Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge Research Articles

Социология науки: эволюция основных программ

The study analyzes the emergence, dynamics and transformation of the basic programs in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Macrosociological and microsociological studies of science are considered. There are weak and strong programs in every scope of macro- and microsociology. The weak program considers the interaction between social context and science while the strong program proves that sociality is included in scientific knowledge. The strong program substantiates the conventional and relative nature of scientific knowledge neglecting the concept of truth. Further development of the sociology of science leads to the emergence of the following new theories: actor-network theory and the theory of object-centered sociality. Such new concepts as an epistemic object, sociotechnical networks, postsocial knowledge societies are developed as well. The basic programs of the sociology of science complement each other; the scientific knowledge depends on both cognitive and social processes.

Jeff Kochan, Science as social existence: Heidegger and the sociology of scientific knowledge

Jeff Kochan, Science as social existence: Heidegger and the sociology of scientific knowledge

Uniting the cognitive and the social

The proposed comment to the paper by W. Lynch provides another indirect argument in favor of the thesis about Lakatos's hidden Marxist roots. The methodology of research programmes and the sociology of scientific knowledge (social epistemology) share a common object of criticism, and a constant opponent. Lakatos calls him the naive falsificationist while a social epistemologist dubs him a metaphysical realist, or fact-objectivist. both criticized the non-critical trust in scientific theories and facts as well as their reification though using different means: the internal dialectic of science’s development and the socio-communicative interpretation of scientific knowledge. Still, the differences between them like the differences between Lakatos’s and Feyerabend’s approaches are two ways of expressing the similar position based on acceptance of some non-dogmatic Marxist ideas.

Jeff Kochan, Science as social existence: Heidegger and the sociology of scientific knowledge

Jeff Kochan, Science as social existence: Heidegger and the sociology of scientific knowledge

De-idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism

Relativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a (largely) implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels of idealization. We defend two claims. First, philosophical discussions of disagreement need to be de-idealized. Second, once a less idealized account of disagreement is available, both our conception of judgement and our understanding of relativism need to be revised. Our example is a case study in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). This case study gives a less idealized account of disagreement that conceptualizes judgements as situated (rather than brute or rule-governed). We argue that this conception can and should be applied to cases of gustatory and epistemic disagreement. The payoff will be a reformulation of relativism in terms of rationally resolvable yet contingent disagreements.

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A world of struggle: how power, law, and expertise shape global political economy

Political arguments are time-sensitive. Which one carries the day in a legislative battle, election contest or strategic discussion depends on its quality, its force, its acceptability and its timeliness. David Kennedy's excellent new volume, A world of struggle, has the benefit of quality, force, acceptability and timeliness. Coming at a moment of widespread disenchantment with expert rule among global publics, this book captures something of the contemporary Zeitgeist. The aim of Kennedy's book is to outline an approach to the study of expertise in global politics that comes to grips with the deeply political nature of expert knowledge. While studies of expertise are not novel in International Relations (IR), Kennedy's work adds to and advances the literature by questioning the category of expertise itself, via an interdisciplinary engagement with critical legal studies, IR, social theory, science and technology studies and the sociology of scientific knowledge. In the process, he draws our attention to the contested politics of knowledge production in the global political economy.

Science, as the Subject of Historical and Social Analysis: A Case Study

The case study presented in the article introduces an intense debate within the social science community in Hungary that arose due to a research report analysing the living conditions of Roma communities in segregated settlements. Firstly, the prevailing norms of the community which were violated by a young researcher are described. Then the article provides an overview of the research report that generated intense criticism against the author and outlines critics representing the “guards” and a defence of “separatist” researchers. Finally, it elaborates on the consequences of the debate and analyses why the study became the focal point of the intense criticism while introducing some potential explanations from the social psychology and sociology of scientific knowledge. All in all, the article does not intend to take a side in the argument only to give a constructivist analysis about the dispute.

REASSEMBLING AND REMEMBERING – THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

This article proposes that the work of the French sociologist of science, Bruno Latour, that conceptualises the political process in a highly pluralist society, can provide a useful starting point for a discussion on the politics of reconciliation. It is especially Latour’s suggestion of an object-oriented politics that will be explored and applied to the South African situation. Subsequently, however, it is argued that Latour’s politics of “reassembling” should be complemented by a politics of remembering. The latter notion is understood in a Platonic-Augustinian fashion – following the interpretation of the contemporary philosophical-theological movement of Radical Orthodoxy – as a diffuse recognition of the other within the self, whereby the politics of reconciliation is, in an important sense, broadened to encompass the interior, psychic and, ultimately, spiritual aspects of the relation between the self and the other. The paper concludes with some remarks on the role of the church as the narrative embodiment of reconciliation conceived as reassembling and remembering.

Sociology and the mirror of nature: Robert Brandom and the strong programme

The ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge has both exerted enormous influence on science studies, and been widely criticised for its apparent commitment to epistemological relativism. In this article we argue that the recent work of the pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom provides a potential resolution to these debates. Brandom’s work, we argue, meets the key commitments of the strong programme, including particularly commitments to symmetry and reflexivity, while also demonstrating how these commitments are compatible with a robust – but non-dogmatic, pragmatist – concept of objective knowledge. In so doing, it provides a theoretically developed account of why the traditions of empirical science studies that emerged from the strong programme need not be seen as undermining scientific objectivity, while it also supports a reflexive, critical sociological analysis of scientific practice.

Authors' response

We are grateful to Dr Hill for his letter and support of the Postdoctoral Dental Match. Is there an orthodontist who is not thankful for the specialty education that he or she has received? Is there an orthodontist who is not hopeful that our specialty will continue to flourish during the next century? Make no mistake, the future of our specialty rests squarely in the arms of our residency programs. The quality of education our residents receive dictates the long-term success of our specialty and the quality of care provided to our patients. Make no mistake, the success of each orthodontic program rests squarely in the arms of its faculty. Every day, faculties should strive to strengthen their programs—strive to make them the best orthodontic programs in the world. Participating in the orthodontic Match strengthens each program and our specialty by promoting good competition. Why? It is a domino effect. By participating in the Match, orthodontic programs agree to a fixed candidate acceptance date: early December. Candidates have time to interview at programs of interest during the fall and rank their preferred programs. Stronger programs get ranked higher, and weaker programs must work to strengthen the education they provide to be more competitive. If all programs competed by participating in the Match, our specialty would be elevated, as would the quality of care orthodontists provide. Not participating in the Match weakens programs and our specialty by promoting bad competition. Why? Non-Match programs do not have a fixed acceptance date. Instead, they compete by pressuring candidates to accept positions as early as September and by requiring candidates to withdraw from the Match. Candidates, eager to specialize, accept these non-Match positions and are deprived of the opportunity to evaluate and rank other programs. Unlike Match programs, there is no incentive for non-Match programs to improve to attract candidates. Non-Match programs simply fill their classes by recruiting and making offers earlier and earlier. If all programs chose to gain an unfair advantage as non-Match programs do, then our specialty would gradually decline along with the quality of patient care we provide. So, where do we go from here? Each orthodontic residency program must establish application requirements that it believes are not only in its best interest but also in the best interest of candidates and our specialty. For us, the answer is clear. For us, the right thing to do, for both the candidates and the specialty, is for all programs in the United States to participate in the Match. As a way to encourage non-Match programs to join the Match, at the University of Iowa, we have decided to interview applicants who meet our qualifications and who are applying exclusively to programs participating in the Match. Match programAmerican Journal of Orthodontics and Dentofacial OrthopedicsVol. 149Issue 6PreviewI would like to thank the authors of “Match or non-Match: At the crossroads” in the November issue for a very well-done article on a subject that needed to be addressed (Allareddy V, Srinivasan S, Southard TE. Match or non-Match: at the crossroads. Am J Orthod Dentofacial Orthop 2015;148:748-54). Full-Text PDF

Žinojimo sociologijos tyrimo projektas kaip sociologijos didaktikos eksperimentas

The article in the framework of teaching research describes the didactic dimension of the project of the sociology of scientific knowledge. Based on sociological investigation of the academic field, it attempts to conceptualize the formation of the habitus of the sociological research. The identification of the sociological habitus is treated as epistemological break, which is followed by epistemological vigilance. The analysis of the chemist academic community reveals not only the unique but also invariant aspects academic field that also shape the field of sociology. The recognition of the specific and isomorphic structure of academic field is considered as entrenchment of the sociological habitus.

In Pursuit of a Promise: Perspectives on the Political Process to Establish the European Spallation Source (ESS) in Lund, Sweden ed. by Olof Hallonsten

Reviewed by: In Pursuit of a Promise: Perspectives on the Political Process to Establish the European Spallation Source (ESS) in Lund, Sweden ed. by Olof Hallonsten Nina Wormbs (bio) In Pursuit of a Promise: Perspectives on the Political Process to Establish the European Spallation Source (ESS) in Lund, Sweden. Edited by Olof Hallonsten. Lund: Arkiv förlag, 2012. Pp. 230. $30.50. Big Science has been an area of investigation for historians and sociologists of science and technology for quite some time. From Derek de Solla Price onward, there have been many works on this topic, covering different disciplines, organizational modes, and geographies. Against this background, is it possible to pose new questions, or have all the answers already been given? A new Big Science project is emerging in the south of Sweden. The European Spallation Source, ESS, will be placed in Lund, a university town just around the corner from the metropolitan area of Malmö (Sweden) and Copenhagen (Denmark). Or will it really? How far along is this project after all? Olof Hallonsten et al. have taken upon themselves the study of a project that has not yet materialized. Despite its lack of a material footprint, the linear proton accelerator project still exists, as a plan, as a threat, as news, as pride, and as a promise. The eight-chapter volume could best be described as centering on research policy, even if historical and other aspects are also considered. Hallonsten and Karl-Fredrik Berggren start off by detailing the chronology [End Page 497] and the decision-making process. Examples of the planned science at ESS then follow, discussed by Berggren and Aleksandar Matic. The chapter reads much like an advertisement, lining up all the possible uses of this “superior” facility. Wilhelm Agrell analyzes the discussion of risks involved and concludes that resistance toward this project never really formed, despite the fact that information reaching the public has been both weak and contradictory. Emelie Stenborg and Mikael Klintman further this last point in their chapter on the systematic local critique from the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation in Lund. Anders Granberg also discusses the critique of the project, but in the research community. His contribution is the longest by far, fifty pages, and is notable also because of its detail. Mats Benner aims to discuss the research policy context of Big Science and in doing so compares ESS to the already existing MAX IV synchrotron radiation facility. Ironically, in Benner’s own terminology, MAX IV has had long-term support within the research community but has never become a natural part of national research policy. ESS on the other hand has weak support in the research community but serves as a national flagship on the policy level. Finally, Aant Elzinga’s contribution is of a more general character, discussing organizational principles for research and how these have changed over time. Always extremely well-read, Elzinga shows an impressive breadth of perspective, in which, however, ESS almost disappears. Overall, the volume provides good insight into Big Science in the making. In his final comment, Thomas Kaiserfeld puts the Anna Karenina principle next to the well-known symmetry principle of SSK (sociology of scientific knowledge) and its siblings. The Anna Karenina principle contends that “Realized Big Science is all alike; every failure must be explained in its own way,” which is an asymmetrical model. Kaiserfeld manages to merge the two, stressing that different perspectives and levels of analytical depth decide whether a project is Anna Karenina or SSK. The road to finalizing this enormous facility is continuously bumpy. Given the investment, the consequences for other lines of research, and the local impact, it is important that science in the making is put under scrutiny, something this volume achieves. [End Page 498] Nina Wormbs Nina Wormbs is associate professor in history of science and technology at the KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. Copyright © 2016 Society for the History of Technology

The Imitation Game and the Nature of Mixed Methods

We describe the Imitation Game, a new research method that collects both qualitative and quantitative data, and which can be used as a mixed methods procedure in many disciplines. Drawing on two projects, one investigating gender, the other sexuality, we show that the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Game combine in four different ways, from more quantitative to more qualitative, involving increasing cultural understanding by the researchers. Crucially, deep cultural input is initially supplied by the players of the Game, who act as “proxy researchers,” enabling data to be gathered quickly and efficiently. The analysis has its roots in sociology of scientific knowledge and studies of expertise and experience, hence the emphasis on the cultural foundations of methods and the nature of expertise.

Steve Fuller: Knowledge, the philosophical quest in history

Steve Fuller’s Knowledge is on the interplay of scientific knowledge and the human condition. Other than Fuller’s work, there is little discussion in the current literature in sociology of scientific knowledge, science and technology studies, sociology of science, philosophy of science, epistemology of science and analytic social epistemology on this interplay. The book provides provocative and controversial views on social epistemology of scientific knowledge in the history of epistemology which is construed widely as forms of knowledge in the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences. The breadth of Fuller’s book is very wide. The book has six chapters with each chapter on a different version of epistemology and its history. Chapter 1 is on cognitive economics, and Chapter 2 is on divine psychology. Chapters 3–5 are extended discussions of the application of divine psychology to psychology of science, philosophy of science and sociology of science, respectively. Chapter 6 is on counterfactual historiography. This review

’n Verkenning van die verhouding tussen wetenskap en inheemse kennis: Moontlikhede vir integrasie in Suid-Afrikaanse Lewenswetenskappeklaskamers

The article is a theoretical exploration of the relationship between science and indigenous knowledge, as well as the implications for integrating the two in Life Sciences classrooms in schools. The theoretical discussion draws on insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge and argues that science should not only be viewed as representation but also as performance. Such a view, it is argued, serves as the basis for integrating indigenous knowledge into the Life Sciences. Practical suggestions are made as to how indigenous knowledge could be infused into Life Sciences classrooms and how teachers can scaffold learners through different types or stages of what Jegede calls, ‘collateral learning’.

Integrated Approach in “Social Research of Science” as a Methodological Problem

Sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is a study of science as a social activity, especially dealing with the social conditions and effects of science and with the social structures and processes of scientific activity. The theorists of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge consider sociological factors as influencing all beliefs in science. Sociology of Scientific Knowledge tends to the unity of the cognitive and social factors. This idea of integrity has to combine cognitive, methodological, historical and social approaches in scientific and cognitive activity. The integrated approach allows to consider science as a systematic and holistic object.

Occam's razor explains Matthew effect

Sociologists of science noticed that the results of many collaborative projects and discoveries are often attributed only to their most famous collaborators, even when the contributions of these famous collaborators were minimal. This phenomenon is known as the Matthew effect, after a famous citation from the Gospel of Matthew. In this article, we show that Occam’s razor provides a possible explanation for the Matthew effect. 1 Matthew Effect: A Brief Description In the 1960s, Robert K. Merton, a sociologist of science, observed that there is a tendency to remember only the most famous contributors to a collaborative project, even when the contribution of these famous contributors was minimal. As a result, the famous researchers become even more famous, while others are largely forgotten [3]. He called this phenomenon Matthew effect, after a citation from the Gospel of Matthew 25:29: “For whoever has will be given more, and they will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them.” This phenomenon has been observed in many areas of science. For example, it has recently been emphasized in an article about the contribution of female scientists to computing which was published in Communications of the ACM, the main Computer Science magazine [1]. 2 How Can We Explain the Matthew Effect? Our knowledge decays with time. In the beginning, we may be well aware of the contributions of different scientists to a project. However, as time goes by, we tend to forget the details – and this explains why with time, our perception of contributions of different scientists changes. To understand why these changes follow the Matthew-effect pattern, let us describe the knowledge decay in precise terms.

From Organisms to World Society

This article proposes to analyze the idea of organism and other closely related ideas (function, differentiation, etc.) using a combination of semantic fields analysis from conceptual history and the notion of boundary objects from the sociology of scientific knowledge. By tackling a wide range of source material, the article charts the nomadic existence of organism and opens up new vistas for an integrated history of the natural and human sciences. First, the boundaries are less clear-cut between disciplines like biology and sociology than previously believed. Second, a long and transdisciplinary tradition of talking about organismic and societal systems in highly functionalist terms comes into view. Third, the approach shows that conceptions of a world society in Niklas Luhmann's variant are not semantic innovations of the late twentieth century. Rather, their history can be traced back to organicist sociology and its forgotten pioneers, especially Albert Schäffle or Guillaume de Greef, during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Learning from ignorance: agnotology's challenge to philosophy of science

The recent commercialization and privatization of scientific research has reconfigured the organization of science worldwide, fostering new scientific practices and new political tools to manage scientific research. Focusing on the mechanisms of ignorance production, the recent literature in agnotology has been a fruitful approach for understanding the social and epistemological consequences that emerge in commercialized science today. Strictly speaking, agnotology is the study of ignorance broadly conceived. Agnotology's innovative contribution to the studies of science stems from its treatment of ignorance as a social construction, one that differs from the traditional conception of ignorance as a natural vacuum (Proctor 2008). Agnotology has uncovered different ways in which the commercialization of scientific research has encouraged the production of ignorance, thus challenging the epistemic adequacy of the current social organization of science. Consequently, agnotology has made evident the need for a well-articulated normative approach capable of identifying and evaluating the epistemic concerns raised by the private funding and performance of science. Although philosophers of science have dealt with some of the social aspects of scientific knowledge production, they have yet to articulate an appropriate social epistemology that addresses these pressing issues. In my dissertation I take up this task.The aim of my dissertation is twofold. First, I examine the epistemic and social problems emerging from cases of ignorance production to argue that agnotology poses a serious challenge for philosophy of science. Second, I draw a path for philosophers of science to address this challenge.The dissertation is divided in five chapters. The introductory chapter describes some of the main challenges that philosophy of science has encountered in the past half century, i.e., the historical challenge posed by scholars such as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, and the constructivist challenge posed by the Strong Program in the sociology of scientific knowledge and the social studies of science more generally, and then introduces agnotology as a new terrain, posing important questions for the philosopher of science. In the second chapter, I present the works of Philip Kitcher (2011) and Helen Longino (2002) as representative of a philosophy of science concerned with the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. I also give a historical account of the major changes that the organization of science has undergone in the past three decades with the move towards the commercialization and privatization of research. I then argue that Kitcher's and Longino's accounts of scientific knowledge have important limitations when evaluating the process of knowledge production in the commercialized framework in which scientific research develops today.The third chapter examines the recent literature on agnotology, focusing on four cases: the tobacco industry's support of cancer research (Proctor 2011), the ongoing debate over global warming (Oreskes and Conway 2010), the pharmaceutical industry's design of clinical trials (Michaels 2008; Nik-Khah 2014), and economists' assessment of the financial crisis of 2008 (Mirowski 2013). I argue that scholars working on agnotology seem to hold implicit normative commitments that are in tension with their descriptive accounts of ignorance-constructive practices. Accordingly, and despite uncovering the limitations of the current organization of science, agnotology does not provide an appropriate normative account of the current production of scientific knowledge either. Further exploration into the normative aspects of agnotology is still needed.In order to start addressing the challenge of agnotology, I build upon the contributions of philosophers of science to the science and values debate. Thus, the fourth chapter presents the science and values framework, describing the lines of argument that philosophers of science have used to understand the role of social and political values in scientific inquiry (e. …