Sociologists of law and economic sociologists will be enthusiastic about Edelman's bold call for heavier sociolegal traffic across the bridges between the legal system and the economy. The Presidential address constructively conceives of this traffic at two levels: one operates at the intellectual level and creatively envisages law and society (LS the other operates at the institutional level and imagines an increasing volume of traffic that is two-way, i.e., not only from economic theory toward legal systems, but from sociolegal theory toward markets and economies. On both levels and in both directions, Edelman's expansive vision offers intellectual excitement and pragmatic value. It may be that this call will puzzle some in L&S for two, seemingly contradictory, reasons. Some will say that the call is unnecessary: cursory glance at Law & Society Association annual conference program will show plethora of sessions that deal with regulation (often of economic endues), corporations, globalization-all of which are implicitly or explicitly about law and the economy. Others will say the call is unwelcome: in the L&S movement historically we have aligned ourselves consciously with society and against the economy. Our finest achievements have often been scholarship on behalf of the poor, of minorities and the objects of discrimination, of the weak and the objects of arbitrary power, of the marginalized and the objects of avoidance or repression. Edelman, if I read her correctly, would answer yes and but no. Yes, there are welcome currents of scholarship that treat the economy, but it is another matter to see them in systematic theoretical context, whether the foil or frame be L&E, on the one hand, or economic sociology, on the other. And yes, L&S has noble record for championing those usually without defenders or spokespersons, for providing a mirror and conscience (Burawoy et al. 2004) to society whose practices deviate from its precepts, and this record should be sustained. But no, she would say, studies of those subject to predatory practices in society nevertheless leave unexplicated the institutions that can turn predatory, aid and abet discriminatory practices, or possibly ameliorate them. On both counts she rightly maintains that L&S requires new seriousness and sustained theoretical and empirical endeavor about the market-that seemingly most valorized institution in contemporary ideology and rhetoric. In my brief comments, I seek to show that Edelman's call not only enriches theory and research within the United States, but it also presents an excellent springboard for extending the L&S collective project into global engagements of law and markets. The Endogeneity of Law and its L&E Foils Let me summarize the high points of Edelman's arguments and then build and expand upon them. She properly takes deliberate aim at two concepts at the heart of L&E theory: efficiency and rationality. She effectively demonstrates their origins (i.e., shows how they are socially, politically, legally constructed), undermines their taken-for-granted foundation (i.e., that the mere mantra of efficiency or rationality should not be taken as self-validating), indicates their limits as explanations of market behavior, shows their variation across social arenas, reveals the asymmetries of power that are hidden within disarmingly neutral terms of art, and shows their shortcomings for prescriptions of policy (i.e., that taken alone as bases of action, implementations of policy will likely be subverted). This formidable feat in itself should open up strong engagement by L&S scholars with vulnerabilities of L&E theory that warrant unveiling. Edelman provocatively offers four-fold strategy for this line of attack. …