Abstract

The paper is focused on the problem of the perception of the Soviet strategy on the eve of World War II by the French military representatives in Moscow. The main assertion of the author of the paper is that the Western European and Soviet strategic cultures after the First World War were in an obvious contradiction to each other. However, despite all the differences between them, they coincided in the desire to prevent an armed conflict in Europe in the 1930s. This common view created the basis for the cooperation between the USSR and Western democracies in the face of the German revanchism. An analysis of the reports by the French military representatives in Moscow for 1938-1939 shows that in the military circles of Paris there was an understanding of those guidelines that directed the vector of the Soviet foreign policy. However, the inability of the French political leadership to accept them as a factor in developing their own strategy frustrated all attempts to form a military-political alliance capable of resisting Germany.

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