South China Sea Dispute Research Articles

Analysis Of Settlement Of South China Sea Disputes By The International Arbitration Agency

The presence of the principle of Non-Refoulement as an instrument in international law requires every country to provide protection for refugees or asylum seekers. However, during the Covid-19 pandemic, there are so many countries that have banned or refused refugees to enter their country in order to prevent the spread of Covid-19. The purpose of this study is to see how the Non-Refoulement principle exists as the customary of international law, and how the Non-Refoulement principle exists as a basis for protection for refugees in Indonesia. The results of the research show that there are problems related to the rights of refugees in Indonesia. However, it can be concluded that Indonesia has consistently applied this principle, for example when dealing with the exodus of Vietnamese refugees.

Equi-Balancing’ Foreign Policy of The Philippines Toward China: The Implementation Of The Philippines’ Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy To China In The South China Sea Dispute

This article explicates the implementation of “Equi-Balancing” foreign policy of the Philippines toward China in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. It argues that in order to protects its core national interests, Philippines should be able to manage its constructive relations with China. In order to do so, Philippines under the Rodrigo Duterte administration formulated and implemented cooperative maritime diplomacy to China. The main objectives of this cooperative maritime diplomacy were creating a closer the Philippines-China relations and on the hand, making some diplomatic distance to the United States in the SCS issue. This article utilises qualitative research method in deciphering the above cooperative maritime diplomacy. To achieve these goals, the Philippines has conducted several concrete actions by building: its sofpower, self confidence and coalition.

COVID-19 and American Attitudes toward U.S.-China Disputes.

The COVID-19 outbreak has fueled tension between the U.S. and China. Existing literature in international relations rarely focuses on virus outbreaks as factors affecting international relations between superpower countries, nor does research examine an outbreak’s potential influence on the public’s opinion about their country’s foreign policy. To bridge this research gap, this study explores the extent to which the American public may be prone to favor policies that “punish” China via existing U.S.-China disputes, such as the South China Sea dispute and the U.S.-China trade war. I conducted an online survey using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and ran multinomial and ordered logit models to estimate the association between an individual’s preferred policies and the country or government an individual blame for the impact of the pandemic. After controlling several essential confounding factors, such as one’s levels of nationalism and hawkishness, I found strong evidence that there is a positive association between people’s attribution of blame to the Chinese government and the likelihood of supporting aggressive policy options in the two disputes with China. That is to say, U.S. citizens who believe that the Chinese government is solely culpable for the outbreak in the U.S., compared to those who think otherwise, are more likely to support hawkish policy options, such as confrontational military actions, economic sanctions, or higher tariff rates. The research provides a glimpse into where Americans may stand in these disputes with China and the potential development of U.S.-China relations in the post-pandemic era.

Japan’s South China Sea Policy and Regional Subcomplex Expansion: Toward Free and Open Indo-Pacific

This research aims to investigate Japan’s motivation to be involved in the South China Sea dispute despite Japan’s far distance from the conflicted area. Utilizing the qualitative research method, this research analyzes Japanese Government official documents and relevant literature to achieve the research objective. The research discovers that Japan’s main interest in the South China Sea is to articulate a safer maritime lane for the sake of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda by balancing China’s assertiveness in the region. Employing a regional security complex framework, this research sees that Japan, by its presence in the South China Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the perception of China as a threat to Southeast Asian countries. The South China Sea involvement will fortify Japan’s security interlink with Southeast Asian counterparts, balancing China’s expansive trait in the maritime zone, accelerating Tokyo-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

Achieving Consensus in the South China Sea: Explaining Bilateralism's Bane and Multilateralism's Boon

A prolonged debate arises whether bilateralism or multilateralism is the most effective path to achieve mutual consensus among parties in the South China Sea dispute. This study identifies bilateral approach negativity to settle such a complex and overlapping dispute existed in that area grounded by two considerations. First, bilateralism is a non-transparent scheme of bargaining process. Due to bilateral implementation only conducted by two states, the more powerful actor will escape from the scrutiny of others, thus making it possesses the opportunity to put forward discriminatory bid and robust sphere to suppress other party’s stance. The bilateral approach would result in a non-consensus agreement for less powerful parties. Second, the conflictual area draws the involvement of more than three sovereign parties with overlapping claims. Multilateralism, negotiation framework for multi-parties, is the most, perhaps the only, promising path to ease the existing tension numerous parties into the stage of consensus. Moreover, multilateralism may present positive norms – transparency and non-unilateralism – that could guide the involving parties to create consensus. The analysis of this paper obtained from utilization of qualitative data, library research methods, and by the comprehension of three conceptual frameworks, bilateralism, multilateralism, and consensus.

China’s Diplomacy: Towards ASEAN Way Norms in the South China Sea

Summary China’s approach to the norms of appropriate behaviour among states is being scrutinised by academics and practitioners — and no more so than in the South China Sea dispute where China’s response to the regional set of diplomatic norms, the ASEAN Way, is controversial. This essay asks three questions: Is China changing its diplomatic practices towards ASEAN Way diplomatic norms and, if so, how and why? Examining the issue through the lens of diplomatic tactics, the essay argues that yes China is changing its diplomacy, by adopting a range of diplomatic tactics: originally acknowledging ASEAN Way norms; later challenging and manipulating them; and, throughout, adopting tactics with ambiguous meanings. China’s tactics change in response to its leaders’ evolving perceptions of China’s international and regional contexts and, in turn, China’s tactics impact the contexts. China’s diplomacy, in this case, is adaptive, multifaceted, context dependent and context-changing, reflecting diplomacy’s longue durée.

EAST ASIA: THE SYSTEMIC DISORDER AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE. AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PROSPECT

"Abstract: This paper analyzes the South China Sea dispute when the international system lacks orientation and respect for the norms, values, and institutions. The conflict is conceptualized to encompass the States, International Law, and the East Asia order. The evidence demonstrates that ASEAN’s regional order is more efficient than the US-Led Liberal order through UNCLOS. Additionally, it is necessary to overhaul and strengthen the institutional mechanisms from international law regarding the United Nations. A change in the order and an international recognition are recommended to legitimize regional institutions to arbitrate territorial disputes. Keywords: ASEAN, regional order, conflict resolution, South China Sea Dispute."

Xi Jinping, “China Dream”, and Chinese Military Diplomacy to ASEAN

The rise of Xi Jinping has brought together the idea of the ‘China Dream’ as a great revival of China. Since the dream referred to the nationalism spirit of a ‘century of humiliation,’ it has made national security issues as the core of China’s diplomacy. While the national security-related foreign policy has enhanced the military's role in China’s foreign policy-making, it brings consequences for China’s tougher stance in protecting China’s national security. However, Xi Jinping’s notion of using military diplomacy has started uneasy relationships between China and some ASEAN countries resulting in ‘ongoing negotiation without progress’ for the South China Sea dispute. The research examines the impacts of the military’s growing role in China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping to its military diplomacy in ASEAN. The results show that Xi Jinping’s leadership and vision of the China Dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness.

The Emotional Backdrop of Legal Discourses in South China Sea Disputes

The China Sea connects as many coastal states as it divides due to the economic and strategic challenges it represents. It also embodies an area of confrontations between the Great American and Chinese strategies. Identifying with precision the differences that arise requires an interest in the symbolic dimensions that surround them. This angle of analysis provides an opportunity to observe the functioning of international law and inevitably leads to a discussion of the emerging international order. The literature on the situation in the China Sea abounds. The paper’s singularity is to approach it under the prism of international law as revealing the psychology of an actor. To carry out this research, the authors use a pragmatic and critical approach to international law. The thesis defended shows that, contrary to a positivist and judicial approach to international law, elements exogenous to the law, the history, and the psychology of an actor, influence the interpretation of existing norms.

Issues Surrounding the South China Sea dispute

On 12 July 2016, the decision of the South China Sea Arbitration1 (The Republic of the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China) by a tribunal created under Annex Ⅻ to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was a near-complete victory for the Philippines. This arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to violate the Convention. In light of limitations on compulsory dispute settlement under the Convention, the Tribunal has emphasized that it does not rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and does not delimit any boundary between the Parties.

The ASEAN’s Attitude to the South China Sea Dispute after the Verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague

The South China Sea is the most inflammable area in the region of Southeast Asia due to its natural resources, commercial and political importance. The ASEAN countries directly involved in the dispute have conflicting interests, mainly related to their relationship with China, a pretender for the whole area. Therefore, attemps to settle the dispute are not successful. On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued a verdict taking into account the Law of the Sea, in which it accepted the Philippines’s arguments and rejected China’s claims based on historical arguments against the islands in the South China Sea. China did not take part in the trial and found its sentences non-binding but at the same time it has entered into a dialogue with ASEAN on the code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. The purpose of the article is to discuss how the parties are involved in the conflict, progress towards signing the Code of Conduct for the Parties in the South China Sea and the attitude of ASEAN countries to this conflict. Due to the degree of dependence of economies on Chinese influence, and relations with other powers, mainly the US, the behavior of individual countries is different. Hence the problem with the organization’s cohesion and attempts to break the deadlock, which have been unsuccessful so far. The basic research hypothesis that will be verified is to maintain the status quo in the South China Sea in the long run. At the same time, it was noted that Vietnam is prepared for long-term actions, based on diplomatic tools combined with a tough attitude, to solve problems related to the sovereignty of disputed areas. ASEAN will have to face up with the issues more consistently, by making greater use of quiet diplomacy. The theoretical basis of the article is Hurrell’s theory of neorealism, which analyzes, among other things, the principles and objectives of regional organizations in the international environment. Hurrell assumes that all regional organizations cannot be understood differently from their regional balance of power and regional dominant forces policy and ASEAN’s attitude proves this point of view.

Strategic comparison of China and USA in the South China Sea

South China sea is one of the most significant maritime regions in the world known for the territorial disputes amongst its multiple regional claimants. The past decade has seen the rise of the North American involvement in this region which has made this region much more vulnerable. This study sheds light over the significance of this complex maritime dispute, highlights the trends that contributed to shaping of the dispute into its current state, and analyzes the involvement of USA and comparatively, the strategies of USA and China in the South China sea dispute.

Russia’s approach to South China Sea territorial dispute: it’s only business, nothing personal

The territorial dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) affecting China and several ASEAN countries has already resulted in drawn-out political tensions in the region. However, one aspect of the dispute is rarely discussed: its influence on Sino-Russian relations and its possible role as a case study in analysing the character of these relations. While Russia moves closer to China in the dispute it still refrains from support of its territorial claims and develops close relations with some of China’s regional opponents such as Vietnam and India. This article describes most recent Russian economic and political activity in the region involving these countries with the aim of clarifying whether the Russian approach to problems in the SCS can be understood as an attempt to balance, bandwagon or hedge against growing Chinese influence, or whether Moscow’s approach is guided by different considerations. This article concludes that Russia’s approach towards the South China Sea dispute is determined mostly by Moscow’s economic interests and cannot be seen as a case of either balancing or bandwagoning China or hedging against it.

Structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy: power uncertainties and small-state hedging

ABSTRACT This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's ‘light-hedging’ approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressure arising from power asymmetry, rivalry, and uncertainties. The features of this approach are: an insistence on not taking sides, concurrent adoption of open deference and indirect defiance, and an active effort to cultivate a fallback position, all aimed at reducing multiple risks associated with the uncertainties of US commitment , China's long-term intentions, and their future relations. We have arrived at three main findings. First, structural impact matters: as geopolitical uncertainty increases, weaker states hedge more deeply. Second, smaller states do have agency, even if only in a low-profile manner. Because smaller states have been disadvantaged under an asymmetric power structure, they often use a combination of diplomatic, legal, developmental, and defence means to shape favourable external conditions. Third, while hedging is chiefly a result of structural factors, the forms and degree of a state's hedging activism are necessarily a function of its threat perceptions, elite interests and other unit-level variables. These factors explain Malaysia's light form of hedging: quiet action and limited defiance alongside open accommodation in managing the South China Sea disputes.

ASEAN’S CENTRALITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

The South China Sea is the contested region between several ASEAN member nations and China. The rise of China along with its offensive Realpolitik policy has offended the sovereignty of many territorial nations in the South China Sea. In this article, the researchers would schematically analyze through the documentary analysis on the ASEAN’s Centrality. Based on the epistemological and ontological inference, the researchers would argue that the ASEAN’s centrality is based on the neo-liberal dilemma of reciprocity and thus neglecting the Statism in the South China Sea. KEYWORDS:ASEAN, China, Indo-Pacific, Reciprocity, and the South China Sea Dispute.

Japan’s Balanced Strategy to Face China’s Threat in South China Sea Dispute

This paper aims to analyze Japan’s foreign policy related to the dispute in the South China Sea (SCS). Even though Japan has no sovereignty claims, it has considerable interests in the SCS region. Japan, which is poor in natural resources, depends on energy imports, most of which are shipped through SCS. As an advanced industrial state, Japan must continue to meet domestic energy demand. However, the SCS area has a potential conflict due to Chinese assertive behavior as the main factor that could threaten Japanese interests. The author use qualitative method with relevant literature studies and official government documentation to conduct a descriptive analysis of the research findings. The results of the study indicate that Japan is implementing a balanced strategy to deal with the potential threat of China. Balancing against threats is conducted in internal ways, e.g. internal reinforcement, and external ways, e.g. forming and strengthening cooperation with other countries outside the United States (US). Since Japan's limitations in military aspect hindered their internal reinforcement, this study emphasizes Japan's external balance strategy. The increasingly dubious US commitment in the Asia Pacific has made Japan strengthen defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The three countries have interest in SCS and provide access that conforms to Japanese interests.

A Critical Assessment of China’s Role in the South China Sea Dispute

South China Sea is only a small part on the map, but it plays a vital role in the stability of the Pacific-Asian region. South China Sea issue has been under spotlight. Five countries have claimed their rights on these tiny islands splashed in the region of South China Sea. Spratly Islands (Nansha) is endowed with abundant natural resources of petroleum, gas, and others. China, as an emerging super power, plays an important role in maintaining the stability of the region. Which role will China play, a bull in the china shop or a coordinator in finding a peaceful solution? This paper attempts to answer this question by presenting a critical assessment of China’s role in the South China Sea dispute.

Stormy Seas: The South China Sea in US-China Relations

How do the United States and China perceive each other’s role in the South China Sea disputes? In this paper, we trace how interactions between the US and China in the South China Sea have hardened perceptions of each other’s broader strategic intentions. Based on our examination of US and Chinese views, we argue that the South China Sea disputes have evolved from a contest over sovereign rights among the claimants into a contest between the US and China over the regional order, including the balance of power and international norms and rules. On the one hand, China views US involvement in the South China Sea disputes as a threat not just to its sovereignty claims but to its rise more generally. On the other hand, the United States views China’s efforts to strengthen its claims and influence in the South China Sea as a threat to the regional order and US leadership in the region. Our findings have two important implications. First, as the US and China use interactions in the South China Sea as an indicator of the other’s broader strategic intentions, hardened perceptions of each other in the South China Sea are likely to fuel adversarial perceptions in other issues. Second, unresolved territorial and sovereignty disputes may heighten the peril associated with power transitions, increasing the risk that the US and China will become entangled in an escalatory spiral.

Soft power is not so soft: is a reconciliation between China’s core interests and foreign policy practices possible?

ABSTRACT China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive engagement with regional organisations. However, cross-nation opinion surveys show that China’s approval in the region has declined significantly since2013. Why does this gap exist, and what can China do to close it? More importantly, how can Beijing effectively align its policy objectives with its soft-power tools to gain more support among its Asian neighbours?This article argues that reconciliation between China’s core interests and its soft power discourse is possible and desirable, as China’s self-restraint, assuring, and leadership practices are crucial sources of China’s policy practices. First, it claims that China’s soft power discourse matters greatly, as a rising country needs to express its good intentions to others in avoiding an anti-China alliance. Secondly, it proposes a feasible framework to reconcile China’s core interests and its soft power policy, in which Beijing could be firm in its official stances and flexible in its execution.It offers an in-depth analysis of three case studies: China’s North Korea policy, its handling in the South China Sea disputes, and its governance in Hong Kong. Finally, it concludes with substantive implications for East Asian politics.

The Prospects of the US Alliance System in Asia: Managing from the Hub

This paper examines the implications of the United States’ “hub-and-spoke” alliance system in Asia. It argues that the US enjoys a bargaining advantage in the current bilateral security relations with its Asian allies. In contrast to a multilateral alliance, the US can better prevent free riders and joint resistance in its bilateral relations. It can effectively restrain the behavior of its allies and compel them to accommodate American interests. The hub-and-spoke system helps the US consolidate its policy influence over the Asian allies, supervise inter-alliance cooperation, and increase defense cooperation between allies and non-allies. This paper uses episodes of defense cooperation between the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India to illustrate the American alliance management techniques since 2016. During this time, the US allies have increasingly participated in regional security affairs due to US demands and guidance rather than autonomous decisions. Facing strong US pressure, allies have found it hard to challenge the US under the hub-and-spoke system despite common grievances. This leads to two implications for the future: First, the US allies may have less autonomy in their foreign policies, restraining their ability to pursue neutral positions and policies in regional affairs such as the South China Sea dispute. Second, the US may discourage or even undermine the emergence of multilateral security institutions in Asia. The US is likely to maintain the “hub-and-spoke” system to safeguard its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.