Severe Acute Respiratory Coronavirus Virus Research Articles

Predictors of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in congregate living settings: a multicenter prospective study.

Older adults residing in congregate living settings (CLS) such as nursing homes and independent living facilities remain at increased risk of morbidity and mortality from coronavirus disease 2019. We performed a prospective multicenter study of consecutive severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) exposures to identify predictors of transmission in this setting. Consecutive resident SARS-CoV-2 exposures across 17 CLS were prospectively characterized from 1 September 2022 to 1 March 2023, including factors related to environment, source, and exposed resident. Room size, humidity, and ventilation were measured in locations where exposures occurred. Predictors were incorporated in a generalized estimating equation model adjusting for the correlation within CLS. Among 670 consecutive exposures to SARS-CoV-2 across 17 CLS, transmission occurred among 328 (49.0%). Increased risk was associated with nursing homes (odds ratio (OR) = 90.8; 95% CI, 7.8-1047.4), Jack and Jill rooms (OR = 2.2; 95% CI, 1.3-3.6), from source who was pre-symptomatic (OR = 11.2; 95% CI, 4.1-30.9), symptomatic (OR = 6.5; 95% CI, 1.4-29.9), or rapid antigen test positive (OR = 35.6; 95% CI, 5.6-225.6), and in the presence of secondary exposure (OR = 6.3; 95% CI, 1.6-24.0). Exposure in dining room was associated with reduced risk (OR = 0.02; 95% CI, 0.005-0.08) as was medium room size (OR = 0.3; 95% CI, 0.2-0.6). Recent vaccination of exposed resident (OR = 0.5; 95% CI, 0.3-1.0) and increased ventilation of room (OR = 0.9; 95% CI, 0.8-1.0) were marginally associated with reduced risk. Prospective assessment of SARS-CoV-2 exposures in CLS suggests that source characteristics and location of exposure are most predictive of resident transmission. These findings can inform risk assessment and further opportunities to prevent transmission in CLS.

Control of SARS-CoV-2 infection in skilled nursing facilities in Detroit, Michigan: a model for emerging infectious diseases.

An infection prevention bundle that consisted of the development of a response team, public-academic partnership, daily assessment, regular testing, isolation, and environmental controls was implemented in 26 skilled nursing facilities in Detroit, Michigan (March 2020-April 2021). This intervention was associated with sustained control of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 infection among residents and staff.

Susceptibility of healthcare personnel with severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) hybrid immunity to XBB lineage reinfection.

Among 8,678 vaccinated healthcare personnel (HCP) with previous coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), by August 28, 2023, 909 (10%) had an infection of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron XBB variant. Reinfection risk was comparable irrespective of previous infection type except for the omicron BQ.1 variant. Bivalent vaccination had a protective effect. COVID-19 vaccines remain vital to protect HCP, including those with hybrid immunity.

Cost-effectiveness of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) testing and isolation strategies in nursing homes.

Nursing home residents may be particularly vulnerable to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Therefore, a question is when and how often nursing homes should test staff for COVID-19 and how this may change as severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) evolves. We developed an agent-based model representing a typical nursing home, COVID-19 spread, and its health and economic outcomes to determine the clinical and economic value of various screening and isolation strategies and how it may change under various circumstances. Under winter 2023-2024 SARS-CoV-2 omicron variant conditions, symptom-based antigen testing averted 4.5 COVID-19 cases compared to no testing, saving $191 in direct medical costs. Testing implementation costs far outweighed these savings, resulting in net costs of $990 from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services perspective, $1,545 from the third-party payer perspective, and $57,155 from the societal perspective. Testing did not return sufficient positive health effects to make it cost-effective [$50,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) threshold], but it exceeded this threshold in ≥59% of simulation trials. Testing remained cost-ineffective when routinely testing staff and varying facemask compliance, vaccine efficacy, and booster coverage. However, all antigen testing strategies became cost-effective (≤$31,906 per QALY) or cost saving (saving ≤$18,372) when the severe outcome risk was ≥3 times higher than that of current omicron variants. SARS-CoV-2 testing costs outweighed benefits under winter 2023-2024 conditions; however, testing became cost-effective with increasingly severe clinical outcomes. Cost-effectiveness can change as the epidemic evolves because it depends on clinical severity and other intervention use. Thus, nursing home administrators and policy makers should monitor and evaluate viral virulence and other interventions over time.

Cycle threshold dynamics of non-severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) respiratory viruses.

Many providers use severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) cycle thresholds (Ct values) as approximate measures of viral burden in association with other clinical data to inform decisions about treatment and isolation. We characterized temporal changes in Ct values for non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses as a first step to determine whether cycle thresholds could play a similar role in the management of non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses. Retrospective cohort study. Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston. We retrospectively identified all adult patients with positive nasopharyngeal PCRs for influenza, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenza, human metapneumovirus (HMPV), rhinovirus, or adenovirus between January 2022 and March 2023. We plotted Ct distributions relative to days since symptom onset, and we assessed whether distributions varied by immunosuppression and other comorbidities. We analyzed 1,863 positive samples: 506 influenza, 502 rhinovirus, 430 RSV, 219 HMPV, 180 parainfluenza, 26 adenovirus. Ct values were generally 25-30 on the day of symptom onset, lower over the ensuing 1-3 days, and progressively higher thereafter with Ct values ≥30 after 1 week for most viruses. Ct values were generally higher and more stable over time for rhinovirus. There was no association between immunocompromised status and median intervals from symptom onset until Ct values were ≥30. Ct values relative to symptom onset for influenza, RSV, and other non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses generally mirror patterns seen with SARS-CoV-2. Further data on associations between Ct values and viral viability, transmissibility, host characteristics, and response to treatment for non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses are needed to determine how clinicians and infection preventionists might integrate Ct values into treatment and isolation decisions.

A severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nosocomial cluster with inter-facility spread: Lessons learned.

Despite infection control guidance, sporadic nosocomial coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreaks occur. We describe a complex severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) cluster with interfacility spread during the SARS-CoV-2 δ (delta) pandemic surge in the Midwest. This study was conducted in (1) a hematology-oncology ward in a regional academic medical center and (2) a geographically distant acute rehabilitation hospital. We conducted contact tracing for each COVID-19 case to identify healthcare exposures within 14 days prior to diagnosis. Liberal testing was performed for asymptomatic carriage for patients and staff. Whole-genome sequencing was conducted for all available clinical isolates from patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) to identify transmission clusters. In the immunosuppressed ward, 19 cases (4 patients, 15 HCWs) shared a genetically related SARS-CoV-2 isolate. Of these 4 patients, 3 died in the hospital or within 1 week of discharge. The suspected index case was a patient with new dyspnea, diagnosed during preprocedure screening. In the rehabilitation hospital, 20 cases (5 patients and 15 HCWs) positive for COVID-19, of whom 2 patients and 3 HCWs had an isolate genetically related to the above cluster. The suspected index case was a patient from the immune suppressed ward whose positive status was not detected at admission to the rehabilitation facility. Our response to this cluster included the following interventions in both settings: restricting visitors, restricting learners, restricting overflow admissions, enforcing strict compliance with escalated PPE, access to on-site free and frequent testing for staff, and testing all patients prior to hospital discharge and transfer to other facilities. Stringent infection control measures can prevent nosocomial COVID-19 transmission in healthcare facilities with high-risk patients during pandemic surges. These interventions were successful in ending these outbreaks.

Contact tracing in the hospital setting during the omicron wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic: persons and periods of concern for nosocomial infection prevention and control.

This study evaluating the efficacy of coronavirus disease 2019 contact tracing in the hospital setting during the omicron variant era found a high incidence of nosocomial severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission in outbreaks, especially among individuals having close contact with infected persons. Identifying close contacts and outbreaks is essential to prevent nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

COVID-19 outbreak and genomic investigation in an inpatient behavioral health unit.

Inpatient behavioral health units (BHUs) had unique challenges in implementing interventions to mitigate coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission, in part due to socialization in BHU settings. The objective of this study was to identify the transmission routes and the efficacy of the mitigation strategies employed during a COVID-19 outbreak in an inpatient BHU during the Omicron surge from December 2021 to January 2022. An outbreak investigation was performed after identifying 2 COVID-19-positive BHU inpatients on December 16 and 20, 2021. Mitigation measures involved weekly point prevalence testing for all inpatients, healthcare workers (HCWs), and staff, followed by infection prevention mitigation measures and molecular surveillance. Whole-genome sequencing on a subset of COVID-19-positive individuals was performed to identify the outbreak source. Finally, an outbreak control sustainability plan was formulated for future BHU outbreak resurgences. We identified 35 HCWs and 8 inpatients who tested positive in the BHU between December 16, 2021, and January 17, 2022. We generated severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes from 15 HCWs and all inpatients. Phylogenetic analyses revealed 3 distinct but genetically related clusters: (1) an HCW and inpatient outbreak likely initiated by staff, (2) an HCW and inpatient outbreak likely initiated by an inpatient visitor, and (3) an HCW-only cluster initiated by staff. Distinct transmission clusters are consistent with multiple, independent SARS-CoV-2 introductions with further inpatient transmission occurring in communal settings. The implemented outbreak control plan comprised of enhanced personal protective equipment requirements, limited socialization, and molecular surveillance likely minimized disruptions to patient care as a model for future pandemics.

Diagnostic testing and antibiotic utilization among inpatients evaluated for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pneumonia.

We evaluated diagnostic test and antibiotic utilization among 252 patients from 11 US hospitals who were evaluated for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pneumonia during the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant pandemic wave. In our cohort, antibiotic use remained high (62%) among SARS-CoV-2-positive patients and even higher among those who underwent procalcitonin testing (68%).

Severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) RNA and viable virus contamination of hospital emergency department surfaces and association with patient coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) status and aerosol-generating procedures.

Emergency departments are high-risk settings for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) surface contamination. Environmental surface samples were obtained in rooms with patients suspected of having COVID-19 who did or did not undergo aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs). SARS-CoV-2 RNA surface contamination was most frequent in rooms occupied by coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patients who received no AGPs.

Low infectivity among asymptomatic patients with a positive severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) admission test at a tertiary care center, 2020-2022.

We used a strand-specific RT-qPCR to evaluate viral replication as a surrogate for infectiousness among 242 asymptomatic inpatients with a positive severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) admission test. Only 21 patients (9%) had detectable SARS-CoV-2 minus-strand RNA. Because most patients were found to be noninfectious, our findings support the suspension of asymptomatic admission testing.

Assessing past versus present severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection: A survey of criteria for discontinuing precautions in asymptomatic patients testing positive on admission.

Infection prevention program leaders report frequent use of criteria to distinguish recently recovered coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases from actively infectious cases when incidentally positive asymptomatic patients were identified on routine severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. Guidance on appropriate interpretation of high-sensitivity molecular tests can prevent harm from unnecessary precautions that delay admission and impede medical care.

Comparison of virus aerosol concentrations across a face shield worn on a healthcare personnel during a simulated patient cough.

Patients diagnosed with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) aerosolize severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) via respiratory efforts, expose, and possibly infect healthcare personnel (HCP). To prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 HCP have been required to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) during patient care. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, face shields were used as an approach to control HCP exposure to SARS-CoV-2, including eye protection. An MS2 bacteriophage was used as a surrogate for SARS-CoV-2 and was aerosolized using a coughing machine. A simulated HCP wearing a disposable plastic face shield was placed 0.41 m (16 inches) away from the coughing machine. The aerosolized virus was sampled using SKC biosamplers on the inside (near the mouth of the simulated HCP) and the outside of the face shield. The aerosolized virus collected by the SKC Biosampler was analyzed using a viability assay. Optical particle counters (OPCs) were placed next to the biosamplers to measure the particle concentration. There was a statistically significant reduction (P < .0006) in viable virus concentration on the inside of the face shield compared to the outside of the face shield. The particle concentration was significantly lower on the inside of the face shield compared to the outside of the face shield for 12 of the 16 particle sizes measured (P < .05). Reductions in virus and particle concentrations were observed on the inside of the face shield; however, viable virus was measured on the inside of the face shield, in the breathing zone of the HCP. Therefore, other exposure control methods need to be used to prevent transmission from virus aerosol.

Evaluation of an antigen-test-based strategy to reduce duration of transmission-based precautions for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection in hospitalized patients.

An academic hospital implemented a severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) antigen-test-based strategy to facilitate discontinuation of precautions for patients admitted with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test. Of 171 patients that underwent antigen testing, 68% had an initial negative test performed a median of 5 days after admission. Antigen testing reduced isolation time by 144 hours.

Disinfection efficacy of Oxivir TB wipe residue on severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

We assessed Oxivir Tb wipe disinfectant residue in a controlled laboratory setting to evaluate low environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2. Frequency of viral RNA detection was not statistically different between intervention and control arms on day 3 (P=0.14). Environmental contamination viability is low; residual disinfectant did not significantly contribute to low contamination.

Residential social vulnerability among healthcare personnel with and without severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection in Five US states, May-December 2020.

To characterize residential social vulnerability among healthcare personnel (HCP) and evaluate its association with severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection. Case-control study. This study analyzed data collected in May-December 2020 through sentinel and population-based surveillance in healthcare facilities in Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon. Data from 2,168 HCP (1,571 cases and 597 controls from the same facilities) were analyzed. HCP residential addresses were linked to the social vulnerability index (SVI) at the census tract level, which represents a ranking of community vulnerability to emergencies based on 15 US Census variables. The primary outcome was SARS-CoV-2 infection, confirmed by positive antigen or real-time reverse-transcriptase- polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test on nasopharyngeal swab. Significant differences by SVI in participant characteristics were assessed using the Fisher exact test. Adjusted odds ratios (aOR) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for associations between case status and SVI, controlling for HCP role and patient care activities, were estimated using logistic regression. Significantly higher proportions of certified nursing assistants (48.0%) and medical assistants (44.1%) resided in high SVI census tracts, compared to registered nurses (15.9%) and physicians (11.6%). HCP cases were more likely than controls to live in high SVI census tracts (aOR, 1.76; 95% CI, 1.37-2.26). These findings suggest that residing in more socially vulnerable census tracts may be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection risk among HCP and that residential vulnerability differs by HCP role. Efforts to safeguard the US healthcare workforce and advance health equity should address the social determinants that drive racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic health disparities.

Twice weekly polymerase chain reaction (PCR) surveillance swabs are not as effective as daily antigen testing for containment of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks: A modeling study based on real world data from a child and adolescent psychiatry clinic.

In the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, child and adolescent psychiatry wards face the risk of severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) introduction and spread within the facility. In this setting, mask and vaccine mandates are hard to enforce, especially for younger children. Surveillance testing may detect infection early and enable mitigation measures to prevent viral spread. We conducted a modeling study to determine the optimal method and frequency of surveillance testing and to analyze the effect of weekly team meetings on transmission dynamics. Simulation with an agent-based model reflecting ward structure, work processes, and contact networks from a real-world child and adolescent psychiatry clinic with 4 wards, 40 patients, and 72 healthcare workers. We simulated the spread of 2 SARS-CoV-2 variants over 60 days under surveillance testing with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests and rapid antigen tests in different scenarios. We measured the size, peak, and the duration of an outbreak. We compared medians and percentage of spillover events to other wards from 1,000 simulations for each setting. The outbreak size, peak, and duration were dependent on test frequency, test type, SARS-CoV-2 variant, and ward connectivity. Under surveillance conditions, joint staff meetings and therapists shared between wards did not significantly change median outbreak size under surveillance conditions. With daily antigen testing, outbreaks were mostly confined to 1 ward and median outbreak sizes were lower than with twice-weekly PCR testing (1 vs 22; P < .001). Modeling can help to understand transmission patterns and guide local infection control measures.

Use of a severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) strand-specific assay to evaluate for prolonged viral replication >20 days from illness onset.

Severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) strand-specific assay can be used to identify active SARS-CoV-2 viral replication. We describe the characteristics of 337 hospitalized patients with at least 1 minus-strand SARS-CoV-2 assay performed >20 days after illness onset. This test is a novel tool to identify high-risk hospitalized patients with prolonged SARS-CoV-2 replication.

Hospital return-to-work practices for healthcare providers infected with severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

A survey of academic medical-center hospital epidemiologists indicated substantial deviation from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance regarding healthcare providers (HCPs) recovering from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) returning to work. Many hospitals continue to operate under contingency status and have HCPs return to work earlier than recommended.

Incidence and risk factors for clinically confirmed secondary bacterial infections in patients hospitalized for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).

The true incidence and risk factors for secondary bacterial infections in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) remains poorly understood. Knowledge of risk factors for secondary infections in hospitalized patients with COVID-19 is necessary to optimally guide selective use of empiric antimicrobial therapy. Single-center retrospective cohort study of symptomatic inpatients admitted for COVID-19 from April 15, 2020, through June 30, 2021. Academic quaternary-care referral center in Portland, Oregon. The study included patients who were 18 years or older with a positive severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) PCR test up to 10 days prior to admission. Secondary infections were identified based on clinical, radiographic, and microbiologic data. Logistic regression was used to identify risk factors for secondary infection. We also assessed mortality, length of stay, and empiric antibiotics among those with and without secondary infections. We identified 118 patients for inclusion; 31 (26.3%) had either culture-proven or possible secondary infections among hospitalized patients with COVID-19. Mortality was higher among patients with secondary infections (35.5%) compared to those without secondary infection (4.6%). Empiric antibiotic use on admission was high in both the secondary and no secondary infection groups at 71.0% and 48.3%, respectively. The incidence of secondary bacterial infection was moderate among hospitalized patients with COVID-19. However, a higher proportion of patients received empiric antibiotics regardless of an identifiable secondary infection. Transfer from an outside hospital, baseline immunosuppressant use, and corticosteroid treatment were independent risk factors for secondary infection. Additional studies are needed to validate risk factors and best guide antimicrobial stewardship efforts.