Human Social Cognition Research Articles

Development and Validation of the Perceived Interpersonal Relevancy Scales: A New Measure of Perceived Threat, Opportunity, and Invisibility Appraisals for Use Across the Adult Life-Course.

Interpersonal relevancy appraisals are a dynamic and understudied aspect of human social cognition. Despite their importance, there are no existing measures. This study developed and validated a new measure of self-perceived interpersonal threat, opportunity, and invisibility appraisals among a life-course sample of adults. We also explored the relationships between relevance appraisals, social connectedness, loneliness, age, and sex-assigned-at-birth. Items were developed based on a theoretical model of multi-domain interpersonal relevance appraisals and refined following feedback from five experts in social psychology. Cross-sectional data were obtained online from a sample of 1,079 adults (age 18-90 years), recruited from the general population of Australia. Data were split into two pseudo-random samples used for 1) scale development and evaluation, and 2) assessment of internal consistency, construct validity, convergent validity with social connectedness and loneliness, and exploratory analysis with age and sex. Results support the factor structure and internal consistency of 17- and 9-item versions of the Perceived Interpersonal Relevancy Scales (PIRS) and measurement invariance across younger and older age groups. Higher self-perceived threat and invisibility appraisals were associated with decreased social network size, increased loneliness, younger age, and male sex. Higher self-perceived opportunity appraisals were associated with increased social network size and decreased loneliness. Results support this new measure of perceived interpersonal relevance appraisals, which shows relationships between the way we believe others perceive us, loneliness, and social isolation. The PIRS likely has wide utility for studies that seek to understand the intersections between human social cognition, well-being, and health across the lifespan.

Being Perceived as a Vital Force or a Burden: The Social Utility-Based Acceptance/Rejection (SUBAR) Model.

This paper proposes a new theoretical model to explain the acceptance/rejection of agents (co-workers) and various social groups (people with mental disorders or disabilities, the elderly, the unemployed/poor, ethnic minorities) in a given social system: the social utility-based acceptance/rejection (SUBAR) Model. Based on a social utility approach, it is proposed that human social cognition evaluates and reacts to agents/groups in a social system on the basis of the perceived strengths and significant contributions they bring to the system (upward forces; e.g., skills, resources, willingness) and the perceived weaknesses that may harm the system (downward forces; e.g., use of social benefits, dependence). While the perception of upward forces for the system (i.e., vital forces) is accompanied by acceptance (positive attitudes and behaviors), the perception of downward forces (i.e., burdens on the system) promotes rejection (negative attitudes and behaviors). The combination of the two indicators predicts that low vital forces/high burden targets will be the most rejected and high vital forces/low burden targets will be the most accepted. The high burden/high vital forces and low vital forces/low burden targets should be evaluated at an intermediate level between the other two. This naive calculation of the forces exerted by agents/groups in a social system is moderated by various variables (scarcity of economic resources, values) and responds to a functional attempt to regulate individual and collective interests, themselves dependent on the efficiency of given systems. Finally, the relationship of the SUBAR model to other relevant theories will also be discussed.

Rethinking the “we” in “we” intentionality: intention-sharing with—and not simply about—things

ABSTRACT This paper aims to place the general thesis for a species-unique “shared” or “we” intentionality, against the theoretical background of the material engagement approach. We will argue that the human ability to enact and share intentions rests upon a relational and participatory foundation of situated activity where intentional transactions between humans as well as between humans and things (in the broadest sense of material environment) are inseparable from the situational affordances of their engagement. Based on that, the paper advocates for an ecological-enactive account of shared intentionality which understands material engagement as central to the evolution and development of human social cognition.

Hormonal Changes During Acute Stress Response

In today’s environment, people constantly find themselves confronted with a wide range of upsetting situations. It is possible for stress to cause changes in the levels of a wide variety of hormones that are found in the serum, including glucocorticoids, catecholamines, growth hormone, and thyroid hormones. The “fight or flight” response requires certain adjustments to be made in order to ensure the individual’s safety. There is a possibility that certain stress-related responses can lead to endocrine illnesses such as Graves’ disease, gonadal dysfunction, psychosexual dwarfism, and obesity. Furthermore, stress has the potential to alter the clinical status of a wide variety of preexisting endocrine illnesses, such as contributing to the onset of adrenal crisis and thyroid storm. Significant consequences of stress include changes in behavior and systemic alterations, as well as changes in cellular mechanisms, hormonal , and brain stimulation. These changes can be observed at all levels, including cellular mechanisms, hormonal changes, and brain stimulation. An entirely new field of research has lately revealed the impacts of stress on human behavior, social cognition, and health. This is in spite of the fact that the influence of stress on health has been the subject of substantial research for a considerable amount of time

Tools and methods to study and replicate experiments addressing human social cognition in interactive scenarios

In the last decade, scientists investigating human social cognition have started bringing traditional laboratory paradigms more “into the wild” to examine how socio-cognitive mechanisms of the human brain work in real-life settings. As this implies transferring 2D observational paradigms to 3D interactive environments, there is a risk of compromising experimental control. In this context, we propose a methodological approach which uses humanoid robots as proxies of social interaction partners and embeds them in experimental protocols that adapt classical paradigms of cognitive psychology to interactive scenarios. This allows for a relatively high degree of “naturalness” of interaction and excellent experimental control at the same time. Here, we present two case studies where our methods and tools were applied and replicated across two different laboratories, namely the Italian Institute of Technology in Genova (Italy) and the Agency for Science, Technology and Research in Singapore. In the first case study, we present a replication of an interactive version of a gaze-cueing paradigm reported in Kompatsiari et al. (J Exp Psychol Gen 151(1):121–136, 2022). The second case study presents a replication of a “shared experience” paradigm reported in Marchesi et al. (Technol Mind Behav 3(3):11, 2022). As both studies replicate results across labs and different cultures, we argue that our methods allow for reliable and replicable setups, even though the protocols are complex and involve social interaction. We conclude that our approach can be of benefit to the research field of social cognition and grant higher replicability, for example, in cross-cultural comparisons of social cognition mechanisms.

Social Brain Perspectives on the Social and Evolutionary Neuroscience of Human Language.

Human language and social cognition are two key disciplines that have traditionally been studied as separate domains. Nonetheless, an emerging view suggests an alternative perspective. Drawing on the theoretical underpinnings of the social brain hypothesis (thesis of the evolution of brain size and intelligence), the social complexity hypothesis (thesis of the evolution of communication), and empirical research from comparative animal behavior, human social behavior, language acquisition in children, social cognitive neuroscience, and the cognitive neuroscience of language, it is argued that social cognition and language are two significantly interconnected capacities of the human species. Here, evidence in support of this view reviews (1) recent developmental studies on language learning in infants and young children, pointing to the important crucial benefits associated with social stimulation for youngsters, including the quality and quantity of incoming linguistic information, dyadic infant/child-to-parent non-verbal and verbal interactions, and other important social cues integral for facilitating language learning and social bonding; (2) studies of the adult human brain, suggesting a high degree of specialization for sociolinguistic information processing, memory retrieval, and comprehension, suggesting that the function of these neural areas may connect social cognition with language and social bonding; (3) developmental deficits in language and social cognition, including autism spectrum disorder (ASD), illustrating a unique developmental profile, further linking language, social cognition, and social bonding; and (4) neural biomarkers that may help to identify early developmental disorders of language and social cognition. In effect, the social brain and social complexity hypotheses may jointly help to describe how neurotypical children and adults acquire language, why autistic children and adults exhibit simultaneous deficits in language and social cognition, and why nonhuman primates and other organisms with significant computational capacities cannot learn language. But perhaps most critically, the following article argues that this and related research will allow scientists to generate a holistic profile and deeper understanding of the healthy adult social brain while developing more innovative and effective diagnoses, prognoses, and treatments for maladies and deficits also associated with the social brain.

Cultural technologies for peace may have shaped our social cognition.

Peace, the article shows, is achieved by culturally evolved institutions that incentivize positive-sum relationships. We propose that this insight has important consequences for the design of human social cognition. Cues that signal the existence of such institutions should play a prominent role in detecting group membership. We show how this accounts for previous findings and suggest avenues for future research.

Cultural evolutionary pragmatics: Investigating the codevelopment and coevolution of language and social cognition.

Language and social cognition come together in communication, but their relation has been intensely contested. Here, I argue that these two distinctively human abilities are connected in a positive feedback loop, whereby the development of one cognitive skill boosts the development of the other. More specifically, I hypothesize that language and social cognition codevelop in ontogeny and coevolve in diachrony through the acquisition, mature use, and cultural evolution of reference systems (e.g., demonstratives: "this" vs. "that"; articles: "a" vs. "the"; pronouns: "I" vs. "you"). I propose to study the connection between reference systems and communicative social cognition across three parallel timescales-language acquisition, language use, and language change, as a new research program for cultural evolutionary pragmatics. Within that framework, I discuss the coevolution of language and communicative social cognition as cognitive gadgets, and introduce a new methodological approach to study how universals and cross-linguistic differences in reference systems may result in different developmental pathways to human social cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Storytelling as Inverse Inverse Planning.

Great storytelling takes us on a journey the way ordinary reality rarely does. But what exactly do we mean by this "journey?" Recently, literary theorist Karin Kukkonen proposed that storytelling is "probability design:" the art of giving an audience pieces of information bit by bit, to craft the journey of their changing beliefs about the fictional world. A good "probability design" choreographs a delicate dance of certainty and surprise in the reader's mind as the story unfolds from beginning to end. In this paper, we computationally model this conception of storytelling. Building on the classic Bayesian inverse planning model of human social cognition, we treat storytelling as inverse inverse planning: the task of choosing actions to manipulate an inverse planner's inferences, and therefore a human audience's beliefs. First, we use an inverse inverse planner to depict social and physical situations, and present behavioral studies indicating that inverse inverse planning produces more expressive behavior than ordinary "naïve planning." Then, through a series of examples, we demonstrate how inverse inverse planning captures many storytelling elements from first principles: character, narrative arcs, plot twists, irony, flashbacks, and deus ex machina are all naturally encoded in the flexible language of probabilitydesign.

Life history impacts on infancy and the evolution of human social cognition.

Greater longevity, slower maturation and shorter birth intervals are life history features that distinguish humans from the other living members of our hominid family, the great apes. Theory and evidence synthesized here suggest the evolution of those features can explain both our bigger brains and our cooperative sociality. I rely on Sarah Hrdy's hypothesis that survival challenges for ancestral infants propelled the evolution of distinctly human socioemotional appetites and Barbara Finlay and colleagues' findings that mammalian brain size is determined by developmental duration. Similar responsiveness to varying developmental contexts in chimpanzee and human one-year-olds suggests similar infant responsiveness in our nearest common ancestor. Those ancestral infants likely began to acquire solid food while still nursing and fed themselves at weaning as chimpanzees and other great apes do now. When human ancestors colonized habitats lacking foods that infants could handle, dependents' survival became contingent on subsidies. Competition to engage subsidizers selected for capacities and tendencies to enlist and maintain social connections during the early wiring of expanding infant brains with lifelong consequences that Hrdy labeled "emotionally modern" social cognition.

Symbolic belief in social cognition

AbstractKeeping track of what others believe is a central part of human social cognition. However, the social relevance of those beliefs can vary a great deal. Some belief attributions mostly tell us about what a person is likely to do next. Other belief attributions tell us more about a person's social identity. In this paper, I argue that we cope with this challenge by employing two distinct concepts of belief in our everyday social interactions. The epistemic concept of belief is primarily used to keep track of what other people take to be true, and this informs how we predict and interpret their behaviors. The symbolic concept of belief, in contrast, is primarily used as a means of signaling one's social identity to other members of one's community. In turn, community members closely monitor each other's symbolic beliefs as a means of enforcing social norms.

Architectural experience influences the processing of others’ body expressions

The interplay between space and cognition is a crucial issue in Neuroscience leading to the development of multiple research fields. However, the relationship between architectural space and the movement of the inhabitants and their interactions has been too often neglected, failing to provide a unifying view of architecture's capacity to modulate social cognition broadly. We bridge this gap by requesting participants to judge avatars' emotional expression (high vs. low arousal) at the end of their promenade inside high- or low-arousing architectures. Stimuli were presented in virtual reality to ensure a dynamic, naturalistic experience. High-density electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded to assess the neural responses to the avatar's presentation. Observing highly aroused avatars increased Late Positive Potentials (LPP), in line with previous evidence. Strikingly, 250 ms before the occurrence of the LPP, P200 amplitude increased due to the experience of low-arousing architectures, reflecting an early greater attention during the processing of body expressions. In addition, participants stared longer at the avatar's head and judged the observed posture as more arousing. Source localization highlighted a contribution of the dorsal premotor cortex to both P200 and LPP. In conclusion, the immersive and dynamic architectural experience modulates human social cognition. In addition, the motor system plays a role in processing architecture and body expressions suggesting that the space and social cognition interplay is rooted in overlapping neural substrates. This study demonstrates that the manipulation of mere architectural space is sufficient to influence human social cognition.

Individual differences in second-order false-belief understanding and executive abilities: A meta-analytic review of evidence from school-age children and adults

Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive Functioning (EF) are two pillars of human social cognition often studied in conjunction, but rarely considered together beyond childhood. Adults routinely undertake ToM activities of higher levels, such as those that require reasoning recursively through other individuals’ presumed reasoning about others (e.g., she believes that he believes that this is difficult to grasp). Yet, the possibility of links between EF and these special kinds of representations, termed second-order ToM, has been much less studied empirically. The objective of the current pre-registered report is to provide a meta-analytic review of the extant literature linking second-order ToM and EF in school-age children and adults. Studies reporting on the relation between EF and second-order ToM were located through systematic search of published and non-published research databases. A final set of 32 studies were meta-analyzed, providing 83 effect sizes and a pooled N of over 2584 child and adult participants. The developmental literature provided evidence of moderate second-order ToM-EF linkage in children (r = .25), which resisted statistical adjustment for age, and did not differ on the basis of children’s cultural background. In contrast, the adult findings were weaker (r = .09), and only accounted for a very small percentage of the meta-analyzed literature. Important methodological gaps were identified, highlighting the need for more research on the links between second-order ToM and EF.

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind.

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

Investigating the Face Inversion Effect in Autism Across Behavioral and Neural Measures of Face Processing

Face processing is foundational to human social cognition, is central to the hallmark features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and shapes neural systems and social behavior. Highly efficient and specialized, the face processing system is sensitive to inversion, demonstrated by reduced accuracy in recognition and altered neural response to inverted faces. Understanding at which mechanistic level the autistic face processing system may be particularly different, as measured by the face inversion effect, will improve overall understanding of brain functioning in autism. To synthesize data from the extant literature to determine differences of the face processing system in ASD, as measured by the face inversion effect, across multiple mechanistic levels. Systematic searches were conducted in the MEDLINE, Embase, Web of Science, and PubMed databases from inception to August 11, 2022. Original research that reported performance-based measures of face recognition to upright and inverted faces in ASD and neurotypical samples were included for quantitative synthesis. All studies were screened by at least 2 reviewers. This systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted according to the 2020 Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) reporting guideline. Multiple effect sizes were extracted from studies to maximize information gain and statistical precision and used a random-effects, multilevel modeling framework to account for statistical dependencies within study samples. Effect sizes were calculated as a standardized mean change score between ASD and neurotypical samples (ie, Hedges g). The primary outcome measure was performance difference between upright and inverted faces during face recognition tasks. Measurement modality, psychological construct, recognition demand, sample age, sample sex distribution, and study quality assessment scores were assessed as moderators. Of 1768 screened articles, 122 effect sizes from 38 empirical articles representing data from 1764 individual participants (899 ASD individuals and 865 neurotypical individuals) were included in the meta-analysis. Overall, face recognition performance differences between upright and inverted faces were reduced in autistic individuals compared with neurotypical individuals (g = -0.41; SE = 0.11; 95% credible interval [CrI], -0.63 to -0.18). However, there was considerable heterogeneity among effect sizes, which were explored with moderator analysis. The attenuated face inversion effect in autistic individuals was more prominent in emotion compared with identity recognition (b = 0.46; SE = 0.26; 95% CrI, -0.08 to 0.95) and in behavioral compared with electrophysiological measures (b = 0.23; SE = 0.24; 95% CrI, -0.25 to 0.70). This study found that on average, face recognition in autism is less impacted by inversion. These findings suggest less specialization or expertise of the face processing system in autism, particularly in recognizing emotion from faces as measured in behavioral paradigms.

Functionally analogous body- and animacy-responsive areas are present in the dog (Canis familiaris) and human occipito-temporal lobe

Comparing the neural correlates of socio-cognitive skills across species provides insights into the evolution of the social brain and has revealed face- and body-sensitive regions in the primate temporal lobe. Although from a different lineage, dogs share convergent visuo-cognitive skills with humans and a temporal lobe which evolved independently in carnivorans. We investigated the neural correlates of face and body perception in dogs (N = 15) and humans (N = 40) using functional MRI. Combining univariate and multivariate analysis approaches, we found functionally analogous occipito-temporal regions involved in the perception of animate entities and bodies in both species and face-sensitive regions in humans. Though unpredicted, we also observed neural representations of faces compared to inanimate objects, and dog compared to human bodies in dog olfactory regions. These findings shed light on the evolutionary foundations of human and dog social cognition and the predominant role of the temporal lobe.

What can evidence accumulation modelling tell us about human social cognition?

Evidence accumulation models are a series of computational models that provide an account for speeded decision-making. These models have been used extensively within the cognitive psychology literature to great success, allowing inferences to be drawn about the psychological processes that underlie cognition that are sometimes not available in a traditional analysis of accuracy or reaction time (RT). Despite this, there have been only a few applications of these models within the domain of social cognition. In this article, we explore several ways in which the study of human social information processing would benefit from application of evidence accumulation modelling. We begin first with a brief overview of the evidence accumulation modelling framework and their past success within the domain of cognitive psychology. We then highlight five ways in which social cognitive research would benefit from an evidence accumulation approach. This includes (1) greater specification of assumptions, (2) unambiguous comparisons across blocked task conditions, (3) quantifying and comparing the magnitude of effects in standardised measures, (4) a novel approach for studying individual differences, and (5) improved reproducibility and accessibility. These points are illustrated using examples from the domain of social attention. Finally, we outline several methodological and practical considerations, which should help researchers use evidence accumulation models productively. Ultimately, it will be seen that evidence accumulation modelling offers a well-developed, accessible, and commonly understood framework that can reveal inferences about cognition that may otherwise be out of reach in a traditional analysis of accuracy and RT. This approach, therefore, has the potential to substantially revise our understanding of social cognition.

Green enrichment for better mind readers? Residential nature and social brain function in childhood

Human social cognition is considered an essential skill necessary for socially appropriate behaviours and social integration. Childhood is a time of rapid social expansion and growing independence from parents, but it is also a period of vulnerability in which children have unequal opportunities for optimal development. Accumulating evidence suggests that access to greenery, such as trees, shrubs, and grassed areas, might promote social skills in children. In this pre-registered, cross-sectional study, we found that vegetation cover around the home was associated with theory of mind (b/SE = 18.36/6.49, p = 0.006, Bayes Factor (BF) = 2.711) but not affect recognition (4.51/6.99, 0.52, 0.133) in 5–12 year-old children (n = 85). Further, neither of two neurophysiological indexes of face emotion processing, the N170 latency (−31.9/42.20, 0.45, 0.201) and the N170 amplitude (−5.58/11.82, 0.63, 1.02), were associated with vegetation cover around the home. Vegetation cover around the home might support the formation of social skills through higher order reasoning about emotion experience and cause and effect as it relates to other people. Future studies including larger, longitudinal samples are required to confirm the findings.

Every individual makes a difference: A trinity derived from linking individual brain morphometry, connectivity and mentalising ability.

Mentalising ability, indexed as the ability to understand others' beliefs, feelings, intentions, thoughts and traits, is a pivotal and fundamental component of human social cognition. However, considering the multifaceted nature of mentalising ability, little research has focused on characterising individual differences in different mentalising components. And even less research has been devoted to investigating how the variance in the structural and functional patterns of the amygdala and hippocampus, two vital subcortical regions of the "social brain", are related to inter-individual variability in mentalising ability. Here, as a first step toward filling these gaps, we exploited inter-subject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA) to assess relationships between amygdala and hippocampal morphometry (surface-based multivariate morphometry statistics, MMS), connectivity (resting-state functional connectivity, rs-FC) and mentalising ability (interactive mentalisation questionnaire [IMQ] scores) across the participants ( ). In IS-RSA, we proposed a novel pipeline, that is, computing patching and pooling operations-based surface distance (CPP-SD), to obtain a decent representation for high-dimensional MMS data. On this basis, we found significant correlations (i.e., second-order isomorphisms) between these three distinct modalities, indicating that a trinity existed in idiosyncratic patterns of brain morphometry, connectivity and mentalising ability. Notably, a region-related mentalising specificity emerged from these associations: self-self and self-other mentalisation are more related to the hippocampus, while other-self mentalisation shows a closer link with the amygdala. Furthermore, by utilising the dyadic regression analysis, we observed significant interactions such that subject pairs with similar morphometry had even greater mentalising similarity if they were also similar in rs-FC. Altogether, we demonstrated the feasibility and illustrated the promise of using IS-RSA to study individual differences, deepening our understanding of how individual brains give rise to their mentalising abilities.

Learning from humans to build social cognition among robots.

Self-organized groups of robots have generally coordinated their behaviors using quite simple social interactions. Although simple interactions are sufficient for some group behaviors, future research needs to investigate more elaborate forms of coordination, such as social cognition, to progress towards real deployments. In this perspective, we define social cognition among robots as the combination of social inference, social learning, social influence, and knowledge transfer, and propose that these abilities can be established in robots by building underlying mechanisms based on behaviors observed in humans. We review key social processes observed in humans that could inspire valuable capabilities in robots and propose that relevant insights from human social cognition can be obtained by studying human-controlled avatars in virtual environments that have the correct balance of embodiment and constraints. Such environments need to allow participants to engage in embodied social behaviors, for instance through situatedness and bodily involvement, but, at the same time, need to artificially constrain humans to the operational conditions of robots, for instance in terms of perception and communication. We illustrate our proposed experimental method with example setups in a multi-user virtual environment.