Declassified documents of the State Committee for Security (KGB) demonstrate how Soviet intelligence viewed Chinese intelligence, after two communist neighbors split apart ideologically, and their vast border became a theater of war in the late 1960s. First, in response to the massive influx of Chinese immigrants, Soviet counterintelligence made tremendous efforts to uncover false defectors sent by Chinese intelligence, employing unique techniques. These include “in-cell” cultivation (i.e., the placement of KGB agents in the same cell with a detained Chinese suspect), and the interregional secondment (marshrutirovanie) of proven KGB agents of Chinese nationality to be deployed in Chinese settlements. Second, fighting Chinese intelligence required coordinated efforts among KGB counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, and the border guards’ intelligence. Third, the KGB developed a comprehensive operational psychology for handling Chinese targets. Three key recruitment fundamentals—ideology, money, and kompromat—were tailored to the social and cultural characteristics of the Chinese population. While Soviet intelligence utilized all available human resources, attempts to establish illegal intelligence positions in China had limited success in the 1970s. Overall, the fundamental approaches of Soviet intelligence toward China were largely determined by geopolitical and cultural underpinnings and the autocratic nature of both regimes.