Sino-British Joint Declaration Research Articles

Hong Kong: Somewhere between Heaven and Earth (review)

266 China Review International: Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1998 Barbara-Sue White, editor. Hong Kong: Somewhere between Heaven and Earth. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996. xviii, 278 pp. Paperback HK $135.00, isbn 0-19-587696-2. Since the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 that restored China's sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, there has been a boom in publications , conferences, and exhibitions devoted to this vibrant Asian city, widely called the "Pearl of the Orient." But in the flood of books and articles that seek to explain this historic handover and its history, it is rare to see new information presented or novel ideas advanced. Barbara-Sue White's Hong Kong: Somewhere between Heaven and Earth, a recent addition to the ever growing list of studies, offers a new approach and a variety of new materials; however, it also has a number of shortcomings. White's book is an anthology of sixty extracts about Hong Kong, a collection ofletters, diaries, poems, speeches, reports, and short stories penned largely by foreign visitors who arrived in the colony at different times and recorded their impressions and feelings about this exciting city. The volume is divided into an introduction and ten sections, each of which represents a different period of Hong Kong's history. It begins with the Tang dynasty in the eighth century, when this tiny fishing village was still an "outpost ofthe celestial empire," and ends with the 1990s, when the British would soon lower the Union Jack in the prized colony, one of the last remnants of their vast empire. The author shows a keen eye for selecting distinctive pieces; she is also to be applauded for her success in unearthing rare and previously unpublished writings garnered from extensive research in archives and libraries in Hong Kong, Britain, and the United States. The anthology is fun to read on four counts. First, it is full of refreshing, personal voices; their chatty tone makes them seem as if their authors are engaging in a dialogue with us. Second, it chronicles the constant changes of a city bursting with high energy and boundless hope. Third, the extracts feature a host of colorful characters: from Queen Victoria to Hong Kong governors, from renowned authors to an American ship's doctor whose work took him accidentally to the colony, and from a British army chaplain who was also an irrepressible storyteller to POWs interned by the Japanese during World War II. Finally, the collection presents a multitude of arresting stories, including festivities at the Man-mo Temple on Hollywood Road, the police pursuit of gangsters and criminals, and© 1998 by University the hellish worlds of opium-smoking and child slavery. Some of the selections are ofHawai'i Pressespecially delightful to read, such as an enchanting poem by Sir Cecil Clementi, an intellectual governor of Hong Kong in the 1920s, who spoke fluent Chinese and whose elegant translation of Zhao Ziyong's Yue ou {Cantonese Love Songs) re- Reviews 267 mains a standard piece ofscholarship today. The information assembled here no doubt suggests that the best way to understand Hong Kong and its checkered history is through a close scrutiny ofprimary sources. Ironically, the major strength is also the primary weakness ofthe book. White's diverse range ofsources, or what she terms "a kaleidoscope of Hong Kong" (p. xv), is so eclectic that these sources render no coherent picture. The selected pieces often appear more like an assemblage of anecdotes and fleeting observations than as presenting a consistent theme. Altiiough interesting connections are occasionally suggested by the author (for example, "the vivacity and rapid pace of the colony," on p. xii), they are never sufficiently demonstrated or systematically delineated. The selections also appear uneven. They are long on Hong Kong's early history but short on its recent developments, especially in the crucial period after the Communist takeover in China in 1949 (only two of the total ten parts are devoted to diis phase), when Hong Kong's citizens began to develop a sense ofbelonging to the place, and the city gradually emerged as one ofworld's leading financial centers. Although White is wise in...

Autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

On 1 July 1997 the People's Republic of China recovered Hong Kong in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 19 December 1984. On the same day, China announced the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) formally established and functioning as of 1 July 1997.

Reform in Search of Politics: The Case of Hong Kong’s Aborted Attempt to Corporatise Public Broadcasting

Following the recommendation of the 1985 Broadcasting Review Board Report, the Hong Kong government proceeded to corporatise Radio-Television Hong Kong, the public broadcaster. The corporatisation process encountered various intra-bureaucratic and extra-bureaucratic problems, as identified in this article. By 1993 it was more or less aborted amidst Sino-British diplomatic impasse. This short-lived organisational reform had appeared on the governmental agenda as a result of the political opportunity provided by the Broadcasting Review Board and the political circumstances in Hong Kong after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. In the end, however, it was also politics which derailed the plan.

Archive: Basic Legal Texts of the Hong Kong Transition: The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law

<i>Archive</i>: Basic Legal Texts of the Hong Kong Transition: The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law

Autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

On 1 July 1997 the People's Republic of China recovered Hong Kong in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 19 December 1984. On the same day, China announced the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) formally established and functioning as of 1 July 1997.

Economic and Public Affairs: An Education for Citizenship in Hong Kong

Economic and Public Affairs (EPA) has been an integrated study of social, economic and political education for the junior secondary classes in Hong Kong since 1984, the year in which the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong was signed. The Hong Kong students could, from then onwards have an opportunity to receive an education for citizenship, in preparation for the post-Joint-Declaration era from 1984 till the end of June, 1997. The scope of content in the three-year curriculum was analysed to have covered mainly the aspect of social education, while that for economic and political education was surprisingly insufficient, if a balanced ‘education for citizenship’ was intended. A revised syllabus with a set of new and re-arranged topics in social, economic and political education was proposed, to cater for the needs of Hong Kong students from 1996 to the beginning years of the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). It is extremely important and urgent for Hong Kong teachers to commit themselves more actively than at any other time in the Hong Kong history since 1841, to facilitate an education for citizenship in schools.

Differences between British and Chinese Views of Law Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People after the 1997 Transfer

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRITISH AND CHINESE VIEWS OF LAW FOREBODE UNCERTAINTIES FOR HONG KONG'S PEOPLE AFTER THE 1997 TRANSFER Steven L. Chant I. INTRODUCTION In 1984, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ( Britain ) formally agreed to re- turn its dependent territory of Hong Kong to the People's Re- public of China ( China ) under the terms of a bilateral Joint Declaration. 1 In this declaration, Britain relinquished sover- eignty over Hong Kong in exchange for China's commitment to adhere to various international human rights standards and to refrain from implementing socialist policies or systems in Hong Kong for at least fifty years from the 1997 transfer date. 2 Be- cause of the tremendous number of differences between Hong Kong and China, the ramifications for this unprecedented return t Associate at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy in the Capital Markets Group. Boston College Law School (J.D. 1995); University of California at Berke- ley (A.B. 1990 with honors); member of the New York, New Jersey and Massachu- setts Bars. For taking the time to review earlier drafts and for providing helpful comments and guidance, I am grateful to Professor Robert C. Berring, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Associate Professor Robert Chu, Rutgers University School of Law - Newark; and Associate Professor Thomas B. Gold, University of California at Berkeley, Sociology Department. 1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit- ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, December 19, 1984, 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. The bilaterally negotiated Joint Declaration became effective on May 27, 1985. The document was initialed by China and Britain on September 26, 1984, formally signed by both nations on December 19, 1984, rati- fied by the British Parliament in March 1985 and ratified by China's National Peo- ple's Congress on April 10, 1985. See Patricia Homan Palumbo, Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 667, 674 (1991). 2. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, parts. I, XIII.

Hong Kong´s Democratic Challenge

The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration stipulates that China will resume sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Yet, democratization in Hong Kong poses a serious challenge to the exercise of Chinese sovereignty. On the one hand, it weakens the Chinese leadership on the island and, on the other, it threatens the communist regime on the mainland. Mutual distrust between the leaders of China and Hong Kong will certainly retard or even kill the development of democracy. Mutual restraint could perhaps provide a chance for democracy to develop in Hong Kong. This means that China has to restrain itself from exercising too much control over Hong Kong in exchange for economic prosperity. By the same token, Hong Kong has to restrain itself from in/luencing the political affairs of the communist regime on the mainland in exchange for gradual democratization in Hong Kong. In the political context of Hong Kong, rapid democratization seems to he impossible. Rather, the path for democratization in Hong Kong will be slow and characterized by occasional conflicts between Hong Kong and its future sovereign master.

Executive opinions on Hong Kong: Point and counterpoint: The future looks bright for China and Hong Kong

The biggest debate about the future of Hong Kong is poised on whether China wil honor the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration or whether it will introduce corruption and over-regulation into Hong Kong's well-functioning Western economy. Fong,an appointee of the Hong Kong government, and Wilson, a longtime resident and employee of Western companies with offices in Hong Kong, briefly tackle both sides of the issue.

Book Reviews : BETWEEN TWO SOCIETIES: HONG KONG LABOUR IN TRANSITION By H. A. Turner, Patricia Fosh and Ng Sek Hong. Centre for Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs, No. 94, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1989, vi + 184 pp., $HK80 (paperback) INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LAW IN HONG KONG By Joe England. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1989,

[Extract] By the Treaty of Nanjing 1842, China ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British Crown in perpetuity. By the Conventions of Peking 1860 and 1896, Britain respectively leased from China the mainland Kowloon Peninsular in perpetuity and its adjacent 'New Territories' for ninety-nine years. The Sino-British Joint Declaration 1985 has arranged for all three, which now comprise the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, to be returned to China's sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region in 1997, with an assurance of the continuance of Hong Kong's current economic and social systems for fifty years. While organized labour can be traced to the nineteenth century in Hong Kong and Canton, it has been the rap id industrialization of the former, assisted by the migration of capital and labour from China in anticipation of and after the defeat of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists by Mao Ze-dong's Communists in 1949, that have brought Hong Kong's industrial relations to the attention of academic researchers and writers. Not uncharacteristic of colonial industrial relations studies towards the end of British rule, the more prominent have been by expatriates of the colonial authority who have mobilized and harnessed the research propensities of local academicians. Of the two works reviewed here, Between Two Societies more fits this pattern, being based on surveys, than does Industrial Relations and Low in Hong Kong, although both acknowledge, among others, the assistance of the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Hong Kong, the publisher of the former.

Power Change, Co-optation, Accommodation: Xinhua and the Press in Transitional Hong Kong

We have documented that political transition set out by the Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 1984 has compelled the Hong Kong press to undergo decisive, yet uneven, editorial paradigm shifts. This article, as a sequel, examines the structural interaction between Xinhua (New China) News Agency, China's command post in Hong Kong, and the ideologically-polarized Chinese-language press. Specifically, we seek to focus our analysis on aspects of Xinhua's co-optation and press accommodation. As a new power centre, Xinhua tries to incorporate the press into the changing political order with offers of benefits, resources and status. In turn, the press organization makes institutional policy – ranging from investment strategies to the internal routine of news work – to adapt itself to, and maximize its position in, a rapidly changing socio-economic context.

The Economic Dimensions of 1997

Hong Hong Kong's projected surrender to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1997 has resulted in much debate as to the future of the Crown Colony under Communist rule. This debate, however, has been dominated by concerns for Hong Kong's political future. Although this debate has been interesting and politically stimulating, it has done little to address the foremost concern of most Hong Kong Chinese: whether or not they will be able to make a good living in post-1997 Hong Kong under Communist rule. Political and environmental changes are important and relevant to all Hong Kong Chinese to the extent that these changes impinge on the population's livelihood. Ironclad guarantees of human rights and democratic institutions will be meaningless, however, should Hong Kong become impoverished after 1997. In this article, I will first assess Hong Kong's future by outlining the structural factors that made Hong Kong's economic prosperity possible; I will then examine how Hong Kong Chinese have taken advantage of these factors in commerce; finally, I will project how these factors may change after 1997, thereby affecting the economic future of Hong Kong. All Hong Kong Chinese are concerned about human rights. However, as long as no demonstrators are massacred by PLA armored divisions on Hong Kong streets, the human rights and freedoms promised and supposedly guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and the Bill of Rights are peripheral to the livelihood of a majority of the population.' The primary concern of Hong Kong's population is to retain the economic freedom and private property rights necessary to maintain a high standard of living in a society that offers a degree of tranquility. Even democracy is but an abstract issue and a peripheral concern to the majority. If Hong Kong Chinese were given a choice between living in a dictatorship with economic

The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong

Since World War II, the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Hong Kong has evolved from a small conspiratorial group lending support to the revolution on the mainland to a fully legitimate shadow government waiting in the wings for the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty, scheduled for 1997. During the intervening years, the CCP in Hong Kong has performed additional functions, using Hong Kong as a base from which to spread propaganda among overseas Chinese about developments on the mainland and to conduct united front work. It has agitated against the activities of the Kuomintang (KMT) in Hong Kong and has attempted to set itself up as the legitimate protector of the rights and interests of the Hong Kong Chinese. And briefly, during the height of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, it led an attempt to topple the colonial authorities in the territory. Beginning in the early 1950s, the CCP established an elaborate structure of political control in Hong Kong. 1 The scope of party control was at first relatively narrow and rested primarily on economic levers. More recently, ten years of economic reform in China and the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong have expanded the scope and, significantly, these changes have provided the party with wide administrative and political authority. To accommodate the new situation, the CCP in Beijing has upgraded the status and leadership of the party in Hong Kong and has exercised more direct control over its bureaucracy in the territory. By the mid-1980s, the institutional structure of party control was well entrenched in Hong Kong. Examining it gives significant clues to the future mechanisms of party control waiting to be expanded in the post1997 era.

“Home” Insurance for British Nationals in Hong Kong?

ince mid-April 1989, hundreds of thousands of students had been enS gaging in peaceful demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, demanding democracy and a dialogue with government officials. For weeks, the government failed to take any action. Foreign guests were present at that time-the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank was in session, and Soviet President Gorbachev made a visit in May. On 20 May, immediately after the guests' departure, however, the Chinese government imposed martial law. Premier Li Peng finally ordered a crackdown on Saturday, 3 June, and by the next day, hundreds of people had been slaughtered. Thousands were later arrested. It was reported that by 28 June, twenty-seven demonstration leaders had been executed despite pleas of leniency from the leaders of the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany, among others. The people of Hong Kong are horrified by these events, all the more so because what happened in China could happen in Hong Kong after 1997. According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, China resumes sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997.' Until then, however, Britain is solely responsible for its administration. Hong Kong will continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign affairs and defense. It will be governed by the Basic Law-of which two drafts have already been completedto be enacted and promulgated by the National People's Congress of China.2 Hong Kong's social and capitalist systems will remain unchanged for a fiftyyear period after 1997. Residents of Hong Kong have the following concerns: (1) The central government of the People's Republic of China will have too much power; (2) Hong Kong's chief executive, who will be appointed by the central govern-

Shifting Journalistic Paradigms: Editorial Stance and Political Transition in Hong Kong

Since the signing of Sino–British Joint Declaration in September 1984 Hong Kong has entered a transitional phase, preparing for its ultimate return to China in 1997. This transition is characterized by a drastic redistribution of power and authority, and a realignment of social forces. Most significantly, a dualistic power structure has emerged, signifying a rapid decline of traditional British colonial dominance and a corresponding rise in the influence of the People's Republic of China in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's Influence on China: The Tail That Wags the Dog?

In 1982, when talks began between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United Kingdom (UK) over the future status of Hong Kong, speculation centered on their eventual outcome. Informed observers knew that only one result was acceptable to the PRC: the eventual return of the territory to Chinese sovereignty. Since the UK was in no position to dispute this, the only negotiating points were when and how such a changeover would occur. While much discussion has focused on the impact that a new PRC-Hong Kong relationship would have on Hong Kong, little attention has been directed at what influence Hong Kong might exert on China. Will it exert any significant influence, and if so, what form might this take? In August 1984 William McCord postulated that Hong Kong might be the tail to wag the Chinese dog.I Today, some four years later, Hong Kong seems already to exert a considerable degree of influence on the PRC. Hong Kong and China have long been closely linked, but the relationship has blossomed dramatically, particularly during the past nine years. The two have been drawn inexorably closer politically, economically, and culturally since the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in November 1978. The most significant event was the signing, in December 1984, of the Sino-British Joint Declaration that formalizes the handing over of the territory to China in 1997, while permitting Hong Kong to maintain its existing social and economic systems for fifty years as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. In

Hong Kong: the politics of the Daya Bay nuclear plant debate

Since the signing in 1984 of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, the colony has become the centre of attention for observers of the Chinese political scene. Observers are particularly enchanted by Deng Xiaoping's vow not to change Hong Kong's present political and economic system for fifty years after its return to China in 1997.1 Deng has promised that the concept of 'one country, two systems' will be practised in Hong Kong after 1997 and in Macao after 1999. Few would question the vital economic contribution of Hong Kong to China's drive for modernization. Moreover, it is apparent that Beijing means to use Hong Kong as a model for the eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Many believe Beijing to be sincere in its assurance that Hong Kong's political stability and economic prosperity will be maintained. Yet most Hong Kong residents-more than half of them left China and came to the colony after 1949-have little, if any, confidence in the communist regime in Beijing. The so-called 'confidence crisis' is generally regarded as the chief obstacle to Hong Kong's future stability. The Beijing government was given a 13-year transitional period to restore the local residents' confidence in communist rule, and the changing China-Hong Kong relations prior to 1997 are, and will continue to be, closely watched by political analysts. Will Beijing succeed in changing its past image of a closed, lawless and totalitarian society-especially during the decade of the Cultural Revolution-to a more open, lawful and democratic one? Beijing had an excellent opportunity to improve its image in the eyes of the Hong Kong people during the Daya Bay nuclear power plant debate which took place in the pages of the local press in the summer of 1986-but threw the opportunity away. The local residents were greatly disappointed by the Chinese government's attitude throughout the debate. Drawing from the newspaper coverage of the issue, this article interprets Beijing's behaviour during the Daya Bay debate and its implications for future China-Hong Kong relations.

Hong Kong: the pressure to converge

In September 1984, after two years of arduous negotiations, the British and Chinese governments initialled the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong. Since then, Hong Kong has entered a stage of transition. During the negotiations which led to the initialling of the Joint Declaration, the Chinese government had used the slogan 'self-administration' ('gangren zhigang'). In July 1984, the Hong Kong government had published a Green Paper on the Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong. The Green Paper had three aims, the first of which was 'to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong'. The positions thus taken by both governments were a great boost to the morale of those who supported political reform and the democratization of government in Hong Kong. Even the ordinary citizen without any special interest in political participation realized that as colonial rule was to be terminated in 1997, and none of the parties concerned wanted the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) to be directly administered by Beijing, the establishment of a Hong Kong SAR government with a high degree of autonomy, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration, would be a natural development. Such a government would also help to guarantee the maintenance of the status quo in Hong Kong for the transitional period of fifty years after 1997. Since then, however, political reform has been a source of controversy not only between Beijing and London but also within the Hong Kong community itself. After the release of the Green Paper, some business leaders openly opposed the direct elections to the Hong Kong Legislative Council which the Paper had proposed. A few went so far as to indicate that they would prefer Beijing's appointees to the Legislative Council to those directly elected. In January 1986, when Lu Ping, secretary-general of the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, visited Hong Kong and consulted the Basic Law Consultative Committee, these businessmen voiced similar opinions on the Committee. These businessmen may have made the logical choice to protect their interests. They believed in the Chinese leadership's sincerity and its determination to maintain stability and prosperity. They were therefore confident that China's leaders would respect and promote their interests. An elected government, accountable to the electorate and hoping to win the next election, would find it difficult to resist pressure from local vested interests, which would in turn hurt business interests. Further, it was thought that a Hong Kong government appointed by Beijing would be more stable and predictable than an elected one. Many business leaders believed that they had the experience and ability to deal with Beijing's appointees, but lacked the

The Sino-British joint declaration on the question of Hong-Kong: Political and legal perspectives

The Sino-British joint declaration on the question of Hong-Kong: Political and legal perspectives