Soviet Aggression Research Articles

American Interest in India Under Carter and Reagan

AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA UNDER CARTER AND REAGAN Thomas Perry Thornton he death of Indira Gandhi resulted from India's internal problems and its implications will be felt most heavily inside India. The foreign policy orientation ofthe new leadership in Delhi is at best ill-defined, and certainly Rajiv Gandhi's main preoccupation over the next months will be his country's domestic problems. But major events such as leadership changes are matters of great concern elsewhere, for India has a significant role to play on the international scene. For nearly two decades Indira Gandhi was the architect and engineer of her country's foreign policy. Following her death, speculation about Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy views has been widespread but necessarily ill-informed since his views are unknown, and perhaps even unformed; we also do not know where he will look for advice. There may be sharp changes ahead, but it is useful to look first to the past as a guide to the coming period of uncertainty. In the past eight years there have been two leadership changes in both India and the United States, and each of these promised much sharper policy changes than seem probable in the transition from Indira Gandhi to her son. There could hardly be two more different settings for the relationship between the United States and India than were presented in 1977 Mr. Thornton is adjunct professor of Asian studies at SAIS. He has dealt with South Asia in the U.S. Department of State and was a senior staff member of the National Security Council during the Carter administration. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of any element of the United States government. 179 180 SAIS REVIEW and 1981. In the former case, Jimmy Carter was the newly elected president of the United States, committed to a more forthcoming policy toward the Third World and an approach that downplayed the importance of the Soviet Union. Carter and his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski would also elaborate a policy of cultivating regionally influential countries as a means of devolving some of the United States' excessive responsibilities that had been assumed during the postwar decades. India, for its part, was soon to hold a general election that would punish Indira Gandhi for the sins of the Emergency and bring Morarji Desai to power, a man known to be well-disposed toward the United States and committed to a greater balance in Indian foreign policy. Certainly, the new leaders were seen as an immense change for the better over their immediate predecessors in terms of the Indo-U.S. relationship. To cap it all, Carter was the first president who had any sort of personal tie to India; his mother had served in the Peace Corps in suburban Bombay a decade earlier. In 1981 the situation was dramatically reversed. The Indian government had passed once again into the hands of Indira Gandhi, who was deeply suspicious of the United States. The new American president showed little interest in the Third World generally and India specifically. His foreign policy posture was focused on the U.S.-Soviet relationship and on the need to build up American positions of strength from which to counter Soviet aggression. Reagan's interest in international economic issues, especially as they would affect developing countries, was not very great. The administration was believed to have strong pro-Pakistani sentiments, in contrast to the Carter administration, where feeling had been distinctly cool toward Pakistan on grounds of human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. Even more important than the personal and national political equations was the state of global politics. The Carter and Desai teams came to power in the glowing Indian summer of détente. Angola was barely a cloud on the South Asian horizon, and in other respects the bipolar relationship seemed conducive to cooperation between the United States and India and unlikely to put demands on either side that would tend to strain the relationship. In early 1981, however, the global situation was notably unfavorable. "Détente" had long since passed from the vocabulary of world leaders, and the Soviet Union was...

Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress and made one of the most momentous addresses of the postwar era. Requesting $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, he emphasized that a fateful hour had arrived and that nations had to choose between alternative ways of life. The United States, Truman insisted, had to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Greece, of course, was then beleaguered by civil war. Turkey, while enjoying remarkable internal stability, supposedly was subject to pressure from the Soviet Union, a constant war of nerves, and the prospect of outright Soviet aggression. Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson warned that if the United States did not act, three continents could fall prey to Soviet domination. 1 The international situation, of course, was far more complex than that described by Truman or Acheson. The president and his closest advisers simplified international realities in order to generate public support for unprecedented peacetime foreign-policy initiatives.2 Many scholars have demonstrated that the Greek civil war did not fall neatly into the category of Soviet aggression-American response. Developments in Turkey, however, have received far less attention.3

The Perils of Intervention

It is a truth, if not universally acknowledged at least widely accepted, that the United States Government would like its Third World allies and client states to be stable, progressive, democratic, and domestically popular. While the U.S. feels it must protect these allies and clients from direct Soviet aggression, ideally they would manage their internal problems themselves.Unfortunately, the ideal is the exception in the Third World. Many of America's allies and clients face a disloyal opposition at home, and often one that seeks or attracts assistance from the Soviet Union or its surrogates. With few exceptions, these governments are neither democratic nor want to be: For every Costa Rica there is an El Salvador or a Guatemala; for every Singapore there is a South Korea or a Philippines.

France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe

A widespread policy prescription among defense experts of the Atlantic Alliance is the strengthening of conventional forces to reduce dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet aggression. Dr. Yost examines the critical role France could play in establishing a more powerful conventional deterrent for the West and discusse

Afghanistan, Poland and Peaceful Coexistence

Abstract The recent Afghan crisis has jolted the Western world. Many in the West fear an irreversible Soviet turn away from peaceful coexistence and toward expansionism in which Angola and Ethiopia were the logical prelude to actions of direct annexation. Several observers have emphasized growing Soviet difficulty with oil supplies, which could become serious by 1985. It is difficult to determine the extent of bad faith in this obsession with Soviet aggression, but it is clear that it is a patent case of what Fromm called “political double think,” where the adversary's behavior appears aggressive, although the same behavior on the part of the West appears logical and natural.

THE IMAGE OF NATO AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

"Isolation" and "Isolationism" are two words which had shaped American Foreign policy until the beginning of the 19. century. American isolation such as it was, had died about the turn of the century, where as American isolationism has been in decliııe ever since. It has been in decline promoted by the strategic realities of the shrinking world in which Americans live. The system of alliances began simply as a means of formalizing the concept of solidarity of American States. This concept was developed during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1932-1945). But the means used for restating the policy of Western Hemisphere solidarity provided the framework for the new policy. Early in the Cold War and very shortly after the United States actively entered the European arena, the basic strategic ingredient in the European situation was the danger of Soviet aggression. Washington soon reached a correspondingly basic decission that the defence of the West was to be based on a 'forward strategy'. This meant the line NATO would defend against a Soviet assault would be in the zone of initial contact —along the Iron Curtain and the Elbe River— rather than along the Rhine after giving up almost ali central Europe to Soviet forces. This decision carried important and far-reaching implications for future doctrine and policy.(***)

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe

The deterrence of Soviet aggression in Europe has been a cornerstone of American policy for thirty years. It was undoubtedly World War II and specifically the reality of Soviet troops as far west as the Elbe that created the peculiar mind set in American foreign-policy makers that envisions the Russians straining desperately at the leash waiting for the opportune time to continue the conquest of Europe. In this view, only the stalwart forward defenses of NATO coupled with the ever-alert SAC have prevented the powerful bear from crashing through to the English Channel and possibly beyond. Given such a heavy burden for NATO it is no wonder American policy makers become glassy eyed as the alliance proves unable, throughout twenty-eight years, to bring its forces and its doctrines into some kind of congruence that would make sense to the world, or at least to ourselves. In vain have we struggled through all those years to provide the right mix of technology, manpower, and doctrine to make NATO rational.' This article argues that of all the frantic and

Rejoinder to Piers

Ploughman highlights three important points. (X) The argument that Eastern Europe is different from other areas of the world is central to my thesis; if that argument falls, so does the overall thesis. The case for the distinctiveness of Eastern Europe is made in the article, and the reader must decide whether or not to accept it. (2) Ploughman suggests that the United States must be opposed to Soviet control of Eastern Europe because it seized control in the past by conquest or stealth and that other position would be regarded as clear notice that an attempted replay-in Africa, the Far East, or elsewhere-would not be effectively opposed. American national interest does not require opposition to any Soviet aggression ipso facto, unless it threatens the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, or social unity of the United States. Ploughman makes no effort to suggest that they are threatened by Soviet control of Eastern Europe; this is rather like a Soviet leader arguing that since the United States was allowed to invade the Dominican Republic without Soviet opposition it will go on to invade Czechoslovakia. Nor is the notion of dominoes finally falling throughout the world twenty-five years after the Soviet takeover persuasive. Obviously there are links between American action in one part of the world and Soviet expectations in another, but they are much more complex than this simplistic formulation. (3) My argument assumes that Soviet control of Eastern Europe is likely to continue for the forseeable future. No doubt all empires have collapsed in the past; so have all alliances and indeed most governments, but that does not mean that we should not attempt to maintain NATO or the American political system. Solid evidence that Eastern European resentment is so great as to seriously undermine Soviet control in the forseeable future would undercut my argument. I could find no such persuasive evidence, and I gather that Ploughman could not either.

Were we at the state of war with the Soviets?!

At the time of the agreement with the German Third Reich on Soviet aggression on Poland on September 17, 1939, the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Moscow was given a diplomatic note declaring that in the face of the "break-up of the Polish state", the USSR "is defending the Belarusian and Ukrainian population" in eastern Poland. This deceptive version was naively accepted by Poland’s Western Allies, who pretended that Moscow was not hostile against Poland. They explained that they did not want to enhance, but rather to overthrow the German-Soviet alliance. The highest authorities of the Republic of Poland were charged with inconsistence and did not declare a state of war between Poland and the USSR as of September 17, 1939. This was a game of slander and the author documented the will of the parties to bring such charges. In the period of the Polish People's Republic, the myth of so-called justified Soviet intervention in 1939 was perpetuated. Today, too, this issue remains not entirely clear for many politicians, historians and journalists. This text analyses the formation of this myth, showing its political ground for various propaganda and proclamations of Western states, and ambiguous attitudes of Polish politicians, especially focused on the very naïve and politically dependent General Sikorski, the Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister, with greater responsibility than the ruling party of the Second Polish Republic for the false opinions about Polish-Soviet relations in September 1939.

Military Assistance for Pakistan

On November 1, 1953 the Karachi correspondent of the New York Times filed a dispatch reporting that discussions of a military alliance between Pakistan and the United States were about to begin. On February 25,1954 President Eisenhower announced that the United States had decided to give military assistance to Pakistan for the purpose of “strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Middle East.” With the President's statement a new and powerful force entered the international politics of South Asia and another landmark of American foreign policy was set up. In the four months which intervened between the newspaper report and the official announcement, most of the important trends and issues in contemporary world politics had touched on or been touched by the U. S.-Pakistan proposal. Internal and external affairs of a dozen countries were affected. Most of the instruments of diplomacy and propaganda were employed to support or oppose agreement. Of primary importance to the United States was the clear and specific implementation of our established policy of supporting regional alliances of free nations to “contain” Soviet aggression and to prevent further expansion. Because of the novelty of the area into which the policy was extended, the speed with which it was implemented, and the precision of the reactions of all parties, American military assistance for Pakistan constitutes an almost ideal case study of international relations in a world in which the movement of events has been greatly accelerated.

On "Soviet Aggression"

Great nations rarely reverse their fundamental historical course overnight. Yet today a constant and well-organized propaganda in the United States and western Europe asks us to believe the farfetched story that the Soviet Union, having vigorously sought international peace for the first thirty years of its existence, has become all at once a nation bent on aggression and plotting the military conquest of other countries.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Cry Halt: U.S. Policy in Korea

We are moving into a new period of American foreign policy. Up to now everything that has been done has been done in the name of defense against the alleged threat of Soviet aggression. This was true of the Truman Doctrine. It was true of the Berlin airlift. It was true of the North Atlantic Pact. It was true of the intervention in Korea. It was true of the Japanese peace treaty. It was true of the alliance with Franco Spain.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The Rape of Poland: The Pattern of Soviet Aggression

The Rape of Poland: The Pattern of Soviet Aggression

The Atlantic Pact: China and Socialism

Recent weeks have witnessed two developments of world-historical importance: the conclusion of the so-called Atlantic Pact and the opening of the final phase of China's long-drawn-out civil war. The Atlantic Pact is ostensibly aimed to prevent aggression against the signatory powers. This, however, is nonsense which will fool only the naive and the gullible. Despite much alarmist talk about the threat of Soviet aggression, not a shred of supporting evidence has been produced. This can only be because none exists.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.