On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress and made one of the most momentous addresses of the postwar era. Requesting $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, he emphasized that a fateful hour had arrived and that nations had to choose between alternative ways of life. The United States, Truman insisted, had to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Greece, of course, was then beleaguered by civil war. Turkey, while enjoying remarkable internal stability, supposedly was subject to pressure from the Soviet Union, a constant war of nerves, and the prospect of outright Soviet aggression. Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson warned that if the United States did not act, three continents could fall prey to Soviet domination. 1 The international situation, of course, was far more complex than that described by Truman or Acheson. The president and his closest advisers simplified international realities in order to generate public support for unprecedented peacetime foreign-policy initiatives.2 Many scholars have demonstrated that the Greek civil war did not fall neatly into the category of Soviet aggression-American response. Developments in Turkey, however, have received far less attention.3