Soviet Side Research Articles

The Efforts of the KGB to Use the Emigree Organisation Santara– Šviesa to Maintain Contact with Occupied Lithuania

Legitimacy at the international level was important for the Soviet occupation regime in Lithuania and they also wanted to achieve it with the help of the emigrants. Cultural relations were dilemma question for soviets and emigration. Culture had to attract emigrants to their side, to distract from resistance activities, to set emigrants against each other and thus to undermine all Lithuanian liberation activities. However, emigrants were seen as a danger due to the possible influence on the locals, but at the same time they were considered an opportunity to achieve political and propaganda goals. Also it influenced negatively relationship with other emigree organizations, but KGB could not make damage to their relationship remarkably. This publication reveals how and by what means Soviet security sought to use the plans of the liberal emigrants to establish personal and cultural relations with Soviet Lithuania for propaganda, agency, and political purposes of the Soviet regime. It is also important to evaluate whether the KGB has achieved its goals. Official cultural contacts were under full control of the soviet side. They were a cover for the KGB agency and propaganda activities. Despite huge efforts soviet security only partially managed to take advantage of closer contacts between emigrants and Lithuania. It can be said that emigrants only partially knew and evaluated the capabilities and methods of the KGB. They did not know how widely the KGB sought to use these connections to harm emigrants. It is believed that personal contacts were safer for emigrants’ organizations. Perhaps the KGB was most fortunate to use these contacts while performing discreditation and promoting the achievements of the soviet regime.

Геннадий Матвеев, Карина Колихова, Введение советско-польского перемирия в действие (октябрь-ноябрь 1920 г.)/The Implementation of the Polish-Soviet Peace Preliminaries (October–November 1920)

The article clarifies the actual date of the entry into force of the Soviet-Polish treaty on the preliminary conditions of peace and armistice of October 12, 1920. The preliminary treaty stipulated that the enactment should happen no later than November 2, and after that date, the withdrawal of Polish troops to the state border line was to begin. The parties pledged not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs and not to support organizations aimed at overthrowing the state and social system of the other party from the moment the truce was ratified under article II of the treaty. Realizing the importance of the armistice, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland and the RSFSR ratified the treaty within the agreed time frame, and it seemed that nothing prevented them from immediately starting work on the final text of the peace treaty in accordance with the agreements. However, the Soviet peace delegation that had arrived in Riga on November 3 did not find the Polish delegation there. It turned out, moreover, that the Polish army was in no hurry to leave the regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR occupied by it, and thus covered the flanks of the anti-Soviet armies of Symon Petliura, Boris Piermikin, and Stanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz which invaded Soviet territory. The protests expressed by the Soviet side yielded results only aer the Red Army had broken through the defense of the Crimea on November 9-10. On November 13, a Polish delegation finally arrived in Riga and a meeting of the heads of the Soviet and Polish delegations, Adolph Joffe and Jan Dąbski, took place, following which Poland undertook to begin the withdrawal of its troops from November 19, 1920. Its yesterday’s eastern allies retreated to Poland and were interned. The analysis of the problem shows that the armistice agreement was actually put into effect not on November 2, but on November 19, 1920, and Józef Piłsudski and the Polish military command are primarily to blame for this.

BASMACI İSYANI VE AFGANİSTAN (1918-1933)

Başlangıç ve bitiş tarihleri hakkında görüş farklılıkları olsa da Basmacı İsyanı adı ile bilinen 20. yüzyılın başındaki Orta Asya’daki bağımsızlık hareketi 1918-1933 yılları arasında Orta Asya tarihini şekillendiren önemli faktörlerden birisi olmuştur. Bu isyanın temel amacı bölgedeki Sovyet yönetimini sonlandırmak ve bağımsız bir Türkistan Devleti kurmaktır. Kendilerini isyana teşvik eden de Hokand Muhtar Cumhuriyeti’nin Sovyetler tarafından yıkılması olmuştur. Orta Aya’nın o dönemdeki siyasi, iktisadi ortamı Ruslara karşı duyulan husumetle de birleşince hareketin gelişmesi için gereken zemin ortaya çıkmıştır. Basmacı Hareketi Enver Paşa’nın 1922 yılında şehadetinden sonra yön değiştirmiş, Rus İç Savaşı’nın bitmesi ile de üstünlük Sovyetler’in eline geçmiştir. Bunun üzerine Basmacılar, Buhara Hanlığı’nın ilhakı sırasında Sovyet hâkimiyeti altında yaşamak istemeyen nüfusun yaptığı gibi, Afganistan’a gitmiş ve mücadelelerine buradan devam etmiştir. Afganistan’da Basmacılar Afgan Devleti ve Orta Asyalı göçmenlerden aldıkları destekle isyanı sürdürmeye çalışmışlardır. Bunda başarılı da olmuşlardır. Bu duruma en güzel örnek ise İbrahim Bek ve Fuzayl Mahsum’un Garm harekâtı gösterilebilir. Ancak başlarda iyi giden bu harekât başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Bunda Sovyetlerin askeri disiplin, teknoloji alanında üstünlüklerinin yanında Basmacılar arasındaki ayrılıkları oldukça iyi kullanmalarının da etkisi vardır. Basmacı İsyanı zaman zaman cereyan eden baskınlarla 1935 yılına kadar sürse de bu tarihte kesin olarak bitmiştir. Bu durumda Afganistan’daki desteklerinin de kesilmesinin etkisi vardır.

Cold War Anthropology From Both Sides of the Iron Curtain

This paper seeks to widen the understanding of Cold War anthropology by considering the history of contacts and dialogue between Soviet and American anthropologists from 1945 to 1964. Focusing mainly on the Soviet side, it argues that the isolation of Soviet ethnography was never complete, although it reached a highpoint during late Stalinism. The paper considers the resuming of contacts between US and USSR scholars in the second half of the 1950s; Soviet participation in international anthropological congresses and its effects on theoretical developments in Soviet anthropology; and the preparation, proceedings and consequences of the 7th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES) and the Expert Meeting on the Biological Aspects of Race, held in Moscow in 1964. The paper argues that these events were instrumental in widening the confines of Soviet Marxism and introducing new research areas (such as psychological anthropology) into Soviet academia. This enabled ethnography in the USSR to present itself as an alternative centre of consolidation for both Western left-leaning anthropologists and scholars from postcolonial countries.

СОВЕТСКО-ИНДИЙСКИЙ КУЛЬТУРНЫЙ ОБМЕН В 1954 – 1960 ГГ. НА ПРИМЕРЕ ЭСТРАДЫ

Cultural exchange in 1954 - 1960 played an important role in the formation of Soviet-Indian cooperation. Adhering to the principles of "pancha shila", the Soviet leadership used the strategy of "soft power" to expand its own influence in Asian countries. The exchange of creative teams and individual performers laid the foundation for building cultural relations between the USSR and India in the future. Closer contacts in the period under review were established between circus, theatrical art and dance ensembles. Spectators from both countries had the opportunity to get to know the intangible cultural heritage of the USSR and India, which, in turn, formed a positive impression on the public. Without official agreements, the exchange was carried out during the period under review on the basis of mutual interest, thanks to the initiative of the USSR leadership, closer interaction was carried out, contacts were expanded in the cultural sphere. Consideration of the issue of the place of variety art in the Soviet-Indian cultural exchange makes it possible to determine the features of the process, identify problematic components, in particular, the reluctance to expand the geography of exchanges and the increase in the cost of organizing tours by the Indian leadership. Nevertheless, the Soviet side sought to use this channel to promote the Soviet way of life, deliberately investing heavily in the implementation of plans for cultural interaction with India.

Failed Alliance: The Failure of Negotiations on the Soviet-French Military Convention against German Revanchism

This article considers the course and results of Soviet-French negotiations on the conclusion of a military convention in 1935–1937. The question of creating a full-fledged military alliance between the two countries arose immediately after they signed a mutual assistance pact in 1935, but initially neither side was fully prepared for this. The impetus for the intensification of negotiations was the events of March 1936 when the Soviet leadership, having failed to normalise its relations with Germany, became convinced of the weakness of the French position against the background of the events of the Rhine crisis. Military and diplomatic contacts began in June 1936 and became especially intense in autumn when L. Blum’s cabinet initiated negotiations between the General Staffs of the two countries. However, at the beginning of 1937, it became clear that for their successful outcome, it was necessary to overcome the resistance of influential military-political circles, which the French government turned out to be incapable of doing. The Soviet side insisted on a transition to direct mutually binding negotiations, but in the summer of 1937, after the resignation of the Blum government, contacts on this issue eroded.

At Penpoint: African Literatures, Postcolonial Studies, and the Cold War

At Penpoint: African Literatures, Postcolonial Studies, and the Cold War

ВПЛИВ ПОЛЬСЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОГО КОРДОНУ НА ЕКОНОМІКУ ВОЛИНСЬКОГО ВОЄВОДСТВА В 1921–1939 РОКАХ

The article attempts to outline the impact of the Polish-Soviet border on the economy of Volyn’ Voivodeship in the interwar twentieth century. The settlement of political and economic relations between Poland and the USSR had a negative impact on the possibility of economic development in the Volyn’ region while focusing on the markets of the USSR. It is established that in the period of 1921-1924 the economy of the region benefited from trade with Soviet Ukraine. During this period, illegal trade flourished in the territories adjacent to the border, which had a positive impact on the economy of the province. However, in the following period of 1925-1939, trade contacts between the Volyn’ Voivodeship and the USSR were reduced to a minimum. The geographical location of the Volyn’ Voivodeship on the border with the USSR and the economic potential of the region remained virtually untapped in favor of economic development. The strengthening of the border by the Border Guard Corps effectively isolated Volhynia from any contact with the Soviet side, thus making it impossible to use the existence of the border for the economic development of Volyn’ Voivodeship. Instead, the second period of 1925-1939 was characterized by the de facto complete elimination of border trade and the closure of the Polish-Soviet border.

CULTURAL EXCHANGE WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE 1970s

This article examines individual stories related to the policy and practice of cultural exchange of the USSR with Western countries. The author presents data that allow us to understand the basic principles of cultural exchange, which the Soviet side adhered to when concluding interstate agreements on cultural cooperation, as well as contracts with specific commercial companies. As cases in the analysis of the main problems of the stated topic, facts (cases) recorded in archival documents of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR dating back to the 1970s were used.

The Unknown War of the Eastern Front: the first American-Soviet television production and Détente’s World War II

This article details the production of the first American-Soviet television collaboration The Unknown War. The 1978 documentary series chronicled the Eastern Front of World War II, an area of the war few Americans were familiar with. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s American film and television portrayals of the war excised or minimized the Soviet Union’s role due to the Cold War rivalry leading to a knowledge gap. The success of the documentary series The World at War spurred the interest of American independent producer Air Time International for a similar series on the Soviet side of the war. For Americans it was capitalizing on a revival of interest in the war while remedying the public’s lack of knowledge on the Eastern. For the Soviet authorities it was a means of furthering relations eased by Détente and bolstering their ‘Cult of the Great Patriotic War’. The series’ creation showcases the difficulties and compromises made to craft a product that suited both sides’ needs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the series never being rebroadcast in the United States and largely forgotten. It serves as an example of the difficulties of such ‘cross-curtain’ collaborations and the Cold War’s influence on the interpretation of World War II.

Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1970 viewed by the Soviet writers’ delegation

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the five Warsaw Pact countries on August 21, 1968 dealt a tremendous blow to Soviet-Czechoslovak cultural ties. Only a small minority of writers and masters of arts, supporting the policy of the so-called “normalization”, showed their readiness to continue to maintain official contacts with the Soviet side. The delegation of Soviet writers, which arrived in March, 1970, was officially received only in Slovakia. The authorities did not dare to hold any official events in Prague, where the boycott by the creative intelligentsia of everything that came from the Soviet side was dominating. The short trip of two Soviet writers to Prague to get acquainted with the situation in literary life was not advertised at all. Readers are provided with the report of the Soviet delegation to the Foreign Commission of the Union of Writers of the USSR on the results of their stay in Czechoslovakia.

Soviet-Czechoslovak Technological Transfer: from the First Post-War Years to the Prague Spring (on the Base of the Foreign Trips Reports of Soviet Engineers)

In this article, a large range of unique sources from the collections of the St. Petersburg Central State Archive of Scientific and Technical Documentation is analyzed and studied for the first time. These are the reports of Soviet specialists in the field of technical knowledge on the business trips to Czechoslovakia in the period from the mid-1940s until the end of the 1960s. Their authors were employees of the Leningrad sectoral research institutes. They were technical chemists, shipbuilders, hydraulic engineers, mining engineers, machine builders, etc. The presented materials made it possible to take a fresh look at the issues of the Soviet-Czechoslovak technological transfer, both within the framework of bilateral relations and within the framework of CMEA. A distinctive feature of all the reports was their de-ideologization. These documents did not contain references to the classics of Marxism-Leninism and assurances of the superiority of socialist science over bourgeois, but they reflected a deep sincere interest in foreign technologies and engineering solutions. Noteworthy is the very respectful attitude of Soviet specialists towards their Czech and Slovak colleagues, and at the same time – deep attention to Czechoslovak technical developments. This fact clearly distinguishes the reports of engineers from the reports of their colleagues in the humanities, especially from the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The latter often wrote such documents from the arrogant position of the “elder brother”, who has a monopoly on the Marxist truth. The Soviet authors of the reports did not separate Soviet technical science from the global context and tried in every possible way to convey the idea of the importance of exchanging experience and scientific and technical information with foreign partners. They looked with some envy at their Czechoslovak colleagues, who, albeit limitedly, had access to Western scientific and technical literature. If we talk about the transfer of knowledge and technology from the standpoint of mutual benefit, then we need to draw a conclusion about its success. Cooperation with the USSR allowed Czechoslovakia to develop a number of new technical areas, such as nuclear power, at the same time, the Soviet side got the opportunity to access promising Czechoslovak technologies in the field of mechanical engineering or polymer chemistry. However, the system of intellectual exchanges, despite the obvious mutual interest of the specialists of the two countries in it, was still fettered by ideological frameworks and party control, and the introduction of certain technical innovations often faced the sluggishness of the planned economy.

Spaniards in the Great Patriotic War

Hundreds of Spanish volunteers who had ended up in the Soviet Union in various ways during or after the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) took part in the Great Patriotic War. First, they were Spanish children, including teenagers. Secondly, several thousand members of the Spanish Communist Party and its leaders evacuated after the fall of the Republic. Thirdly, Spanish Republicans rescued by Soviet diplomats from French internment camps in 1939–1940. In addition, after the outbreak of war, the last of the pilots who had taken a pilot training course at the aviation school in Kirovabad remained in the USSR. The aim of this article is to systematise the information available in memoirs, archival sources and literature on the participation of Spanish volunteers in the war on the Soviet side and to draw conclusions as to the nature and forms of that participation. Soviet conscription centres did not have the authority to enrol Spaniards who did not have Soviet citizenship into the Red Army, and Spanish volunteers were allowed to go to the front thanks to several Soviet military officers who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. It is for this reason that the most massive and effective military efforts of the Spaniards behind enemy lines were in partisan and sabotage groups, as well as in the air force. The Spanish volunteers wrote a glorious chapter both in the history of their country and in the annals of the Great Patriotic War.

The USSR and the Chilean Revolution: to help and how? Issues of economic interaction during the period of Unidad Popular (1970—1973)

The dramatic experience of the "Chilean path to socialism" half a century ago raised a lot of questions about the fate of the left, socialist project in a modern, pluralistic society, about the combination of national and international factors in the fate of the revolution. This work is devoted to the policy of the USSR in relation to the Chilean revolution in the economic sphere. On the basis of documents from the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is proposed to analyze the Soviet policy of helping Chile, the process of negotiations between both countries, decision-making and their motives. The work is limited to issues of economic cooperation, which, in the course of the development of the crisis in Chile, have become key to the survival of the Unidad Popular government. Insuperable for greater dynamism of economic relations between the USSR and Chile were not only objective circumstances, vast distances and limited resources, but also the political failure of the government of Popular Unity, which turned out to be incapable of either formulating long-term tasks for the development of international cooperation or putting into practice the agreements reached with the USSR. The Soviet side was not ready for full-scale integration and assistance to Chile, plunging the process into a viscous mire of bureaucracy and the usual illusory. This is a story of bilateral failure, for which both sides are to blame.

Participation of Soviet Scientists in the Soil Map of the World Project

This article discusses the participation of Soviet soil scientists in the project aimed to create a soil map of the world. The ideas of creating a soil map were based on the ideas of soil classification that had been put forward by V. V. Dokuchaev in the late 19th century. These ideas were further developed by Dokuchaev’s pupil K. D. Glinka who greatly influenced the relevant works of C. F. Marbut, the leader of American soil science. In the Soviet Union, the creation of soil maps was initiated in the early 1930s for the purpose of land and soil inventory, which was necessary to ensure successful development of the collective-farm economy. With their vast experience in soil mapping, Soviet soil scientists initiated a project to create a world soil map at the Sixth International Congress of Soil Scientists, held in Paris in 1956. The first soil maps of individual regions, presented during the ICSS Congress in Madison in 1960, were seriously flawed and could not be integrated into a single map. The International Society of Soil Science asked the U. N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for help and, together with UNESCO, FAO began to provide assistance in the implementation of this project. The Soviet scientists’ positions in the project were undermined in 1961 after the V. V. Dokuchaev Soil Science Institute was removed from under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences and transferred to the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL). Only a few scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Geography, headed by I. P. Gerasimov, remained full participants in World Soil Map Project. In this situation V. A. Kovda, who directed the project on the Soviet side, concentrated on defending the positions of Soviet soil science from the encroachments on the part of American scientists. There was a risk that traditional Russian soil names could disappear from the new soil map of the world. Soviet scientists succeeded in defending their position at the International Soil Congress, held in Adelaide (Australia) in 1968, and secured the holding of the next Congress in Moscow. The first sheets of the soil map of the world were released in 1970.

On the Question of the Debts of Czarist Russia. The Soviet-French conference of 1926–1927

In this article based on materials from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive, most of which have not yet been introduced into the academic circuit, the author examines the preparation, progress, and results of the Soviet-French conference in 1926–1927, where the question of repayment of debts of the Russian Empire, as well as the possibility of France's loans to the USSR were discussed. French documents show that the Soviet side from the very beginning indicated that the issue of paying off royal debts for it, due to the economic situation in the country, was inextricably linked with the provision of loans. The French delegation, although it did not recognize the connection between these two issues, was ready to discuss them in parallel and showed a real interest both in settling the debt issue and in providing loans. Despite considerable disagreement, the positions of the sides gradually converged during the negotiations, specific figures and details on key issues were agreed on, and a mutually acceptable outcome seemed quite possible. However, the coming to power in France in July 1926 of the government of the National Association, headed by Raymond Poincaré, instead of the Left Bloc, which was constructively disposed towards the USSR, and, especially, the Anglo-Soviet flare-up, followed by a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Moscow and London, led to a rise in anti-Soviet sentiment in France and, consequently, a hardening of the French negotiating position, which ultimately led to the failure of the conference. French holders of Russian securities were primarily the ones who lost out.

Losy ostrowskich Żydów (IX 1939–1946)

The geographical location of their shtetl made the wartime fate of the Ostrów Mazowiecka’s Jews different from that of their countryman from other towns in the region. Instead of creating aghetto or planned murder of the Jewish com-munity in Ostrów, the Germans expelled them in 1939 to the Soviet side of the nearby demarcation line. The Soviets, generally wary of all kinds of refugees from the west, qualified alarge part of them for deportation and sent them to the northern regions of their empire. The curse of wandering fate became for them the final blessing of survival.

In Word and in Deed: a Religious Issue in the Messages of State Security in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1950s — the First Half of the 1960s)

The article based on the analysis of documents of Central Committee of the Communist Party from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI) describes the normative and institutional foundations of the activities of Soviet state security regarding church-religious activities in the USSR, and also describes the peculiarities of the interaction of special services with the country's top party leadership on this issue in the 1950s — mid-1960s. Based on a large number of examples, which were taken from documentary sources, the authors conclude that in the post-war decades, the antagonistic policy of “militant atheism” (with the exception of a short surge associated with the Khrushchev anti-religious campaign) gradually transformed into a more loyal attitude of the authorities (including the KGB) to manifestations of religiosity, as a result of which repression towards believers was gradually supplanted by a system of preventive measures. The basis for the intervention of special services in religious issues was now only the active activities of unregistered religious organizations, the clear denial of a relatively small part of believers of the basic Soviet norms and values, as well as the precedents of church-confessional problems reaching the international level with the image of the Soviet side in the global confrontation of the Cold War. As for the nature of the relationship between the highest party authority and the KGB, there was a fairly flexible model of interaction, when the state security provided the party's Central Committee with limited information about their activities in this direction, adapting it to their own ideas about the current trends of Soviet religious policy.

The Tokyo and Khabarovsk Trials in the Context of the Problem of “Bacteriological War”

On the basis of the published declassified sources of information the author of the article presents the analysis of the Soviet law enforcement and judicial bodies’ activity that aimed at identifying and prosecuting Japanese war criminals, who were directly involved in developing “bacteriological weapons” before and during the World War II in the Far East. The Soviet side started receiving the information about the bacteriological weapons’ development from the moment of the liberation of Manchuria. The information was provided by sanitary doctors and war prisoners, who were subjected to overt and covert agent work. In 1947 the information about the experiments conducted on live humans while developing bacteriological weapons was submitted to the USA. The author describes the difference in the organization of the Tokyo and the Nuremberg trials, which lay in the fact that all authority in the Tokyo trial was concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the Allied Powers, who was the USA representative. The author presents the reasons why the issue of the “bacteriological weapons” was not considered in the Tokyo trial. Among the reasons there were procedure issues referred to the organization of the trial and the pursuit of the American side to receive the results of investigations that had been conducted by the Detachment 731, and, as the consequence, to provide its commander with the immunity from persecution. Moreover, one can relate to the reasons the geopolitical situation which was caused by the beginning of the “cold war”. For the conviction of the people involved in the development of the “bacteriological weapons” was held the Khabarovsk trial, which played a considerable role for the further development of the international humanitarian law.

«LIFE» VS«ИЗВЕСТИЯ»: АМЕРИКАНО-СОВЕТСКАЯ ДИСКУССИЯ О ВЫБОРАХ В ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ СССР 1958 ГОДА

The article discusses an attempt to use the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as a tool to promote the political advantage of socialism. The turn of the 1950s and 1960s was marked by a desire to build a dialogue between East and West. The USSR demonstrated its openness and willingness to compete with the West not only with tanks, planes and missiles, but also on a symbolic field. One such aspect of the competition, which was supposed to prove the superiority of socialism, was the Soviet elections. Soviet propaganda actively emphasized that genuine democracy existed only in the USSR. At the same time, the Soviet leadership did not at all seek to hide the features of Soviet elections (such as almost 100% turnout and no alternative elections), but rather tried to show the progressive nature of the Soviet electoral system. The articles by American journalist Hedley Donovan in the “Life” magazine and by Soviet journalist Vladimir Kudryavtsev in the “Izvestia” newspaper, which show the perception of the principles of democracy by representatives of different systems, serve as material in the paper. They show that for an American, having one candidate on the ballot overrode all the advantages of the Soviet elections, while for the Soviet side, it was an important sign of democracy. The desire to use Soviet reality as a basis for propaganda, and disappointment in the outcome of the exchange show that for the Soviet side, the election campaign for the USSR Supreme Soviet was seen not only as a political spectacle, but rather as a real manifestation of the Soviet understanding of democracy. The Soviet leadership adopted the idea of the need to lift the iron curtain, and then the very reality of the Soviet system would be the best argument to confirm the advantages of socialism. The article analyzes the political language of the description of the Soviet electoral system and the problems of modern studies of this issue.