Soviet Diplomacy Research Articles

French diplomats and the military on Soviet Russia and the balance of power in Central-Eastern Europe in 1922

The consolidation of the Soviet state in 1922 and the activities of Soviet diplomacy in the key international forums had a direct impact on the strategic situation in Europe. The eventual strengthening of Soviet Russia/the USSR was both a threat and an opportunity for France as one of the leading European powers of that period, which had obligations and interests in Central and Eastern Europe. The author aims to identify the main approaches of French diplomats and the military to a set of issues related to the possible development of Soviet Russia in 1922 and its place in the European balance of power. The study is based on a wide range of primary sources from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, the National Archives of France, the Historical Service of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Fifth Republic, as well as on recently published French diplomatic and military documents. The author concludes that the French elites had a rather ambiguous attitude towards the process and the first results of political consolidation and socio-economic development of the Soviet state. On the one hand, the formation of the USSR was an obvious manifestation of the growing Soviet power that somewhat diminished the hopes of French officials for the imminent fall of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, diplomats and the military both in Paris and on-site were often skeptical about the prospects for the development of the Soviet economy, noting the catastrophic consequences of hunger, economic and financial ruin. Moderate optimism about the opportunity to intensify trade and economic contacts with Soviet Russia as its economy recovers coexisted with pronounced pessimism. The French assessments of the military potential of the Soviet state were marked by the same ambivalence. The acknowledgement of the current limited capabilities of the Red Army and the Red Fleet was accompanied by the growing recognition that the basis of the military power of the Soviet state had not been undermined. All this could help Moscow improve its international stance in the future, which would inevitably affect the balance of power in Europe. Under these circumstances, the French elites debated the prospects for the ‘normalization’ of the Bolshevik regime and its incorporation into the Versailles order. The author argues that all these contradictory attitudes, views and assessments that surfaced in 1922 to a large extent predetermined the overall direction and specific content of the French policy towards the USSR in the following years.

The disarmament conference in Moscow from December 1922 and Romania

In the conditions of the international isolation of the Russian Government, at the initiative of the Soviet diplomacy in December 1922, a „disarmament conference” was held in Moscow, in which the states bordering Russia participated. Although it was invited, Romania did not respond to the invitation, because the Soviets refused to recognize the border on the Dniester. The tribune of the Moscow conference was used by Russian diplomacy for propaganda purposes. At the conference, the Romanian Government aimed to explore, through its ally Poland, the possibility of normalizing relations with the Russian Government, on the condition of recognizing its eastern border and the intention to give up the treasure seized in Moscow. During an exchange of views with Poland’s representative at the conference, Prince Radziwill, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov warned that Russia would demand a plebiscite in Bessarabia. A century later, a question remains, however, whether or not the Moscow conference was an occasion for a beginning of normalization of Russian-Romanian relations.

Fifty years of nuclear nonproliferation: results, problems, prospects

The article analyzes the preparation and conduct of the last six Review Conferences on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1995. At the same time, some historical aspects of the development of the NPT, the most important articles of this treaty are considered fi rst, and the merits of Soviet diplomacy in the formation of the most important provisions of this treaty are particularly noted. The Review Conferences of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2022 are considered sequentially. For each conference, a brief analysis is given of the international situation that had developed by the beginning of the conference, the positions of States on the eve and during the conferences, as well as what was achieved during each of them. Thus, according to the 1995 conference, it is concluded that this conference was of particular importance for the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NWFZ), since the unconditional achievement of the 1995 conference was the indefi nite extension of the NPT, although the fi nal document was not adopted at this conference. Considering the 2000 Review Conference, it is concluded that, despite all the contradictions between the participating countries of the conference, it ended successfully. The OK participants were able to adopt the fi nal document. The statement adopted at the conference was aimed at the practical implementation of the provisions of article VI of the NPT, which contained 13 practical steps for the implementation of this article. With regard to the 2005 OK, a conclusion is made about a signifi cant deterioration of the international situation on the eve of its holding. The analysis of the events that had a negative impact on compliance with the NPT and led to the emergence of new threats is carried out. Ultimately, it is concluded that the 2005 conference ended in failure because States failed to adopt the fi nal document. On the eve of the 2010 conference, a landmark event was the conclusion of the START III Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States. At the same time, new threats emerged from the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. As a result of the conference, no measures were taken to suspend the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK, but the participants of the OK managed to form the fi nal document of the conference, which was adopted unanimously. According to the 2015 conference, it is stated that it was considered unsuccessful, since the participants of this conference failed to agree and adopt an IT document. It is noted that the main reasons for this were acute contradictions between Russia and the United States, as well as the tense international situation against the background of the Ukrainian and Syrian military-political crises. According to the tenth Review Conference, which nevertheless took place in August 2022 after its postponement due to the coronavirus pandemic, it is concluded that it also ended in failure, since States could not agree and adopt the fi nal document at it. At the same time, the responsibility for the absence of a fi nal document at the tenth OK lies entirely with the United States and its allies, since the agenda of the NPT Review Conference was interrupted by the Ukrainian issue. In conclusion, the article summarizes some results of the state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime after 50 years of its existence. The forecast estimates of changes in the international situation in the fi eld of nuclear nonproliferation in the period between the last tenth Review Conference and the next one, which will be held in 2026, are given. At the same time, it is predicted that in the next fi ve years, the situation in the fi eld of international relations and nuclear nonproliferation is likely to only become more complicated.

Diplomacy in the Woods: Nature, Hunting, Masculinity, and Soviet Diplomacy under N.S. Khrushchev

Abstract Analyzing several documentary films and other sources through the lens of gender and feminist theory, this article explores the role of hunting and nature in Soviet diplomatic relationships. The article views diplomacy as a masculine space in which diplomatic negotiations relied on successful displays of toughness and the exhibition of prowess and agility. These skills were best demonstrated not in the official corridors of power but in settings imbued with symbolic meanings associated with masculinity, such as nature. The latter often served as a homosocial space where power was displayed and reconstituted through ritualistic performances of heroic masculinity. Such rituals as hunting sought to accomplish several goals. They promoted the male bonding that formed the basis of a preferred personal style of diplomacy and allowed Soviet apparatchiks to display marksmanship skills and a level of physical prowess that would present them to their foreign counterparts as potent leaders and desired allies. More importantly, as with other performative rituals of masculinity, Soviet diplomatic hunts produced and reproduced masculinity – and with it, power – and served strategically to assert or challenge international hierarchies, shape new and reaffirm faltering alliances, and demonstrate the agility and potency of the Soviet system to visiting state leaders.

Augustinas Voldemaras and Soviet-Lithuanian Relations in 1926-1929

The article analyzes the nuances of the changes in Soviet-Lithuanian relations after the coup d'etat staged in December 1926. The coming to power of the leaders of the Lithuanian Nationalist and Republican Union A. Smetona and A. Voldemaras initially contributed to the situation of uncertainty in bilateral relations. Moscow was extremely concerned about Voldemaras' desire to exacerbate the Polish-Soviet contradictions in order to solve the Vilnius problem in Polish-Lithuanian relations. The Soviet diplomats feared that Voldemaras could provoke an armed conflict with Poland and that the Soviet Union would inevitably be involved in the conflict. On the other hand, Soviet diplomacy was interested in maintaining both the independence of Lithuania and the maintenance of some tension between Poland and Lithuania, as this situation created obstacles to Poland’s spread of influence throughout the Baltic East. By the late 1920s, it became apparent to Moscow that dissatisfaction with Voldemaras’ policy in Lithuania had reached its climax and that Voldemaras was to be forced out of Lithuanian political life in the near future. As a result, a few months before Voldemaras’ resignation, the political leadership of the USSR categorically opposed contacts with him by the leadership of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

International Efforts to Establish the International Military Tribunal: The Role of Soviet Diplomacy

International Efforts to Establish the International Military Tribunal: The Role of Soviet Diplomacy

International Efforts to Establish the International Military Tribunal: The Role of Soviet Diplomacy

International Efforts to Establish the International Military Tribunal: The Role of Soviet Diplomacy

The USSR and the problem of Northern Epirus at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946

The article is devoted to the study of an important problem of the territorial affiliation of Northern Epirus at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 and the role of Soviet diplomacy in its solution. The interests of Greece, Albania, the USSR and the Western powers in this region, the military and political-diplomatic confrontation of Greece, on the one hand, Albania, on the other, as well as the influence of the factor of the Soviet state in resolving the issue of Northern Epirus are considered. The purpose of this article is to study the national-territorial claims of Greece to Northern Epirus, which were discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. Based on the review of documentary archival materials in the course of the study, the author of the article came to the conclusion that in the process of resolving the issue of the status of Northern Epirus, Greece failed. The evaluation of the results of the efforts of the USSR government to protect the territorial integrity of Albania is given. The active participation of the USSR was aimed at maintaining peace in the region. Comparing the positions of the parties, the author shows the course of the political struggle around the adoption of final decisions on the status of Northern Epirus. The methodological basis of the research is the principles of historicism and consistency, which involve the consideration of phenomena and facts in their entirety and development in accordance with the conditions of a particular historical epoch. The principle of objectivity is also used. The relevance of the research problem is explained by the need to ensure the territorial integrity of states and the normalization of ethnic relations in them. The scientific novelty of the study consists in the fact that, based on the involvement of archival documentary materials, an attempt was made to study the question of the status of Northern Epirus in 1946 in the context of the approval of territorial changes after World War II. In the scientific literature, this problem has not been specifically posed in such a perspective until now.

The Art of Negotiation and Resolution of the Berlin Question (R.V. Dolgilevich. Soviet Diplomacy on the Quadrilateral Negotiations on West Berlin (March 26, 1970 – September 3, 1971) / preface. and publ. R.V. Dolgilevich. Saint-Petersburg, 2021)

The Art of Negotiation and Resolution of the Berlin Question (R.V. Dolgilevich. Soviet Diplomacy on the Quadrilateral Negotiations on West Berlin (March 26, 1970 – September 3, 1971) / preface. and publ. R.V. Dolgilevich. Saint-Petersburg, 2021)

The Mission of Alexandra Kollontai in Mexico: from the Diplomacy of the Revolution to the Diplomacy of State Interests

For twenty-three years, Alexandra Kollontai served in Soviet diplomacy. In the long career of A. Kollontai, Mexico occupies a very short period — only half a year, the memory of her stay is preserved in her diplomatic diaries, correspondence and other documents. The purpose of this article is to study the circumstances that led to the appointment of Alexandra Kollontai as Ambassador to Mexico, to analyze the features of her mission and her relationship with the Mexican Communist Party. The author of the article also conducts a source analysis of her diplomatic diary and other documents, which reflect Kollontai's impressions of getting to know the country, its government and residents.

Soviet diplomacy in Norway and Sweden during the interwar period - the role of Alexandra Kollontai

Soviet diplomacy in Norway and Sweden during the interwar period - the role of Alexandra Kollontai

Rešenje pitanja Besarabije i promene na Balkanu 1940. godine

In 1918, Royal Romania launched an intervention against Soviet Russia, seizing Bessarabia. The Romanian troops were defeated and the Royal Government agreed to evacuate Bessarabia. This agreement was thwarted by the Austro-German offensive against Russia in 1918 and the outbreak of the Civil War. Soviet diplomacy never recognized the fact of occupation. In 1940, when the system of international agreements based on Franco-British dominance in Europe collapsed, the revision of the Versailles order in the Balkans began. The first step of this process was the return of Bessarabia to the USSR.

The Conflict between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Spain in the Lens of American and Soviet Diplomacy, the 1970s

The article analyzes the conflict between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) in the 1970s through the prism of Soviet-American relations during the era of Detente. Since the late 1960s, the Communist Party of Spain, headed by General Secretary S. Carrillo, began to distance itself from the CPSU, the leader of the International Communist Movement (ICM). In the conditions of the ongoing Cold War, the growing conflict between the parties meant the threat of a split within the ICM, which could not but attract the attention of the United States. The purpose of the article is to determine how the conflict between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Spain was perceived by American and Soviet state leaders, diplomats and the expert community during the 1970s, in order to establish how the assessments of this conflict in the United States and the USSR influenced the adjustment of the foreign policy strategies of these powers. The article examines the key stages of the development of relations between the leadership of the Soviet and Spanish Communist parties – "shadow" and public – as well as the perception of this conflict by Soviet and American diplomats, their assessments and reactions. The research is based on the sources of the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), available documents of the US State Department and the CIA.

Bolshevik intellectuals on the foreign policy front: the relationship between Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin and Plenipotentiary Adolf Joffe in 1918

After coming to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks began to form their own system of foreign policy decision-making, rejecting the traditions and standards of bourgeois diplomacy in the Decree on Peace, and refusing to use the personnel of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first trial of the new system, built on the principles of revolutionary Marxism, took place during the Brest negotiations and ended in defeat for Soviet Russia. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918 paved the way for the transition from war to peace between the two countries and, consequently, for the exchange of diplomatic representatives. The Soviet legation in Germany, headed by Joffe, was in fact the only 'window to Europe' for the Bolsheviks. Because of the lack of a fine-tuned foreign policy decision-making mechanism and the highly unstable communication between Moscow and Berlin, and because Joffe was not a professional diplomat, the activities of his plenipotentiary representation were determined by his prerevolutionary political experience and personal qualities. Rejecting the hierarchy of the old regime and making no secret of his own ambitions, Joffe came into continuous conflict with his immediate superior, the People' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, and this conflict continued until the Soviet plenipotentiary representative was expelled from Berlin in 1918. The author reconstructs the formation of key decisions in the sphere of Soviet-German relations at the end of the Great War on the basis of official correspondence between the People's Commissar and the Plenipotentiary, shows the role of human factor in the process and the mechanism of departmental and personal conflicts resolution, the core of which was the authority of Lenin. The author concludes that the process of shaping the Soviet foreign policy in 1918 was extremely rapid, generally in line with the pace of events, and developed by trial and error. The traditions and norms laid down in the first year of the work of the People's Commissariat largely influenced the subsequent history of Soviet diplomacy.

An Unusual Role: Soviet Diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang in 1968

The seizure of the USS Pueblo, an American intelligence ship, on 23 January 1968 triggered one of the most acute and dangerous international crises during the Cold War. The US government comprehensively studied the situation and concluded that a forceful response to the North Korean action was futile, and any action with the use of military force was fraught with the unpredictable escalation and internationalisation of the conflict. In addition, President Lyndon Johnson’s administration had the goal of saving the lives of internees from the ship. The solution to this problem acquired particular importance in connection with the upcoming presidential elections. Negotiations were chosen as a way to overcome the crisis, during which Washington repeatedly appealed to the Soviet government with requests for support in its difficult dialogue with the DPRK leadership. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, for his part, chose the tactic of delaying negotiations. Both sides were in contact with the USSR, as a result of which Soviet diplomacy had to, on the one hand, facilitate the return of American sailors to their homeland, and, on the other, maintain their image of the leader of the world socialist system, condemning US espionage actions near the shores of a state friendly to the USSR. The purpose of this article is to show Soviet diplomacy in the unusual role of a mediator in the dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, and to assess the significance of these efforts for resolving a conflict fraught with global consequences. It is concluded that the actions of Soviet diplomacy in the context of this crisis contributed to the relaxation of tensions in US-Soviet relations.

The Role of the Cyprus Issue in the Greek-Soviet Relations (1956-1960)

The article examines the role of the Cyprus issue in the bilateral relations between Greece and the USSR in 1956-1960. It is based on primal archival research realised at the Constantine Karamanlis Archive (AKK) and at the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE) in Athens. The analysis of the recently declassified documents relate to the events which took place in 1954, when the Soviet Union supported the Greek claims for self-determination of the Cypriot people in the United Nations on the basis of the anti-colonial principles. This contributed to the impressive increase in trade between Greece and the USSR, especially after the unofficial visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov to Athens in 1956. Against the backdrop of the deterioration of the international situation in 1957, Kremlin heavily criticized NATOs decision to deploy the US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe and applied diplomatic pressures to NATO member-states including Greece. The shift from tensions to a peaceful offensive strategy, characteristic of the Soviet diplomacy towards Greece, proved to be a double-edged sword for Moscow in the long term. The author concludes that both countries exploited the Cyprus issue for their benefit. Thus, Moscow managed to take advantage of the Greek discontent with the NATO allies as a means of increasing its own prestige in the region, while the Greek governments capitalized on the Soviet tactics in order to increase its political leverage in confronting NATO on Cyprus.

Features of diplomatic service by citizens of Ukraine

The article examines the peculiarities of diplomatic service by citizens of Ukraine. It was found that in Ukraine the reform of the diplomatic service took place in fragments with the declaration of independence, at the same time with the adoption in 2018 of the Law of Ukraine "On Diplomatic Service" completed an important stage of its Europeanization.
 It is established that a diplomatic service is a civil service that has a special nature and content which consists in the professional activities of officials of the diplomatic service to implement Ukraine's foreign policy, protect the national interests of our country in international relations, and the rights and interests of Ukrainian residents abroad. Despite the innovative approaches enshrined in the Law of Ukraine "On Diplomatic Service" in the scientific literature is often criticized the diplomatic service in Ukraine in view of the specific conditions of its formation in the post-Soviet period, the preservation of Soviet diplomacy, including linear governance, limited circulation information, as well as the low level of its protection.
 It was established that given the specifics of the diplomatic service, it was important at the legal level to establish special requirements for applicants for the position, namely: special and general requirements of professional competence, compliance with general requirements for all civil servants, compliance with special requirements (higher education). master's degree), the appropriate level of professional competence, according to the requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, knowledge of foreign languages to the extent necessary for the performance of official duties, etc.).
 It is substantiated that the diplomatic service is a special type of public service and is characterized by the relevant specifics and increased requirements for persons applying to hold the positions of diplomatic officials. The peculiarity of the diplomatic service is due to the special tasks facing it, including the implementation of Ukraine's foreign policy, protection of national interests of our country in the field of international relations, as well as the rights and interests of Ukrainian residents abroad. In this regard, the requirements for applicants for diplomatic posts are divided into two groups: general (requirements for all civil servants) and special (for professional competencies due to the tasks assigned to the diplomatic service).

Stories of the East in the Context of Artistic Ethnography by V. Mart of the Soviet Period

The relevance of the research is determined by the interest of modern literary criticism in the methodological paradigms of studying texts of artistic and ethnographic content in thematic, genre-stylistic, receptive aspects. The novelty lies in the source study, textual, genre-stylistic analysis of the unpublished collection Stories of the East by V. Mart. The research problem lies in the poetological reconstruction of the history of the creative failure of the opportunist literate writer in the Soviet literature at the beginning of the 1930s. The research methodology is based on genre-stylistic, structural-semantic analysis, source analysis of manuscript texts from the point of view of their ethnographic orientation. Based on the experience of research published in the USSR and works of artistic ethnography of the writer, the authors establish the typological features of the artistic strategy by V. Mart. Research methods: historical and literary, structural and semantic, source analysis, mythological reconstructions. The authors state that the unifying principle of V. Mart’s collection Stories of the East is his “old-fashioned” attitude. It turned out that V. Mart collected variations of previously published “oriental” stories and only a few completely new works (Indian, Japanese, Korean, Chinese themes) into a single artistic space. When creating them, he mainly used typological techniques used in previous publications of the Soviet period: the contamination of traditional mythological plots and revolutionary maxims, the transposition of foreign cultural realities into Russian reality, simplified linguistic, ethnocultural, mythological commentaries, etc. The authors of the article came to the conclusion that the collection was compiled in the early 1930s; at the same time, neither artistic flaws nor problems with the reliability of the ethnographic material became the reason for the rejection of the manuscript for publication. Factography in depicting revolutionary events in China and other countries of the late 1920s played the fatal role of anachronism in the early 1930s, when the situation in the Northeast and Southeast Asia changed dramatically. The ethnographic “true stories” of Mart put together became convincing “sabotage” evidence of the defeat of the revolutionary movement in the East and the strategic mistakes of Soviet diplomacy in the region.

소비에트 러시아 공공외교의 기원 : 1921~1922년 러시아 대기근과 소연방대외문화교류협회의 탄생

This paper examines the historical context in which the Bolshevik government established the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) in 1925. In so doing this paper traces the origin of Soviet public diplomacy. From the mid-1920s to the 1930s, Soviet diplomacy was led by three different organizations each with own aim and strategy—the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that focused on ensuring the newly-found socialist regime’s security and normalizing relations with foreign countries; Comintern which was devoted to spreading socialist revolutionary ideology globally; and lastly, VOKS that complemented the work of these organizations by constructing cultural ties with foreign intellectuals and workers organizations. Soviet Russia was thus one of the early pioneers who simultaneously pursued traditional ‘official diplomacy’ with what could be described as ‘public diplomacy.’ The origin of Soviet public diplomacy however dates back to the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution to 1921-1922 when a devastating famine that struck the Southern part of Russia put pressure on the Bolshevik state to learn to engage with the foreign public. This paper first explores collaboration between the All-Russian Central Commission for Famine Relief and the Workers International Relief, a Berlin-based NGO created by the Comintern, to show how Soviet overseas propaganda emerged from the organizations’ collaborative efforts to win the hearts of the foreign public and to encourage active participation in relief work. Then the paper explores Russia’s diplomatic successes from the 1922 Berlin Russian Art Exhibition, the first-ever international exhibition of Soviet art co-organized by the Bolshevik government and the Workers International Relief. In the conclusion, the paper demonstrates how the two organizations’ collaborative efforts during the 1921-1922 Russian Famine built the foundation for Soviet cultural diplomacy and the creation of VOKS.

Problems of the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1920 and the Riga Treaty in reflection of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo minutes of meetings

The role of the problems of the Polish-Soviet war and the Riga Treaty in the activities of the Politburo of the RCP(b) Central Committee is revealed. It is established that in 1919 this problem occupied an insignificant place in the work of the Politburo, the Polish-Soviet confrontation was given a secondary role against the background of the struggle of the Bolsheviks with the White Movement. The protocols of the Politburo of 1920 reflect the growing importance of the Polish front for Soviet Russia. But even in these circumstances, the issues of the Polish-Soviet war did not become dominant in the activities of the Politburo. It paid the greatest attention to the issues of propaganda work and the preparation and progress of peace negotiations with Poland in the summer and autumn of 1920. The materials of the Politburo meetings confirm that it was this party body that made decisions on key issues of Polish-Soviet relations, which were then implemented by Soviet diplomacy. The Belarusian question during the Polish-Soviet war was considered by the Politburo very rarely and only in the context of Soviet Russia’s achievement of its foreign policy goals.