Hong Kong: the pressure to converge

Abstract

In September 1984, after two years of arduous negotiations, the British and Chinese governments initialled the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong. Since then, Hong Kong has entered a stage of transition. During the negotiations which led to the initialling of the Joint Declaration, the Chinese government had used the slogan 'self-administration' ('gangren zhigang'). In July 1984, the Hong Kong government had published a Green Paper on the Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong. The Green Paper had three aims, the first of which was 'to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong'. The positions thus taken by both governments were a great boost to the morale of those who supported political reform and the democratization of government in Hong Kong. Even the ordinary citizen without any special interest in political participation realized that as colonial rule was to be terminated in 1997, and none of the parties concerned wanted the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) to be directly administered by Beijing, the establishment of a Hong Kong SAR government with a high degree of autonomy, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration, would be a natural development. Such a government would also help to guarantee the maintenance of the status quo in Hong Kong for the transitional period of fifty years after 1997. Since then, however, political reform has been a source of controversy not only between Beijing and London but also within the Hong Kong community itself. After the release of the Green Paper, some business leaders openly opposed the direct elections to the Hong Kong Legislative Council which the Paper had proposed. A few went so far as to indicate that they would prefer Beijing's appointees to the Legislative Council to those directly elected. In January 1986, when Lu Ping, secretary-general of the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, visited Hong Kong and consulted the Basic Law Consultative Committee, these businessmen voiced similar opinions on the Committee. These businessmen may have made the logical choice to protect their interests. They believed in the Chinese leadership's sincerity and its determination to maintain stability and prosperity. They were therefore confident that China's leaders would respect and promote their interests. An elected government, accountable to the electorate and hoping to win the next election, would find it difficult to resist pressure from local vested interests, which would in turn hurt business interests. Further, it was thought that a Hong Kong government appointed by Beijing would be more stable and predictable than an elected one. Many business leaders believed that they had the experience and ability to deal with Beijing's appointees, but lacked the