Northern Ireland: From the Centre to the Margins?

Abstract

Northern Ireland’s election had dramatic outcomes and important consequences for the restoration of devolved power-sharing. For the first time, Unionist MPs elected to Westminster were in the minority. Nine nationalists won seats, seven taken by Sinn Fein (SF) who refused to take up their positions in the House of Commons, with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) recording two constituency triumphs. Eight unionists, all from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) were returned, along with one member of the Alliance Party, not part of either the unionist or nationalist bloc. The once dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) failed to win a seat for the third time in the last four elections. The previous general election result in Northern Ireland impacted across the UK, with the DUP holding the balance of power at Westminster and entering a confidence-and-supply arrangement with the Conservative government (HM Government, 2017). The story of 2019 was of a reversion to type, with all of Northern Ireland’s MPs marginalised. The question begged was how they could articulate Northern Ireland’s interests when their contingent was miniscule compared with the size of the Conservatives’ majority. As those MPs headed to Westminster (or not, in SF’s case), the focus switched to the legislature in Belfast. With the DUP’s glory days in London over and the Northern Irish electorate impatient with the absence of devolved government (and blaming either of the main two parties), the need for the revival of a local power base was apparent. One month after the election, the Northern Ireland Assembly, absent since January 2017, was duly restored. This analysis of the general election examines how the contest developed in Northern Ireland, discusses why four seats changed hands and assesses the implications of the outcome. It examines how arguments over Brexit, unionist, nationalist and pro-Remain pacts, election tactics, a blame game over Stormont’s absence and traditional sectarian politics dominated the campaign. In assessing the results, the chapter draws extensively upon data from the 2019 Economic and Social Research Council’s Northern Ireland general election study, based upon 2,003 post-election interviews with a representative sample of the electorate.1 All data, other than the overall and constituency results, are taken from the study unless indicated otherwise.