Social Primary Goods Research Articles

Working Retirees? A Liberal Case for Retirement as Free Time

AbstractRetirement is often viewed as a reward for a working life. While many have reason to want a work-free retirement, not everyone does. Should working retirees have to give up their retirement pension and, consequently, their status as retirees? The answer, I argue, boils down to whether we conceive of retirement as free time (need-free) or as leisure (work-free). In this article, I put forward a liberal case in favour of free time, despite whether our liberalism leans towards perfectionism or neutralism, with social primary goods being a case in point. Applying this case for free time to retirement yields two significant policy implications. First, it demands “free synchronic combination” – that retirees may use their retirement pensions however they see fit, including to work. Second, it also yields “free diachronic combination” – that, within limits, individuals have discretionary control over how to combine retirement and work across time – thus challenging the idea that retirement should be available only in old age and not earlier in life. So far, the literature on free time focused only on narrow temporal units, such as hours and days, but there is much to gain by extending the concept into retirement.

La justicia desde la perspectiva liberal de Rawls y Nussbaum

In this research, the objective was to analyze justice from the liberal perspective of John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, with a comparative approach. A documentary review of the bibliographic material about the productions of Rawls (1975, 1971, 1986, 1996, 1097), and Nussbaum (1992, 2007, 2012, 2014, 2016) was carried out, also considering the approach of experts in the subject. It is a qualitative research of descriptive type, with methodological design of theoretical, documentary and diachronic cut. The data collection technique was the signing or registration of author, documentary and content references. As a result, an analytical comparison was established referring to some criteria on the notion of justice, and it is concluded by analyzing the postulates of these two philosophers, that the theoretical supports of Rawls, are far from the real society, by assuming that all primary social goods; freedom, equal opportunities, income, wealth and the bases of mutual respect, must be distributed in an equal way, while for Nussbaum justice must produce in its citizens the ability to deliberate, think, discuss, choose and tries to overcome the concept of justice proper to contractualism ensuring respect for the value and dignity of each individual.

On the turn of self-respect toward its social basis in the primary social good

Rawls once regarded self-respect as one of the most important primary social goods, but eventually it turns to the social basis of self-respect. Rawls realized that self-respect as a subjective evaluative cannot be assigned as a social fundamental good. To protect people's self-respect, society needs to provide a social basic structure that is conducive to the formation and cultivation of self-respect, and this social basic structure is in line with the principle of justice proposed by Rawls.

Measuring Freedom

Suppose a principle of distributive justice states that social institutions should maximize the freedom of the least well-off. Understanding how to do so would be easier if freedom only depended on one good, like income. If it depends instead on a composite index of social primary goods, a question arises: Which combination of social primary goods can maximize the freedom of the least well-off? This is John Rawls’ indexing problem. Solving it requires addressing two related problems. The first consists in evaluating, in theory, under which conditions it is acceptable to substitute goods, that is, their substitution rates. The second consists in evaluating which acceptable substitutions are feasible in practice. This article proposes a framework to think clearly about this indexing problem within a Rawlsian, resourcist conception of distributive justice. I conclude by discussing a path towards solving the indexing problem. While further empirical exploration is needed, plausible assumptions about social regimes suggest that maximizing the freedom of the least well-off is likely to require giving them access to a social position with a balanced combination of social primary goods.

A just yet unequal European Union: a defense of moderate economic inequality*

What does justice require concerning socio-economic distribution among citizens of the European Union? The EU should reduce cross-national economic inequalities among inhabitants of different member states, but full economic distributive equality or a European ‘Difference Principle,' may not be required. Individuals' claim to more political influence over matters controlled by their own state in the quasi-federal EU may permit some economic inequality. Section 1 orients this contribution relative to arguments for a European universal income. Section 2 provides relevant features of the EU. Section 3 considers contractualist arguments against certain forms of economic inequality, while section 4 identifies a further argument in favour of equal shares of benefits of social cooperation, based on an interpretation of ‘social primary goods' consistent with Rawls' theory. Section 5 argues that these reasons for economic distributive equality must be weighed against more political influence over matters controlled by the individual’s sub-unit.

Justice, what money can buy: a lab experiment on primary social goods and the Rawlsian difference principle

Many governments and charities adopt Rawlsian difference principle by maximizing the welfare of the least advantaged and giving priority to equality over efficiency. There are two views about which domain the principle should be applied to. The first applies it to the final distribution of income. Previous empirical studies have focused on this but found little evidence supporting it. The other view linked the principle with Rawlsian primary goods: Since the cost of losing primary social goods is huge, people will maximize the benefit of the least advantaged behind the veil of ignorance, such that everyone has access to necessary means. According to the latter reading of Rawls, we experimentally imposed a great cost for losing primary goods, and observed a salient majority of subjects obeying this principle, unlike previous studies finding a minority. Moreover, even if we lowered the cost for losing primary goods, more than one-third of the subjects still adopted this principle.

Meaningful Work, Worthwhile Life, and Self-Respect: Reexamination of the Rawlsian Perspective on Basic Income in a Property-Owning Democracy

Abstract As is well known, John Rawls opposes the idea and policy of basic income. However, this paper posits that his view of self-respect and activity could accommodate its implementation. Rawls lists the social basis of self-respect in social primary goods as the most important good, but does not assume that it is derived from wage labor alone. It appears that his theory of justice aims to criticize the work-centered (wage-labor) society and to overcome it. Besides, as Rawls desires, for our work to be meaningful and our life worthwhile, we should institutionalize basic income because it can improve workers’ bargaining power and their attitude toward work, in addition to enhancing their leisure time. In this paper, by considering the normative relationship between meaningful work, worthwhile life, and self-respect from a Rawlsian perspective, I inquire into the potential of basic income in his well-ordered society.

A transdisciplinary review of the role of economics in life cycle sustainability assessment

This paper reviews the use of economic values in life cycle assessment (LCA) and the justification for environmental life cycle costing (ELCC) as the ‘economic pillar’ of life cycle sustainability assessment (LCSA). A transdisciplinary review of economic values in LCA was undertaken and structured with a series of research questions. The review considered the philosophy of science and focussed on the concept of value as a point of synthesis among the disciplines of LCA, economics and ethics. An example from the ELCC Code of Practice was reviewed to highlight the challenges and alternative approaches explored. ‘Value choices’ and the role of decision makers have been a long-standing and largely unresolved discussion in LCA. Over the past two decades, LCA has been dominated by a utilitarian concept of ethics and valuation based on willingness to pay. This has a number of limitations which are further exacerbated in ELCC and its accounting definition of cost. ELCC struggles to address social costs, and the focus on the decision maker may define values that are not compatible with sustainability. John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ and Amartya Sen’s capability approach were considered to reappraise the use of UN Conventions considered in early LCA literature on values. It was argued that there is an ethical basis to prioritise minimum standards in LCSA to address primary social goods as well as uncertainty in evaluations. This paper questioned the reliance of LCA on utilitarianism and valuation using willingness to pay and, in particular, the claim of ELCC as the economic pillar of LCSA. Concepts of fairness and capability may overcome some of these limitations and provide a basis for integration of social, economic and environmental pillars of sustainability. Although the ethical justification of prescriptive values may only reach agreement on minimum conditions for social and economic cooperation, it was argued that this may provide a reasonable starting point given the global sustainability challenges over the coming decades. A two-stage approach for the implementation of economic values in LCSA was suggested for further debate and discussion.

“应得”的古与今：范式转型与论域拓展

“应得”是当代分配正义的重要概念,也有着悠久的历史。古希腊时代亚里士多德等人语境中的“应得”对应的英文词汇是merit,这与现代社会强调的“应得”（deserve）有很多不同。前者指基于德性来应得公共职务,后者是基于理性个体的行动应得社会基本益品。“应得”从古代merit到近现代deserve的范式转型与启蒙运动息息相关。20世纪以来,约翰·罗尔斯等人对“应得”和“反应得”的区分再次深化了对这一问题的思考。当代“应得”的讨论还突破传统的问题域,在“代际应得”和“全球应得”等论域实现了新拓展。

Políticas sociales focalizadas y el dilema de la justicia

El artículo analiza el impacto de las políticas sociales focalizadas en la distribución de los bienes primarios materiales (ingreso y riqueza) y simbólicos (bases sociales de respeto a sí mismo). Recupera los aportes de Esping-Andersen, así como los estudios realizados en Estados Unidos sobre el apoyo a programas focalizados. La tesis es que las políticas focalizadas, aunque impactan positivamente en la distribución justa de bienes materiales, minan las bases sociales de respeto a sí mismo.

The Misrecognised as the Least the Advantaged Citizens in Plural Democracies

John Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” is the most systematic attempt in recent decades to provide a liberal grounding for justice in plural democratic societies. Rawls argued that social and economic inequalities are justifiable only if they are to the advantage of society’s least-advantaged members. Rawls argued that the least-advantaged position in society was occupied by the citizen with the lowest expectation for primary social goods (all-purpose means like income and opportunity). This paper argues that the least-advantaged citizens, in part, are those whose identities are misrecognised. Misrecognition of identity can cause harm; it can restrict the agency and opportunity of the misrecognised. Minority identity groups (whose identities are often misrecognised) do not do as well as others citizens in social, economic and political terms. This paper argues that the misrecognition of identity constitutes unreasonable democratic practice because it can harm members of minority identity groups.

Social bases of self-esteem: Rawls, Honneth and beyond

This paper discusses Rawls’s thesis that the social basis of self-respect is one of the primary social goods. While the central element of the social basis consists in the attitudes of others (e.g. respect or esteem) the social basis may include also possession of various goods. Further, one may distinguish, following Honneth, universalistic basic respect from differential esteem and from loving care. This paper focuses on esteem, and further distinguishes three important varieties thereof (anti-stigmatization; contributions to societal goods, projects of self-realization), which all differ from recognition of cultural identity. The normative implications will differ in these different contexts.

Cohen’s Rescue

G. A. Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality proposes that both concepts need rescuing from the work of John Rawls. Especially, it is concerned with Rawls’ famous second principle of justice according to which social primary goods should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to the benefit of the worst off. The question is why this would ever be necessary if all parties are just. Cohen and I agree that Rawls cannot really justify inequalities on the basis given. But he also thinks equality is the correct analysis of justice, though he provides no actual direct arguments for this. He does, however, provide a striking analytical argument claiming that fundamental principles of justice must be fact insensitive, and that Rawls’s view of justice violates this requirement. I argue that the requirement is itself misconceived and that principles of justice cannot possibly be fact insensitive in the sense developed by Cohen. Few philosophers share this view of Cohen’s—which I argue is due to several conceptual mistakes. With these ironed out, the contractarian view, broadly speaking, is seen to be plausible and powerful. Meanwhile Cohen appears to embrace intuitionism, a stance that cannot possibly be acceptable in social philosophy. In the end, Cohen is successful in arguing that Rawls cannot have what he wants, but neither is Cohen successful in claiming that justice is equality.

Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle

This paper presents a non-consequentialist defense of Rawls’s general conception of justice requiring that primary social goods be distributed so that the least share is as great as possible. It suggests that a defense of this idea can be offered within a Rossian framework of prima facie duties. The prima facie duty not to harm constrains people from supporting social institutions which do not leave their fellows with goods and resources above a certain threshold. The paper argues that societies in accord with the Rawlsian general conception come closest to meeting this requirement. This way of arguing for the conception enables the defenders of the theory to elude standard objections offered by utilitarians, libertarians, and even other egalitarians.

Citizenship and the Welfare State: A Critique of David Miller's Theory of Nationality

Abstract.For much of the post-war period of welfare state formation, T.H. Marshall's idea of shared entitlement to universal social rights of citizenship formed the theoretical foundations of social democratic political reforms and legitimacy. This approach has been updated by contemporary egalitarian theorists, such as John Rawls. The ongoing politics of restructuring have led to a growing number of arguments against the motivational capacity of an institutional account of social unity. This paper examines a particular argument against rights-based citizenship—David Miller's theory of nationality. Miller argues that “pure” citizenship rests on self-interest, and thus when differences in risk are explicit it can only legitimate minimal redistribution. Strong welfare states require pre-political ties and must be embedded in the ethical relations of shared nationality. Against Miller's position, it is advanced that shared citizenship has both effective motivational and moral dimensions. It can also address the problems the nationality thesis faces in reconciling its account of motivation with the moral diversity that is constitutive of pluralist societies.Résumé.Dans l'après-guerre, au moment de la formation des Etats-providence, la mise en place et la justification des politiques social-démocrates s'appuyèrent en grande majorité sur la théorie de T.H. Marshall à propos du rôle joué par les droits sociaux dans l'intégration civique. Cette approche a été actualisée par des théoriciens égalitariens tels que John Rawls. Les politiques actuelles de restructuration de l'Etat-providence ont provoqué la multiplication d'un certain type de critiques soulignant les insuffisances de cette approche institutionnelle du lien social en termes de ressources motivationnelles. Cet article examine l'une ces critiques, formulée par David Miller dans sa théorie sur la nationalité. Miller soutient que la citoyenneté “pure” repose sur l'intérêt personnel et qu'elle ne peut justifier qu'une redistribution minimale, lorsque les différences engagées sont manifestes. Pour affirmer leur autorité, les Etats-providence ont besoin d'être fondés sur des liens prépolitiques et soutenus par les rapports de solidarité d'une nationalité commune. A l'encontre de la position défendue par Miller, on avancera que la citoyenneté possède de façon effective une dimension qui est à la fois morale et motivationnelle. En outre, elle est à même d'affronter les problèmes que soulève la thèse sur la nationalité, en réconciliant sa conception de la motivation avec la diversité morale inhérente aux sociétés pluralistes.

Can Sen's Capability Approach Present an Alternative Paradigm to Mainstream Economics?

Since the 1990s, the term ‘human development’ and ‘Sen’s capability approach’ have frequently been used by (neo-) liberal international institution. Actually, Sen proposed his capability approach as an alternative to standard liberal utilitarian approaches that focus on resources, per capita income or Rawlsian social primary goods. While according to some social scientists Sen is on the whole a mainstream economist, his capability approach essentially presents philosophical/cultural background and methodological roots radically different from mainstream economics. The aim of this article is to examine the capability approach of Amartya Sen and mainstream economic theory in terms of their epistemological, methodological and ontological aspects.

THE ILLIBERALITY OF ‘LIBERAL EUGENICS’

AbstractThis essay evaluates the moral logic of ‘liberal eugenics’: the ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention. I argue that liberal eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires it. I introduce an alternative to Rawls's social primary goods that might be called natural primary goods: hereditable mental and physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range of projects and pursuits. I suggest that reproductive genetic biotechnologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and genetic engineering, which aim to enhance ‘general purpose’ traits in offspring are less like childrearing practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory. I argue that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all‐purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. I conclude that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio against liberal theory.

Towards a fair procedure for risk management

The need for fairness in risk management is frequently expressed in the risk literature. In this article, fairness is connected to the procedure for decision‐making. Two models for procedural justice in the management of risks are discussed, one that focuses on a hypothetical thought experiment, and one that focuses on actual dialogue. The hypothetical approach takes John Rawls’ theory of justice as a starting point. The actual inclusion approach employs Iris Marion Young’s theory of inclusive deliberative democracy. With Rawls’ theory, important issues concerning risk distribution are emphasized, and a parallel between social primary goods and risk management is drawn. The hypothetical reasoning should mainly serve as a guide concerning risk issues that affect people who cannot be included in the decision procedure, such as future generations. However, when the affected can be included, an interactive dialogical reasoning is to be preferred. Here, Young’s theory is fruitful. It aims at fair decisions by fulfilling conditions of inclusiveness, equality, reasonableness and publicity.

Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal Relation with Rights, Legitimacy, and Other Concepts and Institutions

Arguments concerning law and social change call for a relationship between legitimacy, the rule of law, and respect for rights. To the extent that a government is subject to the rule of law, the human and civil rights of its citizens are advanced. When citizens can bring disputes concerning rights to court rather than fight in the streets, the rule of law is enhanced. Respect for rights and the rule of law are likely to make a government more acceptable and hence more legitimate. A basic requirement of legitimacy is that government advance everyone's share of primary social goods, their opportunity to participate in society and hence their basic rights. Rights are not only statements of ideals or entitlements but goals and tools for pursuit of those goals, means for pursuing law reform, advancing the rule of law, and enhancing society's legitimacy.

Can Justice as Fairness Accommodate the Disabled?

John Rawls's theory of justice has been faulted by some critics for the fact that its principles of justice are blind to the special status of those with chronic, and naturally caused, disabilities.1 Some of its friends, fur thermore, consider this not a drawback but an advantage, since it cor rectly treats disadvantages caused by social agency as more morally ur gent than those caused by nature.2 Rawls's theory is frequently (and understandably) taken as the leading example of liberal egalitarian theo ries of justice: if it gets issues about disability seriously wrong, things look bad for liberal egalitarianism. The purpose of this paper is to show that Rawls's theory can do more for the disabled than is sometimes thought and to show that this is an advantage, thus helping to vindicate liberal egalitarianism more generally. On the face of it, Rawls's theory is a weak candidate for dealing well with the disabled. The parties in Rawls's Original Position measure well being in terms of an index of social primary goods: liberties, opportuni ties, powers and prerogatives of office, and income and wealth. They select the Liberty Principle, which guarantees a set of basic liberties equally to all, and the Difference Principle, which says that opportunities must be equally distributed and that inequalities of income and wealth must benefit those who have the least income and wealth. Because rela