Using Zambia as a case study, this article examines the efficacy of the Zambian regulatory and institutional framework for public distribution of securities in ensuring commutative justice in the administration of disgorgement by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Using the doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches to examining the effectiveness of regulatory rules and institutions, the main findings of the study are: When it is applied to non-corporate insider traders, the statutory formula for disgorgement which is provided in the Zambian Securities Act 2016 tends to under-regulate by leaving some of the insider trading gains with the insider trader—a commutative injustice to the public; When it is applied to juristic persons (companies and other styles of bodies corporate), the formula for disgorgement which is provided in the Zambian Securities Act 2016 tends to over-regulate by taking away from the insider trader more than they actually gained from insider trading—a retributive and commutative injustice to the insider trader. The central argument of this article is that regulatory rules and institutions which promote retributive and commutative justice are likely to inspire social willingness to pay the cost of socioeconomic exchanges and regulation, and as such, are efficient. As a possible way of promoting commutative and retributive justice in the administration of disgorgement in insider trading cases, the article makes a case for the application of ‘the common law approach to the award of damages’ in the determination of the amount which is to be disgorged. The article also makes proposals for the repeal of the statutory formula, and its replacement with the standard formula for disgorgement which has been proposed.