But then why bother with the translation? Why not simply start with the measurable criteria themselves? Karr et al. appeal to intuition. “Surely,” they write, “we can agree that value is lost if a stream community harboring multiple species of mayflies, stoneflies, and caddisflies is replaced—for example, downstream of a waste treatment plant—by a community dominated by sewage sludge worms” (Karr et al., 2021, p. 2). We can agree to this! But it proves our point. The loss of value here can be captured by the specific values of biodiversity and complexity. “Integrity” is not required. The authors tout the “multimetric framework” of the index of biological integrity as a virtue. To us, this amalgamation of biodiversity measures with metrics for anthropocentric values like “fishable and swimmable” waters also proves our point: integrity is usually a proxy for biodiversity, complexity, and culturally preferred states. So why not simply say what we mean rather than using the word “integrity” inconsistently and often incoherently to try to refer to the many ways that ecosystems can be valuable? The authors say that they define integrity as “one endpoint on a gradient of biological conditions, ranging from relatively free of human disturbance to nothing left alive” (Karr et al., 2021, p. 4). Is this not simply another way of saying naturalness? If that is what they value, they should just say so. The authors seem to worry that discarding the word “integrity,” will leave no way to set conservation or restoration goals or to measure success or failure. We disagree. By speaking plainly about what we value and why, whether that be a certain suite of beloved species or a certain measure of biodiversity, we are actually better poised to achieve our goals. Progress toward these goals is easily measured—often with the same exact data we are currently collecting to measure “integrity.” If you want your river to have clean water, lots of fish, and specific native fish, just say so. You do not need the pseudo-objective term “integrity,” which ultimately obfuscates more than it clarifies. The authors declare no potential conflict of interest. Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.
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