Soviet Strategy Research Articles

Socio-cultural origins of beer naming in the Kirov region

Russia in its history has experienced completely different attitudes of the population towards alcohol consumption and, at times, diametrically opposite approaches of the state to its regulation: from dry laws to widespread encouragement, from the northern type of alcohol consumption (dominance of strong drinks) to the southern type (dominance of low-alcohol drinks). In this sense, today we are experiencing a unique situation: in modern Russia, beer (a low-alcohol drink) is taking the lead in the alcoholic beverage market. Beer is again becoming, in fact, a people's drink. This circumstance makes interesting and relevant the question of studying beer consumption in the historical context. How has the consumption of alcohol in the past influenced its consumption today? Is there any cultural connection between the eras? Or is today's beer culture starting from scratch? We have tried to answer these questions by studying modern beer naming.
 In this article the socio-cultural origins of modern beer names are analysed on the example of draught beer shops in the city of Kirov. The names are analysed in the context of successive major Russian historical epochs. The study was conducted using a content analysis method of three hundred and seventy beer names collected by the authors in the first half of 2023 in twenty-two beer shops in the city. Three strategies used for naming beer were identified: pre-revolutionary (these names are closely related to the names of varieties from various Western European countries), Soviet (built on the negation of the pre-revolutionary strategy, based on the development of new, unique names) and post-Soviet (modern names that do not correlate with either the pre-revolutionary or Soviet strategy). The study revealed that the most popular strategies are pre-revolutionary and post-Soviet (38 per cent each of all names considered), while the least popular is the Soviet strategy (24 per cent of all names considered). In addition, the coefficient of uniqueness of the strategy used is introduced, which allows us to understand how diverse the use of a particular strategy in sales is. It is shown that pre-revolutionary and post-Soviet beer naming strategies are most often used in beer sales, while the Soviet strategy is the least popular, which indicates the special characteristics of the beer consumer community.

The Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981

At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions.This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises.The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.

Russia’s Nuclear Propaganda: From the Cold War to Ukraine

ABSTRACT Through comparative historical analysis, we find that Russia’s strategic communications regarding nuclear weapons use in Ukraine broadly reflect Soviet strategy during the Cold War. The Soviet Union employed a combination of aggressive and defensive propaganda narratives regarding nuclear weapons; the former aimed to coerce the West away from interfering in Soviet military interventions abroad, while the latter sought to convince international audiences that the West was primarily to blame for escalations in tensions. Russia continues to employ this same strategy to provide protective cover for its ongoing war on Ukraine. In both cases, actual Soviet and Russian nuclear posture remained significantly less bellicose than its propaganda narratives imply. Our analysis suggests that Russia’s aggressive rhetoric about nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine has thus far been primarily intended to shape Western decision-making, rather than a genuine expression of intent to use such weapons. In Ukraine, nuclear ‘red lines’ advanced by Russian propaganda have consistently been eroded without response, including significant strikes on Crimea, advanced weapons supplied to Ukraine, and the re-taking of illegally annexed territory. Nevertheless, Russia’s nuclear propaganda has been one of its most successful cognitive warfare efforts in limiting or delaying critical Western military support to Ukraine, on the grounds of avoiding potential escalation. While Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains a significant threat to Ukraine and the West, an overly cautious response to Russian rhetoric also risks potentially significant geopolitical consequences by tacitly rewarding nuclear threats.

Intervention, ideology, strategic imperatives: An examination of fluctuating relations between Russia/USSR and sub-Saharan Africa

Throughout the duration of the Cold War and its aftermath, sub-Saharan Africa has been a hotbed of geopolitical contestation. This article examines the role of the Soviet Union and its successor state, the Russian Federation, as a major regional actor. Beginning with Soviet intervention in the Congo in the 1950s, the article posits that sub-Saharan Africa was an initially marginal region for Soviet strategists which became increasingly significant as the Cold War progressed. Soviet strategy was driven by both raw questions of geopolitical clout and a broader attempt to export its ideology to the Third World. The article elucidates the consequences of intervention from both Soviet and local perspectives, emphasising the agency of African states who were able to leverage superpower competition in pursuit of their own interests. However, the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a complete retreat from Africa as strategic priorities in Moscow changed rapidly. Recent Russian re-engagement with the region has continuities with Soviet strategy, but there are marked shifts in its underlying rationale. Under Putin, there has been a concerted attempt to form salutary economic and security relationships with regional autocracies, predicated on transactional realpolitik.

레이건 행정부의 대소련 전략(1981-1985)과 트럼프 행정부의 대중국 전략(2017-2021) 비교연구: 대전략의 관점에서

레이건 행정부의 대 소련전략과 트럼프 행정부의 대중국전략은 미국 패권전략의 변화를 볼 수 있다는 측면에서 매우 중요하다. 따라서 이 연구는 미국 주요 문서를 중심으로 1981년부터 1985년까지 레이건 행정부의 대소전략과 2017년부터 2021년까지 트럼프 행정부의 대중전략을 대전략의 관점에서 군사, 경제, 정치체제 부문으로 나누어 비교하였다. 연구결과, 레이건 행정부는 봉쇄전략이라는 대전략의 원칙하 공세적 군사전략, 유럽을 통한 간접보복 방식의 경제 전략, 자유 민주주의 독려 전략을 시행하였다. 트럼프 행정부의 경우 비자유 패권주의라는 대전략의 전제하에 중국에 대한 공격적인 군사전략, 직접 무역보복 전략을 행하였다. 그러나 정치체제 부문의 전략에 있어서는 초기 유화책에서 강경책으로 선회하였다.

Soviet Science Diplomacy: How Central Asia was Instrumentalised in Soviet Foreign Policy

During the years of the Cold War, the opportunities for foreign scientific cooperation by Soviet scholars were limited. However, despite the impediments of the Soviet system, Central Asian science's cooperation with the outside world has continued. In virtue of being of Asian origin and Muslim and having profound knowledge and understanding of the language and civilizational processes of the East, Central Asian people had a special place in Soviet foreign policy. The Central Asians attracted the sympathy of the peoples of the East, which granted them access to their scientific and diplomatic connections. The paper examines how Central Asians used understanding of and ties to the East in diplomacy, for diplomacy, and with diplomacy. First, the paper unpacks the institutional and individual potential of Soviet Central Asian diplomacy and explains how it was used as a tool for Soviet strategy. The paper then examines Oriental studies as a knowledge basis that enabled improved and more in-depth Soviet diplomacy in the East given the pervasive and basic legacy of Oriental studies in studying the East. Further, Soviet involvement in UNESCO programmes in Asia provides insight into how Soviet policy used its soft power through international organisations. In conclusion, the author summarises how science diplomacy was used to further Soviet policy and evaluates the legacy of Soviet science diplomacy in light of recent developments.

Central Asia in Soviet and British Strategy, 1918

The author analyses Soviet Russia and Great Britain’s strategies for Central Asia, a crucial geopolitical region, the control of which allowed both Moscow and London to safeguard their state interests at the final stage of the Great War. The development of these plans was accompanied by intense internal political struggles in Britain over the 'Bolshevik menace' to British possessions in Asia and the crisis in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan, which spawned ethno-confessional movements of various stripes. The author compares the role and place of Central Asia in Moscow's and London's foreign policy: while the former sought to use the situation to implement plans for a 'world revolution', the latter sought to strengthen its position in countering the national movements that sought support from the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The relevance of the study stems from the persistence and even exacerbation of tensions in the region of interest to the author, which necessitates a study of the historical experience of dispute resolution. The novelty of the study is determined by the introduction into academic discourse of several official diplomatic documents together with the sources from private collections which are examined in a complex, comparative way making it possible to stipulate strategic goals of leading geopolitical actors at the final stage of the First World War. As the article elucidates, despite the existing domestic and foreign scholarship on the subject, various scenarios of military-political steps of Moscow and London in Central Asia require clarification while considering the German-Turkish projects of relying upon nationalistic movements under Islamic slogans.

Sovjetska strategija uoči Drugog svetskog rata u viđenjima vojnodiplomatskih predstavnika Francuske u Moskvi (1938-1939)

The paper is focused on the problem of the perception of the Soviet strategy on the eve of World War II by the French military representatives in Moscow. The main assertion of the author of the paper is that the Western European and Soviet strategic cultures after the First World War were in an obvious contradiction to each other. However, despite all the differences between them, they coincided in the desire to prevent an armed conflict in Europe in the 1930s. This common view created the basis for the cooperation between the USSR and Western democracies in the face of the German revanchism. An analysis of the reports by the French military representatives in Moscow for 1938-1939 shows that in the military circles of Paris there was an understanding of those guidelines that directed the vector of the Soviet foreign policy. However, the inability of the French political leadership to accept them as a factor in developing their own strategy frustrated all attempts to form a military-political alliance capable of resisting Germany.

Enesemääramise paleus ja pragmaatika: Tartu versus Pariis

Enesemääramise paleus ja pragmaatika: Tartu versus Pariis

Review: Cold War and Architecture: The Competing Forces That Reshaped Austria after 1945

Review: <i>Cold War and Architecture: The Competing Forces That Reshaped Austria after 1945</i>

Soviet experience of development of the Soviet Arctic in view of modern problems. Review of Zubkov K.I., Karpov V.P. Development of the Russian Arctic: Soviet experience in the context of current national strategy (on the example of the Ural Far North and Western Siberia). Moscow: Political encyclopedia, 2019. 367 p.

Discussed in this review are the results of the research presented in the monograph of specialists in North-ern studies K.I. Zubkov and V.P. Karpov «Development of the Russian Arctic: Soviet experience in the context of current national strategy (on the example of the Ural Far North and Western Siberia)». The reviewer notes that, in general, the study follows the pattern of state-centrism, teleologism and geopolitical alarmism typical for modern Russian Arctic historiography. Among the most important theses of the authors of this peer-reviewed monograph, are the following ones: (1) the transport and economic development was the basis of the Russian / Soviet Arctic exploration program; (2) the Soviet strategy of the Far North development dictated mainly the technocratic and commodity character of the territory exploitation; (3) modern Russia inherits the definition of the priorities of the state policy in the Arctic Region from the Soviet Union and relies on the territorial and production complexes cre-ated back in the USSR. The reviewer expresses serious doubts about the scientific productivity of the classic geopolitical paradigm used by the authors of the monograph: geared towards large-scale generalizations, it is simply unable to capture the full range of contradictions arising in the process of exploration of the Arctic Region. Hence the authors’ tendency to present the entire process of Arctic Region exploration as predetermined, while in reality the history of the Russian Arctic Region colonization is full of collisions; it is more intermittent than consis-tent. In particular, draws attention the constant reproduction of the same topoi in the rhetoric of Arctic Region ex-ploration. For example, from age to age, it has been repeated that the Northern Sea Route is just about to be-come the largest transnational waterway. The reviewer notes the ambiguity of practical recommendations of the authors. Thus, repeatedly expressing the idea of Russia’s interest in the international cooperation in the develop-ment of the Arctic, the authors are concerned to the same extent that foreign partners may force Russia out of the region. The review is aimed at opening a debate on approaches to understanding the Soviet experience in the Arctic Region development.

‘My task is to get into the French army’: Soviet strategy and the origins of Soviet-French military cooperation in the 1930s

ABSTRACT This article is about the first attempts of Soviet-French rapprochement in the military sphere in the early 1930s. It is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy (AVPRF), military (RGVA) and the communist party (RGASPI) archives in Moscow. It contends that for the top leadership of the USSR the political rapprochement with France did not necessarily lead to making a fully-fledged military alliance. Despite the attitude of Soviet diplomats in Paris, Moscow remained distrustful of the French. It considered military cooperation with them as a way to reinforce the Red Army and strengthen international positions of the USSR without taking excessive obligations.

Solidarity within limits: Interkit and the evolution of the Soviet Bloc’s Indochina policy, 1967–1985

This article examines how Interkit, the Soviet-controlled ‘anti-China International’, evaluated the development of Sino-Indochinese relations, and which contribution the Vietnamese and Laotian delegations made to the forum’s meetings. It investigates how the various shifts in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US relations enhanced or reduced Vietnam’s relative importance in Soviet strategy. It describes how the Kremlin sought to dissuade its East European satellites from responding to Beijing’s overtures by presenting the Sino-Vietnamese conflict as evidence of China’s belligerence, and examines the ideological linkage between Soviet superpower hegemony over Eastern Europe and Vietnamese regional hegemony over Indochina.

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC (1920s)

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC (1920s)

“The laughing third man in a fight”: Stalin's use of the wedge strategy

Although much IR theory focuses on balancing, this paper examines a version of the wedge strategy, what Stalin allegedly called being “the laughing third man in a fight.” This is the practice of advancing one's goals by setting up other states to fight each other. The first case study is Soviet strategy in Europe from September 1939 until June 1941. The second is Soviet strategy in the Far East in 1941–45. What I am looking at here is a policy of deliberately encouraging the start of a war and/or aiding its prolongation in order to weaken both sides. The two case studies indicate that the Soviet Union used such a strategy at times in place of the usual forms of balancing, discussed in the international relations literature. Additionally, analysis of Moscow's conduct, statements by Soviet leaders, and the policies of a number of foreign communist parties indicate that, in addition to any security goals, Stalin's agenda included furthering the USSR's goal as a revolutionary state, even thought this had at times to be constrained by realpolitik.

The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War

Consisting of 34 essays by an equal number of scholarly experts from around the globe, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War should prove an invaluable resource for specialists and students alike. The essays explore a wide range of topics. Eschewing a standard chronological approach, editors Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde have organized the volume around geographical and thematic topics. Every major region of the world is covered, as is almost every conceivable topic—from the standard ones (geopolitics, economics, the nuclear revolution) to those that have become fashionable more recently (race, gender and women's rights, the environment, transnationalism, globalization, and the religious Cold War, among them).One of the book's many strengths is that the contributors do not speak with a single voice. Rather, they represent a diversity of viewpoints and perspectives, including an opening essay by Akira Iriye that takes a contrarian stance, arguing for the relative unimportance of the Cold War compared to other global developments during the twentieth century's second half—such as globalization and the emergence of a human rights regime. The authors have positioned the volume, in their words, “at the intersection of boundaries that divide many cold war histories and historians” (p. 3). Yet three guiding precepts run through the various chapters. First, many of the individual authors stress the global dimensions of the Cold War, emphasizing the agency of small states as well as non-state actors, thus moving well beyond the traditional concentration on superpower relations. Second, the essays taken together help overcome the tendency to separate the political, economic, ideological, and cultural spheres as distinct; the inextricable links between those spheres emerge clearly here. Third, many of the essayists highlight the tight connections between domestic and international developments, showing how the Cold War was influenced by and in turn influenced domestic forces.As with any edited collection, some essays stand out for their freshness and analytical rigor. Naoko Shibusawa's essay on “Ideology, Culture, and the Cold War,” for example, provides the most concise and sophisticated explication I have yet seen of that important subject. She regards ideologies of race, gender, and maturity as mutually reinforcing “notions of modernity” that shaped U.S. and Soviet attitudes and policies, and portrays the Cold War as a struggle between “competing exceptionalist claims” emanating from Moscow as well as Washington (pp. 39, 41). Cary Fraser, in his contribution on “Decolonization and the Cold War,” offers an equally provocative and persuasive explication of that critical historical phenomenon. “Decolonization,” he writes, “was thus project, process, and outcome of the search for a replacement for the quest for North Atlantic hegemony that had shaped the imperialism that preceded 1945 and the bipolar vision of the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact that emerged after 1945” (pp. 471472). John Prados's outstanding synthesis of “Cold War Intelligence History” and Vladislav Zubok's explication of the intersection between power and culture in Soviet strategy also deserve to be singled out for commendation. Among the regional essays, the contributions on the Middle East, by Salim Yaqub; South Asia, by Andrew J. Rotter; and Japan, by Antony Best, are especially noteworthy. Campbell Craig's masterful, succinct essay on the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War also stands out.Other essays prove more descriptive than analytical, and a few border on the superficial, including the entries on geopolitics, on Africa, on international institutions, and on economics.Yet the volume contains far more strong essays than weak ones. Overall, the collection stands as a magnificent achievement. Its breadth and its helpful bibliographical aids alone make this a must-have volume. The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War belongs on the bookshelf of every serious scholar of the Cold War.

Anti-German Insurgency and Allied Grand Strategy

There was not, except in the very broadest sense, a unified ‘Allied’ grand strategy regarding any aspect of World War II. British–American strategy and Soviet strategy were formed in isolation. This was certainly true of the strategy of anti-German insurgency. Aside from geographical and ideological factors a major source of difference was that Britain was at war with Germany from September 1939, while the USSR and the USA became involved two years later. There were major asymmetries: Moscow's insurgency strategy for most of the war was in practice applied to its own national territory, while British (and later American) insurgency strategy was applied to foreign countries occupied by Germany. It will be argued, however, that in different parts of the Grand Alliance the path of insurgency strategy followed a similar trajectory, even if this strategy was not synchronised in time or space. In London, Moscow, and Washington, high hopes were initially placed on popular rebellion in German-occupied territory. It was only months after the entry of their countries into the war that the high commands, both west and east of the Reich, came to the conclusion that insurgent forces could only be used as an auxiliary to huge conventional armies.

Confronting Peaceful Co-existence: Psychological Warfare and the Role of Interdoc, 1963–72

Interest in Cold War psychological warfare and propaganda operations by both East and West, and the institutions that have pursued them, has increased among diplomatic historians over the last decade.1 As an addition to the burgeoning literature on the ideological dimension of the conflict, this article examines the foundation and purpose of the International Information and Documentation Center or ‘Interdoc’. Founded in 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc was meant to develop a psychological response to the Soviet strategy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Its arrival was the result of discussions between French, German, and Dutch intelligence services, along with individuals from industry and academia, that had taken place over the previous six years. Interdoc's central focus was to increase the level of understanding of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1960s Interdoc had expanded into a centre of increasing activity for research, training, conference, and publication programmes. However, at the point when plans were being made to extend its operations by making contacts with the Eastern bloc, Chancellor Brandt's pursuit of Ostpolitik caused a catastrophic withdrawal of German financial support.

A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the politics of American anticommunism

This book is the first biography in 42 years of the priest and educator whomhistorians have called the most important anticommunist in the country.Edmund A. Walsh, as dean of Georgetown College and founder in 1919 of itsSchool of Foreign Service, is one of the most influential Catholic figures of the20th century. Soon after the birth of the Bolshevik state, he directed the PapalRelief Mission in the Soviet Union, starting a lifelong immersion in Soviet andCommunist affairs. He also established a Jesuit college in Baghdad, and servedas a consultant to the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.A pioneer in the new science of geopolitics, Walsh became one of Truman's mosttrusted advisers on Soviet strategy. He wrote four books, dozens of articles, andgave thousands of speeches on the moral and political threat of Soviet Communismin America. Although he died in 1956, Walsh left an indelible imprint on theideology and practical politics of Cold War Washington, moving easily outside thetraditional boundaries of American Catholic life and becoming, in the words of onehistorian, practically an institution by himself.Few priests, indeed few Catholics,played so large a role in shaping American foreign policy in the 20th century.

Reassessing Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan: A declassified history

This article reassesses Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan in 1979, based on newly available archival materials, especially from the former USSR. The article argues that these Soviet documents show that the 1979 invasion reflected defensive rather than offensive objectives. Specifically, the USSR sought to restrain extremist elements of the Afghan communist party, who were undermining stability on the southern Soviet frontier. The findings of this article are at odds with with long-standing views that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a larger Soviet strategy aimed at threatening the Persian Gulf and other western interests.