Southern African Development Coordination Conference Research Articles

Recommendations: Southern African Development Coordination Conference and African Security

<i>Recommendations</i>: Southern African Development Coordination Conference and African Security

SADCC: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SADCC: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference

Zambia and the Liberation of South Africa

The nine member-states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.) – Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland – are notable for their collective weakness relative to South Africa, and their very wide economic and political heterogeneity.1Only four, or at most five, have economies whose annual G.D.P. exceeds $2,000 million: two of these, Angola and Mozambique, are under more or less constant attack from South Africa or its surrogate forces, while Tanzania is actually the most remote, physically and economically. At the same time, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho – who are not in the so-called ‘Frontline’, unlike the other six – have rather close political relations with Pretoria, Malawi most substantively since as early as 1966 and Swaziland since 1982.2Botswana is more independent politically, with a modest G.D.P. and very small population.

Resource-Sharing and Self-Reliance in Southern Africa

The main objective of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is to achieve regional self-reliance through cooperation, but this cannot be achieved without proper information management. The SADCC countries are too dependent on ready-made solutions provided by foreign advisers. There is a considerable amount of information available in the SADCC region, but the absence of national documentation services, and of a national union catalogue, undermines the establishment of intra-regional resource-sharing facilities. Networking will facilitate both accessibility and availability of the region's resources to a wider community. Examines the advantages to the SADCC countries of the networking idea and progress in regional information networks such as SADIS (Southern African Documentation and Information System).

African Regional Organizations. Edited by Domenico Mazzeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. ix, 265p. $42.50).

List of tables, figures and map List of contributors 1. Introduction: the regional trend Domenico Mazzeo 2. The UN and political cooperation in Africa Leon Gordenker 3. The Economic Commission for Africa Isebill V. Gruhn 4. The Organization of African Unity K. Matthews 5. The African Development Bank and the African Development Fund Francis Wodie 6. OCAM: one scene in the drama of West African development R. A. Fredland 7. Competition, conflict and decline in the Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) Lynn Krieger Mytelka 8. The experience of the East African Community: implications for the theory and practice of regional cooperation in Africa Domenico Mazzeo 9. ECOWAS, the EEC and the Lome Convention S. K. B. Asante 10. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and regional cooperation in southern Africa Peter Meyns 11. Conclusion: problems and prospects of intra-African cooperation Domenico Mazzeo Bibliography List of abbreviations Index.

The Effect on the Countries of SADCC of Economic Sanctions against the Republic of South Africa

The principle concern of the present study is to examine how the member states of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) would be affected by an external trade boycott imposed against South Africa. Focus is concentrated upon the level of economic interdependence within southern Africa through an analysis of trading transactions, the export of migrant workers and the communications network. Pretoria's economic and military superiority within southern Africa has resulted in a geography of dependence on South Africa. The level of dependence on South Africa is spatially varied throughout the region and is of crucial significance in assessing how sanctions against South Africa will affect SADCC member states.

Regional economic policy under crisis conditions: the case of agriculture within SADCC

With the international economic crisis, the drought, and food production crisis in Africa, all of the economic indicators show a negative growth and a decrease in the quality of life of most African peoples. After two and one-half 'development decades' of the United Nations, the international community and the individual states have clearly failed in their goal. From the 'capitalist' model of development (Ivory Coast, Kenya) to the 'socialist' model (Ethiopia, Mozambique), the economies are in crisis. 'National' development no longer seems possible. Further, individual states find the colonial legacy of underdevelopment too difficult to transform in a period of international economic crisis. Even countries like Angola and Mozambique, who won national revolutions and began social revolutions to transform production relations, have found the inherited economic linkages an inimical barrier to development. Born in the struggle for political independence of Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) brings together nine economies in the region (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) to address problems of their colonial legacy of underdevelopment, their vulnerability to present economic crises, and their dependence on the South African apartheid economy. This paper analyses the ability of SADCC, as an innovative model for regional cooperation, to coordinate their policies and set priorities for regional development. The first section briefly reviews the international economic crisis of capitalism and discusses the negative impact on developing countries of 'solutions' tried by the advanced capitalist states. The second section analyses the diversity of the SADCC nine, resulting from their different historical positions in the regional Southern African economy, for the contradictions among the nine are important obstacles to regional coordination. Finally, the study investigates SADCC planning in agriculture, coordinated by Zimbabwe. As a priority of SADCC, agriculture is the first productive sector that SADCC is trying to coordinate. There are some real successes for SADCC, ones which point to the idea that regional coordination may alleviate somewhat the long-term international economic

SADCC, SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA

THIS ONE-DAY CONFERENCE on 18 April 1986 at the University of Birmingham, jointly sponsored by the Royal African Society and the Department of Extra-Mural Studies, Birmingham, brought together 57 participants drawn from public life, business, the academic world, journalism and the diplomatic service to discuss current problems and future prospects for relations between South Africa and her neighbours in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. The special focus was on the possible impact of sanctions on the states. The conference was opened by Douglas Rimmer, Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Royal African Society. He thanked Ian and Willie Henderson for their initiative in calling the conference, and urged that the meetings should be used not to provide an outlet for the passions which South African affairs provoke, but to examine objectively the oppositions of ideologies, economic interests and political forces in the region. He called for reali-sm in a spirit of free enquiry and rational debate. The day was divided into four sessions, the first of which provided a historical perspective to the formation of SADCC in 1980. Ian Henderson's paper reviewed South Africa's relations with the region from 1910 to 1975, reminding participants that Smuts's objectives in seeking afronding (rounding-off) of the Union's frontiers in the years after 1910 by the incorporation of the High Commission Territories were similar to the goals of detente in the 1970s: to structure the politics and the economies of southern Africa so that the Union/Republic defined development ob jectives for her neighbours in the interests of white South Africa. In one sense, South Africa's regional diplomacy in the 20th century was highly unsuccessful, Namibia being the only addition to the frontiers of 1910. But in a more important sense, South Africa's 'informal empire' in the region expanded in a silent but effective process about which little has been written. Responding to the theme that South Africa had failed by diplomacy to achieve direct political control over the hinterland, Willie Henderson looked at the origins of SADCC, not so much as a set of written agreements produced by the front-line states at the height of the war in Rhodesia but as a search for effective regional diplomatic alliances pre-dating the front-line brotherhood. Seretse Khama's key role in picking up and developing the

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation

Southern Africa has become a battleground between two ideologically and fundamentally opposed constellation of states, Pretoria and Lusaka constellations. The conflict between the two basically concerns the domestic racial policies and the future of South Africa. The Pretoria constellation was launched on July 22, 1980, and is led by P. W. Botha, the South Africa's Prime Minister. The Botha's axis is a designed strategy which essentially aims at using South Africa's economic power and wealth to manipulate its neighboring nine black ruled states; and to exert subtle pressure to ensure that they cohere with the white minority regime of South Africa. This ambition of the Pretoria constellation is a vital part of the total strategy of survival of the Botha government. This particularly involves the use of the economy as an instrument of maintaining ultimate political power and control based on the maintenance of the basic structures of apartheid. This has in turn motivated South Africa's opposition to the policies of economic and political liberation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states. The second, the Lusaka constellation and also known as the “Southern Nine” was launched on April 1, 1980. It consists of the nine Southern African States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The declared aim of the Southern Nine is to form an alliance which would pursue an economic strategy that would reduce or eliminate their economic dependence on South Africa. To this end, the Southern Nine and the South African-occupied territory of Namibia unanimously adopted a Programme of Action aimed at stimulating inter-state trade with the ultimate objective of economic independence from South Africa.

A Subsystemic Analysis of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference

The overriding structural and political characteristic of the Southern African subsystem has been the dominance of the Republic of South Africa.1 Indeed, South Africa's ties to the subordinate states of the region have given the subsystem form and substance. An economic Gulliver among Lilliputians, South Africa created a network of trade dependencies, investment flows, labor migration patterns, and infrastructural ties (railways, roads, etc.) which bound the countries of the area together and which secured South Africa's pivotal position within the region. Before the successful wars of national liberation in the 1970s, South Africa had close political connections with the white regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia as well as with a black-ruled state, H. K. Banda's Malawi. As a military force, South Africa was without parallel, and the other white-ruled states formed a buffer against the hostile black states to the north. Thus, it was South Africa which both held the subsystem together and benefited from its existence. Much has changed in Southern Africa since the early 1970s. Angola and Mozambique gained their independence from Portugal. Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. These political changes in turn destroyed the buffer zone which had once afforded South Africa protection from the independent African states. Emboldened by the success of such national liberation efforts, blacks within South Africa escalated the tempo of their agitation for change in the structures of apartheid. All of these changes notwithstanding, until recently little had happened to challenge seriously the predominant position of South Africa within the subsystem of Southern Africa. Most of the political and all of the economic ties which gave South Africa leverage over its black neighbors remained intact. However, as George Modelski (1961: 150) observed, regional subsystems are the result of power relationships and regional integration efforts and is nothing necessarily natural, inevitable, or permanent about them. When the southern nine black states formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, they were hoping that there was nothing inevitable about regional economic and political patterns and set about to create an alternate subsystem in Southern Africa. SADCC had its origin in the loose

Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

Regional Cooperation for Development: A Review and Critique of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is a coalition of nine southern African nations united by a common desire both to reduce dependence on South Africa and to promote regional development. What follows is a review and critique of this recently created entity. Following a general introduction, the origin and history of the SADCC are discussed. Next, the criteria considered critical for the success of regional integration by integration theorists is presented, and the SADCC is analyzed in light of these criteria. However, because of the unconventional nature of the SADCC, the author argues that the criteria for success presented by regional integration theorists is not appropriate for an evaluation of the SADCC. Indeed, it is the primary thesis of this article that it is the unconventional nature of the SADCC—including, but not limited to its practice of avoiding supranational institutions, its flexible nature, its low-profile integrative goals, and the effects of continued minority rule in South Africa—which require that different criteria be developed for an evaluation. It is the pragmatic approach of the SADCC which accounts for its success to date, a pragmatism which will provide the key to the organization's longevity.

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: Co-operation or Conflict?

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.) was established in 1979 to eliminate the economic dependence of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe upon the Republic of South Africa, and to create regional self-reliance –that is, economic development and regional co-operation. To attain these goals, S.A.D.C.C. seeks financial and technical assistance from all possible public and private sources, inculding international commercial banks and industrial corporations.

Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe

Given a continuation of current trends, with increasing population growth and declining food production, Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) which could nearly feed itself during 1979–81, will be only 64 per cent self-sufficient by the turn of the century. Zimbabwe has a particularly important rôle to play in trying to prevent such a disaster. It is by far the most important exporter of food and cash crops in the region, and has been allocated the task of co-ordinating a food-security strategy for the nine member-states of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

SADCC AFTER NKOMATI

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 by the nine black states in the regionthe six Frontline States (Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Angola) plus Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho-with a view to progressively reducing their inherited economic dependence on and their mounting military vulnerability to their powerful and menacing neighbour, South Africa. In its first four years of existence, SADCC showed encouraging evidence of modest but steady progress in achieving its long-term objectives. Faced with these signs of success, South Africa has countered with a calculated campaign of economic and military destabilization which, combined with the crippling drought, global recession, and some deficiencies in domestic policy, proved devastating. In March 1984, President Samora Machel of Mozambique-in many ways, the key country in SADCC-finally felt compelled to sue for peace. The resulting Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness, signed at a border ceremony amid a blaze of publicity, formally bound South Africa as well as Mozambique to a mutual commitment to 'refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.' In practice, however, the pact represented a Pretoria diktat, especially when viewed in the light of the subsequent Pretoria Declaration of October 1984. Similarly unequal treaties have been concluded with Angola the Lusaka agreement of February 1984and, secretly two years earlier, with Swaziland. Predictably, South Africa has, in each case, found some excuse for failing to implement the agreed terms fully. At the same time, Pretoria has pressured Botswana and especially Lesotho, to acknowledge its unchallenged regional hegemony as the 'dominant power' on the subcontinent. Both are resisting fiercely and, so far, with some success, though the odds are unequal. Ironically, South Africa has christened its crude exercise in coercive diplomacy the 'peace process'.

Mining in the SADCC

Abstract This paper concerns mining in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in the context of the present world crisis. As such it concentrates on the bulk of mineral–metal extraction in the region which is for export onto the world market, primarily to the industrialized, OECD countries. The potentially important area of intra-regional mineral–metal trade is not considered.

Dependence and collective self‐reliance in southern Africa: The case of the southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Arne Tostensen. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Research Report No. 62, 1982, 170 pp

Dependence and collective self‐reliance in southern Africa: The case of the southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Arne Tostensen. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Research Report No. 62, 1982, 170 pp

The Southern African Pleasure Periphery, 1966–83

Both Lesotho and Swaziland possess a well-developed rhetoric advocating disengagement from South Africa, exemplified most recently in their joint commitment to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. Nevertheless, both countries remain firmly fastened to their dominant neighbour and committed to development strategies which tend to perpetuate such ties. The implications of continued social and economic domination by South Africa have not been lost on analysts of these two small, nominally independent Southern African states.

Economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA

Two of the most significant regional organizations to emerge in Southern Africa in recent years are the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with nine members, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), comprised of fourteen states including five SADCC members. Although their purposes and programs are similar and steadily converging, SADCC and PTA exhibit distinct differences in their origins, memberships, institutional structures, financial patrons, ideologies, and strategies. Although national development remains the ultimate aim of both bodies, reducing external dependency, especially in the case of SADCC on South Africa, and regional cooperation are seen as essential to success. While obvious areas of conflict exist, the two organizations may be able to restrain their rivalry in the interests of their members and possibly of their own survival.

Foreign Aid to SADCC: An Analysis of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy

During the past decade, American foreign policy interests in Southern Africa have steadily increased. In 1974, the collapse of the Portuguese government led to independence for Mozambique and Angola. More recently the Zimbabwean and Namibian liberation struggles have occupied center stage. International attention to South African events has also increased while Western concerns about Soviet influence in the region have intensified. Policy-makers in the United States have not remained immune to these changes. In fact, while American interests in the region have not really changed, they have increased because of the foregoing events and the way they are perceived by American policy makers.1 In April 1980, all the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, and formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. Their purpose was to create a regional organization fundamentally opposed to the South African regime while designed to coordinate development activities which individual members could not undertake. At SADCC's first major international donors' conference in November 1980, the outgoing Carter administration pledged $25 million for regional projects during the coming fiscal year (FY 1982). The Reagan administration's policy has been muted. Although it participated actively at the Zimbabwe donor conference (Zimcord) in March 1981, most aid to the region is still channeled on a bilateral basis. And while Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker has insisted on not "choosing between black and white,"2 the very essence of SADCC is to insist that such a choice must be made. The choice to be made, however, is not between black and white as Crocker has asserted, but between South African repression and liberation as represented by SADCC. In the administration's major policy statements on Africa, SADCC is barely alluded to. Only in the context of private sector support is SADCC referred to-not public aid for large regional projects, which is SADCC's major purpose.3 It is this apparent lack of understanding and interest in SADCC by the administration which is the focus of this essay. Before turning to an analysis of the administration's foreign aid policy toward the region, I describe SADCC as a regional organization with concrete motives and place its views within the context of currently accepted practice in international development. In the last section I compare the administration's foreign aid policy toward the region with its announced policy. Finding the administration's aid policy