The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>

The antagonisms between Russia and the "collective West" require comparation of the newly emerging international situation with that of the Cold War. The basic methodological approach in this article is, therefore, historical-comparative. Therefore, in the first part of the Paper, the phrase "new Cold War" is defined and the change in its use during the previous decades is followed, with an attempt to determine the transformation of international relations from the era of the old, classic "Cold War" to the present day. This phrase was first used during the eighties of the last century to describe the second, the final phase (1979-1985) of the original Cold War between the two superpowers of that era, which ended with a new detente, Soviet Perestroika and the Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations. Later it was used to describe the heightened contemporary political, military, social, informational and ideological tensions between the US (and its allies) on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. Then, in the second part of the Paper, the basic characteristics of the old "Cold War" are described (the dominance of the military-strategic approach in superpower relations, proxy wars, fear of a nuclear escalation, the division of the world into spheres of interest, the primacy of ideology in the conflict between two superpowers, classic geopolitical background of ideological competition). The "New Cold War" is characterized by regional and not global competition, the disproportion in economic power of Russia in relation to the West, the absence of a deeper ideological dimension of the conflict, the dominance of the geopolitical, territorial dimensions of the competition, the existence of third powers that are uniting with Russia against the West, the integration of the conflicting parties in single world capitalist system... In the final part of the Paper, it is concluded that the differences between the old and "New Cold War" confrontations lie, first and foremost, in the structural transformation of contemporary international relations in the direction of multipolarism through a new distribution of world power that yesterday's dominant, hegemonic world power wants to prevent or at least to slow down, and we can all see the decline of the power of the West and the rise of the power of the recovered and new centers of global power in the emerging multipolar world. The US wants to use the "New Cold War" confrontation to protect its previously acquired positions, weaken its rivals and prevent them from strengthening their position and influence in contemporary international situations. These circumstances, however, do not favor the success of such action - for the simple reason that the world has changed dramatically compared to that of more than three decades ago, when the first Cold War ended. The power of the West, both economic, political-ideological and military, is constantly declining, while the power in other centers is permanently strengthening in most of these parameters. In addition, these power centers are interconnected, so it is impossible to implement the isolation measures of the old Cold War period towards them. And finally, there are the internal problems of Western societies themselves: increased social problems, lowest ever levels of trust in their own elites, increased inequality, turning of democratic elections into an empty form with predetermined outcomes, mass immigration that the West is unable to assimilate and convert to "their cultural code"... All this, unless there is a nuclear escalation, indicates that the outcome of the new Cold War will be completely different from the outcome of the first one.

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

<i>The Balkans in the Cold War</i>. by Svetozar Rajak et al., eds., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 372 pp. €106.99.

: The cold war and containment of Soviet expansion have been the defining events for strategists since World War II. In this address, Professor Gaddis examines the relevance of American cold war strategy to the collapse of European and Soviet communism. He describes three factors that were decisive to the success of containment as grand strategy. The first was the role of ideas. Western political and economic philosophers were vastly superior to state dominated, scientific socialism in mobilizing loyalty, productivity, and releasing the creativity of the human spirit. Second, the role of nuclear weapons, even though costly, deployed in excessive numbers, and responsible for prolonging the cold war, did stabilize the conflict, allowing time for the triumph of Western ideas and values. Finally, the role of leadership and strategic vision, even though often unrecognized, was decisive at critical periods.

Editor's Note

Essays on Cold War tensions within NATO and the Warsaw Pact There is no shortage of literature addressing the workings, influence, and importance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact individually or how the two blocs faced off during the decades of the Cold War. However, little has been written about the various intrabloc tensions that plagued both alliances during the Cold War or about how those tensions affected the alliances’ operation. The essays in NATO and the Warsaw Pact seek to address that glaring gap in the historiography by utilizing a wide range of case studies to explore these often-significant tensions, dispelling in the process all thoughts that the alliances always operated smoothly and without internal dissent. The volume is divided into two parts, one on each alliance. An introductory essay by S. Victor Papacosma spells out the themes addressed in the individual essays and the volume’s coherent historiographical contribution. They include, but are not limited to, military and political matters, the consequences of World War II for the non-Western world, the role of individuals in shaping historical events, and the unintended consequences of policy choices and developments. The international group of contributors brings to bear considerable policymaking and academic experience. In approaching the Cold War–era alliances from a new angle and in drawing on recently declassified documentation, this volume adds to the literature in recent international history and will be of interest to scholars in such fields as U.S. foreign relations, European diplomatic history, and security and defense studies, among others. Visit the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security site for more information and news related to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Looking back on the Cold War, historians are beginning to discern new patterns and meanings to replace the familiar picture of a world dominated by bipolar superpower confrontation. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, and still more the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, ushered in a period of instability such as usually follows a major war. Any such dramatic changes necessarily affect perceptions of what has been replaced. Reevaluative scholarship on the Cold War already reflects contemporary priorities in reinterpreting the years between 1941 and 1990. This does not mean that consensus has suddenly broken out on such vexed questions as when the Cold War began, a debate at which Nelson hints in his first chapter. Nor does it mean that there is a newfound unanimity about why the Cold War emerged and why it proceeded as it did. There are, however, signs of new orthodoxies which the two very different books reviewed here illustrate. Both, for example, stress the limits of American and Soviet influence, perhaps not surprisingly in the aftermath of the collapse of one and the obvious limits on the power of the other in the 1980s and 1990s. These two books are written in the knowledge that the Cold War was not a stable international system. Crockatt reminds us that scholars, strategists, and politicians had, by the 1980s, come to regard it as a system that was entrenched for the foreseeable future and that had the virtues (in Western eyes) of predictability and stability. This view depended on assumptions of symmetry in superpower relations and that the Cold War was functional for each side. The events of 1989-1991 have highlighted the significance of asymmetries in Soviet-American competition throughout as well as the need

At any stage of the Cold War, Soviet film culture was inevitably influenced by the political and ideological content of the conflict and by fluctuations in its course. Soviet films represented confrontation with the West with various degrees of directness, dealing with such issues as ideological struggle, espionage, the fear of global hostilities (influenced by traumatic memories of the past world war), and ostentatious or genuine attempts at rapprochement with the other side. Soviet ideologues and commentators from different cultural fields were mobilized to defend Soviet filmmakers and film audiences from possible contamination. Western cinema was condemned as a source and emblem of bourgeois decadence and regarded as a tool of enemy propaganda. Films produced in the United States were the main targets of this condemnation: in stark contrast to the general friendliness which had characterized Soviet attitudes toward American filmmaking during World War II, with the advent of the Cold War they were commonly described as a filthy torrent of slander against humanity produced by Hollywood's conveyor-belts. (1) Against considerable odds, however, during the Cold War American cinema remained an important presence within Soviet culture and generated a significant effect on its Soviet counterpart even during the conflict's most difficult periods, when most American cultural products were rejected as unfit for Soviet consumption. (2) Even in the conditions of growing ideological repression and thorough filtration of anything that was perceived as a product of American capitalism and a tool of imperialist subversion, American films reached the Soviet intelligentsia, as well as common Soviet viewers. The new xenophobic atmosphere (fueled by anti-cosmopolitan witch hunts and courts of honor) did not prevent Soviet filmmakers, who since the earliest days of Soviet cinema had demonstrated enthusiastic interest in American representations of dynamic modernity and American film techniques, from being perceptive observers and processors of America's cinematic achievements. (3) Moreover, in spite of the declared intent to fence out contaminating Western influences, Soviet ideologues paid close attention to the developments in American cinema, sanctioning the use--for very different ideological aims--of stylistic and narrative patterns commonly associated with Hollywood. (4) This article examines certain channels and mechanisms of American cinema's penetration of the Soviet realm at the Cold War's initial and, arguably, most acute stage, the parameters of which were shaped in the last years of Stalin's rule by the most violent official rejection of Western culture. It explores two interrelated issues: patterns of Soviet bureaucratic, intellectual, and popular reception of American films; and U.S. efforts to secure a position in the Soviet film market. The first issue opens another perspective on the two superpowers' ideological and cultural rivalry; the second specifies the problem of cultural influences in a situation when the influencer has to circumvent powerful mechanisms of defense. By demonstrating and explaining diverse responses of Soviet audiences, authorities, and filmmakers to one of the most popular and accomplished products of American culture and one of the most powerful instruments of U.S. cultural policy, I aim to give a more nuanced picture of a period traditionally regarded as one of the lowest points in the relationship between the USSR and the United States. American Films in the USSR during World War II The history of Soviet attitudes toward American cinema in the early course of the Cold War would be incomplete without a look at its reception in the Soviet Union during World War II. (5) First, positive attitudes toward American cinema prevalent at that time provide a dramatic contrast to the mood of the subsequent Cold War. Second, the wartime access to allied countries' films, and the fact that large numbers of foreign movies were obtained as war trophies, profoundly influenced postwar Soviet filmmaking and the general cultural situation in the USSR. …

Editor's Note

To most audiences, deterrence has been interconnected with nuclear weapons whose purpose had been to deter a Soviet attack. But, the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a decade. President George W. Bush has stated that Russia is not an enemy of the US and the numbers of nuclear weapons can be dramatically reduced. It is important to note that deterrence has always transcended nuclear weapons. The US' first line of deterrence has been its formidable conventional warfare capability, designed to prevent conflict and win wars if necessary. The role of nuclear weapons has been to deter the,use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests during the conduct of conventional warfare and to ensure our ability to inflict massive destruction on any who would use nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, against us. With regard to the Soviet Union, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was a critical component of our deterrent to prevent massive Soviet conventional attack against our allies in Europe. However, the events of September 11, 2001 make clear that we have not convinced all who seek to harm us that we will be able to respond in a manner to make them wish they had not even tried. The September 11 attacks, as well as other past conflicts, do not mean that deterrence has failed-it remains effective against the threats for which it was designed. We have known there are other threats for which we did not have a credible deterrent. The challenge is to sustain deterrence against the classic threats as they evolve in technical sophistication while remaining alert to the need to evaluate continuously our ability to deter previously unforeseen challenges. How then should we be looking at deterrence as we consider fifteen or so years in the future, say to about 2015? What will be the role of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction in the future? What should the US be doing to prepare for the future? In this study, we present four futures as a tool for planners who must think ahead fifteen years or more, rather than a prediction of the future. None of the four futures will emerge in just the way we have described. Fifteen years from now, some mix of these futures is more likely, or perhaps we will see a trend towards one of the futures, but with the possibility that any of the other three could appear, perhaps quite swiftly. Any future will undoubtedly contain its own kind of unpleasant surprises and, in contrast to the Cold War; the possession of enormous nuclear-response and conventional-response capability may not be sufficient to deter these from happening. However, there are other tools that the US must include as part of its strategy and security policy in addition to deterrence, specifically dissuasion, defense, destruction, and assurance. Rather than rely on the Cold-War concept of deterrence, future security policy should be built upon the appropriate mix of these elements as a way to steer us toward a more favorable future, while ensuring that we are prepared for the kinds of surprises associated with far less favorable futures. In this study, we have defined three unfavorable futures to be avoided, and one future that represents, we believe, a more desirable global situation than the first three, but still not entirely benign. Our security policy should be defined to avoid or prevent the first three, which we have entitled ''Nuclear Giants, Global Terror'', and ''Regional Nuclear Tension and Use'', and steer us toward a more favorable future, ''Dynamic Cooperation''. We have examined the implications for both policy and military capability that are posed by these different futures. The result often raises more questions than we are able to answer without additional study-however, our primary purpose was to clarify the issues, to identify. what we believe we know, what we don't know, and where more study and effort are needed. Nevertheless, in preparing for unfavorable futures, we must also identify and plan the future we want. This study emphasizes that a desirable future in 2015 would be characterized by peaceful resolution of conflict, growing worldwide economic prosperity, an effective non-proliferation regime, the ability of the United States to control its own destiny without conflict, and expansion of political and economic freedom. Security policies, even in the face of unpleasant futures, should be crafted so as enhance, rather than diminish, these desired goals.

For a decade after the Cold War it seemed that multilateral governance might take root under US leadership, including a reinvigorated United Nations and a strengthened international legal framework. The nuclear explosive devices tested by India in 1998 took place in a pivotal period when the so-called ‘unipolar moment’ of the US began to be challenged by states that were not satisfied such an arrangement could advance their national interests.To European eyes, India never fully incorporated the implications of the post-Cold War changes into its national approach to global affairs. While many in Europe and the US expected Indian perspectives to be closely aligned with their own, India did not fully integrate into the West. At the same time, India tried to preserve its place in the Global South, even as its interests diverged from those of its traditional partners in certain key issue areas—the role of nuclear weapons being perhaps one clear example.While a governance system based on US leadership has corroded, no viable replacement has yet evolved. A further iteration of post-Cold War governance may be in the making, as the US is probably unable (and may not be interested) to play the central role in setting the international agenda or organising (and financing) the key frameworks for interstate dialogue. The main priority might be to insulate the US from any negative effects of events in other parts of the world and create a safe platform for more aggressive economic and financial competition.Fluid coalitions of interest form around specific issues, and as a result states that cooperate closely on one issue (such as military security) might take opposing views on another (such as climate). States cooperate and compete in different configurations, depending on how their interests align on specific political, strategic, economic, social and environmental questions. While some analysts draw parallels with the past, in reality there is little precedent or knowledge to guide current thinking and uncertainty contributes to the re-emergence of military factors in international relations as states seek both assurance and insurance.Uncertainties are promoting national investment that is gradually equipping military forces in ways that could provide major powers with capabilities that emphasise deterrence and defence. Although it is intended to reduce any risk of conflict between major powers, whether this investment will produce a stable global environment is unknown and untested.The pattern described above is challenging and problematic for Europeans, who were comfortable with the concept of enhancing the effectiveness of multilateralism under US leadership. A twin-track approach is emerging. Initiatives to strengthen intra-Western solidarity (particularly the promotion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–European Union cooperation) promote a traditional approach, while intra-European cooperation is being revisited as a hedging strategy, in case autonomous European action is needed in future.In headline documents, India and European states emphasise that they are natural partners and promise to promote rules-based governance of an interconnected and multipolar world. However, Indian perspectives on global governance are largely absent from European discussions, and the promised cooperation appears more aspirational than real.

<i>The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969</i>. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

The Cold War began in Europe in the mid-1940s and ended there in 1989. Notions of a “global Cold War” are useful in describing the wide impact and scope of the East-West divide after World War II, but first and foremost the Cold War was about the standoff in Europe. The Soviet Union established a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in the mid-1940s that later became institutionalized in the Warsaw Pact, an organization that was offset by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led by the United States. The fundamental division of Europe persisted for forty years, coming to an end only when Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe dissolved. Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, edited by Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana, consists of cutting-edge essays by distinguished experts who discuss the Cold War in Europe from beginning to end, with a particular focus on the countries that were behind the iron curtain. The contributors take account of structural conditions that helped generate the Cold War schism in Europe, but they also ascribe agency to local actors as well as to the superpowers. The chapters dealing with the end of the Cold War in Europe explain not only why it ended but also why the events leading to that outcome occurred almost entirely peacefully.

The Cold War began in Europe in the mid-1940s and ended there in 1989. Notions of a “global Cold War” are useful in describing the wide impact and scope of the East-West divide after World War II, but first and foremost the Cold War was about the standoff in Europe. The Soviet Union established a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in the mid-1940s that later became institutionalized in the Warsaw Pact, an organization that was offset by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led by the United States. The fundamental division of Europe persisted for forty years, coming to an end only when Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe dissolved. Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, edited by Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana, consists of cutting-edge essays by distinguished experts who discuss the Cold War in Europe from beginning to end, with a particular focus on the countries that were behind the iron curtain. The contributors take account of structural conditions that helped generate the Cold War schism in Europe, but they also ascribe agency to local actors as well as to the superpowers. The chapters dealing with the end of the Cold War in Europe explain not only why it ended but also why the events leading to that outcome occurred almost entirely peacefully.