Social Democratic And Labour Party Research Articles

Northern Ireland: From the Centre to the Margins?

Northern Ireland’s election had dramatic outcomes and important consequences for the restoration of devolved power-sharing. For the first time, Unionist MPs elected to Westminster were in the minority. Nine nationalists won seats, seven taken by Sinn Fein (SF) who refused to take up their positions in the House of Commons, with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) recording two constituency triumphs. Eight unionists, all from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) were returned, along with one member of the Alliance Party, not part of either the unionist or nationalist bloc. The once dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) failed to win a seat for the third time in the last four elections. The previous general election result in Northern Ireland impacted across the UK, with the DUP holding the balance of power at Westminster and entering a confidence-and-supply arrangement with the Conservative government (HM Government, 2017). The story of 2019 was of a reversion to type, with all of Northern Ireland’s MPs marginalised. The question begged was how they could articulate Northern Ireland’s interests when their contingent was miniscule compared with the size of the Conservatives’ majority. As those MPs headed to Westminster (or not, in SF’s case), the focus switched to the legislature in Belfast. With the DUP’s glory days in London over and the Northern Irish electorate impatient with the absence of devolved government (and blaming either of the main two parties), the need for the revival of a local power base was apparent. One month after the election, the Northern Ireland Assembly, absent since January 2017, was duly restored. This analysis of the general election examines how the contest developed in Northern Ireland, discusses why four seats changed hands and assesses the implications of the outcome. It examines how arguments over Brexit, unionist, nationalist and pro-Remain pacts, election tactics, a blame game over Stormont’s absence and traditional sectarian politics dominated the campaign. In assessing the results, the chapter draws extensively upon data from the 2019 Economic and Social Research Council’s Northern Ireland general election study, based upon 2,003 post-election interviews with a representative sample of the electorate.1 All data, other than the overall and constituency results, are taken from the study unless indicated otherwise.

Does Moderation Pay in a Consociational Democracy? The Marginalisation of the SDLP in the North of Ireland

AbstractA central question in the debate between “centripetalists” and “consociationalists” concerns whether power‐sharing arrangements provide incentives for moderation. This article helps to formulate an empirical answer through an examination of the electoral decline of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in the North of Ireland. Drawing on primary qualitative interviews with key players, this article argues that the SDLP were electoral losers under a system of ethnic out‐flanking. Sinn Féin has successfully presented itself as the “greener” and more robust representative of nationalist interests, whilst simultaneously moderating its message and operating the institutions of Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin has taken ownership of the GFA and has positioned itself as the party best able to ensure its delivery. Sinn Féin’s rights‐based agenda, and vibrant electoral machine, has resonated with the nationalist electorate who are less sure of what the contemporary SDLP stands for.

Northern Ireland: Double Triumph for the Democratic Unionist Party

The General Election result in Northern Ireland impacted across the UK. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) enjoyed a double victory. It extended dominance of the unionist community and collected a bigger prize as its ten MPs (a record tally) held a pivotal position at Westminster. In holding the balance of power in the House of Commons, the DUP was not shy in articulating its price for supporting the otherwise friendless Conservative government in key votes, extracting £1 billion of new funding for Northern Ireland. The DUP’s hegemonic position within its unionist constituency was matched by Sinn Féin’s obliteration of its Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) rival within the nationalist community, but without any obvious reward for republicans. At a time of considerable instability, with Northern Ireland’s political institutions undergoing one of their episodic crises, unionist and nationalist voters overwhelmingly backed the dominant representative forces within their respective ethno-national blocs. This analysis of the election draws upon data from the 2017 Economic and Social Research Council’s Northern Ireland General Election study to examine why the DUP and Sinn Féin dominated the contest and looks at the implications of the outcome in Northern Ireland and at Westminster.1

Managing Orderly Decline? Nationalism in Northern Ireland Since the Good Friday Agreement (1998)

AbstractThe 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly election highlighted substantive issues within nationalism. Both the main nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin, recorded the worst combined vote for over 20 years. This article suggests that the downturn in nationalist support was years in the making and examines why nationalist voters might be turning away from the ballot box. It considers the various factors that underlined both parties' approach to consecutive electoral tests from 1998 until 2016, showing how Sinn Féin replaced the SDLP as the leading force within nationalism, and concluding that new leadership may yet halt the process of orderly decline.

Another Communal Headcount: The Election in Northern Ireland

The Westminster election in Northern Ireland attracted more interest beyond the region than is normally the case. This was not because of healthy new attention being paid to the polity's regular communal (to critics, sectarian) bloc headcount. Rather, it was because the contest's outcome might influence the formation of a minority government at Westminster. This possibility was actively discussed even into election night results programmes, after the exit poll predicted the Conservatives to fall just short of an overall majority, with 316 seats. As that seat tally rose, Northern Ireland's election slid back to its default positions of obscurity and parochial communalism. Religious community background remained easily the most important voting determinant. Unionist electoral pacts in four constituencies heightened the prevailing sense of a traditional Orange versus Green contest, one in which the Alliance Party, aligned to neither bloc, lost its solitary representative. Turnout was a very modest 58%, well below the UK average. Only Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance contested all 18 constituencies. Nonetheless, the contest was not entirely bereft of interest. There were significant arguments over a disparate array of topics ranging from welfare reform to that of same-sex marriage, still banned in Northern Ireland. Four seats changed hands and the once-dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) recovered some recent lost ground to regain Westminster representation.

‘We couldn't do a Prague’: British government responses to loyalist strikes in Northern Ireland 1974–77

In May 1974 the Ulster Workers' Council (U.W.C.), comprising loyalist trade unionists, paramilitaries and politicians, mounted a general strike backed by widespread intimidation. Their target was the Sunningdale Agreement, which produced a power-sharing executive for Northern Ireland and proposed a crossborder institution with the Republic of Ireland. After a fortnight the U.W.C. successfully brought Northern Ireland to a halt and the Executive collapsed, leading to the restoration of direct rule from Westminster. Three years later the United Unionist Action Council (U.U.A.C.) adopted the same strategy, demanding a return to devolution with majority rule and the repression of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P.I.R.A.). This second strike was defeated. Many contemporary politicians were critical of the Labour government's failure to put down the U.W.C. strike. William Whitelaw, formerly secretary of state for Northern Ireland in Edward Heath's Conservative administration and the minister responsible for the bulk of the negotiations prior to Sunningdale, believed that the prime minister, Harold Wilson, and the new secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, did not have the same attachment to the political settlement and were less willing to support the Northern Ireland Executive in its hour of need. Paddy Devlin of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.) argued that the unwillingness to arrest those involved, ‘more than any other single action by the authorities ... caused thousands of law-abiding people who had earlier given support to the executive to switch loyalties’.

The 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly election

The 2003 Northern Ireland assembly election was greeted with a general mood of pessimism. The victory of the two most diametrically opposed parties in the Unionist and Nationalist camps, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, was not supposed to augur well for the peace process and the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. But the opposite happened. The complete disarmament of the IRA in July 2005 paved the way for the signing of the Saint Andrew's Agreement of October 2006. New elections in March 2007 confirmed that the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) were relegated to the sidelines. From May 2007 onwards, the bewildered Northern Irish could witness surreal scenes with Rev. Ian Paisley, an implacable opponent to republicanism for over 30 years, laughing out loud with Martin McGuinness, the former IRA chief of staff. Then Ian Paisley had to vacate his place as First Minister to his Party’s deputy leader, Peter Robinson. The odd Sinn Féin/DUP coalition had to run current affairs. The incomplete abolition of the 11+ examination conducted by the Sinn Féin ministers has left pupils and their parents in a state of great confusion. In January 2010, the Robinson couple was engulfed in a moral and financial scandal which cost Peter his seat in the May Westminster election. In December 2010/January 2011, the ruling coalition had to face the disaster of thousands of families deprived of water due to a particularly harsh winter. The 2011 Assembly election gives us an opportunity to assess the work of this unforeseen experiment and to ponder the future of Northern Ireland.

New Nationalism? The S.D.L.P. and the creation of a socialist and labour party in Northern Ireland, 1969–75

‘Since our foundation, the S.D.L.P. has been proudly nationalist and is 100 per cent for a United Ireland.’ This description, from the website of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.), advances a claim which might be thought not to sit easy with the party's founding ideals which claimed it as a ‘radical socialist party’ and insisted that, while a united Ireland was one of the party's main aims, it would prioritise the socio-economic above the constitutional question. This article will argue that while the S.D.L.P. was widely recognised as a major advance in nationalist politics in Northern Ireland when it was formed in August 1970, it had lost its avant-garde approach to the constitutional question and become a more organised form of the old Nationalist Party by 1975. Although initially the S.D.L.P. combined socialist rhetoric with a discourse that linked social justice with the reunification of the island – its ideal was a ‘completely new constitution for the whole of Ireland, a constitution which will provide the framework for the emergence of a just, egalitarian and secular society’ – there existed an uneasy tension between nationalist and socialist aims within the party, with the former taking precedence by the time of the powersharing Executive of 1974.

Catholic, Irish and Nationalist: evaluating the importance of ethno‐national and ethno‐religious variables in determining nationalist political allegiance in Northern Ireland

AbstractIrish national identity, political nationalism and Catholicism are the defining characteristics of the minority community in Northern Ireland. These identifiable ethno‐national and ethno‐religious characteristics have been the basis of communal solidarity that has transcended increasing socio‐economic heterogeneity within that community. Both of the Nationalist political parties in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), draw their support almost exclusively from their community of origin. What is not known, however, is the relative importance of Irishness, Catholicism and Nationalism in shaping support for either party. Which of these ethnic identifiers is of greatest salience in identifying support for Sinn Féin or the SDLP? Drawing upon recent election survey evidence, this article attempts to rectify this information deficit, highlighting the weighting of components of ethnicity in determining intra‐bloc political allegiances.

The Irish Government and the Sunningdale Council of Ireland: a vehicle for unity?

In December 1973, the British and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive designate agreed to the formal establishment of a ‘Council of Ireland’ as part of the historic Sunningdale Agreement. This council was to have executive functions and co-ordinate the provision of certain services on both sides of the border; it would have ‘executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions’. The Council of Ireland proposal was the British government's formal recognition of the ‘Irish dimension’ which it had accepted in the March 1973 White Paper, the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The proposed council was one of the most divisive issues in Northern Ireland politics during the 1972–4 period, and was strongly resisted by a majority of unionists. The council issue led to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive which had taken office in January 1974. Loyalist opponents of Sunningdale argued that the Council of Ireland, if allowed to operate, would be a stepping-stone to a united Ireland. Recently, some scholars have retrospectively endorsed this interpretation of the council, arguing that the Irish government, in concert with the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.), sought a particularly strong institution – with the goal of Irish reunification. But was the proposed Council of Ireland really intended as a vehicle for future Irish unity?

Political generations in Northern Ireland

Since the late 1980s, Northern Ireland has seen a radical electoral shift away from the historically dominant parties in the Catholic and Protestant blocs – the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), respectively – towards the traditionally more ‘extreme’ parties – Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This change in aggregate support has been accompanied by increasing differences between generations as older cohorts of UUP and SDLP supporters have been replaced by newer cohorts of DUP and Sinn Fein partisans. This is not a result of increased polarisation in values and attitudes (whether overtly political or simply communal intolerance) among younger cohorts who are, if anything, slightly more moderate than their forbears. Rather, this results from the changing political context in which new generations have been socialised – in particular the expanded choice sets facing voters as they have reached voting age. This in turn has positive implications for the consolidation of devolved democratic governance.

The SDLP and the Europeanization of the Northern Ireland Problem

This article explores the various ways in which the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has used Europe – as a source of financial aid, political support, ideas and inspiration – in its attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict. In this, the piece considers the SDLP, not as a subject, but rather as an advocate of the Europeanization of the Northern Ireland problem. In particular, it looks at the role of John Hume, a founding member and later leader of the SDLP, who inculcated a strongly pro‐European outlook within the party. In doing so, the article considers the success of Hume and the SDLP in their efforts to bring a European influence to bear on Northern Ireland, especially in relation to the peace process and the 1998 Agreement. However, it also looks at both the limitations of this influence, and the problems involved with the SDLP's pro‐European approach, particularly since Hume's departure as party leader in 2001. In conclusion, the article suggests that the party may have been ‘over‐Europeanized’, with its long‐term focus on European issues and ideas now becoming electorally disadvantageous. In this way, the Europeanization of the Northern Ireland problem, and by extension the SDLP, has proven costly to the party.

'Dublin is Just a Sunningdale Away'? The SDLP and the Failure of Northern Ireland's Sunningdale Experiment

This article examines the part played by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in both the making and the breakdown of the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. In particular, the article looks at the party's relations with the Irish government in this period. Specifically, it considers the charge that the SDLP—by obliging the Irish government to support its approach—pushed unionist negotiators too far at Sunningdale, producing a settlement which was predetermined towards Irish reunification, and so which justified loyalist claims that ‘Dublin is just a Sunningdale away’. The article draws on recently released archival material to show how the SDLP was, to a significant degree, able to dictate Dublin's policy on Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, suggesting that this led to a uniform and highly ambitious agenda on the part of nationalist participants at the Sunningdale conference. However, it also argues that this agenda was not realized, and that the deal made at Sunningdale was not as favourable towards the SDLP as has sometimes been suggested. Nonetheless, the article maintains that the dynamic rhetoric and perceived momentum of Irish nationalism—orchestrated largely by the SDLP—served to distort that which was actually agreed, and in this helped to undermine unionist support for Sunningdale.

“Humespeak”: The SDLP, Political Discourse, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

This paper explores the vital role played by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in the formulation of a new political discourse and conceptual approach to the Northern Ireland problem. In particular, it shows how John Hume, party leader through the 1980s and 1990s, helped to propagate this discourse, and in doing so influenced policy-making in London and Dublin, and thinking within the republican movement. Although the paper emphasises the importance of this influence, it concludes by considering the reasons why the Ulster unionist community have remained so unreceptive to the political discourse of Hume and the SDLP.

Identity in Northern Ireland: communities, politics and change

Introduction PART ONE: INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY A Postmodernist Approach to Communal Identities in Northern Ireland? Interpreting the Development of the Nation, Irish Nationalism and Ulster Unionism The Governance of Northern Ireland: From Modernity to Postmodernity? Intimations of Postmodernity in the Development of the European Union The European Union and the Resources of Communal Identities in Northern Ireland PART TWO: DIALOGUES Dialogue with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Dialogue with Sinn Fein Dialogue with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Dialogue with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Dialogue with the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) Conclusion Bibliography Index