Spatial Voting Research Articles

On Riker's Theory of Political Succession

Riker's view of the dynamical forces of political systems singles out disequilibrium, strategic voting and agenda‐manipulation as the pervasive features determining the nature of political change. We shall investigate these characteristics in some detail and thereafter evaluate the methodological aspects of Riker's theory. Some observations on the general relevance of the equilibrium analysis of multi‐dimensional spatial voting models for the study of political institutions are also made.

Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition

BASIC TO MODELS of electoral competition is the assumption that candidates adopt positions on policy issues as a means of attracting votes. However, candidates are also judged on the basis of human qualities and other attributes not related to the policies they espouse in a campaign. The spatial theory of electoral competition has, in the past, treated such attributes as part of the policy space over which candidates compete. However, certain difficulties attend such an interpretation. For example, it is difficult to view a candidate's personality as something which can be altered to please the voters. The mistakes that an incumbent has committed in office are not things he can erase to compete more effectively for votes. A candidate's religion cannot be abandoned because it is a political liability. In short, there are nonspatial attributes that affect voter evaluations of each candidate, which are beyond that candidate's immediate control. It is the purpose of this paper to incorporate these nonspatial attributes into the spatial model of electoral competition to show how the policy outcome of two candidate electoral competition is af-

A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition

In his unidimensional model of electoral competition, Downs argues that voters use party ideology as an informational short cut for forecasting the policies that a party will pursue if elected. Parties are perceived by voters as points on an ideological axis. In the Davis-Hinich multidimensional model, on the other hand, the axes are real issues, and the principal actors are politicians who are modeled as points in the multi-issue space. This paper reformulates spatial voting theory in terms of a model that connects what we call predictive dimensions with political issues that are salient during a given election campaign. This model is both a synthesis and an extension of the Downs and Davis-Hinich spatial models. We obtain a median voter result for one predictive dimension that is similar to the Downs result but with important differences. We also obtain results showing the electoral advantage of incumbency and the tendency for incremental change when there is a great deal of heterogeneity in voter perceptions about the candidates.

Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic

In this study formal spatial models are applied to cross-sectional analysis of district results on the second ballot of French legislative elections. A model of probabilistic spatial voting better accounts for the data than either standard “ecological” models or a model of deterministic spatial voting. There are three substantive findings concerning voter behavior. First, the adjustment of voters to external information can be largely viewed as a shift in the spatial (Left-Right) distribution of voters. This shift, plus decisions by parties and candidates as to which districts parties will contest, determines the first ballot outcome. In arriving at second ballot choices, voters then appear to utilize decision rules that have a substantial degree of temporal stability. A second and related finding is that the second ballot can be reasonably accounted for by a single Left-Right dimension. Third, in those districts with three or more candidates on the second ballot, there may be substantial strategic voting with voters switching from candidates close to their ideal points but unlikely to win to more distant candidates who are more likely to win. The existence of strategic voting is suggested by the finding that models based solely on spatial preferences perform well for two-candidate districts, but less well for three- or four-candidate districts.

Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic

In this study formal spatial models are applied to cross-sectional analysis of district results on the second ballot of French legislative elections. A model of probabilistic spatial voting better accounts for the data than either standard “ecological” models or a model of deterministic spatial voting. There are three substantive findings concerning voter behavior. First, the adjustment of voters to external information can be largely viewed as a shift in the spatial (Left-Right) distribution of voters. This shift, plus decisions by parties and candidates as to which districts parties will contest, determines the first ballot outcome. In arriving at second ballot choices, voters then appear to utilize decision rules that have a substantial degree of temporal stability. A second and related finding is that the second ballot can be reasonably accounted for by a single Left-Right dimension. Third, in those districts with three or more candidates on the second ballot, there may be substantial strategic voting with voters switching from candidates close to their ideal points but unlikely to win to more distant candidates who are more likely to win. The existence of strategic voting is suggested by the finding that models based solely on spatial preferences perform well for two-candidate districts, but less well for three- or four-candidate districts.

Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact

We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs. We find that if a strict Nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters, then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large, but finite, electorates. If the votes are independent random events, then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates. Our results have implications for existing models of redistributive politics and spatial competition, as the properties of pure-strategy equilibria in such games carry over to equilibria in games with arbitrary candidate preferences. On the other hand, candidate utility functions will matter if the individual voting decisions are correlated. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, such as changing economic conditions or political scandals, the preferences of parties and candidates with respect to shares of votes will have an effect on political competition.

Analysis of Spatial Voting Patterns: An Approach in Political Socialization

Abstract Passage of the 26th Amendment gave young adults the right to vote. Along with this privilege, new voters assumed responsibility for conducting themselves as knowledgeable citizens concerning issues, candidates, and the electoral process. This study attempts to further student understanding of the electoral process by presenting a method for analyzing spatial voting patterns. The spatial emphasis adds another dimension to the temporal and behavioral - structural approaches in studying the American electoral system. Inclusion of spatial analysis of voting patterns increases understanding and political socialization of young people.