Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe

Abstract

The deterrence of Soviet aggression in Europe has been a cornerstone of American policy for thirty years. It was undoubtedly World War II and specifically the reality of Soviet troops as far west as the Elbe that created the peculiar mind set in American foreign-policy makers that envisions the Russians straining desperately at the leash waiting for the opportune time to continue the conquest of Europe. In this view, only the stalwart forward defenses of NATO coupled with the ever-alert SAC have prevented the powerful bear from crashing through to the English Channel and possibly beyond. Given such a heavy burden for NATO it is no wonder American policy makers become glassy eyed as the alliance proves unable, throughout twenty-eight years, to bring its forces and its doctrines into some kind of congruence that would make sense to the world, or at least to ourselves. In vain have we struggled through all those years to provide the right mix of technology, manpower, and doctrine to make NATO rational.' This article argues that of all the frantic and